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9
The Public, the Private and the Good in 
Higher Education and Research: 
An Introduction
JÜRGEN ENDERS AND BEN JONGBLOED
The public/private divide is a fundamental distinction in higher educa-
tion studies, as it is one of the primary coordinates in the analysis of in-
stitutions and national systems and their political economy. The central 
theme of this collection of essays, which builds on contributions to the 
17th annual conference of the Consortium of Higher Education Re-
searchers (CHER), reflects the changing relationships and boundaries 
between the public and private spheres in higher education and research; 
in other words, the public-private dynamics in this sector. We currently 
observe that traditional boundaries and understandings of the public and 
private spheres in higher education have become blurred, in a similar 
way to other sectors of society that were previously under tight public 
control. This can be seen, among other things, in the delegation of public 
policy to semi-public organisations, non-governmental, arm’s-length 
agencies, independent regulatory bodies or public-private policy net-
works. It also relates to a process by which elements of the fabric of 
higher education are withdrawn from the public sphere, with universities 
setting up private companies, outsourcing research, teaching or support 
services, and the emergence of public-private partnerships or new pri-
vate organisations. But just the opposite is also observed: the introduc-
tion of elements of the private sphere into the public realm of higher 
education. Examples involve the state-induced enforcement of competi-
tion, the increasing role of private funding, and the rise of new public 
management in higher education organisations. Here the term ‘private’ 
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relates to market-type coordination mechanisms: price, competition, de-
centralised decision-making.
In modern societies, higher education has become – and still is – 
overwhelmingly a public responsibility and is perceived as contributing 
to the public good. To a large extent it is heavily subsidised, publicly 
provided by employees of the state, and closely regulated in respect to 
curriculum, teaching and research staff, infrastructural facilities, and 
achievement standards. In historical terms this is a recent phenomenon 
and it is an interesting question why the development of a public man-
date in higher education and research took the form of establishing pub-
licly controlled, state-funded, state-owned institutions, rather than a sys-
tem by which operating subsidies and contracts are granted to non-
public organisations. Certainly, the well-established tradition of direct, 
extensive public responsibility for elementary and secondary education 
has created an important precedent for public involvement in higher lev-
els of education. This is likely to be reinforced by the prominent role 
that education in general and higher education more specifically has 
played in building nation-states as well as their public sectors. Further, 
the emergence of the research university linked the research function to 
the educational one. This brought science and technology into the public 
realm, while the rise of modern science has benefited enormously from 
this marriage, as it became cross-subsidised and legitimised by its indi-
rect teaching function. 
The ‘publicness’ of higher education, including the important role of 
government responsibility, oversight, and funding, the legal status of the 
organisational providers and their staff, is not only a recent phenome-
non, viewed historically, but is currently being challenged in many 
ways. There are many indications of a major transformation of the rela-
tionship between universities and society that also affect the universi-
ties’ ‘publicness’. The importance of innovative knowledge in modern 
societies places universities as ‘knowledge institutions’ in a central posi-
tion, which, however, is not uncontested (Weber and Bergan 2005). 
Various developments are driving the further transformation of higher 
education and research, such as:
• the increasing difficulty that governments experience in providing a 
level of funding sufficient to accommodate growing student numbers 
and support costly research facilities; 
• the increasing use of market or quasi-market mechanisms in the ex-
ternal and internal governance of universities; 
• the increasing expectations as regards ‘value for money’, relevance, 
as well as ‘excellence’ in higher education and research; 
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• the increasing global competition for students, academics and fund-
ing;
• the rapid emergence of distance and cross-border education; and 
• the rise of private non-profit and for-profit higher education provid-
ers in certain regions and countries around the world. 
Higher education is currently undergoing multiple transformations in the 
midst of the impacts of overall public sector reform, the changing role of 
the state, new patterns of social demand, global flows and relationships, 
and the new technologies that are becoming available. The attributes 
traditionally associated with the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ in higher edu-
cation have become unclear and contested, while the ‘private’ aspect of 
higher education is growing in incidence and importance. These devel-
opments challenge the traditional public provision of higher education 
and research and the high confidence placed in public institutions that 
they will provide education and research efficiently and effectively (En-
ders 2005). What is at stake as a result is the way higher education and 
research are governed, financed and provided. What is also at issue are 
changing beliefs about higher education and research as a public or a 
private good, or one that has elements of both public and private goods. 
In elaborating this changing context of public-private dynamics in 
higher education, this introductory chapter maps the overall theme, its 
various manifestations, and thematic areas and contents of this volume. 
We address the different meanings of the ‘private, the public, and the 
good’, which tend to be confused in the often heavily politicised discus-
sion surrounding the transformation of the modern university. We first 
take a closer look at the issue of ‘the public good’ in higher education 
and research. Second, issues of governance (Who decides?), financing 
(Who pays?), and ownership (Who provides?) are discussed, followed 
by a reflection on the benefits of higher education and research. Finally, 
we present and discuss the contributions to this book, which are organ-
ised under five themes:  
1. public sector reform and public-private modes of co-ordination in 
higher education;
2. public and private funding in higher education;  
3. public-private dynamics in a globalising context;  
4. public-private dynamics and university research;
5. public and private providers in higher education. 
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1.  The publ ic ,  the pr ivate and the good 
An important issue for contemporary higher education and research is 
that of the ‘public good’, or better, the conflict around the ‘public good’. 
The various tasks that a university performs and its various outputs are 
currently scrutinised with respect to their value for the ‘public’ as well 
as the ‘private’. In such a situation, a clear definition may be helpful, 
such as that provided by classical economic thinking. According to eco-
nomic theory, a good (or service) is ‘public’ if it is ‘non-rival’ and ‘non-
excludable’ (Samuelson 1954). Non-rivality in consumption implies that 
my consumption of a good does not prevent others consuming it too. My 
reading of a scientific article, for example, does not necessarily prevent 
others from reading the same article too. Knowledge, the central product 
of universities, may thus serve as a classical example of a non-rival 
good. Non-excludability implies that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
limit access to a certain good. The production of knowledge may serve 
as a prime example of a good that is non-excludable, because it is diffi-
cult to make such knowledge exclusive or to control it privately. The 
consequence is that such a product cannot be left to the market because 
the market is primarily interested in selling for exclusive use to consum-
ers who pay for the privilege. In theory, we may thus conclude that the 
central product of higher education and research has characteristics of a 
pure public good.
Theory is one thing, though, but things may look different in prac-
tice. Research outcomes may not be codified in publications or physical 
products and may only be available to those who have access to my tacit 
knowledge. Scientific knowledge may be encoded in publications in a 
language that is only accessible to a limited community of scholars in 
the field, who have previously invested in the capacities needed to un-
derstand this language. Secrecy and patenting provide means to exclude 
others from research outcomes, at least for a certain period of time. Ac-
cess to taught knowledge is certainly restricted too, given the fact that 
study places are limited. In such a case, my consumption does prevent 
that of others. Legal barriers (such as a numerus clausus in certain disci-
plines) or financial barriers (such as high tuition fees for access to elite 
universities) may enhance further rivalry and exclusion. Finally, higher 
education and research in real life are produced by private providers 
who sell their products on the market, as well as by public providers 
who may charge a fee for access to their knowledge. There is thus no 
reason in principle to argue that such products can only be provided as 
public goods and free of charge. Some economists applying this per-
spective have concluded that universities provide services that are not 
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public goods (e.g. Barr 2004); others have concluded that they are ‘im-
pure public goods’ (e.g. Schoenenberger 2005) or ‘quasi public goods’ 
(e.g. Jongbloed 2004).
In sum, higher education and research are certainly not a pure public 
good because they allow for a private as well as a collective return on 
investment. Examples of outputs that are closer to public goods include 
an informed citizenry, better public health, better parenting, lower crime, 
wider political and community participation, and greater social cohesion 
(OECD 1998). Outputs that are closer to the private good include, for 
example, credentials leading to high-paying jobs or marketable tech-
nologies. All of these goods are likely to lie somewhere between public 
and private goods, or have elements of both. Universities are not only 
multifunctional, multi-product institutions; their reality does not always 
correspond to ideal types of public and private goods. 
For one thing, education and research, are both potentially character-
ised by external economies. A characteristic of education in general and 
higher education more specifically is that those who have not directly 
benefited from it may benefit indirectly because the general level of 
education in a given society may benefit all. Likewise, research may 
produce new insights and innovations that are not only beneficial to 
those who invent or exploit new knowledge but to society at large. Ob-
viously, this does not necessarily imply that such goods are governed by 
the state exclusively, that they are fully publicly funded or can only be 
produced in public institutions. The important question of which institu-
tional setting of governance, financing and ownership conditions is 
likely to generate such externalities is not a normative but an empirical 
one (Stephan 1996). The potential externalities of higher education and 
research rather imply that markets are unlikely to generate the public 
good purely on their own. This implies that there is a role for govern-
ment – representatives of the commons, say – in assuring the production 
of goods that benefit society at large. Again, whether the commons are 
best represented by the government of a nation-state is an empirical 
question and not a normative given.  
On another note, a certain public responsibility for higher education 
and research is legitimate due to the relative paucity of information on 
the private and public returns of higher education and research. Citizens 
may not be aware of the individual and collective returns of higher edu-
cation. The consequence may be that their individual demand as well as 
collective support for higher education is inferior to what would be in 
the individual’s or society’s long-term interest. Likewise, information on 
research-based knowledge, on its potential usefulness for the public, as 
well as on its accessibility for the commons may be restricted. Again, 
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the consequence may be that individual access as well as public support 
fall short, having consideration to the potential benefits. Markets for 
higher education and research are imperfect because they do not sponta-
neously produce solutions to these problems. From an economic point of 
view, these (and other) market failures justify public intervention in 
higher education and research.
Public debate on that matter, however – including debates between 
policy-makers and representatives of universities – has a perennial ten-
dency to be less concerned with such useful definitions and questions, 
which are open to empirical investigation. Many advocates of the mod-
ern welfare state, for example, were convinced that the notion of the 
public good in higher education and research can be defined by a norma-
tive theory of public administration. The related belief that higher educa-
tion and research are to be publicly provided, financed and controlled, 
though, is a political value judgment and nothing else. In fact, policy-
makers and representatives of universities both tend to focus increas-
ingly on the contribution of teaching and research to private goods and 
the extent to which the public goods produced (may) have a marketable 
value and contribute to economic wealth. Belief systems are thus sus-
ceptible to change; they are nested in culture, policy sensitive, and sensi-
tive to actors’ interpretations. This is not to say that such belief systems 
are irrelevant, though. Institutional theory constantly reminds us of the 
importance of shared beliefs for the ongoing construction of social real-
ity. Therefore, the study of such changing belief systems is important in 
understanding part of the social forces at work in the re-definition of the 
public, the private, and the good in higher education and research. The 
boundaries of any democratic polity are always contested. As those 
boundaries are contested, so is the nature of the public good. 
2.  Governance 
Throughout the world, governments are experimenting with new models 
and instruments for the co-ordination of public service provision, includ-
ing higher education and research. Traditional state instruments of close 
top-down control are losing ground and governments are seeking new 
ways to co-ordinate their higher education and research sectors. Many 
universities will probably retain important ties to the state through sys-
tems of oversight, contractualisation, and funding. However, the overall 
trend towards the ‘decentration’ of the state (see Thoonen in this vol-
ume) supports a change in the publicness of universities and other public 
providers of higher education and research. This trend is by no means all 
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new and may take quite different forms that provide an interesting field 
for cross-national comparative studies. Overall, awareness is growing 
that the wisdom of the visible hand of government in running increas-
ingly complex social systems such as higher education and research is 
limited. Potential deficiencies of the public hand include, for example, 
the short time horizon of elected politicians, the separation of the costs 
of decisions from their benefits, inefficient production under conditions 
of near-state-monopoly provision of goods and services, unintended 
costs and unanticipated effects of government intervention due to in-
complete information. There is also “no doubt that a great deal of gov-
ernment output is not well defined and its measurement is complex and 
difficult. The relationship between input and output is vague, uncertain 
or even unknown …” (Schoenenberger 2005, p. 83). On the one hand, 
this may help to explain the increasing role of government as it tries to 
enhance its steering capacities, as well as growing government interven-
tion. On the other hand, government failures encourage the search for al-
ternative ways of social coordination. 
The introduction of market-type co-ordination mechanisms in higher 
education and research provides a most obvious alternative and also 
raises the most controversy. In many countries many of the ingredients 
of markets are still not in place in higher education and research, while 
quasi-market elements are becoming increasingly popular in higher edu-
cation policy-making. As Teixeira et al. (2004, pp. 4-5) have shown, ex-
perimentation with market mechanisms takes three main forms: “The 
first is the promotion of competition between higher education provid-
ers. The second is the privatization of higher education – either by the 
emergence of a private higher education sector or by means of ‘privati-
sation’ of certain aspects of public institutions. And the third is the pro-
motion of economic autonomy of higher education institutions, enhanc-
ing their responsiveness and articulation to the supply and demand of 
factors and products.” ‘Marketisation’ in higher education and research 
thus is a complex and multi-faceted process.  
Further, other forms of self-regulation are increasingly stimulated by 
governmental actors that have a potential of collective action to compen-
sate for market and government failures. The professional self-steering 
of academic communities and the institutionalisation of a system of open 
knowledge production in the ‘republic of science’ can be seen as a clas-
sical example of such capacities for self-steering in higher education and 
research. Government attempts to enhance the autonomy and self-
steering capacities of universities as corporate actors (De Boer et al. 
2007) provide an example of a more recent attempt at ‘enforced self-
regulation’ (Jongbloed 2004). The increasing use of networks that in-
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clude public and private actors, such as business and consumer groups, 
in setting research priorities or in encouraging public-private partner-
ships provides another example. Science and technology policy nowa-
days routinely postulates the efficiency and effectiveness of steering in 
and by heterogeneous networks. Innovation networks, regional clusters, 
science polls, excellence networks, and competence networks are 
spreading as a means to encourage cooperation between heterogeneous 
partners as well as a means of neo-corporatist policy-making in these ar-
eas (see Vessuri et al. in this volume). 
Obviously, governance arrangements and instruments are becoming 
more complex and mixed (see King in this volume), while we still know 
very little about their effects and thus their efficiency and legitimacy in 
coordinating higher education and research. Faith in the market is based 
on the fundamental tenet that competition creates efficiencies, cost sav-
ings and productivity gains. In summing up the findings of their book on 
markets in higher education, Dill et al. (2004, p. 345) point to “the 
strong indications that the pressure on universities for more market-like 
behaviour has had a positive impact in terms of cost per graduate and 
scientific productivity.” Obviously, higher education is nowadays host-
ing more students, while research is delivering more outputs with overall 
funding that has not followed this growth. Dill et al. (2004) also point to 
the contribution of market mechanisms to the transparency in the system 
and the operation of universities, their growing flexibility, resilience and 
responsiveness. At the same time, serious concerns are raised about the 
costs of an increasingly fierce, globalising ‘academic arms race’ (Dill 
2005). In such a race institutions and scholars rather invest in their 
standing in the positional market for reputation than respond to genuine 
market needs. Facing competition in markets and quasi-markets for cus-
tomers and funding, the competition in informal and formal ranking sys-
tems for academic reputation can become an end in itself (Calhoun 
2006). Public money may increasingly be used to reproduce or enhance 
the reputation of institutions and scholars, rather than as a means of 
serving the private and the public good. 
Faith in networks is based on the tenet that cooperation and trust will 
create efficiencies, productivity gains, and legitimacy. Enhancing further 
linkages between actors from different social systems, such as politics, 
university, industry, and representatives of civil society, is part and par-
cel of the increasingly visible move from top-down steering and hierar-
chical forms of governance to interactive processes and policy networks. 
The basic assumption apparently is that the social relationships between 
these systems are limited and thus have to be enhanced by government 
incentives (see Rostan and Vaira in this volume). Geuna et al. argue that 
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this top-down approach to networking for research and innovation dif-
fers from a bottom-up approach. In the case of the US, for example, “it 
was the combination of high industrial demand for research and the rela-
tive high quality of the US science system’s output that helped to gener-
ate the new networks bridging science and innovation. It was demand 
that created the new networks, rather than the networks that created the 
demand. In the case of Europe, policy has often created networks that 
are in search of demand” (Geuna et al. 2003, p.  399).  
3.  Financing 
The belief that universities contribute to the public good, both in teach-
ing and research, has traditionally legitimised the public financing of 
higher education and public research. Direct subsidies from government 
or quasi-government organisations such as research councils, and also 
indirect means of public financing such as grants to students or tax ex-
emptions, rest on this notion. Private universities that work on a non-
profit basis have frequently benefited from direct and indirect means of 
government financing (see Geiger in this volume), and even for-profit 
universities may have received indirect public support. 
Throughout the world pressures on public expenditure for universi-
ties has grown while the costs of higher education and research are in-
creasing. After World War II, the coincidence of various phenomena had 
contributed to a political climate that allowed a substantial increase of 
the expenses for higher education and research: namely, the belief that 
blue-skies research best serves society’s needs for scientific and techno-
logical innovation; the boom of the economics of education, i.e. the be-
lief that substantial educational investment is needed in order to ensure 
economic growth; the readiness to reduce inequality of opportunities in 
education. The quantitative development of expansion in higher educa-
tion since the late 50s/early 60s was certainly the most obvious signal of 
such a changing role and extension of the mission of the university at 
that time. ‘Massification’ of higher education, though possibly inter-
rupted by relatively short periods of stagnation, became a major global 
trend (Trow 1974). The transition from ‘elite to mass to universal higher 
education’ produced significant effects, one of which was that retaining 
the research function under the conditions of the mass university tended 
to starve universities of the resources required to sustain excellence 
(Schimank and Winnes 2000). 
Research has also been affected by growth and expansion, as well as 
the search for societal and economic relevance. Internationally and na-
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tionally, research in universities has experienced ‘substantive growth’. 
“In a self-amplifying cycle of effects, research and scholarship steadily 
fashion more cognitive domains – disciplines, specialisms, interdiscipli-
nary subjects – whose respective devotees then push on with new spe-
cialised categories of research” (Clark 1991, p. 103). Restless research 
has moved out in many directions to new frontiers and has thus under-
gone its own ‘massification’. In addition, the rise of ‘big science’ (da 
Solla Price 1963), with its large-scale facilities and huge budgets, called 
for serious investments in research infrastructure and research-related 
personnel.
At the same time, state appropriations were declining, at least in 
relative terms, due to competing commitments. Increasing costs and fis-
cal stringencies thus generated discussion and action as regards new 
forms of external, non-government funding of higher education and re-
search. Revenues from non-state resources play a growing role or are 
expected to do so in the future. Fees paid by students and their families, 
commercial cross-border education and courses for adults, commercial 
e-learning, external research funding from the private sector and the 
non-profit sector, and direct ties with business (licensing and patenting, 
partnerships to develop new research and products) all play their role in 
this development.
The tendency of many governments to place greater emphasis on the 
contribution of higher education as a private good also needs to be 
viewed against this background. Especially the advantages that gradu-
ates derive from higher education diploma legitimise a call for more in-
dividual contributions to the funding of higher education. One can see a 
world-wide trend towards increasing cost-sharing, i.e., the shift of some 
of the costs-per-student from government and taxpayers towards stu-
dents and their parents. This trend can be detected in the increasing tui-
tion fees in countries that are already used to such cost-sharing as well 
as in the introduction of tuition fees in countries where they were previ-
ously unknown. 
Since the 1980s, too, research in higher education has increasingly 
come to rely on private sources of funding (Vincent-Lancrin 2006). In 
the OECD countries, government funding still plays a dominant role, but 
other sources of funding have increased more rapidly (from 18.6% in 
1981 to 28.4% in 2003), which has led to a more diversified system. It is 
not unlikely that this trend will continue in the future, leading to a situa-
tion where half of the research undertaken in higher education may be 
financed by other means than government funding. This trend is usually 
supported from the side of policy-makers because of their hope that sci-
ence and scholarship may be used more quickly and more efficiently for 
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practical purposes – and the related belief that the market is the most ef-
ficient mechanism to achieve such practical purposes. It remains clear, 
however, that enormous public benefits may be derived from the role 
universities are playing in the overall innovation system. What is less 
clear is how to organise public investments in such a way as to secure 
public benefit for public money.  
In this context, another important trend needs to be addressed: public 
spending is increasingly allocated according to formulae and mecha-
nisms borrowed from private, for-profit sectors or new public manage-
ment approaches. As a consequence, revenues from state sources tend to 
be provided on more competitive and conditional terms (Salerno et al. 
2006). Such funding may have many faces. It may be indicator based or 
review based, or both; it may come as the outcome of a negotiation, or 
as the direct outcome of a performance contract. It may apply to the ba-
sic subsidies given to an institution or group, to additional money given 
for special purposes, or both. We also notice that some of the funding 
schemes cover teaching and research activities while others cover either 
teaching or research activities. In any case, it is remarkable how public 
resource flows into higher education and research have changed in re-
cent years while not much is known about how the changing funding 
shapes possibilities and practices in the system (see Kyvik in this vol-
ume).
4.  Ownership 
In much of the world, universities have been public organisations that 
fall under the realm of overall public service, its rules and regulations, 
its funding and supervision. Moreover, the legal status of the bulk of 
universities around the world is usually a public one. This aspect of the 
‘publicness’ of universities is challenged by two developments: the rise 
of private universities and the blurring of the concept of the ‘public uni-
versity’.
First, the idea of the state relying on private institutions to provide 
public services has never been foreign to modern societies, while today 
it has certainly gained in popularity. Some countries have known a long 
tradition of universities as private corporations, typically organised on a 
non-profit basis. Usually, they tend to be treated as quasi-public organi-
sations in recognition of their public mission in teaching and research. 
Private, for-profit universities have been the exception to the rule of 
publicly owned or publicly acknowledged universities. The rise of pri-
vate higher education is thus one of the most remarkable developments 
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in higher education in recent decades (Duczmal 2006). As a result, the 
amount of research and analysis on this topic has increased dramatically 
(for a recent international bibliography, see Maldonado et al. 2004).  
Taxonomic and analytic descriptions of the functions of private 
higher education have identified three roles of private higher education 
(Geiger 1986). The first function of private higher education is to pro-
vide better services. Such private elite institutions have existed for a 
long time in countries such as France, Japan, and the US. More recently, 
this type of private provider has also emerged in other countries in re-
sponse to the decline of quality in the public higher education sector or 
in cases of severe competition for access to high quality public provid-
ers. A second function of private providers is supposed to provide differ-
ent services. The obvious examples are religious-based providers that 
serve the preferences of religious communities. The third, and most 
prominent driver of recent growth in private provision consists of insti-
tutions that provide more higher education and absorb demand that is 
not met by public providers. This non-elite option is a characteristic of 
developing countries as well as developed countries that have to ac-
commodate a massive increase in demand. Usually, governments lack 
the resources or the responsiveness to fund a massive expansion of the 
public higher education sector.
Second, the concept of the public university is becoming increas-
ingly blurred. In the first instance universities are trying to escape the 
straightjacket of public control by changing their ownership status over-
all (e.g. becoming foundations) or by creating sub-units with a private or 
semi-public status. In the second instance revenues from private sources 
such as tuition fees and private research funding gain in relative impor-
tance next to governmental funding. If state provision is becoming a less 
important component of the overall revenues, the public character of the 
institution is becoming more ambiguous. In the third instance more and 
more public universities are actively engaged in profit-making activities 
through entrepreneurial initiatives such as the sale of research outputs, 
the provision of paid services and the like. Institutions seek a profit from 
these activities in order to reinvest the surplus in basic functions that are 
supposed to serve the public interest. Dill (2005) has recently argued 
that the concept of the public university is changing into the reality of 
the publicly supported university and that this publicly supported uni-
versity is in fact better described as a ‘not-for-profit’ institution than as a 
‘non-profit’ institution. Overall, such processes imply that the distinction 
between public and private institutions is blurring. Universities are be-
coming hybrids. 
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But does ownership matter? Basic and applied research, teaching 
and academic degrees, consultancy and services to the community are 
provided by public institutions, private non-profit and private for-profit 
institutions. Obviously, there is no reason in principle to argue that aca-
demic services can only be provided by public institutions. Moreover, 
private institutions provide public goods while public institutions pro-
vide private goods and increasingly try to sell them. The question is 
rather an empirical one, namely what the quality of the outputs is, what 
their costs are, and to what extent the public will benefit from these ser-
vices (see Goodman and Yonezawa as well as Kent in this volume). It is 
thus difficult to argue that institutions have to be public or private. Re-
search has also put forward the hypothesis that the more substantial the 
external conditions (for example regulatory oversight and competition), 
the smaller the differences between nonprofits and for-profits (Powell 
and Clemens 1998). The main issue is thus to study the impact of exter-
nal conditions on the behaviour of institutions and to study under which 
conditions higher education institutions and systems assure quality, effi-
ciency as well as accessibility (see Duczmal and Jongbloed in this vol-
ume).
5.  Benef i ts  
An unintended consequence of the growing importance of the issues dis-
cussed above is that questions of efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and 
practicality dominate much of the discussion of higher education and re-
search. These issues are crucial ones but are obviously related to per-
formance. Performance is related to the idea of the public good and to 
such questions as: Which public? And for whose good? 
Experience shows that the ‘publicness’ of higher education by no 
means always assures fair access and equity based on merit and talent. 
In the days of elite higher education large government subsidies and 
overall government responsibilities were usually uncontested, even 
though higher education served a happy few with a privileged parental 
background. The important contribution of public higher education to 
the self-reproduction of societal elites was not a matter of principle con-
cern. The massification of higher education – that is the increasing de-
mand for and supply of higher learning in many societies – was partly 
supported by a widespread belief that more higher education will open 
access to formerly excluded groups in society. Many public systems and 
universities are, nevertheless, still quite far removed from open, fair ac-
cess. It is thus not surprising that in many parts of the world newly 
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emerging or expanding private providers serve those groups in society 
that are excluded from public provision of higher education. These de-
velopments are not without a certain irony. In most parts of the world 
public universities that served the training of elites benefited from a 
largely uncontested, quite substantial support from the public purse. In 
times of mass higher education and more open access to higher educa-
tion, public support for higher education becomes more contested. Often 
it is private providers that serve previously marginalised student groups, 
who have to pay, while privileged groups are served by the publicly 
funded sector. Traditional public universities may also “compromise 
student learning in an effort to gain academic prestige, profit-making in-
stitutions have a greater incentive to compete on educational value 
added, since they cannot make money by contesting on reputational in-
dicators such as student selectivity and academic research. Therefore, 
for-profit universities were more likely than their public and private not-
for-profit peers to invest resources in activities designed to meet the 
needs of enrolled students rather than in efforts designed to boost institu-
tional prestige” (Dill 2005, p. 7).
A related argument concerns the increasing call for societal rele-
vance of science and scholarship. Put very simply, two alternative, even 
though not mutually exclusive arguments challenge the view that public 
science and scholarship are serving the public good. According to the 
first argument, science and scholarship are just not doing enough to 
serve the public good. In this context it is widely agreed that the most 
important challenges facing us today can be met only with the massive 
support of research-based knowledge. Scientists and scholars, however, 
are continuously preoccupied with communicating within their own sys-
tem, viz., their scholarly communities, instead of being responsive to the 
societal needs of today and tomorrow. New forms of governance, fi-
nancing, and organisation are thus needed to encourage ‘new modes of 
knowledge production’ (Gibbons et al. 1994) and interaction between 
science and its publics. According to the second argument, science and 
scholarship are not only serving the public good but also the ‘public 
bad’. In this context, it is widely agreed that science and scholarship are 
not only the solution to the problem but also the very reason for major 
problems, such as global warming. Beck (1992) has built these notions 
of the public losing faith in science into his theory of the risk society that 
calls for a new public understanding of science as well as a new scien-
tific understanding of the public.  
Finally, globalisation as ‘the widening, deepening and speeding up 
of world wide interconnectedness’ (Held et al. 1999, p. 2) raises ques-
tions, old and new, about the provision and access to higher education 
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and research on a global scale (see Marginson in this volume). Global-
isation is more frequently and easily affiliated with the ‘private’, global 
production and consumption of private goods, marketisation, and com-
petition in higher education. Global communication, global learning and 
global understanding are less frequently set on the agenda of the debate 
on higher education and if they are, they tend to be regarded as utilitar-
ian means towards a better functioning of global economic markets. But 
growing global flows of knowledge, people, and money, and the restric-
tions that limit access to these resources are playing a dramatically in-
creasing role for higher education and research. In effect, international 
relations in higher education and research have become more visible, as 
have their positive and negative effects. This applies most obviously to 
the dramatic and continuing global inequalities in access to higher edu-
cation and research between the global South and the global North. It 
also applies to the increasing competition between nation-states and 
global regions for innovative knowledge that provides first-mover ad-
vantages in the production and sale of global private goods and services. 
We simply cannot confine ourselves any longer to the question ‘Who 
benefits?’ On a national scale, we probably never could. In consequence, 
the issue of the public, the private and the good goes global while ques-
tions related to governance, financing, and ownership in higher educa-
tion and research are no longer limited to national coordination and 
regulation.
6.  Contents of  the book 
In our book we seek to outline the contours of these public-private dy-
namics in five parts: first, by addressing public sector reform and public-
private modes of co-ordination in higher education and research; second, 
by examining public and private funding and their effects on the produc-
tion in higher education; third, by setting the public-private dynamics in 
a globalising context; fourth, by discussing the public-private dynamics 
in research; and fifth, by setting out some discussions on the role of pub-
lic and private providers in higher education. 
I. Public sector reform and public-private modes of co-ordination in 
 higher education 
The papers in this first part focus on further building a more general un-
derstanding of the role of state regulation, the reform of the public sec-
tor, and the role new forms of governance play in the transformation of 
the modern university. 
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In his paper “Public sector reform in the knowledge based econ-
omy”, Theo Toonen examines the experience of public sector reform in 
cross-national perspectives over the last two or three decades. To him, 
understanding variation is the key. The paper shows that various coun-
tries with different administrative systems have followed different pat-
terns of reform within a broader framework of administrative values for 
‘good governance’ of which managerial values are one dimension. In 
this context, the public private dynamic took on different forms while 
the key driver for the blurring boundaries between sectors and the grow-
ing attempts for border-crossing is the emergence of the knowledge-
based economy. There is an understandable reflex to attribute changes in 
the field of higher education and research to changes in governmental 
policy. From a perspective of administrative reform, however, it is more 
accurate to represent governments and higher education systems as both 
being subjected to the same overall development of a knowledge-based 
economy. Government and public sector behaviour are not exogenous 
but endogenous to this development. The concept of the knowledge-
based economy suggests that governments and higher education systems 
are both subjects and objects of the impact of the same overall techno-
logical, international, cultural, and economic developments. The dynam-
ics in public-private relationships in the knowledge-based economy are 
just as much caused by the private as by the public sector side of the 
coin.
Roger King addresses the issue of “Governing Universities: Varie-
ties of National Regulation”, arguing that the theme of ‘public-private 
dynamics’ is nowhere better illustrated than in an account of higher edu-
cation regulation. At first sight, this statement appears perverse. After 
all, public rule-setting and compliance seem at odds with the notion of a 
‘private space’ where non-governmental social and market actions pre-
dominate. Yet increasingly markets are constituted and enhanced by law 
and policy, such as the enforcement of property and contract rights, and 
are also moderated socially to enable such desirable outcomes as cus-
tomer protection and accountability. The paper explores these public-
private dynamics in different higher education systems, exploring the 
notion of a ‘regulatory space’ containing quite messy combinations of 
state, market and self-regulatory instruments. Rather than approximating 
to particular, ideal or typical forms, regulatory systems in particular 
countries contain often quite overlapping elements, and these construc-
tions vary in different jurisdictions. Moreover, rather than globalisation 
leading to regulatory convergence in higher education, it is proposed, 
from an analysis of the USA, South Africa and England that national va-
rieties in regulatory styles remain, and that these are at least to some ex-
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tent explained by distinctive historical and structural factors, by country 
position in the global division of labour, and by explicit public policy 
purposes.
Alberto Amaral and António Magalhães pick up the issue of the po-
tential downsides of institutional prestige-seeking in a more competitive 
environment. Neo-liberal governments proclaim that the state should de-
crease its activity as a service provider and that state regulation should 
retreat in favour of market regulation. This policy approach goes along 
with measures to strengthen higher education providers’ autonomy and 
capacity for organisational self-steering. More autonomous institutions 
forced to compete under quasi-market conditions may, however, pursue 
strategies aimed at increasing ‘their own good’ which may not necessar-
ily coincide or converge with governments’ expectations that they shall 
contribute to the ‘public good’. In turn, such imperfections are opening 
the way towards increased state interference. In their paper “Market 
competition, public good and state interference”, data from Portugal and 
the UK are analysed to understand the behaviour of more autonomous 
institutions in a competitive environment and the related trends of state 
interference in higher education. The paper argues that an effective 
delegation of public interest decision-making to institutions requires an 
affirmative desire to interpret and serve the public good, the will to hold 
institutional self-interest at bay, and the financial strength to balance in-
trinsic values with market forces. 
II. Public and private funding in higher education 
This second part of our book relates to the simultaneous provision of 
higher education funding by public and private sources as well as to the 
related questions about quasi-market competition for funding in higher 
education.
Ben Jongbloed’s paper “Creating public-private dynamics in higher 
education funding” presents three options for the public funding of 
higher education, each based on a different steering philosophy. The es-
say starts with an international overview of total (public and private) ex-
penditure on higher education. This is combined with quantitative in-
formation on the level of private contributions in a large number of 
OECD countries. In particular, levels of tuition fees are shown for a 
couple of higher education systems in OECD countries. Different op-
tions for funding higher education are then presented and classified in a 
two-dimensional framework. Three different funding options are dis-
cussed within the context of this framework. The models integrate ar-
rangements for student support as well as for the private contributions 
(tuition fees) paid by students/graduates/employers. The advantages and 
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disadvantages of the alternatives are discussed from the perspective of 
the key stakeholders in higher education, that is: the students, education 
providers, government/taxpayers, employers/business. The three options 
point to some of the trade-offs and dilemmas that will occur in any dis-
cussion of the reform of higher education funding. The dilemmas con-
cern the borders to be drawn – finance-wise – between, first of all, pub-
licly funded providers/programs and non-funded (i.e. private) institu-
tions/programs, and, secondly, initial higher/tertiary education and post-
initial higher/tertiary education. This touches on the level-playing field 
discussion. In other words, regulation is at stake here. It automatically 
leads to a debate on demand-driven versus supply-driven funding and 
the conditions (e.g. transparency, student support, availability of infor-
mation on public benefits and private benefits derived from higher edu-
cation) under which a demand-driven system could work.  
In his paper “The publicness of private higher education” Roger
Geiger points to the role of public funding for private institutions. For 
the past quarter-century the dominant trend in higher education in the 
United States and throughout much of the world has been privatisation. 
Less conspicuous has been the tendency of private institutions to claim 
growing amounts of public resources. The paper explores these public-
private dynamics in the U.S. by specifically focusing on two important 
contemporary trends: the extraordinary increase in the prosperity of se-
lective private colleges and universities and the explosive growth of for-
profit institutions of higher education. In both cases the trend toward 
privatisation has been fueled in important ways by government policies 
and public funds. The paper shows that using public funds to enlarge the 
purchasing power of students has produced great rewards for selective 
private colleges and universities, making it possible for them to differen-
tiate on the basis of quality and thereby raise prices. Corporate universi-
ties have also been able to exploit this system by effectively competing 
for highly subsidised (hence, price insensitive) lower-income students 
and minimising opportunity costs. The loser in this kind of system has 
been public higher education, which has seen its subsidies siphoned off 
by increasing public support for the private sector. This has in turn com-
promised its ability to maintain a mixed strategy of reasonably low costs 
and reasonably high quality for the majority of traditional students. 
Dominic Orr addresses the limitations to competitive elements in 
German higher education, with a special focus on higher education fund-
ing. The analysis is based on an international comparison and a closer 
study of the changing coordination framework in Germany. The paper 
shows that the main instrument for implementing competition in Ger-
man higher education is currently the method of allocating the state sub-
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sidy, since it is the most significant component of institutions' incomes. 
On the supply side, competition between institutions is constrained, as 
institutions can only partially determine how many students and which 
students they enrol. Furthermore, certain conditions of provision are 
regulated from outside the institutions, thus restricting their efforts to 
provide courses appropriate to their own ‘consumer profile’. On the de-
mand side, students are restricted in their choice of institution by the 
university admission and application system and their choice is further 
inhibited by a lack of information on course provisions and their respec-
tive quality.
III. Public-private dynamics in a globalising context 
This third part of our book covers conceptual issues of higher education 
and research as a public and private provision and good in the era of 
globalisation as well as issues of inter-organisational cross-border coop-
eration and competition. 
The paper by Simon Marginson “Five somersaults in Enschede: Re-
thinking public/private in higher education for the global era” argues for 
a reconstructed public/private distinction in higher education based on 
the social character of its complex outputs. He argues that the pub-
lic/private divide based on legal ownership is obsolete. If public goods 
are outcomes that are non-excludable or non-rivalrous (collective goods 
and externalities), these are produced by both state sector and private 
sector higher education institutions. At the same time, private goods, e.g. 
select places in elite universities, are produced in both state and non-
state institutions. Marketisation augments private goods relative to pub-
lic goods, while enhancing the zero-sum element in relations between 
them, and leads to under-production of public goods. Policy should thus 
foster win-win dependencies that maximise both public and private 
goods. The paper applies this logic to both national and global higher 
education, and argues that because there is no global state, a definition 
of ‘public’ based on state ownership tends to neglect global public 
goods/‘bads’, which are now very significant. It is thus necessary to re-
consider the governance of higher education and research on a global 
scale.
Terhi Nokkala analyses the “Discursive construction of higher edu-
cation as public and private good in the Bologna Process”. The Bologna 
Process is said to be one of the most profound changes encountered by 
European higher education, and it is firmly rooted in the ongoing discus-
sion on the globalisation of higher education. Based in critical discourse 
analysis, the paper suggests that looking at the Bologna Process dis-
course provides us with important insights not only about the Bologna 
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Process itself, but also the wider change in the legitimacy of higher edu-
cation as a social institution. Although a discursive shift towards the pri-
vate good nature of higher education can be observed, the more impor-
tant development can be seen in the conceptualisation of the public 
benefits. The public good nature of higher education seems to take a 
new shape: the public benefits do not operate on an abstract level of a 
general good, but are specifically related to the aspirations of the states 
to become knowledge societies and economies. Higher education has to 
be relevant, and relevance is increasingly defined in terms of the em-
ployability of graduates and direct contributions by the higher education 
institutions to the economic competitiveness of states and regions.  
In response to processes of globalisation and regional integration, in-
ternationalisation activities in universities have changed. Flows have be-
come more massive, the range of activities has broadened, and interna-
tionalisation has shifted from a marginal activity to a central institutional 
issue with strategic importance. These shifts can also be observed in in-
ternational cooperation among universities. Eric Beerkens’ paper
“Global opportunities and institutional embeddedness: Higher education 
consortia in Europe and Southeast Asia” addresses the increase and 
change of interorganisational arrangements in higher education. One 
type of such arrangements – higher education consortia – is analysed in 
detail in this paper, taking inter-organisational diversity as its starting 
point. The basic thesis is that partners need to be similar, yet different, or 
in other words there needs to be sufficient complementarity as well as 
sufficient compatibility among the participating universities. This thesis 
is based on two different perspectives on universities. The resource-
based view argues that organisations cooperate in order to gain access to 
complementary resources, which they need in order to achieve a sustain-
able competitive advantage. Embeddedness theories and institutional 
theories argue that organisations are embedded in and shaped by their 
(national) institutional context. From this viewpoint, cooperation be-
tween partners will be hindered if such institutional backgrounds are in-
compatible with each other. It is argued that the most successful consor-
tia will be those that show a high level of both complementarity and 
compatibility. The chapter also explores the ways in which the manage-
ment of consortia can improve the levels of complementarity and com-
patibility.
Bobby Harreveld, Patrick Danaher, Daryl Alcock and Geoffrey
Danaher also discuss notions of globalisation and alliances in higher 
education. Their paper “Brokering funding-induced changes in higher 
education: preliminary findings from research within a ‘hybrid’ univer-
sity” examines changes in Australia’s higher education system which 
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have been brought about by shifts in funding sources, delivery modes for 
teaching and learning and student catchment markets. The chapter fo-
cuses on the implications of these shifts in funding for the future gov-
ernance of a local–global university in Australia that relies substantially 
for its economic survival on funds generated from alliances in the pub-
lic–private higher education sector. So far, the market pool for Austra-
lian universities has been predominantly the Asian markets. Countries 
such as Singapore, Malaysia and China are eager to be participants in 
this growth industry, and opportunities for the development of profit/ 
not-for-profit strategic alliances exist for the daring. While the profit po-
tential is high, alliances between for-profit and not-for-profit organisa-
tions will have risks. There are a number of viable alliance models that 
can be assessed by the potential entrants to these markets while a cau-
tionary note of care is advised. However, there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the benefits will outweigh the costs if the partnership is 
managed properly. 
IV. Public-private dynamics and university research 
This part of the book covers topics such as science and technology poli-
cies stimulating strategic research, university-industry cooperation, new 
modes of public-private research funding, and their consequences for 
university research. 
The paper by Pedro Conceição, Manuel Heitor and Hugo Horta
“From public to market support for science and technology” attempts to 
contribute to a better understanding of the reality of the US university 
landscape as regards research funding. The paper confirms that public 
funding continues to be by far the largest source of income of US uni-
versities for R&D, and that this funding is more critical for the universi-
ties than for the rest of the science & technology system. Further, it is 
shown that expenditure per researcher in the entire US science & tech-
nology system is balanced between public (universities, Federal labora-
tories) and private institutions (business sector), while in Europe there is 
an imbalance towards the private sector. In the US, the university is also 
gaining importance as an R&D performer. Funding is heavily concen-
trated in the top one hundred universities while the US higher education 
system is still extremely diversified, with various revenue sources. The 
US higher education system’s diversity is maintained by a range of fed-
eral R&D funding agencies that allocate funds to narrower or wider sets 
of universities according to the scientific complexity or goal of their re-
search objectives. Given this situation, the vast majority of universities 
specialise in R&D for certain agencies’ research interests. 
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It has come to be commonly accepted that the innovation process is 
dependent on dynamic links between the production of new knowledge, 
knowledge transfer and economic performance. Particularly in develop-
ing countries, attempts to restructure higher education to serve as a more 
efficient and effective economic driver have often foundered. To explore 
these issues in greater detail, Hebe Vessuri, María Victoria Canino and 
Isabelle Sánchez-Rose look into the complex relations of knowledge in 
industry, the legacies of economic and intellectual elites and state 
power; the encounter of different forms of knowledge carrying unequal 
social prestige; and the roles of academic research. Their paper “The dis-
tributed knowledge-base of the oil industry in Venezuela and its private-
public dynamics” shows that the effectiveness of specific forms of col-
laboration depends on a reasonable reciprocal understanding of the 
knowledge partners, each with its different priorities; and power condi-
tions that should not be too unequal. To be effective, the various actors 
involved must be capable of articulating and satisfying their particular 
needs and interests through a ‘mediation space’ that implies a set of key 
concerns, and where particular aspects of emphasis and strength will 
vary as well. This reinforces the conclusion that it is as much the context 
as the linkage model that determines institutional capacities in the trans-
fer of knowledge and technology. 
During the 1990s, two parallel reform processes triggered several 
changes in the Italian science and technology system. These processes 
are having a powerful impact on university/industry relations, fostering 
an unprecedented situation in the country. Michele Rostan and Massimil-
iano Vaira analyse these “Changing patterns of university-industry rela-
tions in Italy”. The paper describes the structure and culture of the 
higher education system and the industrial system, as well as the institu-
tional changes that occurred in the last decade. Based on several case 
studies, the paper reports evidence of the ongoing changes in univer-
sity/industry relations, both in Northern and in Southern Italy. An inter-
pretation of the findings of these case studies is based on the concept of 
an organisational field structuring process: first, policy reforms intro-
duce a different constitutive and generative principle, and a different 
logic of functioning for higher education in the science & technology 
field. Second, new organisational actors with their demands, needs and 
resources enter the academic field. This, in turn, entails the emergence 
of a new structure of resources and constraints as well as of constitutive 
and normative rules affecting the Italian academic field. 
Over recent decades a strong relative decline in general government 
grants for university research and a subsequent increase in programme 
and contract research has taken place in most countries. Svein Kyvik
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provides data from Norway on “Changes in funding of university re-
search. Consequences for problem choice and research output of aca-
demic staff”. Data on Norwegian university research indicate that this 
change in funding policy has not affected scientific practice among aca-
demic staff in important ways. The strong increase in contract and pro-
gramme research in the 1980s and 1990s led to only a relatively small 
decline in the percentage of academic staff who reported that their re-
search was mostly basic. These statements are corroborated by publica-
tion data. International journal articles enhanced their position as the 
dominating type of publication, while reports declined in importance. 
Furthermore, no significant differences were found in publication prac-
tice between academic staff who had undertaken contract research or 
programme research and those who had not been involved in such ac-
tivities. Two explanations are discussed for the discrepancy between 
speculations on the consequences of increased contract/program funding 
and their measured effects on research practices: the allocation of pro-
gramme and contract funds is to a large extent based on traditional sci-
entific criteria, and academics are often reluctant to engage in applied 
research if the results are not also expected to contribute to basic re-
search output. 
V. Public and private providers in higher education 
The final part of our book covers national perspectives on the emer-
gence, role and governance of public and private providers in higher 
education, the changing role of ownership and the relationship between 
public and private providers. 
In 1989, Poland was freed of its communist ties and began its route 
to the market in all economic sectors. Polish higher education went 
through a rapid period of reform and a large private higher education 
sector emerged. The paper by Wojciech Duczmal and Ben Jongbloed
analyses the effects of the injection of market forces into the higher edu-
cation system, looking at the strategies of private higher education insti-
tutions. Their analytical approach is a mix of elements from industrial 
analysis and institutional theory, set in a context of monopolistic compe-
tition. Use is made of the ‘Five Forces’ model developed by Michael 
Porter to analyse the main competitive strategies of higher education 
providers in terms of markets served, price setting, programme offer-
ings, location, etc. Their empirical research demonstrates that the reac-
tions of private higher education providers in terms of their location, 
pricing strategies, and decisions on the subjects taught and modes of de-
livery can be well understood in the light of this interpretation frame-
work. Most private higher education institutions in Poland, as in other 
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countries facing an undersupply of higher education, are vocationally 
and commercially oriented colleges. They primarily strive to survive in 
the marketplace rather than to boost the broader public good. Their study 
offer is oriented towards low-cost study programmes in high-demand 
disciplines. However, some changes can be observed over recent years, 
such as an increased variety in programmes that can be explained by 
changes in the demand for and the institutional environment of higher 
education.
The paper by Roger Goodman and Akiyoshi Yonezawa “From pri-
vate to public good? The changing relationship between public and pri-
vate higher education in Japan” discusses the changing political context 
for higher education institutions as well as the consequences of demo-
graphic developments. Although Japan is a latecomer, policy ideas de-
rived from New Public Management and related to privatisation and 
marketisation have also gained in importance in Japan. Recently, Japan 
experienced the privatisation (‘incorporation’) of all public institutions. 
The paper argues that the main driving force for the changing pub-
lic/private dynamics, however, is not so much deregulation policies but 
demographic change. Private universities cater to the bottom 75% of 
students and rely almost entirely on fees from students for their survival. 
There is little possibility of an increasing state subsidy for these institu-
tions, and ‘lower-level’ private universities are increasingly being con-
fronted with a bleak future. In order to survive, it is widely accepted that 
many private universities will need to search for new markets and to ‘re-
invent’ themselves. Their internal management structures often make 
such organisational reforms difficult to implement. In turn, this fosters 
New Public Management approaches. 
Rollin Kent’s paper “Mapping Private Sector Expansion in Mexican 
Higher Education” offers an analysis of expansion and institutional dif-
ferentiation of private higher education in Mexico. It documents recent 
growth in this sector and describes the relevant policy decisions. The 
premise is that private and public institutions are part of a common insti-
tutional setting in which policy plays a role, whether implicitly or ex-
plicitly. In contrast to recent research that stresses the anarchic growth of 
private higher education in some countries, the main thrust of the analy-
sis lies in suggesting a typology for understanding growing institutional 
diversity in private higher education, building primarily on Burton 
Clark’s concept of horizontal and vertical forms of diversification. It is 
shown that in a setting of rapid and unregulated private sector expan-
sion, as in Mexico, the search for educational quality and diversity is of-
ten superseded by niche-making in markets that are already saturated. 
The push for graduate education may, however, stimulate vertical differ-
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entiation towards an academically distinct set of institutions in the pri-
vate sector. 
Traditional arguments for the public or private nature of higher edu-
cation are based on economic rationales. The paper by Gaetano Luberto
brings us back to a public higher education system and argues that it 
would be much more defensible to relate the public nature of higher 
education to the need to foster variety and diversity in the system. In this 
light, higher education institutions should experiment in full autonomy 
with diverse combinations of scholarship and teaching in order to find 
the most appropriate responses to the private and public needs of their 
differentiated environment. The Italian higher education system is used 
as a case study to show that a state-centred public higher education sys-
tem may, however, be pushed towards uniformity and standardisation. 
The result has been a higher education system that is unable to perform 
effectively under the changing conditions of mass higher education. The 
recently attested vicissitudes of higher education in Italy can be well ex-
plained in terms of a cultural clash about the meaning and value of insti-
tutional variety and autonomy for higher education. 
Following the analyses presented above, it becomes clear that all 
over the world new ideas and practices are emerging not only on how to 
organise a higher education system and its institutions, but also on how 
to organise its relationship with society and economy. Universities are 
driven by this transformation while they are also drivers of the knowl-
edge-based society. They are increasingly embedded and embed them-
selves in new networks and configurations, sometimes being major 
players in a global competition. The old regime of a more or less strict 
separation between the public and the private is diminishing. The blur-
ring of boundaries brings about entirely new institutional settings in rela-
tion to the cooperation and interfaces of universities with governments, 
other stakeholders, allies and competitors. Governance, financing, and 
ownership are not given institutional characteristics but form dynamic 
relationships that undergo change and reform as well. The ongoing and 
multi-faceted public-private dynamics in the field thus form part and 
parcel of a broader transformation towards a new social contract for uni-
versities (Neave 2006) in the knowledge-based society. We are currently 
observing the rise of a new political economy of higher education and 
research. Our volume puts some of its constituent elements into place.
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Public Sector Reform in 
the Knowledge Based Economy
THEO TOONEN
1.  Introduct ion 
There seems to be a general agreement in recent studies on public sector 
reform that the current and seemingly global wave of public sector re-
form movements should be analysed and understood in the context of a 
process that took place over the last 20 to 25 years. If one looks at public 
sector reform activities in Western Europe since the early 1980s, it 
makes sense to place them in a perspective of public sector reform 
within the Western world in general. A quiet period on the international 
administrative reform front during a large part of the 1970s ended in the 
early 1980s. Since then a new wave of public sector reform and subse-
quent administrative reforms rushed through the liberal democracies of 
the Western world.
Many expectations and discussions on public sector reform in West-
ern Europe – as well as Central and Eastern Europe – have been fuelled 
and conceptualised by the managerial reforms perceived to have been 
taking place within the Anglo-Saxon world (Aucin 1990; Hood 1996; 
Kickert 1997). Many students of management throughout the 1990s 
seemed happy to limit the question of administrative reform to whether 
or not a country followed an ‘agencyfication-model’ comparable to the 
British Next Steps programme of the late 1980s and early 1990s. There 
was a dominant reference to a global paradigm shift in the approach of 
government towards some form of New Public Management (NPM). As 
a consequence, analytic concerns and political issues arising from this 
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type of reform have largely dominated the European research agenda 
and academic debate over the past ten years.
By the middle of the 1990s more and more researchers began ques-
tioning the analytical approach of studying public sector reform in terms 
of a global paradigm shift (Hood 1996; Naschold 1996). Not only was 
there growing doubt about the existence of such a shift, but researchers 
became increasingly concerned that the framing of reforms in terms of 
NPM would overlook crucial developments and reforms going on in 
parts of the public sector other than merely the managerial domains. 
Most countries in Western Europe have, for example, experienced terri-
torial and functional reforms largely falling outside the scope of those 
primarily looking for the pros and cons of ‘managerial reform’. In the 
course of the 1990s a host of potential new EU member states from Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe obviously felt less need for some kind of NPM. 
Government itself had to be reformed and in many cases this required 
much more than managerial reforms: institutional reforms, civil service 
reforms, policy reforms. It seems thus reasonable to ask whether a study 
on ‘reform of the public sector’ should only concentrate on parts of the 
picture and leave out the rest. 
This chapter asks the question ‘What’ actually constitutes the ex-
perience of public sector reform we have been witnessing now for some 
20 to 25 years already (section 2). Here, understanding variation is the 
key. I indicate that various countries with different administrative sys-
tems have followed different patterns of reform within a broader frame-
work of administrative values for ‘good governance’ of which manage-
rial values are only one dimension. In this context, the public private dy-
namic took on different forms (section 3). The development of a Knowl-
edge Based Economy (KBE) sets a different stage for studying public 
sector reform and provides a common denominator for studying ongoing 
institutional, managerial, and governance reforms in the public sector in 
general and developments in the reform of higher education more spe-
cifically (section 4). The chapter concludes with some possible implica-
tions and points of attention for current research and debate of the public 
private dynamics in higher education reform (section 5). 
2.  Facing var iety:  What  const i tutes publ ic  
 sector  reform? 
The topic of public sector reform may be addressed from various angles: 
economic, political, territorial, financial. I address the topic from a gen-
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eral perspective of administrative reform – governance reform if you 
like – of the public sector (Toonen 2003; Löfler 2003). 
Reform is about bringing about change. If it is to be distinguished 
from just any ‘change’, reform is about the promise of bringing innova-
tion and hopefully improvement. Reform is making things better through 
the removal of faults and errors; abolishing or curing abuse or malprac-
tice; especially of a moral, political, or social kind. Reform is therefore 
about values and quality (Toonen 2003). Administrative reform is about 
the administrative quality, constituted by administrative values of public 
sector institutions, of public policy decision-making processes and pub-
lic organisation and management. Administrative and public sector re-
form inherently involves thinking about values, norms, and principles.  
Efficiency, equality, and savings -the three public sector reform ob-
jectives generally identified in the literature (Lane 1995) – are in fact 
applications of more general categories recurrently identified as core 
values of administrative reform (Hood 1991; Toonen 2003): 
• Reforms change the way governments run their business. ‘Given the 
goals’ these reforms aim at increasing efficiency, ‘rationalisation’ 
(instrumentality), and responsiveness within given constraints (a 
growing, declining, or stabilising public sector). Managerial reforms 
affect the way in which resources and opportunities are utilised. 
• Reforms change what governments do, why they do it, and how they 
do it. Attempts at increasing or decreasing equality, changing policy 
entitlements and changing government programmes but also the in-
troduction of ‘interactive decision-making processes’, ‘new forms of 
governance’, anti-corruption programs, quests to increase legitimacy 
and accountability, or ‘rule enforcement’ are examples. They change 
the way in which managerial goals and operational constraints are 
set.
• Institutional reforms change the structure and nature of the govern-
ment or public sector system. Public sector savings amounting to a 
redefinition of the nature of the welfare state are an example, but in 
the current development of the KBE there are many more structural 
forces than budgetary pressures alone which require a re-design and 
re-institutionalisation of traditional administrative values and prac-
tices. Institutional reforms affect the way new forms of governance 
are set and developed, including the public-private dimension. 
Various types of reform try to satisfy different types of values within the 
overall administrative system. Managerial reforms are aimed at improv-
ing the goal directedness, responsiveness, and efficiency of service de-
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livery and have generally been advocated as a way to improve customer 
satisfaction with the system. They are thus considered to contribute to 
the functional or output legitimisation of public sector institutions. These 
ambitions set the stage for the early discussions on public sector reform 
in many, most notably Anglo-Saxon countries. Gradually, and very visi-
ble since ‘ENRON’, ‘Shell’ and ‘World On Line’, the issue of functional 
performance has been complemented in public sector reform (and stud-
ies) with a concern for trust in governance, both in the public and private 
sectors. The attention for new forms of good (corporate or governmen-
tal) governance in terms of coordination, transparency, accountability, 
and integrity has in fact reintroduced classical concerns on input-
legitimisation and procedural legitimisation into the debate and study of 
public sector reform. It is only a matter of time before the question of in-
stitutional or regime legitimisation will finally re-enter the debate under 
the heading of improving the reliability, support, and resilience of public 
sector arrangements. Public sector reform these days is not only de-
manded and studied in terms of efficiency or legitimatisation (‘equal-
ity’), but also in terms of stability, adaptive capacity, and transaction 
costs.
2.1 Neo-Managerial Reform 
From the early 1980s to the early 1990s public sector reform was largely 
studied in terms of neo-managerial reforms or New Public Management 
(NPM) reforms both by those in favour as well as those against these 
types of reforms. The lines of these reform models are familiar:
• a business-oriented approach to government; 
• a quality and performance oriented approach to public management; 
• an emphasis on improved public service delivery and functional re-
sponsiveness;
• an institutional separation of public demand (councils; citizen char-
ters), public provision (public management boards) and public ser-
vice production functions (back offices, outsourcing); 
• a linkage of demand, provision and supply units by internal contract 
management, ‘agencyfication’, ‘corporatisation’, or contracting out; 
and
• (whenever possible) the retreat of government institutions in favour 
of commercial market enterprises (deregulation, privatisation, com-
mercialisation, and ‘marketisation’). 
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It was soon recognised that a business-oriented approach to government 
also does not necessarily lead to a preference for markets over govern-
ments. The insight that the ‘strong state’ is not the same as ‘the large 
state’ is still gaining ground. For example, conservatism today is no 
longer identified in terms of a preference for small government by its 
opponents, but rather in terms of preference for a strong government 
managerially effective enough to keep its promises. Managerial ap-
proaches may and are being used to strengthen governmental organisa-
tions as well as to ‘roll back bureaucracy’ or create room for the market 
and civil society. The question of what government ought to do must be 
divorced from the question of how it manages its affairs.  
2.2 Substance of reform 
From an analytical point of view it is important to observe that the pre-
occupation with the pros and cons of a particular type of reform – such 
as managerial reform, ‘agencyfication’, or privatisation – leads to blind 
spots in the study of government reform for other types of change and 
transformation. Observers in the late 1980s and early 1990s seemed 
sometimes perfectly happy to overlook spectacular historic examples of 
administrative public sector reform. German unification, Italian wars on 
corruption, French decentralisation, Spanish economic consolidation ef-
forts, and Belgian federalisation are just a few examples. These cases 
seldom entered reports on comparative public management reforms. 
From the managerial angle these countries are sometimes even per-
ceived as cases of non-reform. As a consequence, they were presented as 
‘laggards’ in the international administrative reform game, creating the 
impression that they were not worthwhile when it comes to the study of 
reform, transformation, and modernisation. At best, they should be stud-
ied as the (potential) recipients of an international dissemination process 
of fashion, learning, or the adoption of ‘best practice’ from elsewhere. 
From a Public Administration (PA) perspective it had to be con-
cluded however, that most of these countries were certainly not ‘dead 
cases’. From a PA perspective, ‘rationalisation’ and managerial trans-
formation is business as usual. Management reforms have to be seen as 
part of a systemic maintenance cycle. They resurface in a new form 
every ten to twenty years on the modernisation agenda of governments 
(and businesses) – from the Scientific Management movement in the 
1920s, to the Rational Decision-Making Policy Models of the 1940s and 
1950s, to the Comprehensive and Synoptic Policymaking Systems ap-
proach in the early 1970s, to the New Public Management Reforms of 
the 1980s and 1990s. By the 1990s many countries were not so much 
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engaged in managing old business differently but much more in attend-
ing to a completely new and different kind of ‘business’. Spain, Portu-
gal, and Belgium, not to mention the countries in Central- and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), were engaged in the completely new business of regime 
change, democratisation, regionalisation, and other forms of institutional 
reform. For quite a while, the strong debate on the pros and cons of 
NPM led to a serious blind spot for these types of public sector reform. 
In England for example, privatisation was advocated to make public 
service delivery ‘more responsive and efficient’. In the CEE countries 
privatisation had to ‘constitute’ a new market system. The same label 
was thus hiding two parallel but fundamentally different public sector 
reform processes. There is only limited mutual use to each others ‘best 
practice’. It took some time to realise this while costly and lasting mis-
takes were incurred by imposing ‘advanced’ western approaches upon 
the ‘new democracies’ (Toonen 1993; Verheijen 2003). We may also 
ask which countries have undergone more profound processes of mod-
ernisation: those that put old contents in new managerial forms or those 
that put new content and meaning to traditional administrative concepts 
and structures? 
2.3 Process of reform 
There are marked differences even within the category of ‘managerial 
reforms’. Fundamental differences existed between the British, Ameri-
can, and continental approaches to (new) public management reform. 
The differences exist apart from similarities in some (managerial) sub-
categories of analysis or subsections of reform such as quality control 
approaches and an emphasis on productivity or on competition for pub-
lic services. There is no unified picture even within the United King-
dom. There are clear differences between England, Scotland, and North-
ern Ireland as to the degree in which neo-managerial reform proposals 
have been embraced and implemented. 
If one looks beyond developments in the UK, but still stays within 
the more narrowly set agenda of managerial reform, there are quite dif-
ferent patterns and forms of public sector reform to be detected in West-
ern Europe (Hesse and Benz 1990; Benz 1995). British reform policies 
since the late 1970s and early 1980s have been characterised by a high 
degree of visibility, vigour, and radicalism. The English reforms and 
particularly the Thatcher reforms of the 1980s, still stand out as a rather 
exceptional case in the overall European context. It is a rare example of 
a comprehensive, non-consensual, centrally guided, and legislated proc-
ess of public sector reform. This has been the case even though the proc-
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ess was perhaps not designed as such and things were often invented in 
the process (Wright 1994). In other countries the attention for the mana-
gerial dimension of government and administration has increased, but 
did not quite reach the level of attention and controversy it received in 
the UK. The Scandinavian welfare states and the Dutch ‘Welfare Soci-
ety’ have clearly been engaged in a process of redesign, up until the pre-
sent day. The ‘Scandinavian model’ has been declared obsolete and has 
adapted to the current circumstances, largely using ‘policy reforms' 
rather than managerial reforms, although some managerial principles 
helped in redesigning traditional welfare state policies. The ‘Dutch Dis-
ease’ of two decades ago seems to have been cured or at least brought 
under control. For a while the Dutch ‘Polder Model’ became interna-
tionally acclaimed as an example of how to combine a monetary, budg-
etary, and financial approach to public sector reform while safeguarding 
standards of social policy and increasing employment rates. By now it is 
facing problems not in terms of managerial reform but in terms of its in-
novative economic capacity, governance legitimacy, and institutional 
adaptability.
In other countries (such as Belgium, France, and Italy) privatisation, 
de-bureaucratisation, customer-orientation, and decentralisation formed 
striking reform processes as well. In today’s Germany – usually per-
ceived as suffering from a major ‘reform deficit’ – local governments 
are ‘the champions of NPM reform’. In all these countries there are re-
ports on improved public service delivery and a greater awareness of the 
citizen as a client-recipient of the policy process. But these movements 
are hardly fuelled by an explicit neo-managerial reform philosophy. The 
French regions, still, have proved to master the techniques of public sec-
tor marketing and entrepreneurship quite well. As an administrative re-
form phenomenon in itself, the regionalisation of the unitary state – Bel-
gium, Spain, France, Italy, as well as the Czech and Slovak Republics – 
is a striking development over the past 15 – 20 years. These countries 
are usually overlooked as ‘cases of reform’ by those adopting a manage-
rial paradigm to study administrative reform. 
This does of course not imply that managerial reform is irrelevant as 
a focus of study. In the process of regionalisation – France, Belgium, 
and Italy provide examples – administrative bodies have been modern-
ised using notions such as service responsiveness, ‘single service win-
dows’, and citizen orientation. The current Copernicus programme in 
Belgium, which aims at a rather fundamental ‘managerial-reform-with-
lessons-learned’, can only be understood in the broader historical con-
text of ‘state reform’ that occupied the Belgium throughout the 1980s 
and the 1990s while it has been seriously changing the ‘managerial’ side 
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of government. Regionalisation by now is included in the French version 
of the NPM narrative while it played no role in the earlier British ver-
sion (Bevir et al. 2003). Additionally, more traditional concerns are ad-
dressed including problems of administrative integrity and corruption, 
clientalism, and the politicisation of administration. Many central Euro-
pean countries have followed the path of Southern European countries 
instead of implementing Anglo-Saxon ‘managerial reforms’. In these 
countries many reforms have been motivated by concerns about ‘proto 
bureaucratic’ administrative culture, particularly the wish to push back 
traditional clientelistic patterns and legalistic cultures in favour of more 
quality-oriented and output-oriented approaches (Toonen 2001).
The Southern Europe also presents special cases of public sector re-
form in terms of political systems that have faced a regime transforma-
tion from dictatorial or semi-dictatorial systems into civil democracies 
such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain. During most of the 1980s they have 
been trying to reform and modernise their administrative structures by 
building up and expanding public sector activity, mostly in a highly poli-
ticised (i.e., regionalised) context. For a long time this organisational 
development (OD) approach to administrative reform seemed to go 
against the European current, generally characterised by the ‘downsiz-
ing’ of government, be it with mixed results.  
In terms of process, most countries have been more gradualist and 
differentiated – particularly when compared to Thatcherism as the ‘root 
model’ – in their efforts, despite the occasional ‘Grand Design’, ‘Blue-
print for Reform’, or ‘Big Operation’ issued in nearly every country 
once every few years. If ‘Reinventing Government’ in the US is classi-
fied a ‘Blueprint Operation’, then indeed there would be many of these 
operations in Western Europe as well. The reality is that the Bush Ad-
ministration without using the label ‘Reinventing Government’ is proba-
bly behaving more ‘managerial’ than the Clinton-Gore Campaign that 
promoted this label. Even here it seems more accurate to stress the com-
pound, piecemeal, experimental, and gradualist nature of most reform 
processes that we have witnessed.  
Looking at Germany, we may argue that the country shared a seem-
ing lack of attention for managerial issues and structural reform with 
other Germanic systems such as Austria and Switzerland. Luxembourg 
has also shown little signs of far reaching administrative or public sector 
reforms. Perhaps it is the care for prudence and stability that is cherished 
so much by the world of financial ‘Haute Culture’ that makes these sys-
tems cautious in tinkering with their state institutions. But these coun-
tries, including Germany, still cannot be depicted as immobile or petri-
fied and incapable of modernisation, despite the fact that from time to 
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time the systems face severe reform deficits and accumulated pressures 
to modernise. If one tries to understand this kind of stagnation one 
should probably not look at the ideological willingness to adopt a mana-
gerial approach to reform, but at structural institutional factors. The 
stagnation of the German model of Cooperative Federalism is for exam-
ple, partly due to the insertion of five new Länder governments with lit-
tle to offer and everything to ask from their co-federal bargaining part-
ners. In a comparative research perspective it would however, be mis-
leading to see the reliable and stable administrative bureaucracies of 
these countries as lagging behind, for example, the British government 
apparatus just for the mere fact that the latter has experienced more 
change and fanatic reform lately.
3.  Varying Patterns of  Reform 
Reforms are not always ‘goal driven’. In the administrative reform 
game, form follows function only up to a certain degree. Reform actu-
ally seems more of an autonomous evolutionary process. One type of re-
form triggers or induces another type of administrative reform in a 
sometimes highly dynamic fashion. Managerial reforms are often advo-
cated to make governance more effective. Governance reforms are often 
advocated to make institutions more legitimate. At a given moment, in-
stitutional redesign – some would say constitutional decision-making 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962) – inevitably has to follow to reconstitute 
the basis for any managerial and governance action and secure past 
achievements for a sustained public sector development that relevant 
stakeholders and other participants are inclined to rely on.
Administrative and public sector reforms are certified domains for 
the politics of announcement, sweeping political symbolism, and bu-
reaucratic rhetoric. Since the beginning of this century, the productivity, 
effectiveness, efficiency, and budgetary control of public expenditure 
have been called in as reasons for administrative reform in Western sys-
tems. Transparency, the need for streamlining the system, coordination 
and integration, the enhancement of external (democratic) political con-
trol, and enhancing citizen participation have been other almost univer-
sal goals of administrative reform that mean many things to different 
people in different countries at different times. The ‘reform rhetoric’ dif-
fers from era to era. In the 1960s reforms were embraced with reference 
to the ‘rationalisation’ and ‘democratisation’ of the system, while in the 
1980s and 1990s ‘managerialism’ and ‘citizen-as-client’ were prime 
keywords for the business of reform (and consulting). 
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Research seems to suggest that there is no real reform without exter-
nal pressure. The impact of economic pressures is a direct, but largely 
also an indirect factor for explaining the reforms in the last two decades. 
The economic problems at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 
1980s led governments in the Western world into a series of institutional 
and budgetary reforms. These often occurred at regional and local levels 
which in many cases triggered a new wave of subsequent reforms.  
Various countries have used global economic developments or 
European pressures to deal with traditional deficiencies within their own 
countries to stimulate these reforms. Most reforms began in the middle 
of the 1970s and went through an initial period of becoming (politically) 
accustomed to the urge and structural nature of the (economic) problems 
at hand. By the first half of the 1980s Western European society as a 
whole was engaged in a substantial restructuring process with different 
measures of impact and degrees of success. International economic 
changes could no longer be ignored or set aside as merely cyclical de-
velopments demanding a Keynesian recipe within existing economic, 
social, and state structures. The background to the necessity of public 
sector reform gradually revealed itself as a structural transformation of 
the international economic system with all kinds of differentiated re-
gional consequences. A double strategy emerged which included inter-
nationalisation policies on the one hand – the building of a single Euro-
pean market with all its consequences – and regionalisation policies with 
a focus on large scale urban configurations on the other. State structures, 
their administrative substructures, and interfaces with societies had to 
adjust as part of this. 
The major core values underlying and legitimising reform were, are, 
and will thus be ‘economic’ in nature and hence often address the opera-
tional or managerial level of reform. What is striking about the post-
1980s reforms compared to earlier reform movements is the urge with 
which these economic goals were pursued. Improving international 
competitiveness and, as part of this, balancing the budget and the reduc-
tion of government deficits has become a prime motive behind reforms 
in most countries. If one takes the drive for increased flexibility, viabil-
ity, and economic robustness as the core values of public sector reform 
over the past fifteen years, theoretically relevant comparative questions 
fundamentally change compared to the managerial question of effi-
ciency, goal-directedness, and responsiveness. 
Take France and the UK for example. It is fairly obvious that from a 
perspective of institutional adaptive capacity France could and should be 
studied not as a different case but as a case in the same category as the 
UK. England has tried to bring flexibility and adaptability into the sys-
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tem by promoting managerial values and techniques. France has tried to 
do the very same, but due to a different institutional set up and adminis-
trative culture had to concentrate on different administrative features of 
the system for a long time. For most of the 1980s and 1990s French re-
form efforts aimed at creating conditions for a more flexible operation of 
the system, that is, the untangling and simplification of an overtly com-
plex, interdependent, and immobile (inter-) governmental system by de-
centralisation, democratisation (of the Départments), and the limitation 
of the Cumul des Mandats across levels of government. It is only re-
cently that the debate on a more managerial approach is getting off the 
ground.
This concern for governance issues instead of managerial issues is 
characteristically shared by many countries on the continent. From the 
1960s onward collective decision-making of government units has 
played a role in Germany (‘Politikverflechtung’ and joint decision 
traps). They also appear to have become more important in the Nether-
lands (covenants with sub-national governments), France (decentralisa-
tion and ‘contrat du plans’), and Scandinavia (strengthening the regional 
level, free commune experiment) resulting in different institutional con-
sequences depending on the contextual nature of the particular problem.  
This indicates a growing interest in reforming the interrelationships 
and mechanisms of co-governance and joint decision-making in various 
countries. Part of this process also involves the development of intricate 
relations between public, semi-private, and private organisations with a 
focus on the co-production of collective services and the idea of bring-
ing governments back to the people. Contrary to the 1960s and 1970s, 
administrative reform in most countries has been less concerned with an 
increase in civil participation than with the functional organisation of 
participation in government. A client orientation has been more often 
imposed upon citizens than requested by citizens. 
Values of economy, productivity, and efficiency have played impor-
tant roles in Western reform policies of the 1980s and 1990s. It should 
not be overlooked, however, that these values seldom triggered the re-
form. Most if not all countries only started to act upon more fundamen-
tal threats and challenges. In many countries these threats were eco-
nomical in nature. Further, countries differed in their timing of response 
depending on political choice and leadership but few actually escaped 
the consequences. 
For some countries, public sector savings were the first step on the 
road to structural reform. Other countries faced and continue to face the 
need to first resolve structural institutional problems which created fun-
damental instabilities and inconclusive decision cycles which hampered 
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the adaptive capacity of their systems. Both types of reform, managerial 
and institutional, trigger new questions of joint decision-making, coordi-
nation, control, legitimacy, and system integrity. More and more, the 
‘bottom line’ to engage in reform is not only defined in financial-
economic terms but also in terms of external trust and administrative re-
liability.
3.1 The public-private dynamics 
Given these developments, the public-private distinction as a featured 
element of the public sector reform process stands for a rather diverse 
substance matter that deserves careful conceptual treatment for interna-
tional comparative analysis. ‘Corporatisation’ and ‘privatisation’ have 
been important programmes that not only symbolised many of the re-
form policies in many Western European countries but provided finan-
cial means to support them. Corporatisation requires that regulatory 
functions are separated from service delivery functions, as was done in 
New Zealand. Corporatisation is regarded by some as a step toward pri-
vatisation (as in the UK). In some countries, privatisation has been and 
is considered the solution to all problems of government including the 
size, expenditure, and coordination of public services. Wright (1995) 
even spoke of the ‘privatisation craze’. Many programmes for privatisa-
tion, in fact have been programmes of deregulation and de-
bureaucratisation. Privatisation has often been a financial and budgetary 
transaction – a way of ‘downsizing’ – as well as a measure to escape bu-
reaucratic rules, public sector pay schemes, routines, or procedures by 
placing activities outside the government organisation or the confines of 
ministerial responsibility. A sense of de-bureaucratisation has been per-
meating reforms at all levels of government. This does not so much im-
ply ‘a government that provides more with less’ but rather a government 
that seeks to simplify administrative procedures and reduce transaction 
costs to improve contact with citizens and business and make the system 
of public law more transparent.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the quest for ‘deregulation’ particu-
larly referred to a reform of inter-governmental relations. But ‘free local 
government’ did not necessarily mean ‘free industry’, ‘free society’ or 
‘free citizens’ at the local level. Often a deregulation of inter-
governmental affairs seems to have resulted in a re-regulation of society 
at the local or regional level. In the early 1980s, deregulation of local 
government in many countries was not yet accompanied by deregulation 
for the market. The administrative meaning of ‘deregulation’ however, 
shifted during the 1980s. It primarily became a response to the changing 
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terms of competition in the national context and the newly emerging in-
ternational markets (e.g., in energy, telecommunications, transport, 
banking, and insurance). 
Parts of the budget oriented reforms seek to strike a new balance be-
tween the public and the private sector via the introduction of market-
type mechanisms (MTM’s) to public tasks. To the OECD this has be-
come a key part of management reform strategies: the (re-) positioning 
of government in a competitive environment. Among the various re-
forms several stand out (OECD 1995). The creation of internal markets 
and user charges for governmental agencies is intended to improve cost-
awareness within government. It also creates the possibility that sub-
national governments can choose where to buy particular services; at the 
central government or elsewhere (as in the Nordic countries). An older 
but still very popular (at least in Australia) approach is contracting out 
services. A new development is that of markets in property rights which 
provide an alternative to regulating access to common pool resources. 
Iceland does this, for instance, in its regulation of access to fishing 
grounds. Yet another instrument is the ‘voucher’ that restricts consumers 
in their choice of services but leaves them free to choose suppliers. 
The attention for state-citizen interfaces in the 1980s and 1990s is 
thus different from earlier administrative reform movements in the 
1960s and 1970s that were aimed at democratisation and increasing citi-
zen participation in policy formation in many Western European coun-
tries. In the 1980s and 1990s, public services were brought closer to 
population centres; various administrative functions were concentrated 
in one office. ‘One-stop-shops’ were introduced in many European mu-
nicipalities but underlying bureaucratic power structures prevented this 
approach from becoming a more comprehensive feature or task of local 
government. Several countries developed service-standards as a centre-
piece to their reforms; among these are the Public Services User’s Char-
ter (Belgium), the Public Service Charter (France), the Public Service 
Quality Charter (Portugal), and the Citizen’s Charter (UK). 
3.2 Decentration 
The transfer of non-core business in public sectors may range from de-
centralisation (which by definition only involves public partners), con-
tracting-out and ‘agencyfication’ (which may involve private partners) 
to privatisation (private actors only). Central to any of these transfers has 
been the attempt at ‘decentration’. This is basically pursued for two rea-
sons: first, to offload the centre whether through decentralisation, de-
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regulation, or privatisation; or second, to strengthen local government 
through decentralisation, deregulation, or amalgamation.  
We prefer to speak of ‘decentration’ instead of decentralisation be-
cause these developments mean a dispersion of tasks from the former 
centre of the nation-state – national government, often called ‘central 
government’ – in many directions: de-central to municipal and regional 
governments, de-concentrated to special and functional agencies in the 
system, ‘horizontal’ to markets, firms and third sector institutions in the 
civil society (NGO), and ‘upwards’ to international institutions such as 
the EU, NATO, OECD, World Bank, or even the UN. The role of na-
tional governments, former building blocks of an intergovernmental 
‘world order’ (or European governance system), is not necessarily be-
coming less important but is definitely changing into a more enabling, 
facilitating, controlling, and regulating direction. Decentration contrib-
utes to the necessity for policymakers and public managers to work and 
cooperate within networks of many different actors, which has contrib-
uted significantly to the rise of interdependency and network analyses 
more and more subsumed under the concept of ‘governance’ (Bogason 
and Toonen 1998). 
4.  The Emerging Knowledge-Based Economy 
It is striking that in almost all Western European systems where funda-
mental reforms and transformations have taken place, classical issues of 
good governance, administrative integrity, accountability, control, and 
supervision have eventually come to the fore. The quest for good gov-
ernance these days even seems to have surpassed the quest for good 
management, also within the Western European context.
Some perceive a pendulum movement. The question is however, 
whether this process is really a regression to old administrative values 
and practices and a return of traditional administration. The overall con-
text of public governance has changed dramatically over the past decade 
due to internationalisation and Europeanisation alone. New forms of 
management eventually will call for new forms of governance in order 
to be effective in the longer run. New forms of governance eventually 
require new institutional and regulatory arrangements in order to be ef-
fective and legitimate in the long run. In a period of reform and trans-
formation, traditional functions of government and administration gain a 
new meaning not because these functions have changed but because the 
contexts in which they operate are changing.
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Various successive labels have been used to describe this broader 
transformation process: First and Second Oil-crises, Post-Industrialism, 
Post-Fordism, Service Economy, Globalisation, The New Economy and 
– most recently – the development of a Knowledge Based Economy 
(KBE). The European Council gathering in Lisbon 2000 has serviced 
this label by announcing its ambition to develop the EU by 2010 into: 
“…the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion” (Lisbon European Council). In doing 
so, the concept of the KBE was overloaded with all the ambitions which 
make a reform concept useless in the end because of the likely political 
frustration following the inability to implement its full promise. From a 
perspective of administrative reform, the Lisbon Declaration was not a 
very wise act. 
The forces constituting the transformation into a KBE however, are 
real and well recognised by now. The ICT revolution has become more 
silent since the burst of the Internet Bubble but precisely the lack of 
hype enables a more pragmatic, realistic introduction of many of the 
promises and achievements – with their own success and failures, ad-
vantages and disadvantages, ecstasy and frustrations – into the various 
domains of the day to day world of governance and (higher) education. 
Anti-Globalism has become a global phenomenon. The global branding 
of Noami Klein and the icon of the Anti-Globalist Babe as her Global 
Logo only represents one of the many paradoxes of the process.  
The development of a multi-cultural/multi-ethnic society is develop-
ing into a reality – liked or not, underscored or feared – in many parts 
and regions of the world through new forms of international and foreign 
policy among less and less ‘sovereign’ states as well as through the in-
ternational demographics and migration patterns. A process of individu-
alisation of and within the mass society (at least in the Western world) 
among costumers, citizens, and firms; but also among cities, municipali-
ties, regions, or self proclaimed cultural categories is giving rise to con-
textual strategies. User specific, tailor-made approaches take over the 
former production oriented and standardised policies within business 
and governments.  
4.1 Re-arranging governance 
The KBE has a potentially strong impact on the core business of (higher) 
education: the gathering and dissemination of knowledge and the or-
ganisation of learning. New markets emerge, nationally and internation-
ally. Old niches disappear or become open to contenders. The very no-
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tion of a KBE suggests that under the impact of new technology, inter-
nationalisation, individualisation, and changing economic structures the 
educational process will take on a fundamentally different institutional 
form (Huisman and Toonen 2004). The development of a KBE has an 
autonomous impact on governmental structures and many reform initia-
tives these days are aimed at dealing with them. Again, adopting a 
‘managerial paradigm’ to study these developments comparatively 
would be rather ill-suited. 
In the field itself, there is an understandable reflex to attribute 
changes in the field of (higher) education to changes in government pol-
icy. This is expected given the strong government involvement in the 
educational sector. From a perspective of administrative reform how-
ever, it would be more accurate to present both governments and educa-
tional systems as subjected to the same overall development of a KBE. 
Government and public sector behaviour are endogenous to the devel-
opment of the KBE, just as institutions of (higher) education are. The 
concept of the KBE suggests that governments and (higher) education 
systems are both subjects and objects – victims if you like – of the same 
overall technological, international, cultural, and economic develop-
ments. The dynamics in public-private relationships in the KBE are 
caused just as much by the private as the public sector side of the coin.  
Under the current circumstances, it would thus be unwise to stick to 
the neo-managerial paradigm to organise one’s research design, also in 
matters of higher education. New forms of regulation and the transfor-
mation of patterns of control for example, which both governmental and 
educational institutions experience, have to be understood as part of a 
broader systemic change and institutional (re)development. Government 
structures and governance processes are being rearranged in efforts to 
deal with the challenges most Western state systems are facing. These 
challenges not only encompass managerial terms but terms of legitimate 
governance and adaptive institutional redesign as well, where adminis-
trative values other than just efficiency and managerial control are at 
stake.
The ‘horizontalisation’ of the relationship between the state and so-
ciety has consequences for the way processes of governance may be or-
ganised. The attention for independent oversight functions is generally 
treated from a ‘managerial’ perspective of increased interest in the sepa-
ration of policymaking and implementation, decentralisation, and the 
formation of new or the use of existing ‘independent agencies’ in carry-
ing out central government policy. There is however, more at stake: A 
quest for transparency in decision-making and operational procedures 
has increased as well as interest in the results and effectiveness of pol-
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icy. There is a perceived need to account for performance to the citi-
zenry and the ‘users’ of public policy output legitimisation. The ‘eman-
cipation’ of the citizen and user, formation of governance networks, 
‘horizontalisation of social relations’, the impact of ICT and the continu-
ing internationalisation of business and government are in the back-
ground of the development of growing attention for the (independent) 
oversight function in governmental affairs.
The change in oversight function is not an event unique to the educa-
tional sector; it is part of a broader movement. Parallel to the develop-
ment of the Educational Inspectorate, and some times inspired by it, the 
development of various other Ministries in the Netherlands reflects a 
clear interest in their inspection and oversight function. The consolida-
tion, professionalisation, and internal strengthening of the position of the 
Inspectorates of the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Envi-
ronmental Affairs, The Health Inspectorate, The Inspectorate of Traffic, 
and Physical Works and Water is clearly and publicly under way. 
Many new independent regulatory bodies have been inserted into the 
governmental control system over the past decade, sometimes making 
older existing bodies obsolete but often also representing a whole new 
area of governmental regulation. Most notably this is the case in the area 
of market regulation, (European) Competition Law, Anti-Trust policy, 
and Telecommunications. 
All these institutions are relatively new, or at least renewed under 
the impact of internationalisation and Europeanisation processes over 
the past 10-15 years. They have in common that they concentrate their 
activities primarily on the regulation and control of firms and markets. It 
is important to realise however, that many of these services were still 
public and government services not too long ago. From a governmental 
control perspective, they have been placed under a different rather than a 
new control regime where market regulation and competition have re-
placed hierarchy and oversight to some extent. This move often requires 
complex and very detailed legal ‘(re)regulation’ and the institutionalisa-
tion of new ‘overseers’, often with considerable discretion in exercising 
its regulatory and compliance mandate. Since the logic of this movement 
underlies the developments of many different policy areas, the overall 
result indeed shows signs of an ‘audit explosion’ in terms of the ‘moni-
tors’ that national Ministries have developed, often in joint collaboration 
with the localities involved. Closer inspection often reveals the substitu-
tion of one ‘control mechanism’ with another one. 
Some perceive all these reforms in the regulatory systems as an insti-
tutional regression or even as a ‘recentralisation’. The developments in 
oversight structures are sometimes presented as a reversal of the reforms 
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described earlier. The very nature of institutional development in the 
KBE however, suggests that the hierarchy of the nation state where the 
centre ‘takes’ and ‘gives away’ power to higher and lower levels of gov-
ernment has been transformed. It requires a different pattern of regula-
tion in order to serve basic questions of legitimacy, not so much in terms 
of ‘customer satisfaction’ but more in terms of social trust in the institu-
tional reliance of public sector institutions.  
Hierarchical supervision in a ‘horizontal’ relationship leads to many 
problems in terms of trust, governance, and reliability. There is the prob-
lem of the same person or entity being the (co-)producer of policy as 
well as the controller of the same policy. A contractual, mutual relation-
ship presupposes the existence of a relatively independent third party for 
surveillance of contracts and performance and for conflict resolution. 
Whistleblowers, even if they do belong to the formally institutionalised 
system of checks and balances, are not very popular in ‘mutual relations’ 
and easily regarded as formalistic ‘bureaucrats’ or organisational nui-
sances. They are however, institutionally necessary to safeguard and 
protect the integrity of the system. Where ‘hierarchical’ or ‘bureaucratic’ 
principles such as civil service loyalty can no longer do the job, a more 
‘autonomous’ institutionalisation of this function is required. Several 
governmental committees in The Netherlands addressed this issue in the 
second half of the 1990s. The emerging overall trend was to develop a 
movement to encourage “Trust in Independence” of internal and exter-
nal oversight bodies as the title of a governmental White paper on ad-
ministrative oversight states (Commissie Borghouts 2000). It is for the 
sake of the quality and reliability of the system – and the effective 
autonomy of governmental and educational institutions within it – that 
the regulatory functions are consolidated.  
‘Horizontalisation’ (‘interactive government’) also means that the 
politically responsible echelon of the organisation has to involve itself 
more directly with the external operation. Only this echelon is ‘man-
dated’ to do legitimate business with partners on behalf of the organisa-
tion. External operation through the organisational hierarchy is also ‘too 
bureaucratic’ for the required flexibility. In addition, it stirs up stable 
and well-organised organisational routines with the short term interests 
typical for politicians.
Effective horizontal relationships are also assumed to be based on 
trust. Information is usually better trusted if it is considered ‘independ-
ent’. In the hierarchical organisation, the top could determine which ‘or-
ganisational truth’ had to be enforced and complied to, and the ‘monitor-
ing’ and collection of information took place accordingly. In horizontal 
relations there is more need to convince, persuade, and build jointly 
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM IN THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY
57
agreed upon images of reality – which still might be appreciated in dif-
ferent and conflicting ways. There is no longer a one-to-one relation be-
tween the findings of ‘monitors’ and political decisions for action.
Changes in monitor and oversight functions reflect a deeper institu-
tional transformation of the public sector caused by the various social 
and economic developments subsumed under the heading of an emerg-
ing KBE. The development of contractual governance arrangements as 
well as the emergence of bargaining – instead of command – among 
various levels of government has already been observed. It is part and 
parcel of the institutional repertoire of systems where the former 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ of the sovereign nation state is gradually giving 
way to more open, cross-national ways of governance and ‘open meth-
ods of coordination’.  
This does not make them ‘good’ or ‘effective’. The development of 
the welfare state has been described by many as a by-product or coinci-
dence – an accident almost – of broader historical developments (Swaan 
1988). The ongoing redesign and revision of the administrative state can 
hardly be understood as the outcome of a centrally planned, masterly 
guided, and rationally controlled reform process either. There are how-
ever, some logical institutional consequences that are ignored at the risk 
of losing trust and confidence in the system. In turn, this would and does 
affect general purpose governments and policy specific institutions such 
as in higher education.  
The very notion of separate ‘policy sectors’ is being challenged by 
the dynamics of the KBE. Social value is increasingly produced in cross 
specialised settings. This applies to the notion of inter-disciplinary aca-
demic research and the need to bridge the distance between specialised 
policy branches in the way governments and policy specific institutions 
– such as the institutions of (higher) education, labour markets, industry, 
culture, and physical and social infrastructure – were used to organise 
themselves. Coordination is too weak a term to indicate the type of re-
integration – in theory – required by a KBE from governments and 
(higher) education systems. Re-integration as a concept for the KBE 
asks for bringing together again the joint governance of specialisations 
(disciplines, divisions of labour, governmental competencies, etc.) once 
separated for good reasons of division of labour in an industrial or ser-
vice economy. 
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5.  Conclusion and impl icat ions for  research
In many if not all countries there are examples of ‘comprehensive’ cen-
trally planned reform initiatives that failed, were never implemented, or 
only reached the stage of design. This experience is what gives ‘reform’ 
its bad name in academic circles, particularly when compared to the 
promises associated with reform in everyday politics. It has contributed 
to the idea that reforms are hardly ever effective, particularly when the 
executors of the reform are not included in the design, which seldom is 
the case in ‘centrally implemented grand designs’. There is indeed, a 
category of public sector developments that perhaps could be best de-
scribed as ‘great transformation, but no reform’. If one bothers to look 
beyond the confines of official reform policies however, it often be-
comes clear that public sector reform is not a clear-cut, one-dimensional 
reorganisation process but more often a long term and multi-dimensional 
emergent strategy (Burke 2003).  
Current public-private dynamics in higher education have to be un-
derstood as part of a larger, long term, and international institutional re-
development process of the public sector, or better, of the public do-
main. Political reactions to common challenges are moulded by the op-
portunities and constraints embedded in (administrative) state traditions 
and historical legacies, such as existing (higher) education systems and 
various logics – ‘path dependencies’ – of reform. The managerial di-
mension (instrumentality, responsiveness, and efficiency) is important 
and requires attention for new forms of regulation, accountability, and 
oversight (governance). In addition, robustness in terms of stable adap-
tive capacity, resilience, and reliability are likely to become important 
concerns in ongoing reforms both in educational systems as well as in an 
increasingly differentiated public sector at large. Given the development 
of the Knowledge Based Economy with all its institutional ramifications, 
it would be unwise to study the public-private dynamics only in terms of 
the pros and cons of a neo-liberal, neo-managerial approach to public 
sector reform. 
The study and understanding of institutional variation is the key. 
There are analytically two separate dimensions which determine this 
variation. First, there is the substance dimension looking at different 
subject matters of reform (managerial reform, reform of management, 
policy reform institutional reform. regime reform). Second, there is the 
process dimension looking at different modes or approaches to public 
sector reform (comprehensive, functionalist, gradualist reforms). It is 
important to realise that we are dealing with a subject matter which re-
quires not only a (decentrated) multi-actor approach but also a multi-
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level analysis. The questions of responsiveness, efficiency, instrumental-
ity, perverse measures, and bonus effects deserve all the attention they 
can get in the study of the public-private dynamics. There are however, 
other questions to be addressed in the debate on public sector organisa-
tion focussing on social responsibility, organisational accountability, 
new forms of legitimatisation, and transparency.
Public-private dynamics will follow from the fact that institutions of 
higher education increasingly will have to be embedded – and embed 
themselves – in regional networks and configurations, sometimes being 
players or hotspots in a global competition. This will bring about whole 
new institutional questions of governance in relation to the cooperation 
and interfaces with governments, other ‘social entrepreneurs’, and allies 
in newly founded KBE consortia. Governance and accountability are not 
given institutional characteristics; they are (dynamic) relationships. This 
means that not only the institutions but also their institutional environ-
ment will have to undergo refurbishment. The macro developments in 
administrative regulatory and oversight structures have been mentioned. 
The perverse confusion of operational – managerial – performance and 
contract management with quality and quality control has to be resolved 
at the level of institutional arrangements, not at the level of individual 
contract negotiations. Transparency, accessibility, and quality are the set 
of minimum standards publicly acknowledged as belonging to some 
kind of public domain. Resulting questions of legitimisation and new 
forms of public and private accountability presume the existence of a 
proper institutional infrastructure within which these questions can be 
effectively handled: Is the strict separation of public and private (higher) 
education the sole solution we can think of in the face of the intricate 
dynamics in (the governance of) international higher education? Or is 
this policy dilemma only an artefact of an international higher education 
system organised for and by nation-states?  
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Governing Universities:
Varieties of National Regulation 
ROGER KING
1.  Introduct ion 
The theme of ‘public-private dynamics’ for the analysis of higher educa-
tion – the key coordinating focus for the chapters of this book – is no-
where better illustrated than in an account of higher education regula-
tion. At first sight, this statement appears perverse. After all, public rule- 
setting and compliance seem at odds with the notion of a ‘private space’ 
where non-governmental social and market actions predominate. Yet in-
creasingly markets are constituted and enhanced by law and policy, such 
as the enforcement of property and contract rights, for example, and are 
also moderated socially to enable such desirable outcomes as customer 
protection and accountability. Indeed, contract law may be regarded as 
the most private and delegated form of government regulation. In recent 
years, the marketisation of higher education has occurred as a conse-
quence of public policy decisions, rather than ‘naturally’ or ‘privately’, 
and has resulted in more, not less, or in different forms of, regulation in 
many systems. Moreover, as we shall see, the notion of ‘regulation’ in 
higher education and in other sectors, is increasingly ‘de-centred’ as a 
concept, to take account of the ‘networking governance’ of public and 
private actors in public decision-making in contemporary democracy, in 
contrast to more traditional, hierarchical, and state-dominated notions of 
regulation (Pierre and Peters 2000). 
In this chapter we seek to explore these public-private dynamics as 
they are manifested in different higher education systems. We start by 
exploring the notion of ‘regulatory space’ in higher education and sug-
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gest that regulatory systems tend to contain quite messy combinations of 
state, market and self-regulatory instruments. Rather than approximating 
to particular ideal typical forms, regulatory systems in particular coun-
tries contain often quite overlapping elements, and these constructions 
vary in different jurisdictions. Moreover, rather than globalisation lead-
ing to regulatory convergence in higher education, it is proposed, from 
an analysis of the USA, South Africa and England, than national variety 
in regulatory styles remain, and that these are at least to some extent ex-
plained by distinctive historical and structural factors, by country posi-
tion in the global division of labour, and by explicit public policy pur-
poses.
Broad-brush characterisations of regulatory approaches in higher 
education across countries have a tendency to neglect or to play down 
significant national differences. Although it is possible to describe a 
general convergence towards patterns of similarity in higher education 
regulatory arrangements – more state and market regulation in countries 
with a strong self-regulatory tradition, such as the UK; more market and 
self-regulatory processes (institutional autonomy) in traditionally state- 
dominated systems, such as found across Continental Europe; and more 
federal state influence in long-standing market systems (such as the 
USA) – such patterns nonetheless overlay key national regulatory varie-
ties. Particularly we need to ‘fine-tune’ our notions of ‘regulation; and 
we need to understand the particularities that flow from countries’ po-
litical histories and structures, and from differential positions in the 
global division of labour. 
Regulation (simply stated) is a form of rulemaking that usually com-
prises the functions of standards setting, information gathering, and be-
haviour modification (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). It is often, but not al-
ways, associated with government. External or state forms of regulation, 
whatever the force of traditional command-and-control modes, and 
whatever the sector under consideration, rely on others for effective im-
plementation. Regulators are always at one step removed from those 
they influence, lacking the direct bureaucratic hierarchy over regulatees 
generally available to leaders within organisations. This ‘gap’ raises a 
fundamental and persisting dilemma for regulators on how to enrol 
‘partners’ in their regulatory enterprise. A wide body of literature on 
governance, and the operations of publicly constituted markets, points to 
such persisting issues as principal-agent problems, and the necessity for 
governments to be involved in a range of public-private networking and 
other relationships for effective state rule (Kjaer 2004; Teixeira et al. 
2004).
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‘De-centred’ interpretations of regulation take this issue of ‘social 
enrolment’ further and challenge state-centred definitions of regulation. 
They focus more on the notion of ‘regulatory society’ than ‘regulatory 
state’. Rather than government having a monopoly on the exercise of au-
thority and control within a jurisdiction, power and influence are re-
garded as dispersed between social actors, of which government is one 
(Black 2002; Scott 2004). Private groups of all kinds, such as media, 
voluntary associations and other non-governmental or civil organisa-
tions, are not simply the targets of regulation but help to constitute and 
secure it. De-centred approaches raise the issue of how best regulation is 
to be exercised, and particularly the use of non-state instruments, such as 
the market, or professional forms of self-regulation, or even the media.
De-centred analyses strongly suggest that government-backed regu-
lators should work with the self-regulatory capacities and associations of 
social actors. Consequently, governmental command-and-control regula-
tory instruments have often been criticised as ineffective and rigid, and 
as less likely to secure legitimacy with regulatees, than forms of self-
regulation in which the state operates more as a steering, licensing or 
endorsing mechanism (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Gunningham et al. 
1998).
2.  Regulatory Space 
The regulation of higher education at national or systems’ levels has 
commonly been regarded as approximating to one of three broad types: 
state regulation, with governmental and legal rules exercised hierarchi-
cally over institutions, and generally involving high levels of formal 
codification, external evaluation, and explicit sanctions; self-regulation,
in which institutions and their member associations seek to construct and 
operate rules and controls over themselves, particularly through individ-
ual normative internalisation of appropriate standards and behaviour, 
and where the focus often is on member rather than client protection; 
and market regulation, in which orderliness, responsiveness and quality 
in systems are assured through the mechanisms of competition, choice 
and consumerism. The famous Clark (1983) ‘triangle’ at its three points 
broadly incorporates these ‘ideal’ forms, although others have extended 
the confines of regulatory space to include four (Becher and Kogan 
1992) and six (Marginson and Rhoades 2002) dimensions. 
It is rare, however, to find a regulatory system that does not combine 
often very messy combinations of elements from at least two of the 
models. Self-regulation, for example, rarely, if ever, lives up to its de-
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scription. Such systems generally are dependent on some level of state 
agreement in order to be legitimised and to be effective. State involve-
ment in shaping self-regulatory systems can leave a strong imprint 
(Ogus 1994). Similarly, the extension in higher education systems of 
market or ‘quasi-market’ forms of coordination usually have ensued 
from, and continue to be dependent upon, determined government action 
in reforming traditional or welfare-state institutions to make them more 
efficient and externally responsive. And, conversely, even state regula-
tion in the form of government-introduced statutory frameworks for uni-
versity accountability is often dependent on self-regulatory processes, 
such as peer-driven academic judgements and rankings.  
Apart from descriptive concerns, analyses of higher education regu-
lation that, inevitably, confront comparative national variety soon raise 
questions about regulatory trajectories and their global inevitability. 
That is, for individual countries, historical background, governing struc-
tures, and position in the global division of labour are among factors that 
act against worldwide regulatory convergence of higher education sys-
tems. Stages in a country’s social-economic development are important 
factors in helping to shape particular forms of higher education govern-
ance. Although we will examine the case of South Africa more closely 
later in the chapter, we can refer at this point to South Africa’s current 
‘command-and-control’ approach to the reorganisation and direction of 
its higher education system as an example that reflects both a strong so-
cial transformational agenda and a determination that universities will 
help the country respond to global economic competitiveness as part of 
national development (Subotzky 2003). The higher education system is a 
key focus for the reconstruction of post-apartheid society, following the 
historic stratification of institutions by racial purposes under the previ-
ous regime. Higher education is subject to strong regulatory state inter-
vention that is regarded as necessary for introducing social equity, mar-
ket-based competition, goals-oriented funding policies, and institutional 
capacity- building towards the best international standards.
In East Asia, too, strong governmental intervention in higher educa-
tion in countries such as Singapore and Malaysia is asserted on grounds 
of economic necessity and relevance. For nearly 40 years Malaysian 
governments have required admissions, curricula and the language of in-
struction in public universities to reflect ethnic quotas and the cultural 
development requirements of the Bumiputras (Tan 2004; Lee 2004). 
Elsewhere, strongly directive forms of higher education regulation may 
be found in other transforming societies, such as in some of the coun-
tries of central and eastern Europe (King 2004a). Once ‘matured’ devel-
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opmentally, a key issue is whether forms of higher education govern-
ance will also change in such countries.
Higher education regulation in England, however, as we shall see, 
displays a greater mix of self- and state- driven features, and consider-
able instrumental oscillations and divergences. Here, there is a long-
standing sense of institutional autonomy – although somewhat atrophied 
by governmental intervention in recent years, and which also was never 
exported as a model to its colonies where full university operation and 
freedom were regarded as potentially subversive (Altbach 2004).
The USA, our third case discussed below, contrastingly offers multi-
dimensional and overlapping forms of regulation, involving both sector 
self-regulation (accreditation) and external governmental review at local 
state and federal level. However, unlike the English case, there is no his-
tory of strong governmental regulatory action at the centre in the USA, 
although there are signs that this may be changing. Recently there ap-
pears also to be convergence of governmental and non-governmental 
regulatory approaches in seeking to combine external performance 
evaluation with greater freedom for institutions in determining the 
means for achieving results (Kezar and El-Khawas 2003). As a world 
economic and higher education leader, the USA also exerts a strong in-
fluence for trade-in-services regulatory modelling internationally 
through WTO-GATS and through more bilateral trade processes 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).
Marginson (2003, p. 134) suggests that in higher education “a new 
policy globalism”, dating from around the mid-1980s, “had its roots in 
the de-regulation and re-alignment of national financial systems and the 
associated tendency to convergence in all economic policies”. He goes 
on to remark that it reflected “the dominance of neo-liberalism in eco-
nomic and social policy, and the emergence of techniques associated 
with that approach, such as simulated markets in the public sector”. 
Sporn (2003, p. 129) also argues that de-regulatory convergences are oc-
curring across Europe, based on greater institutional autonomy, entre-
preneurialism, and external performance evaluation.
Yet ‘policy transference’ through increasingly global public/private 
epistemic communities of experts and decision-makers is no smooth and 
unidirectional affair. Often it runs up against national conditions, con-
texts and global positioning which influence local receptivity to such 
ideas originating elsewhere. We shall see that this is particularly the case 
in South Africa, where, as in many transitional countries, there is the 
need for strong interventionist government to offset the adverse effects 
of market-driven globalisation (Subotzky 2003, p. 173).
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Notions of national regulatory variety, rather than assumptions of 
policy convergence in worldwide higher education systems, additionally 
help to challenge a further and related orthodoxy in state theory and pub-
lic policy analysis. This convention is based on the notion of the ‘over-
loaded’ state in advanced societies as having retreated in recent decades 
from many of its previous responsibilities so that it becomes simply one 
partner with others operating looser networks of influence and authority 
(King and Kendall 2004). The image is that of governance without sov-
ereignty (Pierre and Peters 2000). Internationally, too, it has been argued 
that the nation state is being reduced to only one part of a globalised 
network containing many participants, and that, “in the future, the close 
ties that, in many cases, still exist between higher education and the na-
tion state will dissolve. The state will be a partner – albeit an important 
one – instead of a major actor defining much of higher education’s scope 
and possibilities” (De Wit 2003, p. 175).
Yet there are signs that governments have more modernist, executive 
and hierarchical ambitions than is indicated by this portrait. In the UK, 
for example, across a range of policy domains, and increasingly includ-
ing higher education, reliance on older, intimate, oligarchic, pre-
democratic and secretive forms of self-regulation have been succeeded 
in the final decades of the twentieth century by what may be termed pol-
icy hyper-innovation undertaken by the state (Moran 2003). The private 
character of the most important parts of self-regulatory systems have 
been transformed and replaced by tighter state controls. New regulatory 
institutions based on hierarchy, formal codification, transparency and ju-
ridification have been introduced.  
High modernist state ambition and intervention are also apparent 
outside the UK. In Singapore, and other parts of Asia, the state main-
tains a dominant presence in higher education decision-making and 
planning. Even in the USA, with its tradition of generally weak central 
government and strong self-regulatory accreditation processes, govern-
mental regulatory interventionism has become more apparent in recent 
years. At local state level, but also recently at Federal level as indicated 
by the Re-Authorisations of the Higher Education Act, governmental ac-
countability ambitions for universities and colleges have become quite 
marked, not least through the application of student outcomes- based 
performance indicators. 
So far we have suggested that, for national systems at least, we need 
to be careful in assuming convergence to similar patterns of state-
university regulation. Global and local factors help produce variety 
within countries. Moreover, the view that a more quiescent state is giv-
ing way to softer forms of public-private networking coordination – ef-
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fectively that regulatory power is becoming dispersed and diffused as a 
system product rather than exercised in a sovereign way by states – is 
not necessarily supported by analysis of regulatory systems for higher 
education in a number of countries. These include those in England and 
the USA, where arguably, on the basis of strong liberal cultures, it could 
most be expected. 
There is a further reason for being doubtful about theories that posit 
regulatory convergence among countries towards a common ‘post-
nation state’ outcome, and towards one that is felt to be especially ap-
propriate for the globalised, neo-liberal circumstances of the early 
twenty-first century. Regulatory approaches are not merely technical ar-
rangements in order to achieve efficiency, effectiveness and overall ra-
tionality in the face of perversity and disorder. They reflect values and 
are based on particular ‘world views’. As such they are essentially con-
testable. Libertarians recoil from state rules; hierarchists prefer law and 
bureaucracy to self-sufficiency and markets (Hood 1998). An intricate 
balance to reflect all such ideals in regulatory modelling is probably im-
possible. Regulatory systems consequentially are unstable. We must ex-
pect controversy, change and resistance whatever the arrangement – not 
a journey to an agreed final destination suitable for all. Moreover, in ad-
vanced capitalism, innovation and destruction are dominant features in 
the constant creation of value and profitability (Schumpeter 1942). This 
means that in all sectors governments face continual challenges as to 
what needs regulating, and by whom.  
3.  Regulatory models 
There are various reasons for governmental regulatory intervention in 
sectors: market failure; democratic accountability; cost reduction and 
value-for-money; the influence of ‘public opinion’, sometimes through a 
‘scandalised’ media; the result of pressure from interest groups; and the 
‘inner life’ and ambitions of regulatory agencies and their personnel 
themselves (Baldwin and Cave 1999; Scott 2004). Even the introduction 
of competitive or de-regulatory pro-market policies may require new 
rules to prevent subversion by incumbent and dominant interests. Sup-
porters of regulation (such as social democratic governments, including 
New Labour in the UK) see it as a means to correct over-large market 
power, and, particularly where large amounts of public expenditure are 
involved, to ensure accountability in the public interest. Others (neo-
liberal political parties and thinkers, for example), contrastingly, regard 
state regulation as prone to legalism and ineffectiveness, or to capture by 
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dominant interests, including by those purportedly being regulated. As a 
result, in this latter view, regulation by government is best avoided or 
kept to a minimum wherever possible. Preferring the self-regulatory ca-
pacities of markets and organisations, such proponents view regulation 
at best as only being used to ‘hold the fort’ until competition arrives. 
Rather than being concerned, as the ‘regulationists’ are, with market 
failure, advocates of ‘de-regulation’ and increased choice regard gov-
ernmental failure as the greatest danger. 
Issues of regulation in national higher education systems have at-
tracted wider public attention recently in a number of countries. Policy 
commitments by governments in seeking value-for-public-money, to as-
suring quality, to meeting social objectives of equity and opportunity, 
and to generating informed choice and diversity for students and other 
university consumers, has resulted in policy-makers seeking either 
greater, or at least different forms of, regulation of universities in order 
to achieve these goals. 
Yet, concomitantly, governments also recognise – and in some coun-
tries, such as the USA, this is a longstanding view – that enterprise, 
knowledge-creation, and entrepreneurialism within universities also re-
quire corporate and academic freedom from the state. Too much regula-
tion is likely to dampen creativity and innovation. Moreover, ‘anti-
bureaucracy’ is a common ideological theme with powerful electoral 
resonance in many liberal democracies, and also in many post-
communist central and eastern European states, and this can help to re-
strain too excessive levels of intervention by states in higher education 
as well as in other policy areas. The dilemmas that confront higher edu-
cation decision-makers in both government and the institutions lies in 
finding the balance between regulation and autonomy that allows these 
various and sometime conflicting policy aims to be achieved. 
We now consider the primary regulatory instruments available to 
governments, and their applicability in higher education systems, with 
these dilemmas in mind. 
3.1 Command-and-control 
A commonly employed regulatory instrument that can be found in many 
sectors, especially so historically in the USA, has been termed ‘com-
mand-and-control’. ‘Command’ refers to the prescriptive nature of the 
regulation laid down by government or legally-sanctioned agency, and 
‘control’ refers to the command being supported by negative sanctions, 
such as being fined for not meeting standards or targets. The thrust of 
command-and-control regulation is rather negative. It is often regarded 
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as particularly inappropriate for professional employees such as academ-
ics and, more generally, as being out-of-kilter with the social and eco-
nomic complexities and expectations of the modern age. Criticism of 
such an approach, most apparent in the USA, focuses on its excessive 
legalism, its incipient hostility to regulatees, and its inflexibility. In the 
fast-moving world of borderless and technology-supported provision in 
a range of commodities and services, including higher education, it can 
be slow to take account of new circumstances and new players, acting as 
a barrier to market entry and competition. Moreover, ‘command-and-
control’, it is argued, encourages compliance with minimum standards 
rather than providing incentives for going beyond the norm or for inno-
vation. When seeking to control a social area that covers many sectors, 
such as health and safety at work, or environmental protection, rather 
than simply a particular sector, command-and-control regulation is often 
regarded as lacking local knowledge to be operationally effective, or as 
having to resort to overly detailed and burdensome applications of gen-
eral laws, which often are not appropriate for the distinctiveness of most 
sectoral conditions (Baldwin and Cave 1999; Gunningham et al. 1998). 
Despite its drawbacks, ‘command-and-control’ regulation nonetheless 
has benefits of transparency, simplicity and reliability. 
However, it has to be recognised that there has been a turn away in 
much of the regulatory literature from ‘command-and-control’ models 
towards what are regarded as ‘smarter’ forms of regulation based on at 
least a substantial element of self-regulation (Gunningham et al. 1998). 
The professions particularly, it is thought, are best regulated in such 
ways.
3.2 Self-Regulation 
Generally professionalisation is regarded as a means of controlling 
working conditions through ‘self-regulation’. Professional control over 
work has usually been associated with the creation of specialised, or 
knowledgeable, products or commodities (as in medicine or education) 
that are increasingly regarded as socially necessary by the public, and 
whose production is protected through the activities of a member asso-
ciation, particularly in controls over training, entry, competition and dis-
cipline.
It is this characteristic of ‘closure’ that has attracted criticism of self-
regulation as self-serving and inefficient by those preferring coordina-
tion through the competitive market (economic liberalism), or as de-
manding state regulation to combat biased class interests (Marxism) or 
to address professionalism’s perceived citizen unresponsiveness (‘Third 
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Way’ social democracy). Interestingly, all critics, including Thatcher 
governments in the UK, have not been averse to a strong state as a pri-
mary instrument for achieving their objectives. Unsurprisingly, given the 
strength of these criticisms in a number of countries, self-regulation for a 
while fell into disrepute in the latter stages of the twentieth century, rein-
forced by media coverage of professional disputes and scandal in areas 
such as health, and a sense of self-regulation’s inadequate accountability 
in a democratic age. In the UK, particularly, self-regulation had been 
formed predominantly in a pre-democratic era, and its informality, be-
havioural congeniality, and secrecy were cultural modes used by the 
economic and political elite to avoid wider public scrutiny (Moran 
2003).
These accounts sit oddly with the notion of a ‘retreating state’, one 
that was alleged to be creeping away from the centre of the governance 
stage in the 1980s and 1990s. In England, an ambitious modernising po-
litical elite, including those from both the major political parties, has for 
two decades or more been engaged in hyper-active institutional reform 
in a number of sectors, including higher education, based on the intro-
duction of much more formal state evaluation and ‘quasi-markets’. In 
the USA, local states have also sought to introduce greater formal per-
formance accountability and evaluation of their public services, includ-
ing universities and colleges (Dill 1997). 
The attractions of self-regulation are that it aims to improve regula-
tory effectiveness (through incorporating local knowledge, for example, 
which is increasingly a capacity of employees rather than owners in mo-
dern, knowledge-focused learning organisations). It is also regarded as 
enhancing the moral basis of regulatory authority. That is, self-regula-
tion works with the grain of occupational culture and therefore has a 
greater chance of becoming accepted as legitimate, and avoiding oppor-
tunistic evasion, resistance or surly or ‘creative’ compliance (Braith-
waite 2002). 
Self-regulation, however, is not without difficulties. For example, it 
can be used to serve the private interests of a sector and, without a 
strong external hand, standards atrophy, become un-policed, and are 
rarely sanctioned. Nor are self-regulatory processes particularly trans-
parent, essentially being confined to ‘insiders’. However, self-regulation 
may work effectively when competitive and other pressures result in all 
organisations within a sector as likely to suffer from ‘maverick’ or un-
ethical conduct coming from any one of them, which may result in regu-
latory leadership coming to be exercised by the bigger entities. A key is-
sue for higher education systems is whether increased marketisation and 
institutional stratification is diminishing shared ‘communities of fate’ 
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between universities in national sectors. Are notions of the ‘self’ in uni-
versity ‘self-regulation’ fragmenting into less sector-wide elements, lea-
ding to more exclusive university pressure groups based on reputational 
alignment, and with a consequent debilitation of overall systemic self-
regulatory capacities? 
3.3 Market regulation 
State- and self-regulatory modes are regarded by some as less satisfac-
tory a form of coordination than the spontaneous order of the competi-
tive market place. Broadly, synoptic state surveillance is regarded as im-
possible to achieve in the face of the widespread tacit knowledge pos-
sessed by non-state actors (Hayek 1979). Competition, choice and in-
formed consumer decision-making provide better webs of regulatory 
control than laws and peer-group constraints. An increasing regulatory 
approach to higher education in a number of countries is to introduce 
wider institutional competition, such as through selective funding proc-
esses, user-pays models for the consumption of services, and more de-
regulated tuition fee structures. The production and dissemination of in-
stitutional performance evaluations and other data is also aimed to pro-
vide more informed consumer choice and to iron out some of the imper-
fections in university student markets. In some cases, administrative ap-
peals arbitrations (‘ombudsmen’), and sometimes allowing recourse to 
private law remedies (torts), are extended to students, now objectified as 
consumers with rights rather than as simply welfare recipients. 
Yet two points illustrate that state regulation does not necessarily 
‘soften’ with marketisation but often retains its strength. First, maintain-
ing the conditions for increased competitiveness or ‘quasi-markets’ often 
involves more state rules and intervention than previously, not least in 
areas of quality assurance and consumer protection. Second, marketisa-
tion measures in higher education generally have been limited and con-
trolled, and de-regulation has not been full-blown or easily allowed the 
entry of new private providers. 
The next section examines a number of the above regulatory issues 
in three countries: the USA, England, and South Africa. These are coun-
tries that exhibit variety in levels of economic development, locations in 
the global division of labour, and political cultures and structures. As 
such they help to provide illustration of some of the themes outlined 
above. The USA is included as an example of a market-based regulatory 
system but also as one with increasing levels of governmental regula-
tion. The case of England exemplifies a regulatory system moving from 
self- to more state- and market-based regulation, but which is also char-
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acterised by state hyper-innovation, governmental ambition and regula-
tory oscillation. South Africa is included, rather than say a Continental 
European country, because its strong state ‘shaping’ of the higher educa-
tion sector highlights in a fairly explicit form an example of increasing 
command-and-control in its regulatory approach, whereas European 
countries are generally moving in the other direction. In part, South Af-
rica’s regulatory developments are a consequence of distinct historical 
and globalisation processes.  
4.  Three countr ies 
The USA 
The USA system provides an example of multiple and often overlapping 
authorities. There is a widespread international sense that higher educa-
tion in the USA is either largely self- or de-regulated, at least when 
compared with the increasing national state controls over universities in 
more centralised countries. Yet the USA was the first modern ‘regula-
tory state’, expanding particularly in the mid-decades of the twentieth 
century under Roosevelt’s New Deal, with many of its institutional 
structures, rules and agencies providing inspiration elsewhere, including 
for the EU. It is not clear why its higher education system necessarily 
should be regarded as inevitably more ‘de-regulated’ than other coun-
tries.
Admittedly, evidence for a de-regulated higher education system in 
the USA may be drawn from the long-standing system of degree-
awarding accreditation for universities and colleges by the six regional 
accreditation entities. Although accreditation bodies are compelled to be 
judged for their quality by being officially ‘recognised’, either by the 
Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA), a private, non-
governmental national coordinating body, or more directly by the Fed-
eral Government, accreditation of institutions is a peer-driven, self-
regulatory and formally voluntary process. Nonetheless, accreditation in 
practice is hardly an optional extra: institutions need accreditation to 
gain access to Federal student financial aid and research funds.
Self-regulation through accreditation has faced periodic challenge 
from Congress and the White House in the last decade, usually at the 
point when the Federal Higher Education Act requires ‘Re-
Authorisation’ (around every six years) and which offers the opportunity 
for politicians to reconsider whether self-regulating accreditation serves 
the interests of the various higher education stakeholders (employers, 
students, parents and government). Since the 1992 Re-Authorisation, 
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standards for Federal scrutiny of accrediting organisations have been 
built into the Act, and accreditation has been required to fulfil new regu-
latory responsibilities centred on institution and program compliance 
with student financial aid requirements, as well as its continuing respon-
sibilities for assuring academic quality. During the current Re-Authori-
sation Act process (2004, but extended to 2005) Congress appears de-
termined to add further obligations for institutions and accrediting or-
ganisations that are focused on improving the public accountability of 
higher education. The stated goals and objectives of the Federal De-
partment of Education similarly is to regard accreditation as a means for 
promoting a greater emphasis on achieving results, improving student 
achievement, and ensuring accountability for taxpayer funds (USDE 
2004).
Self-regulation appears sufficiently threatened by political action in 
the current Re-Authorisation process for CHEA to publish documents 
headed “Is the Era of Self-Regulation Over?” (5 January, 2004) and “Is 
Accreditation Accountable?” (2003). CHEA sees the federal government 
as aiming – “as a principal focus of legislative proposals” – to shift more 
of the responsibility for academic quality to the federal level and away 
from self-regulation (CHEA 2004). As part of the current Re-Authorisa-
tion hearings in Senate committee (prior to formal introduction of the 
Bill) it has been suggested by politicians that higher education needs to 
assure the general public and employers that students are adequately pre-
pared for the world of work, and that accreditation is transparent to the 
public so that students and parents not only understand the process of 
accreditation, but also what the process reveals about the quality of insti-
tutions. Some Senators and others cite “runaway grade inflation”, “cur-
ricular disintegration”, and “political correctness” as evidence that stan-
dards in institutions are falling under the watch of the current accredita-
tion regime, and that the “cartel” arrangements of accrediting organisa-
tions make internal reform difficult (CHEA 2004). 
In CHEA’s view, Congress and the USDE are seeking to take over 
judgements for academic quality that have long been the responsibility 
of colleges and universities. It cites, as examples, such issues as the de-
termination of conditions for the transfer of credit, deciding what counts 
for quality in distance learning, and prescribing acceptable student out-
comes (CHEA 2004). Prior to 1992 there was ‘tacit agreement’ that ac-
countability in the accreditation process was discharged if accrediting 
organisations carried out their procedures responsibly. However, federal 
officials now want additional evidence on institutional and program per-
formance, including student outcomes. There is discussion about estab-
lishing national standards of performance and outcomes for all institu-
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tions and programs. In some cases this has extended to consideration of 
comparative ranking systems as a basis for judgements on, for example, 
awarding federal funds. 
Regulation at the level of the states has shown similar tendencies for 
more explicit accountability and intervention (Heller 2004, p. 52). Dill 
(1997) notes that by 1990 over two-thirds of states had passed regula-
tions encouraging public institutions of higher education to implement 
various forms of ‘student assessment’ programs with the aim of boosting 
greater institutional focus on student learning and its outcomes. Al-
though changes in the political complexion of Congress in the mid-
1990s stalled proposals for even greater state regulation of universities 
and colleges, states have nonetheless moved forward with performance 
indicators and regular external review for higher education institutions, 
with outcomes sometimes linked to budgetary allocations. Often local 
legislators have cited in support of such moves similar reasons to those 
regularly advanced in parts of Congress for instilling greater focus in ac-
creditation on student outcomes. Rises in institutional tuition fees have 
also raised legislative concerns at state level about institutional account-
ability. However, while some states have responded by considering 
greater regulatory controls over institutions, in the face of severe budg-
etary difficulties others are reportedly considering ‘setting their colleges 
free’ from the state system altogether and allowing them the independ-
ence to set their tuition fees in return for giving up on state appropria-
tions. In some cases, however, there is a requirement that greater fund-
ing autonomy is accompanied by the extension of specific performance 
goals, such as for graduation rates (Kelderman 2004)  
At the turn into the new millennium there seems to have been a sig-
nificant step-change towards greater degrees of government involvement 
in academic matters at local and federal levels in the name of democratic 
accountability. This contrasts with earlier periods when institutions had 
the trust of state officials and benefited from the general belief that they 
worked most effectively when enjoying high levels of autonomy 
(Zumeta, 2001). Nowadays states concern themselves with credit trans-
fer arrangements, improving graduate rates and scores, and teachers’ 
workloads. Both states and accreditors increasingly seek to introduce 
performance accountability into their processes – there is a common and 
“explicit focus on goals and results, and the conviction that external bod-
ies can properly set those goals” (Kezar and El-Khawas 2003, p. 95).  
South Africa 
Current government policy in South Africa, and its regulatory stance, 
towards higher education is aimed to redress the inequalities and institu-
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tional racial differentiations of the apartheid era, while at the same time 
developing the overall capacities of universities in order for South Af-
rica to compete competitively in the global economy. These two aims 
can be in tension; some critics would prefer a stronger tilt in government 
higher education policy towards greater social equity and greater fund-
ing support for the less well-advantaged institutions, while others favour 
ensuring that South Africa is able to develop at least a handful of world-
class universities based on selective research excellence. Subotzky 
(2003) describes these two opposing policy drivers as “transformative-
redistributive” and “global market-driven” respectively. Despite sym-
bolic adoption by the new state of the equity, anti-poverty and access 
agenda of the former, which was an ideological necessity in the early 
post-apartheid years to conduce consensus and generate national pur-
pose, it is the “global market-driven” agenda that increasingly has taken 
policy priority. 
South Africa’s 2001 National Plan for higher education is strongly 
interventionist and centrally driven, with a range of targets for enrol-
ments, graduation rates, and staff and student equity. Its command-and-
control features have helped to make progress on delivery uneven and 
patchy. The focus on symbolic aspirations, without detailed implementa-
tion procedures or resourcing plans, has produced capacity difficulties at 
both the centre and in the institutions. This is compounded by constant 
regulatory and policy initiatives, not always clearly linked to the Na-
tional Plan. Moreover, following a ‘regulatory vacuum’ for private 
higher education, which led to the rapid growth of many ‘fly-by-night’ 
and other operators in the late 1990s, since 2001 regulation of these in-
stitutions has been highly prescriptive, leading to a steep fall in commer-
cial overseas providers. 
A feature of the regulatory approach in South Africa to the higher 
education system is its combination of strong state action and the intro-
duction of market processes. It has been described as an example of a 
‘top down’ model in which an authoritative centre distributes policies 
through the system in a linear, hierarchical process. There is little real 
attempt at enrolling the regulatees in the development of policy, which 
consequently tends to result in implementation failure (Subotzky 2003). 
The approach is some way removed from ideas of a ‘light touch steer-
ing’ state. South African regulatory policy towards its higher education 
system is characterised by ‘high modernist’ rationalism, based on ‘big 
bang’ systemic transformation that is to achieve change ‘at once’ (Cloete 
et al. 2002). 
The approach makes favourable assumptions about the efficacy of 
strong centralised policy-making by the state, reflecting in part perhaps 
ROGER KING
78
the government’s Marxist influences from the anti-apartheid struggles. It 
is an approach that not only tends to produce resistance, but also gov-
ernmental responses based on viewing opposition as seeking to protect 
privileged interests. This in turn leads to further top-down policy genera-
tion by leaders to overcome such opposition. Consequently, the higher 
education policy and legislative framework in South Africa “has become 
fairly strongly regulative in character” (Subotzky 2003, p. 188). 
There is little sign that this ‘regulatory higher education state’ is be-
ing moderated. Increasing powers for the Minister in recent legislation 
indicates the continuance of a strong top-down regulative role. This has 
been further displayed in current announcements of ‘non-voluntary 
mergers’, which are considerably reducing the number of higher educa-
tion institutions in South Africa and also creating new types of ‘compre-
hensive university’ and ‘universities of technology’ involving the tech-
nikons (non-university colleges). Changing the size and shape of the 
overall structure of the system is regarded by the government as a key 
means of demonstrating observable reform in the absence of major re-
ductions in institutional stratification and equity, and as an important 
signal of seeking to enable at least some universities to compete success-
fully for world-class standing. The difficulty, given the predominance of 
the command-and-control mode adopted, is whether policy intentions 
will be matched by achievements, or whether dislocation, resistance, and 
rising costs might eventuate instead, in part as a consequence of inade-
quate participatory or self-regulatory processes built into the regulatory 
architecture. The South African University Vice Chancellors Associa-
tion (SAUVCA), for example, complains of consultations taking place at 
too late a stage in the policy formulation process and as involving “a 
vast amount of work” (SAUVCA 2003). 
It is not clear whether the doubts about governmental capacity for ef-
fective policy implementation follow from the intrinsic nature of com-
mand-and-control regulation, or whether the South African case indi-
cates inadequate experience, expertise, and planning capacity. Higher 
education institutions are complex organisations consisting of many 
non-corporate disciplinary and other identities. They are comprised of 
loose-coupled parts and it is not clear to what extent they will be capable 
of handling the large-scale change that is now coming their way or of 
achieving unity of institutional purpose in the light of the many amal-
gamations being implemented. It may also be difficult for the govern-
ment to fully fathom and respond to regulatory failure or defects if or 
when these occur. 
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England
With the recent national devolution of a number of UK governmental 
powers, including education, it is appropriate to consider English higher 
education as a distinctive entity within the UK. Nonetheless, certain pol-
icy domains, such as research assessment and teaching quality assur-
ance, tend to operate UK-wide. A feature of the English university sys-
tem is its centralisation. Partly this is governmental, with policies and 
resource planning formulated by a national education Department and a 
higher education Funding Council, and within a political structure that 
provides considerable executive power to the Cabinet formed from the 
ruling political party. But in part it also reflects the reputational domi-
nance of leading research-intensive universities, especially Oxford and 
Cambridge, who for long have contributed a major share of personnel 
for occupational elite positions and who regularly top various “league 
tables” of university performance (King 2004b). 
Although before the Second World War university development in 
England and the rest of the UK was beginning to be part of a clear na-
tional framework with central controls (epitomised by the University 
Grants Committee, a body formed in 1919 to formulate a public expen-
diture requirement to its sponsoring department – the Treasury – and 
which allocated the subsequent block grant), the model was that of state-
backed professional autonomy and self-regulation. We should be clear, 
however, that ‘self-regulation’ had a peculiarly British twist. It was 
based more on close ties between institutional leaders and politicians – 
elite intimacy – than what we might describe as organised formal incor-
poration of a professional academic occupation, the basis of which was 
historically underdeveloped (Halsey 1992; Perkin 1990). Rather than 
formal and extensive systems of public accountability or policy inter-
ventionism, gentlemanly and informal ideals of elite behaviour were 
seen as the most effective means for guaranteeing appropriate institu-
tional governance of universities in the national interest. Until after the 
mid-twentieth century the age was one still of oligarchy rather than de-
mocratic accountability and this was reflected in government-university 
relationships. Moreover, universities, as chartered bodies, were formally 
independent of government in a way not always found, for example, in 
Continental Europe. 
The growth of an alternative form of higher education in the poly-
technics and colleges in the 1960s and 1970s that was ‘owned’ and de-
veloped by the state – described as public sector higher education – and 
the accompanying ‘binary line’ distinguishing it from the traditional 
universities, had significant regulatory implications. The eventual unifi-
cation of the system in the early 1990s, with the designation of the poly-
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technics as universities, helped to ‘import’ the stronger governmental 
regulatory frameworks governing public sector higher education into the 
whole system. Greater accountability to the government on behalf of 
students, taxpayers and other users of university services was inevitable 
in the political climate of the 1980s and 1990s when there was a turn 
away generally from reliance on professional, or rather elite, self-
regulation and culture, to more transparent and numerical forms of pub-
lic evaluation and democratic holding-to-account. 
The introduction of a body of higher education law during these 
years helped reduce the formal autonomy of the universities (although, 
arguably, it increased the freedoms of the former local authority ‘main-
tained’ ex-polytechnics). Statutory provisions created a prescriptive in-
strument for higher education funding, gave greater means of direction 
and influence to ministers, and provided for the formal assessment of the 
quality of the university output. The longstanding discretions allowed to 
universities and their academics have been systematically whittled away 
by new accountability procedures, although they have not entirely dis-
appeared. Consequently, relationships between universities and the state 
have become increasingly formalised, replacing previous ‘regulation’ 
which operated through clubbality, mutual elite respect, similarity of so-
cial and educational origins, and intimacy. Now the relationship is char-
acterised by greater wariness, formality and transparency (King 2004b). 
The regulation of higher education in England in recent years, how-
ever, is probably best characterised, not by a simple unidirectional re-
treat from self-regulatory processes, but by oscillation and patchwork 
design. The regulatory pendulum has swung between versions of hierar-
chical and formalised controls, on the one hand, and continued reliance 
on self-regulation and normative professional codes on the other. This 
can be identified both in the operation of varying regulatory approaches 
between the different regulatory institutions, and in changes in regula-
tory policy within such bodies. For learning and teaching, for instance, 
the current methodology of the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) is 
moving back from detailed and burdensome forms of quality assessment 
to approaches aimed at auditing institutions’ own processes, and where 
the purpose is as much for the benefit of the institutions’ developments 
internally as for external consumer appraisal. This suggests that ‘respon-
sive’, ‘self-regulatory’ or ‘light touch’ regulation may be appropriate for 
forms of external quality assessment in higher education, but that, for fi-
nancial accountability for example, more intrusive or ‘externally expert’ 
governance may be justified. 
Although the QAA, established in 1997, is legally independent – as a 
private company limited by guarantee and as a registered charity – it is 
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clearly strongly influenced by the attitude of government, which is the 
ultimate main paymaster for the sector. In 2000-1 a concerted campaign, 
involving particularly the leading research universities, successfully 
pressed to have reduced the degree of detailed scrutiny in the evalua-
tions carried out by QAA – for it to use a ‘lighter touch’. The Minister 
subsequently announced that the QAA would be changing its approach, 
although it was not clear that he had the authority to do so (Lewis 2004).
In comparison with the QAA’s previous methods, the objective now 
appears more to work with the grain of institutional autonomy, and with 
self-regulatory and professional practice. In research assessment, how-
ever, the regulatory tendencies seem to be moving from an opposite 
starting point, based strongly on peer review, to more codification and 
formality. It is possible to distinguish, in plans for future Research As-
sessment Exercises (RAE), undertaken by the UK funding agencies, a 
movement – still gentle – towards greater hierarchism. Although self-
regulatory peer review remains at the heart of the system for the next 
‘round’ in 2008, increasingly the work and decisions of the 70 or so dis-
ciplinary panels will be subject to the supervision and decisions of 
around 15 multi-disciplinary overarching groups, a tightening of previ-
ous arrangements. It will be interesting to see whether future Exercises 
will be able to resist gradually increasing formalism and hierarchy. For 
the immediate future an essentially self-regulatory arrangement remains, 
but with a few signs of formalism and hierarchy beginning to appear.  
In another area, stronger regulatory formalism and hierarchy are 
more apparent: the establishment by the government, under higher edu-
cation legislation permitting variable undergraduate tuition fees for full-
time domestic undergraduates, of an Office For Fair Access (OFFA). 
OFFA will operate as a statutory regulator, within a legal and policy 
framework that maps out for it a widening participation strategy under 
four headings: attainment, aspiration, application and admissions. OFFA 
directly covers aspiration and application, as admissions is regarded as a 
matter for universities directly, while attainment is a matter of improv-
ing performance in schools. Institutions that wish to charge variable fees 
above the standard fee will be required to enter an agreement for widen-
ing participation with OFFA for a five-year period. Universities, how-
ever, will propose their own access targets and have responsibility for 
measuring their progress. OFFA will have the power to reject unde-
manding proposals and, in extreme circumstances, it will be able to di-
rect the English Funding Council to withdraw operating grant. OFFA 
will report to parliament every five years and the regulator will submit 
an annual report to the parliamentary committee for Education and Skills 
(DFES 2004). 
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It could be argued that OFFA may become a rather toothless regula-
tor, and that its establishment was part of a ‘fig leaf’ political strategy by 
the Labour government to satisfy its own ‘backbench’ critics of variable 
tuition fees in order to secure passage of the legislation. Undoubtedly 
some Labour members of parliament have argued for much stronger ac-
cess regulation for the universities, claiming that OFFA should have 
powers to define and set targets for social access by institutions, includ-
ing for admissions, rather than OFFA simply judging institutions’ own 
proposals. The government, however, with an eye on universities’ 
claims of unwarranted interference with their autonomy and academic 
freedom, argues that OFFA provides an example of ‘light touch’ regula-
tion. Nonetheless, OFFA presents a further regulatory institution for 
higher education and is capable of having additional powers conferred 
on it in future, including the ability to set standards for access. If univer-
sities, particularly those traditional elite institutions with few students 
from poorer backgrounds, for commercial, financial, independence, or 
other reasons, do not meet OFFA’s widening access objectives, it is not 
difficult to conclude that government has an instrument in OFFA that 
could be substantially strengthened. 
The regulatory oscillation and divergences that we have just de-
scribed in English higher education in part stems from the strong execu-
tive authority possessed by governing parties in the Westminster parlia-
mentary system. There is considerable and relatively unrestrained free-
dom for governments to experiment with policies. This has contributed 
to what we may describe as ‘hyper-policy’ and constant change by the 
state, initially as part of strategies to halt economic decline and then to 
enhance global economic competitiveness, in which the introduction of 
ill-informed policy reform results in negative or perverse feedbacks and 
unintended consequences. This, in turn, leads to even more unstable and 
increasingly formalised regulation, generally without an adequate level 
of support from those being regulated. 
The increased direct regulatory role of the state in English higher 
education is marked by the requirement for higher education institutions 
to deliver against national priorities and political policies. Since 1981-2 
the Secretary of State for Education has issued letters of ‘guidance’ to 
the Funding Council making explicit the terms on which universities are 
to receive funding. By the end of the 1980s this had translated into gov-
ernment creating a funding body that was based on statute and clearly 
took orders from Ministers. It was based on the notion of the state as an 
investor in and procurer of higher education services for which institu-
tions competed to supply. The annual letter from government to the 
Funding Council under the New Labour administration has become in-
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creasingly imbued with explicit targets and detailed initiatives, including 
on curricular issues, such as foundation degrees; higher education in fur-
ther education colleges; innovative and flexible programmes of study; 
two year honours degree courses; the skills agenda; and credit transfer 
systems. Its 2003 White Paper was equally fine- grained and reads more 
like an operational than a strategic document, specifying, for example, 
that there will be 70 centres of teaching excellence and up to 50 teaching 
fellowships allocated annually (Taggart 2004). Moreover, although the 
White Paper was subject to normal consultation processes, there is little 
sign of their impact, and it was not preceded by a wide series of discus-
sion papers as found in recent Australian higher education reform (see 
the “Crossroads” publications by the Australian government in 2003).  
In part, micro-management by the state reflects a level of frustration 
with achieving higher education modernisation. Regulatory see- sawing 
in England also stems from a form of in-built regulatory ‘capture’ in 
higher education regulatory designs. It is academics that confer substan-
tial legitimacy and prestige on the RAE, for example, and who are in-
corporated into the formal peer reviews of colleagues and their work that 
are required by government policies, and which have major funding 
consequences for universities. Similarly, the QAA could not function 
without the participation and judgements of academics on the quality of 
learning and teaching throughout the sector. The outcome is systemic 
regulatory turbulence and variety stemming from the constant govern-
ment need to find the right balance between the judgements and support 
of the ‘invisible college of academics’, to use the telling description 
from Kogan and Hanney (2002), and external accountabilities and de-
mocratic oversight. 
5.  Conclusion     
The above analysis points to the persistence of national variety in regu-
latory modes in higher education rather than to convergence towards a 
particular global or neo-liberal form. Nonetheless, it also has been pos-
sible to point to quite strong tendencies towards the inclusion of the 
principles of greater transparency, formality and hierarchy in many regu-
latory arrangements. Consequently, we cast doubt on notions of the ‘re-
treating state’ that have been found in higher education research and 
public policy analysis more generally. National states are not being con-
sumed within a range of public-private networks but remain ambitious 
and modernist, and this continues to be reflected in regulatory processes. 
However, higher education regulation, for its effectiveness, relies in-
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creasingly on the state (public) mobilising self-regulatory and market 
(private) processes, but not necessarily in ways that delegate territorial 
jurisdiction and sovereignty to un-elected decision-makers.   
References
Altbach, P. (2004). ‘The Past and Future of Asian Universities’, in Alt-
bach, P. and Umakoshi, T. (eds.), Asian Universities: Historical Per-
spectives and Contemporary Challenges. Baltimore and London: 
John Hopkins University Press, pp. 13-32. 
Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. (1992). Responsive Regulation. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Baldwin, R. and Cave, M. (1999). Understanding Regulation: Theory, 
Strategy, and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Becher, T. and Kogan, M. (1992). Process and Structure in Higher Edu-
cation (2nd edition). London:Heinemann. 
Black, J. (2002). ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’. Discussion Paper 
4 presented at the Centre for the Analysis of Risk and Regulation,
London School of Economics. 
Braithwaite, J. (2002). Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation.
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Braithwaite, J. and Drahos, P. (2000). Global Business Regulation.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Clark, B. (1983). The Higher Education System: Academic Organization 
in Cross-National Perspective. Berkeley, CA: University of Califor-
nia Press. 
Cloete, N. (2002). Transformation in Higher Education: Global Pres-
sures and Local Realities in South Africa. Landsdowne: Juta and 
Company. 
Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) (2004). ‘Is the Era 
of Self-Regulation Over?’, Letter from the President, 5 January, pp. 
1-2.
Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) (2003). ‘Is Ac-
creditation Accountable’, Monograph, 1, pp. 1-22.
Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) (2004). Update, 6, 
January 23, pp. 1-2. 
Department for Education and Skills (2004). The Higher Education Bill,
8 January, www.publications.parliament.uk. 
GOVERNING UNIVERSITIES: VARIETIES OF NATIONAL REGULATION
85
Dill, D. (1997).  ‘Accreditation, Assessment, Anarchy? The Evolution of 
Academic Quality Assurance Policies in the United States’, in Bren-
nan, J., de Vries, P. and Williams, R. (eds.), Standards and Quality 
in Higher Education. London: Jessica Kingsley, pp. 15-43. 
Gunningham, N., Grabosky, P. and Sinclair, D. (1998). Smart Regula-
tion. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Halsey, A (1992). The Decline of Donnish Dominion: The British Aca-
demic Profession in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
Hayek, F. (1979). Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol.3: The Political 
Order of a Free People. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Heller, D. (2004). ‘State Oversight of Academia’, in Ehrenberg, R. (ed.), 
Governing Academia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 49-67. 
Hood, C. (1998). The Art of the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Kjaer, A.M. (2004). Governance. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Kelderman, E. (2004). ‘States and Public Colleges Consider New Rela-
tionships’, Stateline.Org., 4 March, 1-2. 
Kezar, A. and El-Khawas, E. (2003). ‘Using the Performance Dimen-
sion: Converging Paths for External Accountability?’, in Eggins, H. 
(ed.), Globalization and Reform in Higher Education. London: 
SRHE/Open University Press, pp. 85-98. 
King, R. (2004a). ‘The Rise and Regulation of For-Profit Higher Educa-
tion’, in Observatory on Borderless Higher Education, Mapping 
Borderless Higher Education: Policy, Markets and Competition.
London: OBHE, pp. 154-197. 
King, R. (2004b). The University in the Global Age. London: Palgrave. 
King, R. and Kendall, G. (2004). The State, Democracy and Globaliza-
tion. London: Palgrave. 
Kogan, M. and Hanney, S. (2000). Reforming Higher Education. Lon-
don: Jessica Kingsley. 
Lee, M. (2004). ‘Malaysian Universities’, in Altbach, P. and Umakoshi, 
T. (eds.), Asian Universities: Historical Perspectives and Contempo-
rary Challenges. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University 
Press, pp. 221-246. 
Lewis, R. (2004). ‘Ten Years of International Quality Assurance’, in Ten 
Years On: Changing Higher Education in a Changing World. Lon-
don: Centre for Higher Education Research and Information, Open 
University, pp. 27-34. 
Marginson, S. (2003). ‘Higher Education Reform in Australia – An 
Evaluation’, in Eggins, H. (ed.), Globalization and Reform in Higher 
Education. London: SRHE/Open University Press, pp. 133-163. 
ROGER KING
86
Marginson, S. and Rhoades, G. (2002). ‘Beyond National States, Mar-
kets, and Systems of Higher Education: A Glonacal Agency Heuris-
tic’, Higher Education, 43, 281-309. 
Moran, M. (2003). The British Regulatory State. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Ogus, A. (1994). Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. 
Perkin, H. (1990). The Rise of Professional Society in England Since 
1880. London: Routledge. 
Pierre, J. and Peters, B. (2000). Governance: Politics and the State.
London: Macmillan. 
Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: 
Allen and Unwin. 
Scott, C. (2004). ‘Regulation in the Age of Governance: the Rise of the 
Post-Regulatory State’, in Jordana, J. and Levi-Faur, D. (eds.), The 
Politics of Regulation. London: Edward Elgar, pp. 145-174. 
South Africa University Vice Chancellors Association (SAUVCA) 
(2003). Response to NQF Consultative Document, November. 
Sporn, B. (2003). ‘Trends relating to Higher Education Reform in 
Europe’, in Eggins, H. (ed.), Globalization and Reform in Higher 
Education. London: SRHE/Open University Press, pp. 117-29. 
Subotzky, G (2003). ‘Symbolism and Substance: Towards an Under-
standing of Change and Continuity in South African Higher Educa-
tion’, in Eggins, H. (ed.), Globalization and Reform in Higher Edu-
cation. London: SRHE/Open University Press, pp. 164-193. 
Taggart, G. (2004). A Critical Review of the Role of the English Funding 
Body for Higher Education in the Relationship between the State 
and Higher Education in the Period 1945-2003. Unpublished Doc-
toral dissertation, University of Bristol. 
Tan, J. (2004). ‘Singapore Universities’, in Altbach, P. and Umakoshi, 
T. (eds.), Asian Universities: Historical Perspectives and Contempo-
rary Challenges. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University 
Press, pp. 175-197. 
Teixeira, P., Jongbloed, B., Dill, D. and Amaral, A. (2004). Markets in 
Higher Education: Rhetoric or Reality? Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
United States Department of Education (USDE) (2004). ‘Re-
Authorization of the Higher Education Act: Goals and Objectives’, 
ED.Gov.
de Wit, H. (2003). ‘The Consequences of European Integration for 
Higher Education’, Higher Education Policy, 16, 161-78. 
GOVERNING UNIVERSITIES: VARIETIES OF NATIONAL REGULATION
87
Zumeta, W. (2001). ‘Public Policy and Accountability in Higher Educa-
tion: Lessons from the Past and Present for the New Millennium’, in 
Heller, D. (ed.), The States and Public Higher Education Policy.
Baltimore:  The John Hopkins University Press, pp. 155-97. 

8989
Market Competition, Public Good, and
State Interference
ALBERTO AMARAL AND ANTÓNIO MAGALHÃES
1.  Introduct ion 
Over the last decades the relationship between higher education institu-
tions and the state has changed from a model of state control to a model 
of state supervision. Simply put, this new model implies that institutions 
are given some degree of autonomy; that they self-regulate their behav-
iour in response to distant steering from the government. However, gov-
ernments began increasingly to interfere in higher education creating 
what has been called the ‘interventionary’ state or even the ‘evaluative’ 
state.
More recently, at least in some countries, neo-liberal governments 
have come into power and a new political rhetoric has become popular. 
Neo-liberal politicians proclaim that the state should decrease its activity 
as service provider, that state regulation should retreat in favour of mar-
ket regulation, and that competition is a necessary ingredient to ensure 
that institutions become more responsive to society and more efficient in 
the use of public funds. 
This new model was expected to soften state interference in higher 
education institutions. However, when autonomous institutions are 
forced to compete under market-like conditions, they might follow 
strategies aiming at increasing ‘their own good’. This does not guarantee 
that the strategic objectives defined by the institutions will coincide or 
converge with the ‘public good’ or the government’s objectives, which 
opens the way for even more state interference.
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This paper analyses data from Portugal and the UK to argue that 
autonomous institutions in a competitive environment may develop 
strategies to ensure institutional advantages that may be contrary to gov-
ernmental policy objectives. This opens the way to corrective action 
from the state and creates a paradoxical situation where, despite a cur-
rent neo-liberal rhetoric of “less state” there is actually increasing state 
interference in public services.
2.  Changing relat ionship between higher 
educat ion inst i tut ions and the state 
In recent decades the relationship between higher education institutions 
and the state has undergone major transformations away from the model 
of state control characteristic of the early stages of the modern univer-
sity. The “facilitatory state” described by Neave and Van Vught (1991, 
p. xi), was the form the state assumed to manage the social demand for 
higher education after World War II until the end of the 1960s. This pe-
riod corresponds to a change from a ‘primary’ welfare state “designed to 
provide a safety net for the poor” to a ‘secondary’ welfare state which 
mobilised institutions (including universities) “to promote a democratic 
culture and to encourage social mobility” (Scott 1995, p. 79). 
In Western Europe, the instability of the 1960s was mainly felt at the 
institutional level. Faced with an instability that had worked its way out 
of academia to become a pervasive political concern, governments 
elected to act within the sphere of the ‘private life’ (Trow 1996) of the 
universities, thus reducing a social uprising to a case of students’ unrest. 
Government reforms to normalise the ‘private life’ of academia by man-
dating its organisational characteristics (patterns of participation, gov-
ernance, and authority) announced a different, ‘interventionary’ posture 
of the state. 
From about 1983-85, governments began to interfere even more in 
higher education, radicalising the ‘interventionary’ state. This coincided 
with the emergence of “a more elaborate ‘secondary’ welfare state with 
a more active and interventionist agenda” (Scott 1995, p. 79).
In Prometheus Bound (1991), Neave and Van Vught suggested that 
something was changing, “Hercules is on his way” to unchain Prome-
theus, and that a new sort of relationship was emerging through a hybrid 
composition of state regulation and claims of institutional autonomy; 
leading to what they have called a model of “state supervision”. In the 
new model the state abandons its traditional strategy of ‘rational plan-
ning and control’ in favour of ‘self-regulation’ (Van Vught 1989). How-
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ever, Neave and Van Vught (1991) have warned of the danger that under 
increasing product control by the government, the academe might be 
“gradually reduced to the status of a ‘knowledge factory’ – impotent to 
resist the short-term and political opportunism of objectives which gov-
ernment has set” (Neave and Van Vught 1991, p. 253) and have recog-
nised that “…the musicians are still marching down the broad highway 
of detailed plan and control” (Neave and Van Vught 1991). 
3.  Neo- l iberal ism, pr ivat isat ion,  and 
compet i t ion – the promising Hercules? 
In some countries, neo-liberal governments have recently come into 
power and introduced a new political rhetoric. Increased privatisation of 
higher education has been observed under a variety of forms, which in-
clude the establishment of private higher education institutions, the use 
of market mechanisms, and the increased contribution of students and 
families to the costs of higher education.
The ‘market’ has emerged at the centre of the political stage at two 
different levels. At one level it has emerged as a reality that social sys-
tems couldn’t afford to neglect if they intend to survive; at another level 
as a rhetorical device to legitimate policies. Neave states that in Western 
Europe the orientation towards market (de)regulation – at least as far as 
higher education is concerned – was a pragmatic answer to the need to 
transfer resources to other welfare areas such as health and social secu-
rity, rather than an option determined by the inner virtues of the market 
as a regulation instance (Neave 1995, pp. 57-58). Yet, the ‘market’ also
appears as the ideological building block of the rising mode of regula-
tion, especially when one refers to the US example where this develop-
ment “[...] stands foursquare in current debate [...] over the place and re-
sponsibility of government” (Neave 1995, p. 59). 
Jongbloed (2004, pp. 89-90) uses a traffic metaphor to clarify the 
differences between the traditional government system of centralised 
command and control (similar to traffic signals) to coordinate their 
higher education systems and the adoption of market-based policies 
(similar to a roundabout). In Jongbloed’s metaphor, traffic lights heavily 
condition drivers’ decisions, the same way government regulation condi-
tions the behaviour of institutions. On the other hand, while influencing 
traffic behaviour, a roundabout delegates decision-making authority to 
the drivers (Dill et al. 2004, p. 329).
Militant neo-liberal politicians proclaim that the state should de-
crease its activity as service provider, that state regulation should retreat 
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in favour of market regulation, and that competition among institutions 
is a necessary ingredient to ensure that institutions become more respon-
sive to society and more efficient in the use of public funds. 
Does all this mean that the market will emerge as the new Hercules 
coming to unchain Prometheus? Will it succeed? Can autonomous uni-
versities be trusted to pursue the public good even under market compe-
tition or, on the contrary, will the state have to intervene in more detail 
to ensure that universities do not deviate from their public service obli-
gations?
In two very interesting papers Massy (2004a, b) argues that “…the 
way institutions currently respond to markets and seek internal efficien-
cies, left unchecked, is unlikely to serve the public good” (Massy 2004b, 
p. 28), a danger exacerbated by excessive competition or by retrench-
ment operations. Massy (2004b) argues that when competition is exces-
sive or when the state cuts public subsidies that curtail the institutional 
capacity for discretionary spending, non-profit institutions behave as 
for-profit ones, ignoring the promotion of the public good inherent to 
their missions. This forces the state to intervene by changing the rules of 
the market to ensure the fulfilment of its own political objectives. 
Public universities receive at least a significant part of their budgets 
from the state under the argument that they further the public good by 
contributing to economic development and advancing the life prospects 
of citizens through increasing their ‘employability’ potential (to use the 
new European terminology). Public universities are non-profit organisa-
tions that are forced by law to reinvest any surplus in the organisation 
itself instead of ending-up in private benefits for its members. In princi-
ple this offers the state some guarantee that the organisation will not di-
gress from its obligation of upholding the public good. And it explains 
why the state, at least in most European countries, mistrusts private 
higher education institutions and either forbids them or tries to control 
them more closely that it does for public institutions (Teixeira and 
Amaral 2001). 
This paper analyses the behaviour of non-profit higher education in-
stitutions in a market-like competitive environment to understand if they 
will always uphold the primacy of the public good or if will they pro-
mote their own ‘private good’, namely under conditions of financial 
stringency or exacerbated competition, thus justifying a more interven-
tionist role for the government. 
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4.  Two European cases,  Portugal  and the UK 
To address the thesis that non-profit institutions may develop strategies 
that do not converge with government policy objectives or the public 
good, we have studied two cases, the UK and Portugal. The UK was 
chosen because it is the most extreme example among European coun-
tries of the emergence of neo-liberal policies; including the emergence 
of new managerialism in public administration, the appointment of non-
academic vice-chancellors and presidents, increased accountability, and 
promotion of inter-institutional competition. Portugal was chosen as a 
good example of a ‘weak state’ unable to properly steer the system, 
where a large private sector of higher education institutions (non-profit 
in principle) was allowed to develop alongside the public sector. 
4.1 The case of the UK 
We used the UK White Paper on Higher Education (Dfes 2003a) – The 
Future of Higher Education to select two policies the Government de-
fined as high priority: 
“Fair access: Universities are a vital gateway to opportunity and fulfilment for 
young people, so it is crucial that they continue to make real and sustained im-
provements in access. The social class gap among those entering higher edu-
cation is unacceptably wide. Those from the top three social classes are almost 
three times as likely to enter higher education as those from the bottom three. 
…Young people from professional backgrounds are over.” (Dfes 2003a, p. 17) 
“Research: The Government intends to improve the position of research fur-
ther by focusing resources more effectively on the best research performers… 
Concentration brings real benefits, including better infrastructure (funding ex-
cellent equipment and good libraries), better opportunities for interdisciplinary 
research, and the benefits for both staff and students, which flow from discuss-
ing their research and collaborating in projects.” (Dfes 2003, p. 28)
“…Taken together with the exceptionally generous funding settlement for re-
search, these proposals will reinforce the position of our leading institutions so 
that they can continue to compete on the world stage…” (Dfes 2003, p. 38) 
Fair access has received considerable attention from the Government 
because the proclaimed intention of widening access might be seen as 
incongruent with the decision to increase tuition fees by allowing uni-
versities to set their value between a minimum of £ 1,000 and a maxi-
mum of £ 3,000. Following the 2003 White Paper, the Department for 
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Education and Skills (Dfes) produced a paper on “Widening participa-
tion in higher education” (Dfes 2003b) and commissioned a report from 
the Admissions to Higher Education Steering Group (AHESG) on good 
admission practices that was published in September 2004 (AHESG 
2004). The 2004 Higher Education Act has received Royal assent on 1 
July 2004 and makes provisions for the establishment of an Office for 
Fair Access (OFFA). 
Both the “widening participation” paper and the commissioned re-
port have recognised a considerable gap between the participation of 
young people from families working in occupations classified as skilled 
(manual), partly skilled or unskilled (IIIM, IV, and V social class 
groups) and the participation of young people from families with profes-
sional and non-manual occupations (I, II, and IIN social class groups). 
While participation of the former groups increased from 10% to 18% 
during 1990-2000, the participation of the latter groups increased from 
37% to 48%. Therefore, despite the massification of the higher educa-
tion system, the gap in participation between young people from higher 
and lower social class backgrounds has increased. 
The Dfes considers the principal cause for the increasing gap the big 
discrepancy in attainment as “for example only 19% of those manual 
backgrounds obtain tow or more A-levels by the age of 18 compared to 
43% from non-manual backgrounds” (Dfes 2003b, p. 7). Other causes 
are differences in aspiration (“one in four working class young people 
who achieve eight good GSCE passes do not end up in higher educa-
tion” Dfes 2003b, p. 2) and differences in application (a significant 
number of well-qualified students, namely those from the state sector, do 
not apply to universities where competition for places is high, a behav-
iour that contrasts with that of students from independent schools). 
Admissions to higher education are considered a matter for universi-
ties, not for the government (Dfes 2003, p. 2, p. 15). However, despite 
maintaining that admission to the university must be on merit, and irre-
spective of class or school attended, the Dfes has questioned the tradi-
tional admission criteria based on the A level system by considering that 
“prior attainment, as measured by examination and assessment results 
[the number of A levels], does not necessarily provide a complete guide 
to the potential of a student to succeed in higher education” (Dfes 
2003b, p. 16). 
The AHESG report (2004) has supported the position of the Dfes by 
defining a fair admissions system as one providing “equal opportunity 
for all individuals, regardless of background, to gain admission to a 
course suited to their ability and aspirations” (AHESG report 2004, p. 6) 
and suggesting that “merit could mean admitting applicants with the 
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highest examination marks, or it could mean taking a wider view about 
each applicant’s achievements and potential” (AHESG report 2004, p.  
6).
In other words, as prior attainment is considered the main barrier to 
decreasing the participation gap between students from lower and higher 
social class groups, universities were asked to rely less on the traditional 
A level system by taking into account that “it is fair and appropriate to 
consider contextual factors as well as formal educational achievement, 
given the variation in learners’ opportunities and circumstances” 
(AHESG report 2004, p. 6). 
Although higher education institutions can introduce variable tuition 
fees of up to £3,000 per year from 2006, the Dfes (2003b, p. 18) has 
stressed, “the Government is determined to ensure that access to higher 
education is broadened not narrowed” and it has created the OFFA to 
fulfil this objective “to exercise judgements in ensuring that universities 
are taking the actions they see as necessary to achieve their widening 
participation ambitions if they introduce variable tuition fees” (Dfes 
2003b, p. 21). 
Despite the government’s clear intention of widening participation, it 
is not clear that all universities will align institutional strategies with this 
objective. The PA Consulting Group has published a report The Survival 
of the Fittest (2004) on the degree of alignment between the policy ob-
jectives set out by the Government and the business priorities driving in-
stitutional decisions. This report is based on the results of a survey of all 
heads of the UK’s more than 170 autonomous universities and other 
higher education institutions. The survey collects the views and expecta-
tions of the vice-chancellors on the future direction of higher education 
and what “they perceive to be in the best interests of their institution in 
an increasingly competitive market for students, contracts and funding” 
(The Survival of the Fittest 2004, p. 3). 
Some universities will tend to increasingly avoid recruiting students 
from poor backgrounds funded by the Higher Education Funding Coun-
cil of England (HEFCE) as they consider that it does not make good 
business sense, preferring instead to reinforce their activities in the areas 
of post-graduate, professional development, and non-European interna-
tional provision, which offer better business prospects. The PA Consult-
ing report transcribes comments from respondents to their survey that ar-
ticulate that trend: 
“Eventually we expect to have a different profile and mix based on more post-
graduates and fewer undergraduates, more professional and NHS, and more 
international students. We have agreed a major change programme to . . .shift 
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the balance of activity, reducing dependency on HEFCE funded with growth 
achieved (income) from new markets.” (PA Consulting 2004, p. 15). 
The attitude against wider participation was reinforced by a report (JM 
Consulting 2004) commissioned by the HEFCE, Universities UK 
(UUK), and the Standing Conference of Principals (SCOP), on the costs 
of widening participation (WP). Based on data from 18 institutional case 
studies the report concluded that the average costs of WP students are 
131% of a Band D student (i.e., one studying a standard classroom-
based subject) to be compared against a funding allocation of 118% of 
the base price in 2003/04. It is suggested that: 
“…many HEIs are absorbing a range of ‘hidden’ costs associated with widen-
ing participation activities, in areas including academic staff, support staff 
(e.g. finance, counselling), and the use of facilities. As institutions become 
more aware of their costs and their cost drivers these might become more visi-
ble…” (JM Consulting 2004, p. 30). 
It is in this context that the government has established the OFFA and 
mandatory “access agreements” to be approved by the OFFA for all uni-
versities wishing to charge variable fees in excess of the standard fee 
(currently £ 1,000). These agreements will cover “an institution’s plans 
for outreach, financial and other support for students and its own mile-
stones for assessing progress in widening participation” (Dfes 2003b, p.  
19).
The second area of government intervention relates to research pol-
icy and the idea that resources should be concentrated in a small number 
of centres of excellence rather than dispersed throughout the higher edu-
cation system. This policy has been implemented since the unification of 
the system but the 2003 White Paper proposes to reinforce its implemen-
tation, paving the way to ‘teaching-only’ institutions.
In a statement to the Commons, Education and Skills Secretary 
Charles Clark, (22 January 2003) argued that “we need still more focus 
upon world-class research” and has made clear that the government’s 
policy “means giving extra resources to our very best research depart-
ments and world class universities as well as ensuring new research will 
emerge and flourish”. This concentration of research financing in a 
small number of institutions was combined with a proposal for awarding 
the title of university to “teaching-only” institutions. However, this was 
rejected by universities as a threat to the traditional relationship between 
education and research inherited from the idea of the Humboldtian Uni-
versity. The March 2004 Consultation Report by the Dfes (2004b), 
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showed that analysis of responses to the consultation on proposed new 
criteria for degree awarding powers and university title concluded: 
“There were mixed views on the proposal to allow institutions with only 
taught degree awarding powers (DAP) to be eligible for university title (UT) 
in future. Universities UK and individual universities generally opposed the 
proposal with the Standing Committee of Principals (SCOP) and other higher 
education institutions (HEIs) in support.” (Dfes 2004, p. 2) 
However, in the comments to the responses on the 2003 White Paper 
public consultation, the Ministry argued that excellent teaching can take 
place where teachers are not engaged in publicly funded research (DFES 
2004a). In May 2004 the Dfes produced a new discussion paper, Re-
newable Degree Awarding Powers (Dfes 2004c), proposing that instead 
of maintaining the practice of granting degree awarding powers (DAP) 
on an indefinite basis, “DAP should in future be granted for fixed terms, 
renewable subject to satisfactory external audit”. The analysis of re-
sponses to the consultation (Dfeds 2004d) concluded that “there was an 
overwhelming response in favour of organisations in the publicly-funded 
higher education sector gaining indefinite DAP while other organisa-
tions have fixed term DAP”.  
On 16 July 2004 Higher Education Minister Alan Johnson made a 
statement to the House of Commons announcing his decision to grant 
the university title on the basis of taught degree awarding powers and 
number of students, thus allowing institutions without research degree 
awarding powers to gain the title. This means that the Government was 
not receptive to widespread public opposition, and was committed to 
implement its policy of concentrating research funding even at the ex-
pense of decoupling teaching and research. 
In August 2004, the Dfes issued the “Guidance for applicant organi-
sations in England and Wales” (Dfes 2004e) including provisions for an 
organisation applying for the title of University provided that it must: 
• have been granted powers to award taught degrees; 
• normally have at least 4,000 full time equivalent higher education 
students, of whom at least 3,000 are registered on degree level 
courses (including foundation degree programmes); and, 
• be able to demonstrate that it has regard to the principles of good 
governance as are relevant to its sector.
Despite this clear policy of concentration of research resources in a 
small number of research institutions, and the establishment of “teach-
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ing-only” institutions, the survey of the PA Consulting reveals that 
“most universities continue to regard their research strengths in particu-
lar areas as an important competitive differentiator, and are planning to 
increase their investment in selected research areas” (2004, p. 19) thus 
opposing the objectives of government policy.  
This shows that the myth of the Humboldtian university still persists 
not only in academia but also in society, ignoring Habermas’ proposition 
(1987, p. 41) that “the assertion of un-broken faithfulness to Humboldt 
is the life-lie of too many of our present day European universities and 
academics”. Lindsay and Rogers (1998) argue that students tend to make 
decisions in terms of an institution’s reputation, which is determined 
mainly by the institution’s research reputation rather than the quality of 
teaching. And this might explain why university managers think that 
giving the institution a research profile is still good business, even if 
funds need to be raised from sources alternative to public funding. 
4.2 The case of Portugal 
We have used data collected in our research projects for the Portuguese 
case. In Portugal the awareness of the economic value of education 
slowly permeated the political jargon during the 1960s as the authorities 
assumed there was a connexion between the supply of skilled labour and 
the rate of economic growth. This was a major consequence of Portu-
gal’s participation in the OECD (then the OEEC) Mediterranean Re-
gional Project (MRP) together with Italy, Greece, Spain, and Yugosla-
via. The MRP was the first large-scale international educational plan-
ning exercise, and created a scenario where the capacity building of hu-
man resources played a major role in economic policy. In the early 
1970s these political changes materialised in the expansion of the higher 
education system, including initial steps in the implementation of a bi-
nary system. 
After the 1974 Revolution the importance of education in economic 
policy remained unchallenged. The 1975 Government Action Pro-
gramme recognised that: “Educational policy has its place in this Pro-
gramme of Social and Economic Policy as one of the fundamental tools 
for promoting economic development…” (Programa do Governo Pro-
visório 1975, pp. 9-10). The World Bank strongly supported this politi-
cal orientation. From 1978 to 1984, the Bank sent 19 Missions of Super-
vision to Portugal to provide technical assistance. These missions have 
had a significant impact on educational policies that reflected the Bank’s 
strong views on direct links between higher education and the needs of 
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the economy (Teixeira et al. 2003). These views are repeated over and 
over in the World Bank’s reports for the Portuguese government: 
“…an investigation linked to manpower requirements, needs to be undertaken 
in the higher education system with a view not only to determining the nature 
and areas of specialisations required for economic development of the country 
…” (World Bank 1977, p. 14) 
“…rationalising educational development in accordance with plans for eco-
nomic development and manpower needs, particularly in reference to secon-
dary and tertiary levels.” (World Bank 1977, p. i) 
“…rationalising educational development at the secondary and tertiary levels 
in accordance with the country’s economic plans, manpower requirements, 
and available resources.” (World Bank 1977, p. ii) 
 But the Bank also provided support for the introduction of a generalised 
system of numerus clausus to contain the fast expansion of enrolments 
observed after the 1974 Revolution – enrolments jumped by almost one-
third in three years: “In view of the rapidly increased university enrol-
ments, which represent an uneconomical drain in the economy…[the 
Bank recommends a] gradual introduction of quantitative restraints…” 
(World Bank 1977, p. ii). The Bank has also been in favour of the im-
plementation of vocationally oriented institutions (polytechnics) offering 
shorter degrees than the university sub-system. However, without reduc-
ing the supply of university graduates, particularly in engineering, 
graduates from the polytechnics might find employment opportunities 
scarce; the Bank saw this as a threat to the new short vocational educa-
tion programmes. 
The investments in the non-university education system, given prior-
ity over the higher education system, produced an increasing number of 
candidates to higher education, which combined with the limits to access 
to higher education set by the numeri clausi created an increasing mis-
match between the number of candidates and the number of vacancies. 
By the mid-1980s the situation had become intolerable as a large num-
ber of young people were left outside higher education without any 
credible alternative. This context promoted the emergence of private 
non-profit higher education institutions, which have developed quickly 
under the political patronage of Minister of Education Roberto Carneiro 
(1987-1991), an indefatigable champion of the private sector. 
There has been strong support at the political discourse level for a 
much more prominent role for private higher education, clearly assumed 
by leading political actors as an important ideological instrument for 
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strengthening Portuguese democracy, and as a tool for its social and 
economic development. On the other hand, the lack of public resources 
and a climate of financial stringency have paved the way for the devel-
opment of the private sector as it contributed to increase student enrol-
ment without additional demands on the public budget. 
At the time of the revolution the supply of private higher education 
was basically restricted to the Portuguese Catholic University. Minister 
Vitor Crespo (1980-1982) allowed for the establishment of the first pri-
vate university and Minister Deus Pinheiro (1985-1987) authorised an 
additional significant number of private institutions. However, the con-
solidation and expansion of the private sector is associated in general 
with Minister Roberto Carneiro (1987-1991) who did not hide his ideo-
logical belief in the private sector. In 1989 Carneiro created very favour-
able conditions for expansion of the private sector by eliminating mini-
mum passing marks on entrance examinations to higher education; al-
most doubling demand from one day to the next. Students have been al-
lowed to enter higher education even with zero marks in the entrance 
examinations, which has only become a tool for ranking students in the 
national competition for vacancies. This has created a huge market for 
the expansion of the private sector without close scrutiny of the quality 
of educational provision. 
Expansion has been very fast in terms of enrolment. In 1983/84 pub-
lic enrolments represented 88.6% against 11.4% of the private sector; in 
1990/91 the values were 72.5% and 27.5% respectively; in 1995/96 the 
public sector represented 63.4% against 36.6% for the private sector; in 
2000/01 the public sector accounted for 70.4% and the private sector for 
29.65; and in 2003/04 the public sector had increased to 72.6% and the 
private sector had decreased to 27.4%. These values show that after a 
very fast increase of the private sector its enrolments have been declin-
ing over the last few years. 
Expansion of higher education and its diversification, as well as the 
increase of student enrolments in fields of economic importance have 
been explicit government policy goals for almost two decades. Minister 
Carneiro placed high expectations on the private sector to fulfil these 
goals. It was believed not only that private institutions would provide an 
educational provision better adapted to economic and regional demands 
and societal needs, but would also contribute to the diversity of the sys-
tem in geographic as well as disciplinary terms (Sousa Franco 1994).
Contrary to those expectations however, the private sector developed 
in directions opposite to the government’s objectives. Figures 1 and 2 
represent the vacancies of the private and public sectors arranged by dis-
ciplinary areas (Table 1) for the period 1992/93 to 1998/99.  
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Table 1: Disciplinary areas 
Code Area Code Area 
100 Teacher training 600 Agriculture 
200 Arts and Humanities 700 Health and Social security 
300 Social Sciences,  
Commerce and Law 
800 Services 
400 Sciences 900 Others 
500 Architecture and 
Engineering
It is obvious that the private sector (Figure 1) concentrates its offer 
mainly in area 300 (Social Sciences, Commerce and Law), 47.8% of the 
total offer, almost ignoring the areas 400 (Sciences) and 500 (Architec-
ture and Engineering) in opposition to the government declared priori-
ties. In the public sector (Figure 2) the distribution across disciplines is 
more balanced, with area 300 only 28.4% of the total offer against 
35.8% of the combined areas 400 and 500. 
Figure 1: Vacancies in private institutions by disciplinary areas (92/93 
   to 98/99)
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Figure 2: Vacancies in public institutions by disciplinary areas (92/93 
   to 98/99) 
The contribution of the private sector has also not fulfilled political ex-
pectations that it would contribute to better regional distribution of 
higher education institutions throughout Portugal, i.e., to more equitable 
regional diversity. Figure 3 shows that private HEIs have concentrated 
mainly in the most populated areas of the districts of Lisbon (and 
Setúbal) – in the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region – and Porto – in the 
North Region – where available vacancies largely exceed those offered 
by the public sector. “Indeed, the element of profit present in the mar-
ket’s logic explains why private institutions avoid less developed re-
gions or regions with lower population density” (Correia et al. 2002 p.  
110).
Figure 3: Regional distribution of vacancies – private sector 
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This development of the private HE sector has been criticised by the 
World Bank. In its 1989 report the Bank considered that the Portuguese 
government still lacked a policy on private higher education institutions, 
allowing them to increase the imbalances of the scientific and regional 
distribution of higher education supply (Amaral and Teixeira 2000). 
These results show that the government’s explicit goals of diversifi-
cation and economic relevance have not been fully attained despite a 
rather restrictive legal framework that imposed the Ministry’s authorisa-
tion before the private sector and the public polytechnics could initiate 
new study programmes. The government has adopted a lax regulation 
approach allowing both the mushrooming of the private sector in a di-
rection contrary to the aims of the diversification policy (geographical 
distortions and insufficient supply of technical degrees), as well as some 
academic drift of the polytechnics. Despite general political statements 
hinting at greater disciplinary and regional diversity and increased re-
sponsiveness to economic and social demands, the government’s ‘lais-
sez-faire’ attitude has allowed the private sector to develop in a most un-
controlled manner, and in directions contrary to the government’s objec-
tives. For more detailed information on the impact of the private higher 
education sector upon the development of Portuguese education see 
Teixeira and Amaral (2001) and Correia et al. (2002).
The government’s planning ineptitude and its permissive attitude 
towards the private sector has resulted in disaster. The expansion trend 
of demand was reversed in 1996 when the number of candidates for 
higher education started to decline. At the time, the gross participation 
rate was already over 40% of the relevant age cohort and the govern-
ment shifted its attention from increasing ‘quantity’ to improving ‘qual-
ity’. Pass examinations at the end of the tenth and eleventh grades, and 
national examinations for each subject at the end of the twelfth grade, 
have been re-established and Minister Marçal Grilo has reversed the 
permissive access rules set by Carneiro. Higher education institutions 
are allowed to set minimum marks in the access examinations to higher 
education, putting an end to the ludicrous situation of students to enter-
ing with zero marks. This move to improve quality has taken place at the 
same time that the consequences of two decades of low birth rate were 
beginning to affect the size of the 18-24-age cohort (Amaral and 
Teixeira 1999). The combined result of these two trends – raising the 
standards to enter higher education and decreasing the age cohort – has 
created a severe crisis that can force the collapse of many private institu-
tions.
The establishment of this “market-like” competition for students will 
influence future developments of the Portuguese higher education sys-
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tem. Private institutions have everything to lose in this game,: they are 
more expensive for students, their recruitment is very local, and their so-
cial prestige is not very strong. Not only the private sector is facing a 
challenge however; public polytechnics, especially those located in 
towns where there are also well-established universities competing di-
rectly for the available students, will face increasing enrolment difficul-
ties, as well as some of the younger public universities located in less 
populated inland regions. Recent legislation enforcing minimum marks 
in the national access exams for every candidate to higher education 
(public or private, universities or polytechnics) may contribute to rein-
force the declining trend of enrolments.
4.3 Comments 
The PA Consulting group report (2004) compared the objectives of the 
government against the intentions of Vice-Chancellors and concluded 
that “market responses may not deliver the collective policy goals for 
higher education” (PA Consulting 2004, p. 6) as “there is a paradoxical 
dissonance between the objectives driving government-led changes in 
higher education policy and the responses being pursued by vice-
chancellors” (PA Consulting, p. 8).  
We argue that this ‘paradoxical dissonance’ can be easily explained
by taking into account that changes of the UK higher education system 
have strongly relied on market-based solutions. Shattock (2003) states 
“financial stringency, competition, the RAE [Research Assessment Ex-
ercise] and other factors have had the effect of considerably sharpening 
institutional management.” Therefore, universities have learned the hard 
way and many will no longer pursue policy goals that do not correspond 
to ‘good business’. 
The PA Consulting report is clear in the UK case in recognising that 
vice-chancellors look for opportunities for their institutions under the le-
gal framework imposed by the government, which does not guarantee 
convergence with the government policy goals for the system (PA Con-
sulting 2004). Some national objectives such as social inclusion or 
closer collaboration with local companies might not be considered sound 
business opportunities by institutions. PA Consulting considers this 
mismatch between government objectives and institutional strategies 
might result in increased government control and interference: 
“…Government’s encouragement of a competitive environment among uni-
versities is succeeding to a point, but that market outcomes may not yet fully 
align with all the Government’s objectives. This is likely to require a more ac-
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tive role from Government in managing and influencing both the demand and 
supply side of the emerging market.” (PA Consulting 2004, p. 21) 
Vice-chancellors have strongly resented the contradiction between mar-
ket-like competition and the increasingly interventionist role played by 
the state. One respondent stated: 
“The White Paper has a contradiction at its heart: on the one hand, it vigor-
ously promotes market forces and greater competition; on the other hand, it in-
creases forms of central regulation, sets limits to prices, and is very prescrip-
tive.” (PA Consulting 2004, p. 8) 
The vision of increasing government interference is shared by a signifi-
cant number of researchers and institutions. For Tapper and Salter 
(2004, p. 12) increasing state intervention has been eroding institutional 
autonomy to force institutions to deliver outcomes in keeping with po-
litically defined goals “over time the political control of policy direction 
has become both more all-encompassing and more detailed”. 
In its response to the 2003 White Paper the Royal Society (30 April 
2003) suggested:
“… the Government needs to recognise that it is more important to have the 
correct governance arrangements, coupled with appropriate reporting of statis-
tical and other output information, than to be constantly trying to steer and mi-
cromanage HEIs from the centre.”  
This analysis shows a developing state interference to ensure that politi-
cal objectives are fulfilled, even if the government’s proposals are con-
tradictory or not consensual. For instance, the Royal Society (Tapper 
and Salter 2004) considered that “further  significant increases to re-
search selectivity at a departmental level would have serious  detrimen-
tal consequences” and “extending the use of the title ‘university’ may 
not  achieve this end [to increase the status of HEIs] and could have 
other undesirable consequences. 
The Portuguese case is somewhat different from the UK case, as it 
represents a typical example of a weak state, unable to properly steer the 
system, resorting to “a bureaucratic weak and arbitrary form of interven-
tion based on prescriptive fiat and rigid rules and procedures” (Kraak 
2001, p. 31).
The Portuguese private sector is mainly non-profit (at least on paper) 
and does not receive direct public subsidies, depending for its survival 
on the revenues from tuition fees and other taxes paid by students. As 
private institutions cannot easily spare money for discretionary funding, 
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they assume strong elements of for-profit behaviour (Massy 2004a), 
which have resulted in strategies contrary to the government’s objec-
tives. This has led the private sector to concentrate its offer in areas of 
low running costs and low investment – Social Sciences, Commerce, 
and Law – while avoiding strong involvement in areas such as Architec-
ture and Engineering, despite the government’s political decision of giv-
ing priority to these areas.
This “weak state” behaviour has also been evident in the govern-
ment’s lack of capacity to resist pressures to expand the system by 
authorising an increasing number of private institutions and study pro-
grammes. This has led the Portuguese higher education system to a deep 
crisis; public and private sectors have been allowed to develop without 
taking decreasing birth rates into account, which has created an overca-
pacity that will last for more than two decades. At present there are ob-
vious signs of this crisis as some private institutions merge and others go 
bankrupt or are sold. Only when this crisis was evident did the state in-
tervene, sporadically resorting to extraordinary measures that attempt to 
force reality to conform to the results desired by the political actors.
There are signs of the emergence of reinforced state interference in 
Portugal. The Law 1/2003, passed in January 2003, determines:
• the establishment of a new higher education institution requires prior 
accreditation – based on criteria of the expected quality of teaching, 
social relevance, and financial viability – by the Ministry after con-
sulting the recently established Higher Education Council;
• the creation of new departments or faculties in existing higher edu-
cation institutions follow similar procedures; 
• that the pedagogical autonomy of public universities be lowered to a 
level close to the level of autonomy of polytechnics and the private 
sector;
• that a system of ‘academic accreditation’ be implemented by the 
same agencies responsible for the quality evaluation system; 
• that the Ministry may use the results of accreditation to close down 
institutions and study programmes; 
• that the Ministry may close down study programmes with low en-
rolments;
• that under specific circumstances, the Ministry may establish the ba-
sic curricula of the different study programmes offered at national 
level.
The Portuguese government has also made other political decisions that 
may be seen as a movement towards a market regulated system, more 
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compatible with its neo-liberal inclination (Teixeira et al. 2004). But 
these ‘pro-market’ decisions have been obscured by a decisive move-
ment towards state interference that denounces a weak state and its lack 
of sophistication that precludes efficient steering. 
5.  Conclusions 
The two cases support the thesis that autonomous institutions may de-
velop strategies to ensure institutional advantages even when they are 
contrary to governmental policy objectives, thus opening the way to 
government intervention. One observes a contradiction between a neo-
liberal rhetoric that favours market regulation and the reduction of state 
intervention and a de facto increase of intervention by the state. 
In the UK, government intervention is more systematic; in the ‘weak 
state’ of Portugal government intrusion to change the rules of the game 
is more arbitrary and occurred only after a crisis situation was declared.
One might say that the new relationship between the HEIs and the 
government is portrayed by the “roundabout model” (Jongbloed 2004) 
but with an increasing number of (government) traffic lights inside the 
roundabout restricting the routes. This is consistent with the idea that an 
effective delegation of ‘public-interest decision-making’ authority to in-
stitutions requires “an affirmative desire to interpret and serve the public 
good, the will to hold institutional self-interest at bay, and the financial 
strength to balance intrinsic values with market forces” (Massy 2004b, 
p. 33). Unchecked behaviour of institutions however, especially under 
conditions of strong competition and financial stringency, may not cor-
respond to the best public interest, which makes a strong case for gov-
ernment intervention.
Therefore, one has to infer that it is very unlikely that Prometheus 
will be unchained in the visible future. The modern Zeus wants to give 
knowledge to the mortals – even if his idea is that they will repay this 
gift with their labour under less stable contracting conditions – and he is 
afraid that an unchained Prometheus will place his own interest above 
that of the humans he used to protect, thus interfering with God’s plans. 
This is a post-modern version of Greek mythology where Prometheus, 
the former mythic friend of humanity becomes the bad guy that the eagle 
(the state) will continue tormenting, in some cases in a more sporadic 
but also more savage way. 
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Creating Public-Private Dynamics in
Higher Education Funding:
A Discussion of Three Options
BEN JONGBLOED 
1.  Introduct ion 
In January 2004, the Economist ran a couple of articles on the sorry state 
of higher education. One was called “Pay or Decay” (Economist 2004) 
and painted a very bleak picture of universities in Britain and elsewhere 
in continental Europe. The message was twofold: (1) students should 
bear more of the costs of bringing them a university degree, and (2) uni-
versities should be freed from the burden of state planning and regula-
tion. The model propagated by the magazine to fulfil both goals simulta-
neously was one in which universities would be free to decide on the 
level of the tuition fees and the number of students admitted to their 
programs. It was argued that governments would have to rethink the way 
they fund their higher education institutions. This recipe for reform 
would be a significant break with Europe’s tradition of providing indi-
viduals with a higher education at very little or no cost. While some will 
disagree with part of the evidence brought forward by the Economist to 
justify its call for reform, there is no denying that students receive a sig-
nificant private return out of their investment in higher education. 
Graduates earn significantly more than non-graduates and are less likely 
to be unemployed, therefore there is an efficiency argument that can be 
brought forward to justify the raising (or introduction) of tuition fees to 
be paid by students. One may also invoke the equity argument because 
most students are from families that may be regarded as more advan-
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taged than others. In other words, the funding of higher education is very 
much one of finding a balance between public and private contributions.  
This public-private debate is also very much present in the incentive 
structure for the mechanisms used by governments to allocate public 
funding to the providers of higher education. Given that governments 
face increasing claims on their purse from sectors such as health care, 
security, and care for the elderly, one cannot expect that higher educa-
tion providers are likely to receive more state funding. Both govern-
ments and providers will try and make sure that whatever is received in 
terms of public subsidies is used in the most cost-efficient way. The 
mechanisms for allocating public funds contain a number of regulations 
and incentives that each have implications for the achievement of higher 
education’s three main goals, that is: quality, efficiency, and equity. 
Policymakers’ efforts at promoting cost efficiency and enhancing educa-
tional quality have given rise to a diverse and sometimes quite elaborate 
array of funding systems and regulatory frameworks. To bring these in-
centive frameworks and incentive structures as closely as possible in line 
with incentives to generate increased private resources for higher educa-
tion would seem to be the challenge that governments and providers are 
confronted with these days. Indeed, in many countries, policymakers and 
parliaments are seriously rethinking the way their higher education sys-
tems may be funded, coordinated, and steered; and to what extent public 
entities and private agents should be responsible for meeting the cost of 
higher education. 
The message of this contribution is that it is not only the level of 
(public and private) funding, but just as much the basis and criteria ac-
cording to which public funds are made available that can improve the 
efficiency, quality, and accessibility of higher education. To discuss 
these criteria (in section 5), this chapter looks at funding mechanisms – 
funding models – and how they may be classified (section 3). Three op-
tions for the public funding of higher education are discussed (section 
4), along with their potential in realising the goals of generating addi-
tional private funding and contributions to the goals of efficiency, qual-
ity, and access. Preceding this analytical part, section 2 briefly presents 
some factual information on the contributions made by the public sector 
and the private sector in terms of financing higher education. 
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2. Publ ic  and pr ivate expenditure on
higher  educat ion
A great deal of literature exists on the appropriate means for funding 
higher education (Greenaway and Haynes 2003; Chapman 1997; Barr
and Crawford 1998) that suggests that the burden of paying for higher 
education may be shifted away from the general taxpayer to the student. 
This chapter is not the place to start a debate on the arguments that state 
that the main beneficiaries of higher education (i.e., students) should 
bear the main burden of the cost of tuition. Instead we merely present 
some basic facts on the relative shares of the public and private shares in 
the funding of higher education systems in some OECD member states.  
Figure 1: Expenditure on higher education institutions, 2000 
Source: Based on OECD (2003), Table B 2.1b (Tertiary education total) and Table B 
3.2 (Tertiary Education; relative proportion of private sources). 
Note: Contributions from students are net of tuition fees paid by government. 
Based on figures from OECD’s Education at a Glance (OECD 2003), 
figure 1 simultaneously shows total expenditure on tertiary (or higher)
education institutions as a percentage of GDP (vertically) and the share 
of total expenditures that originates from non-public sources such as 
students, donations, and other non-government sources (horizontally). 
The message expressed by the OECD (OECD 2004, pp. 131-132) is that 
those countries that have been able to channel more than 2% of GDP 
into higher education – the United States, Korea, Canada, and Israel – all 
raise a substantial share of funding from these alternative sources. The 
Netherlands occupies a ‘middle position’; it raises one-fifth of spending 
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from private sources, higher compared to many other OECD countries, 
but well below the share in the countries with a high (i.e., more than 2% 
of GDP) total spending on higher education. Many of the Western Euro-
pean countries are situated in the left part of the diagram, where private 
contributions are low and higher education expenditure is between 1 and 
1.5% of GDP. 
Many OECD member states traditionally provide individuals with a 
higher education at very little or no cost -Germany, France, and the 
Scandinavian countries. In many European countries full-time students 
only pay a low tuition fee or no fee at all. In many other countries (e.g., 
the UK, the Netherlands) government offsets the fees by means of grants 
and scholarships.
Figure 2: Resource flows to and from higher education institutions 
Figure 2 shows the most important resource flows to and from higher 
education institutions. We can identify three main sources of funding for 
higher education institutions: (1) governments, (2) students and house-
holds, and (3) other private entities. Government resources include op-
erational grants (for both teaching and research), capital investment, and 
research grants paid directly to institutions. Student payments include 
tuition fees and charges for ancillary services.1 Other private payments 
                                             
1 The government may act as a financial intermediary, providing loans to 
students to meet some or all of the costs. Education institutions may meet 
the costs of the tuition by awarding scholarships. 
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and resources include private donations and gifts and payments for con-
sulting, patents, and other services. 
 We now present some facts about the levels of tuition fees. The lev-
els of fees (expressed in Euros) for the academic year 2000/2001 are 
shown in Table 1 (Jongbloed 2004). It is immediately clear that in many 
European countries tuition fees are either non-existent or comparatively 
low.
From 1977 to 1998, tuition fees for undergraduate students in the 
United Kingdom were paid automatically by the government – through 
the Local Education Authorities. Three fee categories (or fee bands) ex-
isted: classroom-based subjects (a fee of £750 in 1997/98), laboratory-
based courses (£1,600), and medical courses (£2,800). From the aca-
demic year 1998/1999, the government implemented a flat-rate tuition 
charge of £1,000 per student per year, irrespective of university or sub-
ject studied. This was accompanied by an income test, which meant that 
students from poor backgrounds paid no fees and students from well-off 
backgrounds paid the entire fee. In between a lower and an upper in-
come threshold, a tuition fee was charged on the basis of a sliding scale. 
Until 2006, the fee was set at £1,100 (€1,500) representing the highest 
level in Europe. From 2006, English universities are allowed to charge 
up to £3000 per year per student. Students are allowed to borrow 
through a state-run loan scheme and pay back their loan once they start 
earning an above-threshold salary. Students who cannot will not have to 
pay an up-front fee. Instead, the Student Loans Company will pay 
money into the university’s bank account to pay each student’s fees and 
it pays money into the student’s account to help him/her meet living 
costs.
In the Netherlands, tuition fees for regular full-time students are cen-
trally determined by Parliament (based on policy proposals by the Min-
ister of Education) and are uniform for all subjects in the two main sec-
tors in higher education, the universities and the hogescholen (universi-
ties of professional education). The rate for full-time students amounts 
to around €1,500, rising with inflation. However, in recent years, the 
Dutch parliament has allowed institutions to charge higher fees for a se-
lective number of programs that provide a demonstrably higher added 
value to the students. Turning to the countries that charge low or modest 
fees, we first point out the cases of Belgium (the Flanders community) 
and France. Here uniform national fees do exist, but students receiving 
student support are exempted. In France, bursary holders, representing 
around 15% of all students in the first (two-year) and second (one- to 
three-year) cycle of higher education, do not pay fees. Regular students 
in the French public institutions are pay fees set by the ministry of Edu-
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cation, ranging from €100 for general programs to €800 for specialised 
programs. In private institutions the fees are determined by the institu-
tions and are much higher. In Belgium, bursary holders only pay some 
15% of the tuition fee paid by non-holders. In the Scandinavian coun-
tries and Germany, the only contributions paid by students are (compul-
sory) student union membership fees or health services payments. In 
Greece (not shown in the table) there are no fees. In Italy, since 1992 
universities are free to impose fees, which may vary from €400 to (in 
some cases) €2,500 and are levied on top of registration fees. The public 
universities in Spain have to charge uniform fees according to field and 
level of study. The fees vary between €500 and €750. Austria introduced 
tuition fees in 2001. The level of the fee is the same across all institu-
tions: €726. 
Table 1: Tuition fees in selected OECD countries: rates in year 2000/ 
   2001 (in Euro) 
Country Type/sector of 
higher education 
Public
institutions 
Private
institutions 
  Min. Max. Min. Max. 
Austria Fachhochschule (Ba), 
Universität (Ba/Ma) 
726 726   
Denmark Ba/Ma 0 0   
Finland Ba/Ma 51 86   
Flanders
(Belgium) 
higher vocational 
education (Bachelor) 
50 406   
 university (Ba/Ma) 80 660   
France Université (Ba) 104   
Université (Ma) 800   
Grandes Écoles 1,400 5,600 
Germany Universität (Ba/ 
Ma)/Fachhochschule
(Ba)
Studenten-
beitrag  50 
Ireland University, college 670 670   
Netherlands hogeschool (higher 
vocational education; 
Ba)
1,302 1,302 1,585 2,950 
 university (Ba/Ma) 1,302 1,302  5,210 
 part-time and ‘slow 
lane’ students 
(unis/hogeschool)
1,302 2,605   
 MBA programs 4,500 24,000 
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Country type/sector of higher 
education
Public
institutions 
Private
institutions 
  Min. Max. Min. Max. 
England & 
Wales 
Bachelor (UK/EU stu-
dents)
1,500 1,500   
 Bachelor (non-EU stu-
dents)
4,860 12,810   
    Master: taught MA 
(UK/EU students) 
Master: research 
(UK/EU students) 
3,000
3,910
4,500
4,640
 Master (non-EU stu-
dents)
7,880 12,920   
 MBA programs average: 14,290   
Scotland Bachelor graduate en-
dowment: 2,840 
Spain university 500 770  
Sweden Ba/Ma Union fee:  30   
Australia Bachelor (Australian 
students) humanities, 
social sciences, educa-
tion, nursing, arts eco-
nomics, natural sci-
ences, engineering, 
math., IT medicine, law
HECS rates: 
2,076
2,957
3,461
 Bachelor (fee-paying 
Australian students) 
Bachelor (overseas stu-
dents) Master (course-
work Ma; Australian 
students) Master (re-
search Ma; Australian 
students)
4,500 – 12,500 
7,200 – 14,400 
3,500 – 6,800 
HECS rates 
New
Zealand
university (Ba) average: 1,720 
(depending on 
institution)
average: 2,400 
(depending on 
program) 
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Country type/sector of 
higher education 
Public
institutions 
Private
institutions 
  Min. Max. Min. Max. 
United
States
 average Min- 
max 
average min-max 
 university (Bache-
lor, 4-year)
2,890 1,260-
6,930
16,650 13,620-
21,870
 university (Ma) 3,500 12,030  
 university (first pro-
fessional degree in 
Law)
6,670 18,160  
 university (first 
prof. degree in 
Medicine)
9,980 23,740  
Source: Jongbloed (2004) 
Apart from the Netherlands and the UK, European governments have 
tried to stick to a tradition of free (or relatively inexpensive) education 
for all. Parliaments have been very reluctant to introduce tuition fees. 
Irish Parliament even decided to abolish fees in 1996, which means that 
as of 2003 Irish students pay an annual registration fee of €670. Previ-
ously Irish students paid substantial tuition fees (on top of the registra-
tion fee), ranging from €2,400 to €4,500, depending on the level and 
field of study. Many countries have some form of regulation of domestic 
undergraduate fees, setting the fees at modest levels. There is less regu-
lation in the case of fees for part-time students or students in postgradu-
ate programs (masters, e.g., MBA). The freedom of universities to levy 
and set fees is quite limited. Some deregulation took place in Australia, 
where universities can offer a limited number of unregulated fee-paying 
positions to domestic undergraduate students once universities have 
filled up their quota of Commonwealth funded positions. For students in 
government supported positions, tuition fees are set at three levels ac-
cording to the so-called Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
(HECS). The HECS rates (see table 1) reflect the differing costs univer-
sities incur when delivering courses on the various disciplinary fields. 
However the rates also take into account the potential future earning ca-
pacity of graduates. This is the reason why law is in the highest ‘fee 
band’. However, as in the UK, a bill was passed recently in Australia to 
allow universities more freedom in setting their fees. The bill has some 
similarities to the UK Bill accepted by the Parliament in 2004 in the 
sense that (from the year 2005 on) universities are free to set the fees for 
their undergraduate students up to a maximum that differs according to 
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the subject group (there are three ‘bands’) in which the program is cate-
gorised. The maximum is three times the HECS rate.
With Austrian and German higher education administrators and poli-
ticians slowly getting used to the idea of student fees, one can see fees 
and graduate contributions becoming an unavoidable ingredient of 
higher education systems in continental Europe. When the next step – 
flexible fees – will be taken is still unsure. Flexible fees can have bene-
ficial effects. They would allow the price mechanism to work and 
achieve a better balance between supply and demand for higher educa-
tion courses (Jongbloed 2004). Such fees would act as a rationing device 
in situations of scarcity and allow institutions to raise resources for high-
demand programs. Another role for flexible fees is to work as a signal-
ling device, giving prospective students information about costs and 
quality of the various higher education programs on offer. However, it is 
largely accepted that the recipe of flexible fees can work only hand in 
hand with a loans system that allows students to defer payment of their 
fees until after they graduate (Barr 2003). Allowing students the option 
to defer the payment of fees is an element of the Australian financing 
system and the British system. To prevent the fear of debt deterring en-
rolment of students from lower social economic groups, the government 
would have to tie the repayment of student debt to the graduate’s income 
(Barr 2001). Policies aimed at increasing the private funding would have 
to go hand in hand with policies aimed at reducing the risks that (pro-
spective) students face. The design of the debt collection system is an 
important element of the set of policies. This means that efforts would 
have to be undertaken in the area of providing information to students 
and their parents as well as designing a system of providing targeted 
grants to disadvantaged groups in society for whom access is fragile.
3.  Funding mechanisms: a classi f icat ion 
We now turn to public funding and discuss the models and arrangements 
for the public funding of higher education. Governments provide direct 
financial support to universities and colleges (see top arrow in diagram 
2) because higher education provides positive externalities – monetary 
as well as non-monetary benefits – that impact on others than the indi-
vidual that takes up a higher education program. We stress here that the 
funding of universities is not just for economic reasons; there is no 
proven connection between spending on universities and economic 
prosperity (Wolf 2002). Because of the social benefits, subsidies are 
channelled to universities. The basis for the subsidies (the level and the 
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distribution across institutions and programs) lies in political, social, and 
economic criteria. Ultimately the exact criteria are determined in politi-
cal debates in parliament, but influenced – to a large extent – by social 
and economic realities. Some parliaments would like to achieve a uni-
form and egalitarian higher education landscape (for instance equal sub-
sidies for all students in all programs), or achieve specific economic ob-
jectives such as addressing shortages in key labour markets. Other poli-
cymakers would like to see a diverse and market-driven system emerge 
(e.g., subsidies distributed competitively). In other words, funding ar-
rangements differ across higher education systems. 
For the classification of funding arrangements two questions may be 
used (Jongbloed and Koelman 2000): 
a. What is funded by the government? 
b. How is it funded?  
Question (a) concerns the funding base for the government allocations to 
higher education institutions: Are the funds tied to educational outputs
and performance, or rather to inputs? Question (b) relates to the issue of 
the degree of market orientation in the funding arrangements. Whose de-
cisions actually underlie the observed flow of government funds to higher 
education institutions, or: ‘What drives the system?’ The answer may be 
found by paying attention to issues such as: to what extent are funded 
numbers or funded (research and degree) programs regulated (or planned) 
by central authorities? And: do higher education institutions compete for 
funds (i.e. students, research programs)? Do they have the right to deter-
mine the level of tuition fees by themselves? Can they select their stu-
dents?
Question (a) can be rephrased as follows: What is the degree of out-
put orientation in the public funding? When financial means are made 
available to institutions to cover distinct costs such as staff salaries, ma-
terial means, building maintenance costs, investment, or so-called ‘costs 
to continue’ this is called input funding. If the budgets are driven by 
measures of activity such as the number of students enrolled in an insti-
tution, we also speak of input funding, because student numbers will 
largely determine the level of inputs spent in the instruction process. In 
contrast, in funding arrangements where institutional budgets are tied to 
specific teaching and research outcomes of the institutions’ activities we 
speak of output funding. Funding on the basis of output is believed to 
contain more incentives for efficient behaviour than input funding. If 
budgets depend on performance measures, there is reason to believe that 
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those who receive the budgets will pay increased attention to their per-
formance.
Question (b) relates to the issue of market orientation in the funding 
arrangements. One of the characteristics of market orientation is the de-
gree of competition implied by the funding decisions. Stated differently: 
“Are funded student numbers or funded (research, degree) programs 
regulated (or planned) by central authorities or are the funding flows 
driven by the decisions of the clients (students, private firms, research 
councils/foundations)?” The answer to this question may be translated 
into a measure for the degree of centralisation, distinguishing a situation 
of intensive government oversight and regulation from a situation in 
which consumer and producer sovereignty is large. At the extreme end 
of regulation the government determines the institutions’ resources cen-
trally, for instance by prescribing the exact numbers of students in dif-
ferent programs. In the deregulated case, individual decisions made by 
students and education providers drive the system. Here, institutions 
have considerable latitude to operate as they see fit and institutions have 
a large autonomy over how funding is procured and spent. In practical 
situations, the degree of centralisation (or market orientation) will lie 
somewhere between the two extremes.
In the figure below, the vertical axis depicts the degree of (de-) cen-
tralisation and a horizontal axis expresses the degree to which govern-
ments are paying for the results (outcomes) instead of the efforts (in-
puts). We distinguish four quadrants (Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4) to classify 
funding arrangements. 
Figure 3: Four funding systems 
We now provide a number of examples that relate to the four types of 
funding.
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Q1: planned, input-based funding through providers 
The top-left-hand portion of the diagram represents a centralised system 
of funding. It shows a more traditional type of budgeting, where alloca-
tions are based on requests (activity plans, budget proposals) submitted 
to budgetary authorities. This is known as negotiated funding. In this 
mechanism, the budget allocation is often based on the previous year’s 
allocation of specific budget items. Separate budget items are then nego-
tiated between representatives of educational institutions and the funding 
authorities (i.e., the ministry, or funding council). Annual changes (usu-
ally increases) in each budget item are treated individually, with discus-
sion taking place on the basis of cost projections. In this case, budget 
items are likely to include categories such as staff salaries, material re-
quirements, building maintenance costs, and investment. Funding is line 
item based, and shows the different expenditure items as separate lines 
of the budget. These line items are determined by referring to norms 
with respect to indicators such as unit costs (or unit cost rises) or capac-
ity (e.g., funded number of students). The German and French funding 
systems still retain much of these characteristics. 
Q2: performance-based funding of providers 
Quadrant two (top right) is still a centralised system but now criteria on 
which funding is allocated refer to outputs rather than inputs. For exam-
ple, in such a performance-based funding system a formula generates 
funds for institutions that are successful in terms of their students passing 
exams. Depending on the number of credits (i.e., weighted number of 
passed courses) accumulated by their students and the subject categories 
concerned, a budget is flowing to the higher education institution. This 
type of model operates in Denmark (taximeter model), while in Sweden a 
mix of enrolment numbers and credits determines the funds allocated to 
higher education institutions. In the Netherlands, a mix of the number of 
first-year students (‘freshmen’) and the number of Master’s degrees con-
ferred determines the funds allocated to the universities (Jongbloed and 
Vossensteyn 2001). Other examples can be found in the UK, where aca-
demic research is funded in proportion to a measure of research quality. 
Research quality is assessed and rated every five years (in Research As-
sessment Exercises). 
Q3: purpose-specific purchasing from providers 
A funding system located in quadrant 3 (lower right) is a market-
oriented system. For example, higher education institutions are invited 
to submit tenders for a given supply of graduates or research activities. 
The tenders selected by the funding agency are the most price-
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competitive. In this tendering process, higher education institutions are 
encouraged to compete with one another to provide education, training, 
and research to meet national needs. Another example is research funds 
awarded by research councils. This system makes use of contracts
signed between the funding agency and higher education institutions, 
with the latter agreeing to deliver graduates for targeted labour market 
needs, or research outputs targeted at strengthening the innovative ca-
pacity of the country. When entering into a contract, the funding agency 
will make sure it obtains the services it wants for a reasonable price. In 
this way the cost-effectiveness of the delivery is stressed. In the contract, 
both parties express that they will obey certain criteria. Only if these cri-
teria are fulfilled, will the higher education institution receive core fund-
ing. The criteria may concern the types and qualifications of students 
admitted to the higher education institution, the (maximum) level of tui-
tion fees (if any) charged by the institution, and the commitment made 
by the higher education institution towards its students in the instruction 
and teaching processes. 
Q4: demand-driven, input-based funding through clients 
In the last quadrant (lower left) the funding system makes use of vouch-
ers. The core funds of higher education institutions are supplied through 
the clients of higher education institutions. Students obtain vouchers, 
which can be traded for educational services (i.e., educational consump-
tion), at the higher education institution of their own choice. For the 
higher education institution the vouchers represent a certain value; they 
can be cashed at the Ministry of Education. Each (prospective) student is 
given a limited number of vouchers, representing a value, which can be 
used in a flexible way (during a certain period of time and for programs 
supplied by a given number of accredited or recognised education provid-
ers). In this funding system it is the consumer that drives the system; the 
system is demand-driven. The client (student) decides what institution to 
attend and what programs to enrol in. The higher education institutions 
must look after the quality of their teaching and their supply of courses, 
because unattractive programs will not receive sufficient funding. The 
voucher system can be combined – like many other funding variants – 
with a system of differentiated course fees. The higher education institu-
tions then charge the students a certain percentage of the course costs. 
Tuition fees may be regulated to some extent by the government, but 
flexible pricing is expected to make students pay attention to the quality 
of the service they get from the higher education institution. Combining 
vouchers and fees may result in a system that is responsive to individual 
students’ demands. A research funding model situated in diagram Q4 
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would be similar to the research council example given for quadrant three, 
but in this case there would be more attention paid to basic research in-
stead of research for which the outcomes are easier to specify. 
Funding system trends 
Surveying the funding mechanisms in place across OECD states (e.g. 
Leszczensky et al. 2004), one can observe that governments in a number 
of countries have attempted to separate their support for teaching and re-
search by providing block (i.e., lump sum) funding for each activity – 
covering the day-to-day running costs. There has also been a move away 
from negotiated line item funding (located in quadrant Q1) towards more 
transparent, rational – formula-based – mechanisms (quadrant Q2). Addi-
tionally, one can observe the tendency to replace block funding for re-
search with competitive funding mechanisms (Q3), or performance-based 
funding mechanisms (Q2). The extent to which this has been achieved 
naturally varies across countries. In some countries, universities have ac-
cess to additional funding for specific initiatives such as increasing the 
participation of certain target groups, targeting specific skills areas, post-
graduate training, setting up research infrastructure, public-private re-
search partnerships, or specific strategic research in ‘areas of excellence’. 
In all cases, the allocation of block grants or targeted funds is tied to spe-
cific conditions in terms of quality and accountability requirements.  
If we were to summarise international trends in funding mecha-
nisms, the direction in which they are developing looks like the one 
shown by the upper arrow (A) in figure 4. Whether developments will 
lead to a more demand-driven system (a further movement along arrow 
B) remains to be seen. The four quadrants in the figure are characterised 
by means of four names that reappear in the next section. 
Figure 4: Trends in funding mechanisms 
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4.  Opt ions for  higher educat ion f inancing 
In debates about the funding of higher education the crucial question il-
lustrated by figure 4 is: how to strike the ‘right’ balance between central-
ised (public) approaches and decentralised (private) approaches. For 
many, this debate is about the balance between public and private in-
vestments in higher education, but in reality this debate is much broader 
and includes the questions of to what extent funding would have to be 
supply-driven versus demand-driven and whether it should be input-
oriented or performance-based. These questions are highly ideological 
and political, depending as they do on what is ‘right’, ‘just’ and ‘what 
works’. As mentioned in our introduction, funding mechanisms need to 
meet multiple goals: quality, efficiency, and equity. In fact these are 
headings under which a large variety of sub-goals can be grouped. At 
the same time, the funding mechanism would have to be flexible enough 
to accommodate important global trends and new dynamics such as in-
dividualisation, internationalisation/globalisation, and the injection of (in 
particular, information and communications technology-driven) tech-
nologies. 
In the Netherlands, very heated debates are occasionally held on the 
topic of vouchers and demand-driven funding (situated in quadrant 4 of 
figure 3 and 4). Demand-driven funding is often promoted as a means to 
inject more incentives towards increasing responsiveness and efficiency 
into the system. It permits student choice to drive the funding of higher 
education providers. The crucial aspect of the voucher idea is freedom to 
choose. This, according to Barr (1998), would require that education is 
not just provided by public institutions but also – or at least in part – by 
private institutions. Students would be allowed to redeem their vouchers 
also by enrolling in selected private institutions that – just like the public 
ones – comply with minimum quality (i.e., accreditation) standards. 
Thus student choice becomes the key element in a system where stu-
dents ‘vote with their feet’ and the outcome of their search for the high-
est value for money determines which institutions receive public funds 
for teaching.
Voucher systems are only one of the options that can be brought 
forward for the funding of higher education. The question of what is the 
‘best’ option will depend on the goals to be achieved and how the sys-
tem in place is actually working towards those goals. To illustrate this 
point we present a list of goals and conditions that came up during dis-
cussions on a new funding model in the Netherlands (Jongbloed and 
Vossensteyn 2002). The goals were many indeed: 
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• The funding model should underpin an open higher education sys-
tem with equal opportunities (a ‘level playing field’) for all provid-
ers, be they public or private; 
• The system has to lead to an adequate balance between the various 
parties (stakeholders) involved (i.e., students, government, business) 
when it comes to the responsibility for resourcing and deriving bene-
fits from the system. In other words costs and benefits need to be 
shared;
• Funding has to enhance (competition on the basis of) quality; 
• The system will have to be able to handle the increased competition 
(for students, research contracts) from abroad; 
• Funding will have to allow for a more diverse higher education sys-
tem with varied institutions and programs that differ in terms of 
length, quality, and method of delivery; 
• Students will have to be able to choose, be mobile, and collect their 
credits from a wide set of programs and providers, without barriers 
between institutions; 
• The funding mechanism will have to encourage the generation of 
additional private revenues (from students, their parents, employers, 
and business); 
• Programs that have an important social or cultural value should con-
tinue to receive support from the government and the institution; 
• Funding mechanisms should not erect financial barriers for qualified 
students to enrol in the institution of their own choice. Financial 
support to students will guarantee equal access opportunities for all. 
We will not discuss the details for each of the nine individual goals and 
conditions. Many are self-explanatory, but we would like to pay atten-
tion to the ‘level playing field’ condition mentioned first. A number of 
developments lead to the blurring of boundaries between universities 
and other providers of post-secondary education. One can point to vari-
ous forms of co-operation between institutions. Also the distinction be-
tween private (i.e., unfunded) providers and public providers is becom-
ing less clear. Additionally, due to the introduction of accreditation 
mechanisms, the focus these days is on the degree program, its contents, 
and its quality. And it is increasingly less relevant who supplies a par-
ticular program.  
The other goal/condition we would like to mention is the seventh: 
the potential for increasing private contributions. The private returns 
from a university degree and the low price elasticity of demand are often 
put forward as justification for increasing private revenues in higher 
education. However, not all degrees are the same. A bachelor degree dif-
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fers from a master’s degree. A degree in economics is different from a 
degree in humanities; a degree from a teacher training college is differ-
ent from a degree obtained in law school. In other words, classifying de-
gree programs according to their private and their social return would 
seem like the proper way to start a discussion on raising fees or, looking 
at the other side of the coin, determining the degree to which the gov-
ernment should be involved in funding particular degree programs 
(Jongbloed 2003). In fact this issue touches on the same topics to be 
considered under the second condition (public and private responsibili-
ties for higher education and research). One immediately encounters the 
problems surrounding the measurement of private rates of return and – 
even more difficult – social rates of return (Jongbloed 2004). Raising 
fees, or indeed, allowing them to differ across degree programs, can only 
be justified towards customers (students) in situations (i.e., markets) 
where quality differences and price differences are transparent. 
Faced with these nine constraints and the underlying practical prob-
lems of measurement and implementation, the discussion (still unre-
solved) in the Netherlands has led to the construction of three funding 
options for the funding of teaching in universities and polytechnics.2
The arrangements may be placed in the classification scheme (figures 3 
and 4) shown above. They include several ingredients, some of which 
have been selected to make the contrasts between the options as clear as 
possible. The ingredients of the three financing options shown in table 2 
are stated in terms of:
1. steering philosophy, that is, the actor that takes the lead in shaping 
the higher education programs offered to students; 
2. the mechanisms adopted for allocating public funds for teaching; 
3. private (i.e., fee-based) funding; and 
4. the student support system. 
Table 2 shows the three different arrangements. The options each pro-
ceed from a different idea about who takes the lead in shaping the higher 
education landscape. The leading actor is, respectively, (1) the student, 
(2) the higher education institution, and (3) the government. The table 
lays out a useful framework for thinking about financing higher educa-
tion; the basic philosophy as well as how public and private financing 
mechanisms come to bear. 
                                             
2 This exercise was carried out by CHEPS at the request of the Dutch Min-
istry of Education (Jongbloed and Vossensteyn 2002). The funding of re-
search was considered in a separate exercise.  
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Table 2: Funding methodologies: three options 
Student
centred
Supply driven Program
oriented
Steering
philosophy
• Demand-driven
• Freedom to 
choose
• Open system 
• Customer-
oriented
• Conditions
w.r.t. program 
coherence and 
quality
• Government 
organises/
oversees qual-
ity control and 
information 
supply
• Supply driven 
• Providers take 
the lead 
• Publicly funded 
versus non-
funded providers 
• Competition on 
the basis of 
prices and qual-
ity offered by 
providers
• Selection of 
students
• Steering
through
programs 
• Government 
chooses which 
programs to 
fund and which 
not to fund 
based on macro 
efficiency and 
other criteria 
• Open system 
(level playing 
field)
• Protection of 
socially rele-
vant programs 
Public
Funding
method 
• Limited num-
ber of credits 
(vouchers)  per 
student
• Vouchers to be 
used only for 
accredited 
(parts of) pro-
grams 
• Formula funding 
of degrees (com-
pletions/credits)
• Contract fund-
ing (tenders) 
• All providers 
(public, pri-
vate) can com-
pete for con-
tracts 
Tuition fees • Fees partly 
covered by 
vouchers
• Differentiated 
fees
• Fees deter-
mined by pro-
vider
• Top up fees (dif-
ferentiated fees) 
• Fee levels de-
pend on provider 
strategy & com-
petition
• Fees also deter-
mined by quality, 
program length, 
etc.
• Uniform fees 
for publicly 
funded pro-
grams (gov-
ernment sets 
fees)
• Other pro-
grams charge 
differential 
fees
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Student
centred
Supply driven Program
oriented
Student
support
• Student sup-
port distin-
guishes be-
tween cost of 
living and cost 
of attendance 
• Grant + loan 
for tuition  
• Grant + loan 
for cost of liv-
ing
• Extra entitle-
ments (vouch-
ers) for disad-
vantaged stu-
dents/programs 
• Providers supply 
student support 
package
• Package based 
on merit & need 
of student 
• Support can be 
combined with 
job or family ac-
tivities 
• Extra scholar-
ships offered by 
employers 
• Providers offer 
loans through 
private banks 
• Many options 
fit this scenario 
Option:
• only grants & 
scholarships
for publicly 
funded pro-
grams 
• for other pro-
grams only 
government 
backed loans 
are made 
available
Source: Jongbloed & Vossensteyn (2002) 
The student-centered option is in fact the most demand-driven system. 
Here, students choose which providers receive public money (through 
vouchers). Any differences in costs across programs are expressed 
through differential fees. Institutions are competing for customers, for 
instance by delivering tailor-made programs; flexibility is key. The stu-
dent-driven option fits somewhat roughly over quadrants four and three 
in figure 3. 
In the second, provider-driven option, the strategy of the higher edu-
cation provider is of the utmost importance. Institutions try to get their 
programs accredited in order to qualify for public funding and try to dis-
tinguish themselves from other providers by means of their program 
supply. The institution generates more resources if it is more successful 
in delivering graduates and setting its fees at levels acceptable for stu-
dents. This supply-oriented option may be placed in the right-hand part 
of figure 3 in quadrants two and three. 
In the program-oriented option, the degree of planning by the gov-
ernment is the largest. Given the supply of programs by the various pro- 
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viders in the higher education system3 and in the face of criteria such as 
social and private rates of return, labour market needs, cultural/regional 
diversity, et cetera, the government decides about the number of student 
places to fund. Unfunded programs are left to the market. All providers 
can compete for contracts to deliver a specified amount of graduates. 
Programmes that provide a high private rate of return to the student 
(once they are graduated) will receive no (or hardly any) direct govern-
ment funding; possibly only in the shape of student support for the stu-
dents taking up that programme. This government-oriented type of fund-
ing fits in quadrants one and two of figure 3. 
5.  Discussion:  on trade-offs,  di lemmas and 
level  playing f ie lds 
Both figure 3 and table 2 lay out useful frameworks for thinking about 
financing higher education. However, it will be clear that one cannot 
construct an ideal funding model that meets all criteria such as the ones 
listed in the previous section. The three options are useful as a basis for 
thinking about the economic tradeoffs and dilemmas that come with dif-
ferent financing options. The ‘right’ choice of funding model depends 
on the priorities that policy-makers have in terms of goals – what they 
would like to achieve on behalf of students and society in general, and 
what they perceive as problems in the existing model. The three options 
presented here (demand-driven, supply-driven, and programme-driven) 
all rate differently on the (nine) conditions specified by policymakers. 
Additionally, the success of any system will also depend heavily on the 
amount of funds society is prepared to invest in higher education from 
public and private sources. When it comes to private revenues, all three 
options allow for additional private income to be derived from student 
fees. However, this depends crucially on the government allowing insti-
tutions to set fees (either up to specified levels or without any bounds 
whatsoever). In the third (program-oriented) option the government 
keeps an eye on fees charged for students in publicly funded programs – 
                                             
3 In the Dutch context the term used here is ‘macro-efficiency’. Higher edu-
cation institutions that have plans to start a new degree programme for 
which they seek government funding are obliged to submit evidence to the 
Education Ministry that the programme meets a real demand and does not 
lead to unnecessary duplications given the programmes already on offer in 
the Netherlands. The macro efficiency criterion therefore serves to stress 
the overall goal to secure a broad supply of programmes in the Nether-
lands while at the same time it seeks to achieve an efficient allocation of 
tasks across the higher education institutions. 
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these will be programs where the social rates of return are substantially 
higher than the private returns from these programmes. To give an ex-
ample, programs in the bachelor phase of higher education are funded 
(and protected), while fees for higher degree (master’s) programs in vo-
cational subjects are deregulated. Another example is the public funding 
of teacher training programs. Student places in this critical area may be 
funded from public sources while students in fields such as economics 
or law receive far less public funding. 
Given the diverging properties of the three funding options, the chal-
lenge is to create a mix of models or a mix of elements from all three to 
meet a particular set of priority goals and conditions. The advantages 
and disadvantages of the three options may be discussed from the per-
spective of the main stakeholders:
• students;
• institutions (i.e., providers of higher education);
• government/taxpayer; and
• employers of graduates.  
It would go too far to discuss all options from the perspective of these 
four stakeholder groups. The only remarks at this point are that students
would seem to be served best in the demand-driven option, where flexi-
bility and opportunities for lifelong learning are the greatest. Institutions
enjoy the most stability in the second option; they can plan on the basis 
of a transparent funding system and their own choice of profile and pro-
grams. They also have the freedom to choose how funding is internally 
allocated. However, there is a chance in both the first and second options 
that programs confronted with low student demand will suffer. Employ-
ers will be worried that in option 1, program coherence gets lost in the 
battle for students. In option 2, providers will remain autonomous and 
may try to seek more cooperation with private business to provide strong 
programs and attractive student aid packages. Society (as represented by 
government) would see its supply of graduates in important fields such 
as health, teacher training, and other public services guaranteed by 
means of a planned and accountable system of publicly-supported pro-
grams in the third (programme-oriented) option.
On the topic of injecting more private money into higher education 
we would like to state that students (and/or their parents) and private 
businesses are more inclined to spend money on universities when they 
feel their demands are met more closely. The chances for this to happen 
are far greater in a deregulated system that allows institutions and stu-
dents, respectively institutions and businesses, to work more closely to-
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gether and decide on program content or research directions without 
government interference. In other words, options 1 and 2 would seem 
candidates for a higher education funding system that generates more 
funding from the private sector. In option 1, private contributions can be 
combined with vouchers to pay for tailor-made courses. In option 2, in-
stitutions with strong teaching and research profiles seek closer collabo-
ration with private business to enhance the quality of degree programs 
and research programs and offer student support packages to students 
that study in particular fields. 
The three options, in the (intentionally, highly market-oriented) way 
presented here, point to several trade-offs and dilemmas that will occur 
in any discussion about the reform of higher education funding. But, 
first of all, what the options show is a development with some of the fol-
lowing characteristics of the higher education system emerging:  
• increased competition between (private and public) providers; 
• the need for differentiation and the building up of a strong  
institutional profile/image; 
• the rise of strategic alliances (mergers) between institutions. 
What also becomes clear is that some critical issues have to be dealt 
with:
• the need for increased transparency and reliable information about 
what is on offer; 
• the need to increase our understanding of the public and private 
benefits that derive from higher education; 
• the need to make a distinction between bachelor’s programs and 
master’s programs when it comes to the funding of teaching. 
The dilemmas we encounter are about the lines (or borders) to be drawn 
– finance-wise – between, first of all, publicly funded provid-
ers/programs and non-funded (i.e., private) institutions/programs, and, 
secondly, initial higher education and post-initial higher education. 
Some of the dilemmas touch on the level-playing field discussion, in 
which it is often argued that private providers should have the same 
privileges and access to public funds as public providers. In other words, 
regulation (or re-regulation), such as the conditions attached to public 
funding, student support and accreditation, are at stake here.
 This automatically takes us back to the (public-private) debate on 
demand-driven versus supply-driven funding and the conditions under 
which a demand-driven system with more student-centred financing of 
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higher education could work. The potentially negative effects of de-
mand-driven funding have to be prevented by accompanying policy 
measures in the field of funding, accreditation, and protection of cultur-
ally important subjects. Table 3 gives an overview of advantages and 
disadvantages of demand-driven (voucher) funding. 
Table 3: Advantages and disadvantages of vouchers 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• strengthening student choice 
• strengthening responsiveness 
to customers 
• increase in diversity of educa-
tional services (both in deliv-
ery methods and range of 
programmes) 
• strengthening flexibility in 
learning routes 
• increase in efficiency of 
provision
• increase in quality of 
provision
• increase in private contribu-
tion to cost of education 
(‘topping up’ the voucher) 
• greater opportunities for 
lower income families and 
minorities
• inability of clients to assess 
information on the quality of 
education
• geographical factors limit 
choice
• over-subscription may require 
rationing (selection) and fa-
vour high-income families 
• high administrative complex-
ity (and costs) 
• need for government regula-
tions to protect subjects, indi-
viduals, quality, and equity 
• large variations in enrolment 
and funding may lead to un-
der-utilisation of capital and 
insecure jobs for teachers 
• programmes with high cul-
tural value but small enrol-
ments will be forced to close 
• if used to the full, vouchers 
lead to additional government 
expenditures 
Source: Jongbloed and Koelman (2000) 
The table points to some of the requirements that would need to be ful-
filled for student-centred funding to work. Sceptics will immediately 
point out the need for the increased regulation called for by the introduc-
tion of a market-driven system – something that would seem contradic-
tory: to create a market-like higher education system the government in-
terferes heavily in the market to protect students, subjects, and institu-
tions.
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What we can learn from the above overview of funding trends and 
methodologies is that, before racing to a market-based reform along the 
lines suggested by the Economist in its analysis of problems in Western 
European higher education, it would seem important to first address the 
following questions: 
• What are today’s problems and bottlenecks that stand in the way of 
the realisation of public goals; and can that public goal (say public 
good, or externality) actually be quantified/approximated in some 
way?
• To what extent can students express their demand (and do they wish 
to do so; do they really vote with their feet if allowed to; do they act 
rationally)?
• Is there sufficient room for a market to emerge? (What about free-
dom of entry for new providers/entrepreneurs; what if commercial 
providers would like to qualify for public funding?) 
The effects of a policy of charging substantial fees from students and/or 
the effects of a policy of demand-driven funding depend crucially on ac-
commodating policies in areas such as (the incentives to be included in) 
funding mechanisms, student support systems, quality assessment, avail-
ability of information, and opportunities for new education providers to 
enter the market for higher education. To give an example: While the 
demand-driven option offers individuals the greatest amount of choice 
and leverage in the market for higher education, information asymme-
tries will make it difficult for consumers and producers to contract on 
quality (Glaeser and Schleifer 2001; Weisbrod 1988). A strongly de-
mand-driven scheme also runs the risk of forcing culturally important 
but financially weak programs to close.  When it comes to the issue of 
fees, the setting of low or no tuition fees may help correct one form of 
distributional inequity (by helping to ensure that students from lower in-
come families are not priced out of the education market) yet create an-
other by subsidising students in expensive physical and biological sci-
ences programs to a greater extent than those in social sciences or hu-
manities fields (Salerno 2004).
In short, each of the financing options presented above gives rise to 
dilemmas and tradeoffs that suggest none are effective in isolation. A 
better understanding of these tradeoffs then can provide a useful guide 
for pursuing alternative financing schemes. 
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The Publicness of Private Higher Education: 
Examples from the United States1
ROGER L. GEIGER
For the past quarter-century the dominant trend in higher education in 
the United States and throughout much of the world has been privatisa-
tion. One prominent theme has been the increased dependence of public 
institutions on private sources of funds. Less conspicuous has been the 
tendency of private institutions to claim growing amounts of public re-
sources. This paper will explore public-private dynamics in the U.S. by 
specifically focusing on two important contemporary trends: the ex-
traordinary increase in the prosperity of selective private colleges and 
universities and the explosive growth of for-profit institutions of higher 
education. In both cases the trend toward privatisation has been fuelled 
in important ways by government policies and public funds. 
When investigating private higher education at the end of the 1970s, 
I found public support for private institutions in many countries. But one 
theme of my study – Private Sectors in Higher Education: Structure, 
Function and Change in Eight Countries – was that the provision of 
public resources was accompanied by greater public control (Geiger 
1986). The contrast with the present situation in the U.S. is stark. The 
largest public subsidy has occurred through the federal system of student 
financial aid, and it has been free from all but accounting controls. It is 
helpful to at least glimpse at how the context of higher education 
changed in this era. 
                                             
1 My thanks to Ben Jongbloed, Dan Levy and Karen Paulson for helpful 
comments.
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The 1970s, broadly speaking, constituted a kind of culmination of 
the social and fiscal aggrandisement of national states in most devel-
oped, Western countries. One considerable accomplishment of this 
movement was to build the foundations of mass higher education. By the 
end of the decade, some doubts about these developments were being 
voiced – talk of the ‘crisis of the welfare state – but not in higher educa-
tion. Perhaps the only dissenting gesture was the creation of the Univer-
sity of Buckingham, which was regarded literally as a quixotic gesture 
by the university establishment, and also by some of its founders! Pri-
vate higher education was off the radar screen or, as in France and Swe-
den, vestigial survivals of greatly diminished private sectors. 
In other countries, where it was too large to ignore, something else 
had occurred: the private sector was increasingly assimilated with the 
public sector. In Japan and Belgium this brought a large infusion of pub-
lic funding. But with those funds came stringent bureaucratic control. 
Public agencies did not trust private institutions; and they were intensely 
concerned about upholding quality. The result in Japan was subsidies 
that were increased or diminished according to a complex set of per-
formance measures. In Belgium, rigid formulae for instructors per stu-
dent and square meters of classrooms were imposed in order to achieve 
the chimera of ‘equality’ between private and public universities. The 
Philippines, lacking the resources to subsidise the private sector, never-
theless required, among other things, daily class attendance reports to be 
filed with the Ministry of Education. 
Even in the United States, the 1970s realised a longstanding proph-
ecy that federal money would bring federal control. Universities became 
subject to a host of federal regulations that increased their administrative 
costs and decreased their freedom. The late 1970s was a kind of nadir 
for the private sector in the U.S. What happened next proved to be part 
of a worldwide movement. 
Privatisation in higher education began early in the 1980s and has 
been gathering force ever since (Geiger 1988). It assumed three possible 
forms: 1) an increased reliance on private rather than public resources, 
particularly in supporting public institutions; 2) increasing cooperation 
and interaction with private industry; and 3), relative increase in the im-
portance of private institutions of higher education, whether in size, 
prestige, or influence. 
During the 1980s the first two processes were probably more evident 
in most of the world than the third. Certainly, as governments struggled 
(or declined) to maintain funding for systems of mass higher education, 
the idea of student fees, market coordination, or partnerships with indus-
try became far more attractive. In Europe, a few experimental private in-
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stitutions were established, reactions of various sorts to the perceived 
homogenisation or to some, stultification, of the state sector. Perhaps the 
largest impact occurred in Australia, where the Bond University shat-
tered the complacency of the state monopoly (Jones and Anwyl 1987). 
But Bond was just a single institution, and as it turned out, a rather weak 
one too. 
The global picture changed with the collapse of the Soviet Empire. 
The higher education vacuum created by dysfunctional and deteriorating 
communist systems was gradually filled by private ventures. Suddenly, a 
large part of the globe was transformed from having no private higher 
education to relying on a large and differentiated private sector for a 
substantial part of higher education needs. This transformation is not my 
topic, but as Daniel Levy (Levy 2002; Altbach and Levy 2005) has em-
phasised, it deserves recognition as one of the signal features of the cur-
rent era. And one aspect is germane here. As Dmitry Suspitsen (2007) 
has found, leading segments of the new private sector in Russia are 
aligned or connected with the older public institutions. Similar arrange-
ments seem to be emerging in the still newer private sector of China 
(Yan and Lin 2003). The point is that such situations do not represent a 
clear dichotomy between public and private. Rather, the very existence 
of many private institutions is predicated on access to and utilisation of 
public resources. 
This is the situation I wish to address. On one hand, the era of priva-
tisation has meant an increasing reliance of public institutions on private 
resources; and on the other hand, it has also brought a mirror-image 
movement of private institutions drawing on public resources. More-
over, this has not been accidental. A central thrust of the privatising 
agenda has been to encourage government policies that make this possi-
ble.
In the remainder of this paper I will address this situation in the 
United States. First, I will describe how private colleges and universities 
have grown prosperous by leveraging federal student aid funds into 
higher tuition. Next, I will try to account for the most rapidly growing 
part of American higher education – for-profit institutions. Lest these be 
considered uniquely American phenomena, let me emphasise that link-
ing tuition and public student financial assistance is fundamental to the 
privatising agenda in virtually every country (Johnstone 2007). In addi-
tion, for-profit higher education is likely to appear wherever these condi-
tions are realised. 
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1. Tuit ion and Financial  Aid in
the El i te  Pr ivate Sector
Let me start back at the dawn of privatisation. In 1978 I attended an in-
formational meeting at Yale. The university, it seems, was broke – or as 
broke as it could be with a $500 million endowment. It faced structural 
operating deficits and had imposed a hiring freeze. All but a small frac-
tion of the endowment was tied up in restricted funds, leaving Yale’s 
working capital at “the lowest tolerable level.” Significantly, it felt that 
tuition could not be raised due to competitive conditions (Yale Univer-
sity 1977). Tuition that year was about $4,400. 
Today, of course, Yale enjoys the greatest prosperity in its history 
(although it would measure prosperity against Harvard and Princeton). 
Tuition for 2004-2005 was $29,000, in the same range as at least 100 
other private colleges and universities. Of course, there is a connection 
between affluence and high tuition. 
Not just Yale, but the entire selective private sector has prospered in 
the age of privatisation. In 1980, the median expenditure per student (in 
constant dollars) at public research universities was $10,000, and at pri-
vate ones, $11,000. In 2000 those figures were $14,000 for publics 
(+40%) and $22,000 for privates (+100%). For the privates, about 70 
percent of that figure represented tuition income, a figure that has re-
mained fairly steady over two decades. Private sector prosperity rested 
mainly on increases in tuition but also on the growth of other sources of 
income (Geiger 2004a, pp. 28-42). 
In other words, the private sector was highly successful not only in 
raising tuition, but also in tapping other sources of funds.  These gains 
came primarily through the appreciation of their portfolios and from 
gifts. Still, the ability to attract large donations seemed to rest with the 
same factor that permitted outsized increases in tuition – institutional 
prestige.
In the U.S., prestige in undergraduate education is largely deter-
mined by selectivity – the academic ability or attainments of entering 
students. However, the obsession with prestige, and the pecking order 
produced by magazine rankings, only affect a minority of American stu-
dents. Perhaps 15 percent of full-time (4-year) students seek and find 
places in the selective sector. They represent a large portion of the 
brightest and wealthiest students. They believe, with some justification, 
that attending the most selective school that will have them will produce 
lifetime benefits in earnings and careers. For their part, universities have 
believed, again with good reason, that qualitative competition through 
increased spending will make them more attractive, and hence more se-
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lective. The U.S. system has always exhibited some of these dynamics, 
but in the last two decades the push for selectivity and qualitative com-
petition among institutions has been exaggerated to the point of domi-
nating the system (Geiger 2004a, pp. 77-83). Moreover, these dynamics 
have propelled the steep escalation of tuition, but not alone. The fuel that 
made this possible was student financial aid. 
This system evolved as follows (Geiger 2004a; 2002; 2004b, pp. 
161-184). Going back to 1978 again, Harvard, which then charged the 
highest tuition, broke ranks by raising its tuition aggressively for the 
next several years. It compensated somewhat by increasing its own fi-
nancial aid to needy students. This approach was assisted by Congress, 
which amended the student financial aid statutes to make subsidised 
loans available to all students. This was done during a time of nearly 
runaway inflation. Soon large numbers of students were taking govern-
ment loans, whether they needed them or not. Eventually, some controls 
were re-imposed, but the volume of loans scarcely subsided. Americans 
love credit. The 1980s saw the emergence of a student loan culture that 
has only grown since. 
The system of student finance that emerged by the late 1980s was 
amazingly beneficial for institutions. Student expenses for attending col-
lege were met in four different parts. 
• First, how much they could afford to pay. This was called the ex-
pected family contribution, and it was determined by a formula that 
combined income, assets, and obligations; 
• Second, direct financial grant aid. Federal (Pell Grants) and state 
grants are determined almost entirely on the basis of financial need, 
so that only lower-income students are eligible. Work-study pro-
grams are similarly limited by income. These programs cover only a 
portion of the cost of attendance; 
• Third, federal subsidised and unsubsidised loans. Subsidised loans 
have income limitations and are also capped. Nevertheless, they pro-
vide a significant fraction of the cost of attendance. Unsubsidised 
loans are also available and rapidly growing in importance; 
• Fourth, institutional student aid, also called tuition discounts. If the 
maximum possible revenue from the first three sources is less than 
the cost of attendance, the institution essentially waives the remain-
ing fees as an institutional scholarship, or tuition discount. 
These last two components were the innovations of the 1980s. The 
emergence of the loan culture simply allowed students to pay far more 
than would otherwise have been possible by tapping future earnings. 
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This additional purchasing power made it much easier for institutions to 
raise tuition. And so did the expanded use of institutional aid. Ivy 
League schools had always provided some institutional aid, but most 
private colleges and universities offered very little. This changed in the 
1980s as the advantages of ‘high-tuition/high-aid’ approach became 
widely recognised.
The genius of high-tuition/high-aid as a social invention is that the 
final increment of student expense is met through institutional aid. By 
adjusting institutional aid, or the discount, according to what each stu-
dent can pay, a system of differential pricing evolved. Each student is 
charged the maximum he or she can afford. Price sensitive students are 
subsidised; those who can afford it are charged full price. Under these 
arrangements, institutions have experienced no resistance, in an eco-
nomic sense, to increases in tuition – verbal protests occasionally, but no 
decline in demand. If anything, their popularity has grown. Highly selec-
tive institutions have thus faced an almost perfectly inelastic demand 
curve.
The system of high-tuition/high-aid has long been advocated by 
economists as the most equitable means of financing higher education. 
Still, it came about not as conscious policy, but through the evolution 
just described. Loans were originally meant to be a backstop for students 
in adverse circumstance. Developments in the early 1980s made them 
instead the mainstay of federal support for higher education. However, 
the unanticipated consequence was to set in motion forces that produced 
VERY high tuition. And this situation has had unwelcome repercus-
sions.
First, as tuition rises, fewer students can pay the full amount and 
more require institutional aid. As the amount of aid rises, the yield from 
tuition drops. From 1990 to 2002, the rate of tuition discount at private 
universities rose from 20 percent to 30 percent. At the latter figure, a 
$10 dollar increase in tuition brings $7 additional dollars. For private 
colleges, which are smaller and for the most part less affluent, the tuition 
discount rose from under 30 percent to over 40 percent (Lapovsky and 
Hubbell 2003). Higher tuition thus generates pressure for still higher tui-
tion.
Second, this approach has made selective private institutions increas-
ingly dependent on students from high-income families. The most selec-
tive schools have stabilised their tuition discount by recruiting large 
numbers of full-payers. The top schools can do this because wealth, 
good schooling, and high achievement are so closely correlated. The re-
sult, however, is that the greater the selectivity of an institution, the 
lower the percentage of students qualifying for financial aid. In the Ivy 
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League, 54 to 60 percent of students receive no aid – that is, they can af-
ford educational costs that now total more than $40,000 per year. Per-
haps 6 percent of households aged 45-54 could be expected to pay such 
amounts. Furthermore, most of those receiving financial aid are not the 
‘worthy poor,’ but in fact come from the middle and upper-middle class 
families that still need help to meet these enormous costs. To be blunt: 
high tuition favours the wealthy more than high aid helps the needy.2
Third, in most private institutions each student now pays a different 
price for the same service. Below the most selective institutions the ratio 
of full payers drops precipitously. At the less selective colleges more 
than 90 percent of students now receive aid. Here is where federal stu-
dent aid is most vital for maintaining inflated tuition levels and also sus-
taining institutions. Perhaps a third of their revenues probably come 
from federal grants and loans, funnelled through tuition. 
Fourth, although differential pricing can muster powerful economic 
rationales, the student aid game is not a very fair game (McPherson and 
Schapiro 1998). The practices that are now dignified under the title, “en-
rolment management,” are intended to optimise student quality while 
meeting revenue targets. With all the variables in the student aid mix, in-
stitutions can manipulate the packages they offer to their own advantage. 
Caveat emptor one might say – and some students not only do that, but 
consciously game the system. But one of the justifications for non-profit 
institutions is supposed to be trust: that is, the prohibition on the distri-
bution of profit compensates for the asymmetry of information between 
seller (university) and buyer (student). This game has been sullied fur-
ther through the widespread use of merit aid. Such institutional awards 
are essentially bribes to lure good students to less selective institutions. 
As such, they are a dubious use of institutional resources. 
Fifth, the revenues generated through very high tuition have been 
used in the selective sector to fuel qualitative competition. Within limits, 
this is certainly a good thing; but this competition is now likened to an 
arms race (Winston 1999). Moreover, the competition for undergraduate 
students has decidedly exaggerated student consumerism. Most prosper-
ous colleges now sport new libraries, but also new student centers and 
athletic centers. Colleges now compete as much on the basis of creature 
comforts for present consumption as on the potential for intellectual en-
hancement and future benefit. 
                                             
2 The wealthiest institutions have compensated by offering extremely gen-
erous financial aid packages to lower income students. However, the 
number of such students who qualify for admission is quite small. 
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2.  The For-Prof i t  Sector  
The proprietary sector of American higher education lies at the opposite 
extreme from the selective sector. Whereas the selective colleges pre-
dominantly serve wealthy students with excellent schooling, the modal 
student of proprietary colleges is from a non-wealthy family and most 
likely has not had a positive experience in school. This clientele seeks 
education chiefly in order to get a decent job. Most proprietary schools 
in the U.S. have been engaged in this kind of vocational or technical 
education, either for certificates, two-year associate’s degrees, or bache-
lor’s degrees. Another, more recent, clientele is working adults, who 
seek educational credentials for purposes of career enhancement. Tradi-
tional colleges and universities offer many programs of this type, but 
proprietary schools have found ways to compete effectively in this mar-
ket. The pioneer was the University of Phoenix, founded in 1976, which 
now has the largest enrolment of any private university. 
The for-profit sector appears to be the fastest growing segment of 
American higher education, and the fastest growing part of this sector 
has been the institutions owned by public corporations.3 This is inten-
tional. Whereas these corporations sell educational credentials in their 
urban classrooms, they are selling growth on Wall Street. The “Chroni-
cle [of Higher Education] Index of [the stocks of] For-Profit Higher 
Education” appreciated by 500 percent from 2000 to 2004 (Chronicle of 
Higher Education Almanac Issue 2004; Ortmann 2002). The nine pub-
licly traded companies in this index were valued at nearly 30 times earn-
ings, which was close to twice the valuation of the overall market. This 
is really the corporate sector of higher education, which is different 
from the old proprietary sector. How did higher education become such 
a lucrative business? Two factors are primary – replication and student 
financial aid. 
The University of Phoenix set the example. It created a business plan 
that worked for marketing higher education, and then showed it could be 
replicated. The result was spectacular growth. Elsewhere, voca-
tional/technical programs rely quite heavily on public student financial 
aid. This entire sector has been transformed in the last ten years. 
Proprietary vocational education has a long history, antedating the 
system of public education. Until recently, it could be described as ex-
                                             
3 Data on the for-profit sector is neither consistent nor reliable. The National 
Center for Education Statistics reports this sector growing from 430,199 
students in 1999 to 450,084 in 2000 – an increase of 4.6% – to about 3% 
of total enrollments. The following account draws upon company financial 
reports and college guidebooks for the most current information. 
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ceedingly decentralised: thousands of independent trade schools offered 
mostly non-degree vocational courses. They competed to some extent 
with community colleges, but they largely compensated for the long-
standing lack of effective public vocational education in the United 
States. Bryant and Stratton dates from 1854; Strayer Education was 
founded in 1892; DeVry in 1931. The latter two have become large cor-
porations only in recent years. DeVry, for example, had expanded 
slowly over the years, but now the majority of its campuses date from 
1997. Other corporate universities are of more recent vintage (Table 1). 
In the last decade there has been a marked consolidation of the industry. 
Growth has been achieved by replicating successful business plans, but 
also by acquiring and reshaping existing schools. What had been a frag-
mented industry is now dominated, at least for degree-granting pro-
grams, by corporations (Kinser 2004).  
Table 1: Companies in the ‘Chronicle Index of For-Profit Education’* 
Name Date 
IPO
Enrol-
ment#
Cam-
puses#
Sales
($ mil)
Profit
Margin
(%) 
Market
Capitalisa-
tion ($ bil) 
Apollo
Group
1994 200,052 71 1,700 19.8 12.73 
Career
Education
1998 83,200 78 1,500 10.8 3.14 
Corinthian
Colleges
1999 52,000 81 726 11.1 1.08 
DeVry 1991 49,000 71 785 7.4 1.36 
Education
Manage-
ment 
1996 58,000 43 853 9.0 2.03 
ITT Edu-
cation
Services
1995 38,000 77 572 11.1 1.49 
Laureate
Education
1993 130,000
**
12** 552 9.4 1.45 
Strayer
Education
1996 20,000 27 166 23.3 1.43 
U. Phoe-
nixOnline
2000 79,400 NA NA NA 1.26  
*Data generated 8/24/04 from diverse corporate sources   
** International campuses and enrolment 
ROGER L. GEIGER
148
Why have corporations only recently sought to invade education? In 
macro-economic terms there is a simple explanation. Education is the 
second largest industry in the country (after healthcare), comprising 
more than 7 percent of GDP. Seventy percent of these revenues are from 
public sources. Corporations have been drawn to education, not because 
they can build a better mousetrap or classroom, but in order to tap into 
this enormous reservoir of public funds.4
When the federal student aid system was put in place in 1972, stu-
dents from proprietary schools were deemed eligible. This immediately 
created possibilities for abuse. Fraudulent trade schools enrolled stu-
dents in dubious programs in order to pocket their student grants (now 
called Pell Grants). With the advent of the loan culture in the 1980s, 
more legitimate schools took advantage of this opportunity by enrolling 
ill-prepared students and signing them up for federal loans. Loan default 
rates skyrocketed, but it took Congress the entire decade to enact a rem-
edy. Eventually, some safeguards were put in place: schools with high 
default rates were denied federal student aid; and no more than 85 per-
cent (soon changed to 90 percent) of a school’s revenues could come 
from federal aid programs. However, these abusive practices were petty 
thievery. Corporate universities grasped that they had far more to gain 
from retaining and graduating financially aided students than from fleec-
ing the failures. An important threshold was passed in 1992, when loan 
limits were raised. This extended the profitable pricing point for these 
schools, making the enterprise more lucrative. The explosion of corpo-
rate higher education soon followed (see Table 1).
None of these institutions could operate on revenues from students 
themselves. The technical schools rely on federal and state student fi-
nancial aid. A year’s tuition in 2003 was pegged at $9000 – $11,000, 
which seems to be the maximum that can be derived from Pell Grants 
and student loans. Institutional aid can be adjusted to cover any shortfall. 
No ‘consumer surplus’ is left with their customers, although in this case 
that term refers to a student’s eligibility for federal aid (Goldin and Rose 
2003). In fact, an application for federal student aid (FAFSA) is required 
for admission to all these schools. The vocational or trade schools are 
most heavily dependent. Kaplan College, for example, derives more than 
eighty percent of its revenues from federal student aid. Corporate uni-
versities (degree-granting) tend to be less dependent. Their financial dis-
closures are not complete, and eligibility varies from campus to campus. 
                                             
4 The political battles surrounding this development are most conspicuous 
in primary and secondary education, where they revolve around vouchers, 
charter schools, and corporate management of school systems. 
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Probably few obtain less than 50 percent of revenues from student aid. 
The bottom line: this business plan would not exist without federal stu-
dent aid, particularly student loans. 
The University of Phoenix (corporate name: Apollo Group), the 
poster child of the for-profit sector, grew from a different business plan. 
It caters to working adults (students had to be 23 or older) and awards 76 
percent of degrees in business and management. The niche Phoenix fills 
is defined less by content and more by the manner of delivery (Sper-
ling/Tucker 1997). Offering five-week modular courses to cohorts of 
students, Phoenix has minimised the opportunity costs as well as the ef-
fort required for earning its degrees. Other institutions carry this ap-
proach even further. For example, Cambridge College allows students to 
acquire a master’s degree in education chiefly by attending a five-week 
summer course (Goldin 2003). When a credential is the goal, education 
can be streamlined. 
Most working students at the University of Phoenix would fail to 
qualify for federal aid, but they are subsidised instead by employers, 
who pay tuition for the majority of students. Similarly, school boards 
subsidise their teachers for their five weeks at Cambridge – and give 
them a raise when they receive their degree. 
Unlike nonprofits, for-profit universities replicate successful busi-
ness plans by creating additional units, which are generally modest in 
size. Expansion is facilitated by the commodification of knowledge. The 
University of Phoenix has ‘unbundled’ the faculty role. Content is pro-
vided by professional course designers, who start with ‘learning objec-
tives’ and then assemble materials that will fulfil those objectives. Eve-
rything must be pre-packaged and simplified so that the shifting corps of 
part-time teachers (actually, independent contractors) need only ‘deliver’ 
this material to students across the country. Standardised assessment al-
lows the students subsequently to demonstrate that they have met the ob-
jectives (Farrell 2003; Newton 2005). In a true university a student iden-
tification card represents potential access to the world’s treasury of 
knowledge, but in the for-profit sector a student’s tuition purchases a 
measured ‘product’. 
The for-profit segment of the American market largely delivers what 
it promises – career-enhancing educational credentials. In this respect 
these institutions have developed and exploited distinctive segments of 
the market. At their best, they offer a credible service to clienteles that 
are not well served by traditional institutions. And they have some vig-
orous defenders of that role (Sperling and Tucker 1997; Ruch 2001). 
However, across the spectrum of corporate universities, they can also be 
guilty of commodifying, or trivialising, knowledge, and of pedalling 
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credentials of dubious worth, all at partial public expense.5 Of greater 
concern is that these practices are not confined to this particular market 
niche.
This issue leads back to growth, for it is growth that brings the 
greatest rewards to owners and managers. As they seek new markets in 
which to expand, the corporate universities increasingly intrude on the 
domain of traditional higher education. The fastest growing areas of for-
profit enrolments are master’s degree courses and then bachelor’s de-
grees. Phoenix has lowered its age limit from 23 to 21, and it has an-
nounced a new unit that will cater to traditional aged (18 year old) stu-
dents. All told, it plans to open 7 to 9 new campuses in 2005. The com-
petitive advantage of corporate universities lies in opportunity costs 
(greater convenience; less work), in vocational focus on specific careers, 
and, with price escalation at public and private institutions, they can also 
be competitive in pricing. 
The next frontier is online education. Phoenix has already spun off 
its online programs into a separate company. At least three of the other 
corporate universities (Strayer, Career Education, Laureate Education) 
boast online units. Indeed, their experience with the model of commodi-
fied knowledge may prove to be the most feasible approach to providing 
higher education online. Only one obstacle impedes their business plan – 
getting the government to pay for it. To date, virtual students do not 
qualify for federal financial aid. If the corporate universities have their 
way, however, this will be changed – and more dubious credentials will 
be produced at public expense. 
This last situation reveals that the success of corporate universities 
has less to do with the markets than it does with politics. In this respect 
the stereotypes about for-profit higher education – both negative and 
positive – are off the mark. Defenders would have us believe that they 
are fighting to establish free enterprise – to provide consumer choice in 
professional training – in a closed, autarkic industry. Critics decry 
shoddy and superficial instructional programs that cheat students of a 
thorough education. However, this is an industry supported by third-
party payers that do not police the product. Corporate universities go to 
great lengths to please their clientele through the ease of obtaining cre-
dentials. They are more likely to hoodwink the government than their 
                                             
5 The responsibility for upholding educational standards in the United States 
falls to the regional accreditation bodies whose policies are by no means 
consistent (see Kinser 2004) The non-acceptance of course credits from 
for-profit colleges by traditional institutions has been an embarrassing and 
growing problem for many of these schools, which they have sought to 
remedy through congressional legislation (Hechinger 2005). 
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students. (Government investigations into financial aid irregularities 
seem to be endemic to the industry.) Their business plans depend on 
turning federal student aid into profitable growth. Hence, their fate de-
pends more on the rules governing financial aid than it does on the mar-
ketplace. Much the same could also be said for the selective private sec-
tor.
3.  Publ ic  Pol icy and the Pr ivate Sector  
The conditions just described have important consequences for educa-
tional policy. The crucial issues surrounding federal student aid are em-
bodied in the Higher Education Act, which requires periodic reauthorisa-
tion. These provisions were debated without resolution in 2004 and 
2005. The most likely outcome will be the perpetuation of the existing 
system with slight concessions to the for-profit sector. These battles are 
also fought at the state level, where the privatising agenda has growing 
support.
One key to the success of the corporate sector has been its political 
clout.6 The Career College Association, which represents for-profit col-
leges, has been recognised as one of the most effective lobbying groups 
in Washington. Unlike other higher education associations, it gives 
campaign funds directly to congressmen. The corporations make addi-
tional contributions. Thus, the committee writing the reauthorisation leg-
islation has been extremely solicitous toward the for-profit sector (Burd 
2004).
The details are too numerous to list. Nevertheless, a strong campaign 
has been mounted to scrap the 90 percent rule, so that a school could get 
all of its revenue from federal student aid. Another proposed rule change 
would make students in online courses eligible for aid. And, a more in-
clusive definition of ‘institution of higher education’ would make pro-
prietary institutions eligible for various forms of federal institutional 
support. Such changes would subsidise and encourage the most dubious 
practices in the corporate sector, as well as those of independent entre-
preneurs. Since many of the federal programs have fixed amounts of 
funds to disperse, such changes would siphon some funding away from 
traditional colleges and universities (American Council on Education 
2004; Burd 2004). 
                                             
6 John Sperling (2000), founder of the University of Phoenix, describes its 
history as a continual political struggle. 
ROGER L. GEIGER
152
At the state level, the trend toward funding higher education through 
student aid has been gaining momentum. In several states suggestions 
have been voiced to convert all state support for higher education into 
student vouchers. Such funds might then be used at private or proprie-
tary institutions, as well as public ones. Starting in 2005, state appropria-
tions for public higher education in Colorado have been substantially 
converted to vouchers, which can be used in part at private institutions.7
Policy discussions have been moving in that direction in other states as 
well. State support for student financial aid has been growing much 
faster than appropriations for public universities, as states seem to be 
endorsing the high-tuition/high-aid strategy. The most dramatic devel-
opment has been the rapid rise of tuition at state universities. With 
budgets under pressure, states have basically allowed a greater share of 
the financial burden to be shifted to students, and their loans. 
At the national level, there has been a fundamental disagreement 
about the central pillars of federal policy – grants and loans. It is heresy 
in Washington D.C. to suggest that there is any connection between stu-
dent loans and tuition escalation. The American Council on Education 
even produced a study that claimed to prove such a disconnection. But 
legislators seem to know better, and they appear to be wary of both the 
cost and the likely impact of expanded borrowing. In terms of afforda-
bility, there is a crying need to raise the caps on subsidised loans, in 
keeping with the rising cost of college. The lower-priced public institu-
tions have opposed higher loan limits largely because they would help 
wealthy, high-priced institutions and make spending differentials even 
larger. Nevertheless, some modest increase in loan limits seems inevita-
ble (at least for the first two years, which have lower limits), since it is 
needed to sustain the present system. With respect to grants to low-
income students, the need is obvious here as well. However, the pros-
pects are for only small increases, spread over many years. 
Federal financial aid policy has become hostage to the entrenched 
system of high-tuition/high-aid. Federal loans, in particular, have be-
come a middle-class entitlement – and a situation in which greater sup-
ply will generate greater demand. Congress has good reason to be wary 
of the cost and the impact. However, such considerations preclude a fi-
nancial aid policy that would target low-income students, who badly 
need additional aid to meet rising costs. 
The longstanding argument of economists has been that greater effi-
ciency in the finance of higher education could be achieved through a 
                                             
7 In this case, Colorado students at private Colorado colleges would receive 
one-half of a voucher (c. $1,200), if they demonstrated financial need. 
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system of student financial aid that forced higher-income students to pay 
for more of their education and subsidised lower-income students. How-
ever, the consequences of such a system, which I have described, were 
unforeseen by policy analysts. On the other hand, entrepreneurs in the 
private sector anticipated the market forces created by these develop-
ments and took actions that benefited their companies. Moreover, they 
actively intervened in the political process to obtain even more favour-
able terms. 
It is an axiom of marketing theory that firms can obtain advantages 
through product differentiation or through becoming the low-cost pro-
ducer, but that mixed strategies will fail (Porter 1980). Something like 
this seems to be occurring through the marketisation of U.S. higher edu-
cation. Using public funds to enlarge the purchasing power of students 
has produced great rewards for selective private colleges and universi-
ties, those able to differentiate qualitatively and thereby raise prices. 
Corporate universities have also been able to exploit this system by ef-
fectively competing for highly subsidised (hence, price insensitive) 
lower-income students and minimising opportunity costs. The loser in 
this kind of system has been public higher education, which has seen its 
subsidies siphoned off by increasing public support for the private sec-
tor. And this has compromised its ability to maintain a mixed strategy of 
reasonably low costs and reasonably high quality for the majority of tra-
ditional students. 
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More Competition in German Higher 
Education: Expectations, Developments, 
Outcomes 
DOMINIC ORR
1.  Introduct ion 
In June 2000 the German Monopolies Commission published a report 
which argued that competition should become the leading principle for 
higher education policy. The report argues that a functioning market fa-
cilitates effective communication between buyers and sellers and there-
fore provides an information base superior to any amount of state plan-
ning. Through orientation on market demand universities will provide 
the right thing for the market (i.e., become more effective), at the right 
time and at the right price (i.e., become more efficient) (Monopolkom-
mission 2000, passim). This claim is a critique of the effects of ineffec-
tive state efforts to initiate higher education reforms in Germany, par-
ticularly since the expansion of the system in the 1970s, and as an argu-
ment for a replacement of such top-down reforms with the dynamic in-
strument of the market. In the conclusion to his book on the study-
structure reforms in Germany between 1975 and 1986, Schreiterer 
judges the planned, rational steering approach of these reforms to have 
been a complete failure (1989, p. 322) and the possibility of the state to 
steer higher education in such a way as over-estimated (1989, p. 310). 
Along with many other policy analysts and political advisors, including 
the German Science Council (WR 1994, 2000), Schreiterer sees a need 
to change the approach to policy coordination away from state dirigisme 
towards a coordination framework based on decentralised responsibility 
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at the institutional level and incentive-driven state initiatives, although 
he doubts whether state planning can be completely replaced – it just has 
to get smarter (1989, pp. 322-326). A book which has remained a mani-
festo for reform in German higher education since its publication in 
2000 speaks of the aim to “unleash” the university from the bonds of 
state legislations and regulations; HEIs1 would thereby become “learn-
ing organizations” in a system which could “breathe” (Müller-Böling 
2000, p. 30). Although the term Wettbewerb (competition) has become a 
key element of higher education reform discourse in Germany,2 even in 
2005 universities still could not be characterised as “unleashed”. During 
the past few years, facilitating competition has been only one of at least 
three competing policy objectives for higher education, the other two be-
ing budget restraint and system restructuring. The question is whether all 
three objectives can be achieved simultaneously. Is talk of competition 
as the solution to Germany's higher education problems too simple? 
In an interim conclusion on reform in German higher education from 
2001, Kehm and Pasternack argued that talk of competition and institu-
tional autonomy has more to do with the reduction of complexity in po-
litical discourses than with the ultimate purpose of state reform initia-
tives being enacted (2001, p. 226). The authors argue that the German 
state strives to maintain its influence on higher education and tends to be 
more reactionary in this respect than its neighbours (2001, p. 214). In 
2004 and 2005 Germany saw efforts to introduce a national competition 
between German HEIs for special funding as “elite universities” and 
general agreement on the need to introduce tuition fees into the system. 
Both initiatives would introduce significant new aspects of competition 
into German higher education; however, the implementation of both ini-
tiatives is being hindered by the claims of the Länder for sovereignty 
over “their” higher education systems. Since the place, which these ini-
tiatives will ultimately hold in German higher education, cannot yet be 
fully foreseen, they will not be discussed in detail below.  
This paper argues that the main instrument for implementing compe-
tition in German higher education is currently the method of allocating 
the state subsidy, since it is the most significant component of institu-
1 The term higher education institution (HEI) will be used in this article as a 
generic term. In the German system, the most predominant institutions of 
higher education with a vocational orientation and an emphasis on tea-
ching over research are called Fachhochschulen. These institutions usually 
use the term "University of Applied Science" in English language prospec-
ti, but to avoid confusion the original German term will be used when re-
ferring to these institutions throughout this paper. 
2 A recent strategy document from the Science Minister in Baden-
Württemberg used the term 39 times in 90 pages (Frankenberg 2004). 
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tions’ incomes. This point becomes clear when data is viewed in a com-
parative context (section 2). The paper investigates the current restric-
tions to the development of competition using international comparison 
(section 3) and a closer look at elements of the German system (section 
4). The main agents of coordination in Germany are the Länder; it is 
necessary to analyse the implementation and debates regarding competi-
tion at this level to understand the context fully. The higher education 
system in Berlin has been chosen for this analysis because it very clearly 
highlights some of the major points common to the other higher educa-
tion systems in Germany.3
2. General  comparison of  higher  education 
 funding in Germany,  UK, and USA 
Different sources of funding give rise to competition by rewarding suc-
cessful institutions with financial resources. It is therefore interesting to 
compare the various sources and consider the potential effect of each on 
competition between institutions of higher education. 
Incomes are made up of state subsidies, third party funds for teach-
ing (i.e., tuition fees) and research, operating income, and in some cases, 
donations and interest from endowment funds. According to dependency 
theory, the effect funding measures have on an institution is largely de-
pendent on the relative magnitude and criticality of a given source of 
funding (Slaughter and Leslie 1999, p. 68). Furthermore, each of these 
funding streams involves different sources of funding (public vs. pri-
vate) and tends to be allocated to different levels in the HEI (see table 
1).
3 This contribution was written in 2005. Although the general character of 
the German higher education system has not changed since then and, 
therefore, the following analysis holds, some modifications have occurred. 
These concern an overall slight increase in the share of institutional grants 
determined by indicators, the implementation of supplementary research 
funding for “elite universities” and the introduction of moderate tuition 
fees. For an update see Orr et al. (2007) and Orr and Schwarzenberger 
(2007).
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Table 1: Income streams and income receiver 
Funding stream  Private Public “Performer”/Receiver 
State grant   X 
Donations  X  
Investment and Inter-
est/ General operating 
income  X  
Central administration 
Contract funding and 
subsidies for research 
(public)  X 
Contract funding re-
search (private) X
Tuition fees  X (X) 
Professor/Workgroup 
For illustrative purposes, figure 1 compares the income streams of uni-
versities and Fachhochschulen in Germany with those in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. In particular, the charts emphasise the 
high dependency of German institutions on state subsidies, which ac-
count on average for between 79% and 91% of institutional incomes.
Figure 1: Sources of higher education funding in Germany, UK, and 
   USA  
Data source: Germany – Statistisches Bundesamt (2003) 
Sources of higher education funding in Germany
Universities € 12.1 billion 2001
(without medicine)
Fachhochschulen € 2.6 billion 2001
79%
State subsidy
18% Third-party
funding
3%
Operating income
5%
Third-party
funding
91%
State subsidy
4%
Operating income
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Data sources: USA – The Chronicle of Higher Education (2004); UK – Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (2004) 
Interestingly, the proportion of budgets funded by third parties at 16-
18% is very similar in three of the systems. The high level of depend-
ency on the state subsidy shown by the Fachhochschulen is directly re-
lated to their lower levels of third-party funding. Such funding is highly 
competitive since all HEIs compete against each other for the monies. In 
contrast to state subsidies, however, the proportion of income funded via 
this source varies greatly between institutions and institution types. Just 
34 of a total of 250 American research universities and four of a total of 
174 HEIs in the UK receive the lion’s share of research funding (UK: 
25% or €1.5 bill. 2002-03); in Germany the top twenty universities ac-
count for 56% of third-party research funding. A further difference – 
highlighted in table 1 – is the source of these funds. Whilst funding from 
the German Research Council (DFG) accounts for over a third of all 
third-party funding in the German university sector and commercial con-
tracts make up about a fifth, the Fachhochschulen receive over a third of 
their third-party funding from industry and a negligible amount from the 
DFG (Waugaman et al. 2004, p. 25). Universities therefore receive this 
funding stream from a largely public funding sources and Fach-
hochschulen acquire it on the private market.  
A remarkable difference between Germany and the other two coun-
tries can be seen in respect of the income drawn from other operations 
(e.g., cafes, accommodation, conferences, shops, etc.) and tuition fees. 
Currently, many operations outside the core tasks generate no supple-
mentary income for HEIs in Germany. On the one hand, this is because 
the Studentenwerke run auxiliary facilities which would otherwise gen-
erate such income such as restaurants, cafes, and halls of residence. On 
39%
State subsidy
17%
Third-party funds
19%
Operating
income
23%
Tuition fees
2%
Donations and interest 
from endowments
36%
State subsidy
16%
Third-party
funds
20%
Operating income
20%
Tuition fees
1%
Interest from 
endowments 
7%
Donations
Sources of higher education funding in USA und UK
USA (public universities without medicine) 
€ 141.9 billion 2001
UK (public universities with medicine)
€ 23.3 billion 2001
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the other hand, courses in Germany remain virtually free of charge to the 
student at the moment, but tuition fees are expected within the next few 
years. Leszczensky has estimated that these could account for up to 10% 
of university income in the future (Leszczensky 2004, p. 24). 
Competition clearly exists between institutions in Germany in the 
acquisition of third-party funding. The introduction of tuition fees will 
further promote such competition. Within a system of such high depend-
ency on the state subsidy, performance-based allocation systems would 
offer a particularly effective way to install a further competitive element 
into the coordination framework. Looking at current methods will pro-
vide a touchstone for the current commitment to competition in German 
higher education.  
3. A comparison of  the methods of  state  
 subsidy a l locat ion and the degree of  
 compet it ion they faci l i tate  
In general, state subsidies in the higher education systems of the sixteen 
German Länder and elsewhere tend not to be allocated as a single block, 
but comprise one or more of four distinguishable components, which 
each allocate by a different method and facilitate a different degree of 
competition. In some systems separate components are used to allocate 
funding for research and teaching and in others no specific difference 
between these activities is made. 
Indicator-based funding: A university’s budget is based on its per-
formance as measured by fixed indicators (e.g., number of graduates) in 
a formula. Although price-based models exist in theory whereby an in-
crease in an indicator’s value results in a proportional change to the cal-
culated state subsidy, most procedures distribute a fixed-budget between 
institutions and the resulting subsidy is therefore dependent both on the 
performance of a university and the performance of its direct competi-
tors. Only those models which utilise indicators that measure outputs are 
truly performance-dependent. Utilising input-based indicators (e.g., 
number of professors) improves the transparency of the process, but re-
sults in an allocation irrespective of the competitive performance of an 
institution.  
Project-based funding (earmarked grants): The basis of this alloca-
tion can be diverse. Either a programme initiative is developed by the 
state (e.g., to increase the participation of non-traditional students, as in 
England) or institutions are free to develop proposals, which are then 
evaluated and funded following an affirmative judgement (e.g., for the 
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development of new research areas, as in Ireland). The former case 
however, is the most common for components of state subsidy.4 The cri-
teria for judging a proposal can be a combination of previous perform-
ance and a formative judgement on the proposed project. In both cases 
institutions compete with other grant applicants. Cooperative projects al-
ter the dimensions but not the degree of competition between proposals. 
Mission-based funding: The idea behind this component is the search 
for a consensus between state and university on future policy and institu-
tional goals. Funding for the achievement of these goals is normally laid 
down in a contract-like agreement and valid for a given number of years. 
Since the charm of this component is its flexibility, it is difficult to char-
acterise it beyond its benefit of supplying a budget based on common 
goals. The ultimate achievement of these goals may or may not be 
measured at the end of the agreement period. In the former case a budget 
adjustment may be made. Competition between institutions for alloca-
tions within this component is not transparent and usually marginal.  
Discretionary incremental funding: The extent of central control via 
the state within this component depends on whether the grant is allo-
cated as a line-item budget with fixed expenditure categories or as a 
block grant. In the latter case, state control is minimal. The basis for this 
funding was traditionally the previous year’s budget, which was carried 
forward and at times increased to take account of inflation (incremental-
ism) or corrected on account of general budget constraints. As higher 
education reform often entails the abolishment of line-item budgeting, 
this method of allocating a state subsidy has become increasingly inap-
propriate, since the basis of the allocated amount cannot be recon-
structed at a later date and is not transparent. This component does not 
facilitate competition between institutions. 
Each of these components can be distinguished by the degree of 
competition or centralised planning it facilitates (see table 2). The real 
level of competition is dependent on various framework conditions (see 
below).
4 In Ireland projects are financed through a supplementary funding pro-
gramme: The Programme for Research in Third-Level Institutions distrib-
uted €605 million between 1998 and 2004. 
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Table 2: Main components of state subsidies to HEIs 
High level of direct  
competition
High level of centralised  
budget planning 
Funding
component
Indicator-
based 
funding
Project-based 
funding
(earmarked 
grants) 
Mission-
based 
funding
Discretionary
incremental
funding
Basis of 
funding 
Formulaic 
measurement
of an institu-
tion’s per-
formance
and perform-
ance of other 
competitors
using indica-
tors. Output 
indicators as-
sure a direct 
measurement
of perform-
ance.
An institu-
tion’s (or 
consortium’s)  
project pro-
posal and 
competing
proposals.
Negotiations
between
state and in-
dividual 
HEIs.
An institu-
tion’s previ-
ous year’s 
budget.
The proportion of state subsidies allocated by each component for those 
German Länder that implement indicator-based models is shown in table 
3. Current funding models in Germany tend to allocate limited specific 
funding via mission-based agreements – albeit these agreements are an 
important framework for government steering (Orr and Schwarzenber-
ger 2007) – and so the table indicates solely whether such arrangements 
are currently in place. Hamburg has recently changed its funding system 
and allocates about 2% of the state subsidy via mission-based agree-
ments with individual HEIs. Project-based funding is currently not a dis-
tinct component of state allocations, but is sometimes included in discre-
tionary budgets. 
MORE COMPETITION IN GERMAN HIGHER EDUCATION
165
Table 3: Components of state subsidies to HEIs in Germany and their 
   relative proportion 2005 
High level of direct  
competition
High level of centralised  
budget planning 
German State Indicator-
based 
funding
Project-
based fund-
ing (ear-
marked
grants) 
Mission-
based 
funding
Discretionary
incremental
funding
(approx.) 
 % Yes/No Yes/No % 
Baden-
Württemberg
20 (28 FH)* No No 80 (72 FH) 
Bayern 2,4 (0,6 FH) No No 97,6 (99,4 FH) 
Berlin 15 No No 85 
Brandenburg 95 No Yes 5 
Bremen 5 No Yes 95 
Hamburg 98 No Yes 2 
Hessen 95 No Yes 5 
Niedersachsen (30 FH) No No (70 FH) 
Nordrhein-
Westfalen
17 No Yes 83 
Rheinland-
Pfalz 
95 No No 5 
Thüringen  15 No Yes 85 
Source: Adapted and in some cases updated from Leszczensky and Orr 2004, p. 53. 
*FH = Fachhochschulen 
The table shows that the proportion of state subsidies allocated on the 
basis of indicators varies considerably between the German states (see 
also Hartwig 2004). The discretionary component remains remarkably 
high in the majority of states. Brandenburg, Rheinland-Pfalz, Hamburg, 
and Hessen are exceptions to the general trend and utilise indicator-
based funding as the main funding method. However Brandenburg, 
amongst others, also includes the number of academics as one of its in-
dicators. Since the value of this indicator does not change according to 
performance, the proportion of state grant allocated by performance
must be corrected to 70% for the universities and 84% for the Fach-
hochschulen (Leszczensky and Orr 2004, p. 48). Furthermore, in Hessen 
the performance-based allocation model is currently in a state of review 
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and may be scaled down following both political and procedural prob-
lems.
To put the German situation into perspective, table 4 specifies the 
proportions allocated by component for a selection of OECD countries. 
Table 4: Components of state subsidies to universities in selected OECD 
   countries and their relative proportion 2003 
High level of direct competition High level of centralised
budget planning 
Country Indicator-
based 
funding
Project-based 
funding
(earmarked 
grants) 
Mission-
based 
funding
Discretionary
incremental
funding
 % % % % 
Australia 94* 6 - - 
England 83 17 - - 
Finland 68 20 - 12 
Ireland 63 7 - 30 
Norway 60 7 - 33 
Sweden 62 - 38 - 
Spain
(Valencia)
84 - 12 4 
Czech
Republic
58 30 - 12 
*For Australia the pre-funded HECS contributions are counted as state subsidy. 
Source: Leszczensky et al. 2004b, p. 188.  
An overview of the components used by other OECD countries and their 
respective importance for state subsidies highlights a variety of prac-
tices. In comparison with the general trend in Germany, it is noticeable 
that the models shown tend to rely to a lesser extent on non-transparent 
discretionary budget allocations and more on competitive components. 
Australia and England have the highest potential for competition in the 
group and utilise both formulae and project-based funding. However, the 
real competition between institutions is limited in both these countries. 
The Australian and English models are driven largely by student num-
bers, but in neither case are the institutions at complete liberty to deter-
mine how many state-funded students they will enrol. Maximum student 
numbers are negotiated between the state and individual institutions. In 
Australia these numbers are even determined by subject. However, in 
contrast to English institutions, their Australian counterparts can enrol 
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up to 35% more students per course if these students pay the full fee 
themselves (except in medicine).  
A comparison between tables 3 and 4 would suggest that Hamburg, 
Hessen, Brandenburg, and Rheinland-Pfalz are bucking the national 
trend to fall in line with international models since the proportion of 
budget allocated via discretionary components is minimal. However, a 
closer look at some of the framework conditions affecting German insti-
tutions will show that the potential for direct competition between insti-
tutions is even more tightly restricted than the examples of Australia and 
England.
4.  General  restr ict ions to competi t ion between 
 inst i tut ions in Germany 
Jongbloed (2003) has developed a set of conditions necessary for a free 
higher education market with open competition between institutions. 
The fulfilment of these conditions results in the elimination of barriers 
and regulations to a free exchange of resources between suppliers (HEIs) 
and consumers (students). However, he concludes that this may not be 
the policy objective of governments (Dill 2003; Leslie and Johnson 
1974). It is more likely that governments will minimise their direct in-
fluence on higher education systems and individual institutions and in-
stead restrict themselves to determining and supervising the rules of in-
teraction between suppliers and consumers. Jongbloed uses the analogy 
of a move from traffic lights at an interchange that dictate the movement 
of traffic based on a fixed timetable to a roundabout, where the move-
ment of traffic is only regulated by two rules: Drive round the round-
about in a set direction and yield to traffic already on the roundabout. 
This analogy is instructive, because it still allows the state to dictate 
many rules of exchange. For example, only cars that pass certain stan-
dards are allowed to use public roads and only drivers who have passed 
a test can drive cars. Further, a visitor to England would know that, in 
some cases, traffic light systems are actually integrated into big round-
abouts. This could be taken as an analogy for high priority policy issues 
necessitating more intervention by the state. Although this paper will not 
attempt to test the German system for Jongbloed’s eight conditions of 
marketisation, his model raises a number of issues regarding teaching 
that are highly relevant to current debates in Germany: 
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• On the supply side, competition between institutions is constrained, 
as institutions can only partially determine how many students and 
which students they enrol. Furthermore, certain conditions of provi-
sion are regulated from outside the individual institution, thus re-
stricting HEI’s efforts to provide courses appropriate to their own 
‘consumer profile’;  
• On the demand side, students are restricted in their choice of institu-
tion by the application system; their choice is further inhibited by a 
lack of information on course provisions and their respective quality.
4.1 Supply-side restrictions 
Jongbloed sees students as a resource with which HEIs may maintain or 
enhance their product (2003, p. 118). This is because higher education is 
a so-called ‘customer-input technology’. Regarding teaching, for exam-
ple, students are not only educated by lecturers or professors, but also by 
their peers through both in- and out-of-class situations (Harvey and 
Knight 1996, p. 148). This has significant consequences for providers, 
since they do not wholly determine the quality and success of higher 
education processes (compare, for example, research on course drop-
outs: Heublein et al. 2003). It is therefore in their interest to develop 
competitive strategies which do not simply aim to increase the number 
of ‘bums on seats’, but to acquire those students who best fit their prod-
uct profile (i.e., research-led, vocational-led, emphasis on natural sci-
ences, etc.). A further requirement for competition is that they should be 
able to design programmes appropriate to market demand. As Jongbloed 
recognises, professors are usually given a high degree of freedom in re-
spect to course design, but are subject to certain regulations which guar-
antee minimum standards for both students and prospective employers. 
Two methods of setting standards are in fact conceivable: through ad-
ministrative norms or professional judgements on quality. 
In Germany both the freedom of providers to select students and de-
sign their programmes are restricted. Indeed these two restrictions are 
interconnected and relate to the constitutional right of a qualified school 
graduate to a study place. The possession of an Abitur following secon-
dary school is interpreted by the Constitutional Court as giving the 
bearer the right to study their chosen subject at an institution of their 
choice (Kluth 2001, p. 46). HEIs are only able to turn qualified students 
away if their courses are full to capacity, which inhibits their ability to 
select students most appropriate to their courses. The method by which 
capacity is calculated also has implications for programme design. 
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Student selection 
Due to the right of a qualified school-leaver to a study place, selection 
processes have been broadly non-existent until now. Exceptions have 
been limited principally to courses with an aesthetic orientation where 
students must supplement their application with a portfolio of work or a 
display of their talent.
Recently, a report by the German Science Council recommended 
that HEIs be given the right to select all their students by individual abil-
ity and qualifications (WR 2004). This would indeed be a radical re-
form, but would be relatively difficult to achieve without restricting the 
constitutional right of qualified applicants to a study place. However, a 
number of Länder have begun to introduce reforms, which would in-
crease the opportunity for HEIs to select appropriate candidates. In Ba-
den-Württemberg, where approximately 11% of all students in Germany 
study, all HEIs with courses in which demand exceeds capacity must se-
lect 90% of student applicants on the basis of procedures that assess 
qualifications and individual ability (Frankenberg 2004, p. 25). This re-
quirement affects about 60% of study places there. Similar reforms exist 
in Bavaria and Hamburg. 
Study places in subjects for which demand exceeds supply on a na-
tional level are administered in Germany by a central agency (Zentral-
stelle für die Vergabe von Studienplätzen), which has until now allo-
cated study places to students on the basis of many factors not directly 
related to student choice or the preferences of HEIs. In 2003 some 
thirty-one thousand study places (6% of all new students) were allocated 
in this way. A reform of this procedure comes into force from winter 
semester 2005, where: 
• 20% of places go to students with the highest Abitur-scores, who can 
select the HEI of their choice; 
• 60% of places will be allocated based on HEIs’ individual criteria 
and procedures; and 
• 20% according to waiting lists. 
Although this affects only a small proportion of students, it is hoped that 
it will promote a further reform at the state level and the use of these 
new freedoms at the institutional level, both of which would be neces-
sary to significantly increase the pro-active autonomy of German HEIs.  
Capacity regulations and their implications for programme design 
The decision on what capacity a study course at an individual HEI has is 
taken using normative regulations. As publicly funded institutions, HEIs 
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are required to fully exploit the resources available to them to maximise 
student numbers. However, to assure professors’ freedom to carry out 
teaching and research and assure the quality of education for those stu-
dents already enrolled, normed limits are set via a formula for student 
capacity on the basis of the so-called “capacity regulation” (Kapazitäts-
verordnung). The normed capacity of a study course at an individual in-
stitution is largely based on the number of academic personnel employed 
(teaching capacity) and the calculated teaching-load required by a 
course. These two factors dictate the number of students that can be en-
rolled within capacity boundaries. This administrative framework results 
in a number of restrictions regarding programme design and provision. 
Whilst the capacity formula takes the specific didactical models used in 
the respective subject area into account to calculate course teaching-load 
and the personnel requirement, it is necessarily based on common prac-
tices. The possibilities available to an institution to offer modular 
courses with innovative teaching techniques such as e-learning and par-
ticularly intensive phases of student supervision are restricted by their 
potential to reproduce these activities in a way that conforms to the for-
mula. Most importantly, efforts to increase supervision (i.e., staff-
student ratios) would be represented in the formula as spare capacity for 
more students. It is important to note that these regulations only apply 
under certain circumstances; namely, when an HEI restricts the number 
of applicants to one of its courses. In such a case, applicants have the 
right to approach the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht), who 
then test the claim that a course is full to capacity on the basis of the set 
norms. This occurs frequently in popular courses.
The other method of assuring minimum standards, which could 
eventually offer an alternative to this administrative calculation, is the 
use of accreditation and evaluation. Whilst a system of accreditation has 
now been established in Germany, it relates only to new Bachelor- and 
Masters-courses. Even though Germany is aiming to integrate all higher 
education courses into this study structure by 2010 and some HEIs have 
already completed this transition (e.g., Erfurt University), the proportion 
of Bachelor and Masters courses currently provided in Germany is 16% 
of all undergraduate courses and 64% of all postgraduate courses (not 
including PhDs) respectively. On the latest figures roughly 29% of these 
have completed the procedure of accreditation (Hochschulrektorenkon-
ferenz databank “Hochschulkompass” 2005). Although such a reform 
would assure the quality of provision, it would not ensure that HEIs are 
fully exploiting their resources. It has been argued that this condition 
could be fulfilled through a further development of performance-related 
funding coupled with individual contracts between state and HEI on the 
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number of students enrolled (Kluth 2001, p. 92). Both are currently un-
der development in many of the German Länder.
4.2 Demand-side restrictions 
On the demand side, Jongbloed argues that students must be in a posi-
tion to select from the various offers made by different HEIs and be suf-
ficiently informed about the courses offered in the market. The previous 
section showed that the opportunity for students to select their place of 
study is currently restricted, but that reforms are in place to increase stu-
dents’ influence on the selection of their place of study.  
Regarding the amount and quality of information on study courses, 
their content, and the future prospects of graduates on the job market, 
empirical studies show that potential students are not satisfied (Lewin et 
al. 2002). They concur with an OECD expert report on Germany, which 
criticised advice structures as being too dispersed and overly bureau-
cratic (WR 2004, p. 11).  A report by the German Science Council con-
cludes that relevant information is not reaching potential students to a 
sufficient degree and consequently, there is an inadequate consciousness 
of profile differences between individual institutions (ibid, p. 14). Unlike 
the largely supply-side restrictions, these are not so much due to restric-
tive regulations as to underdeveloped attitudes. On the positive side, a 
number of HEIs have implemented successful marketing initiatives and 
the comparative league tables drawn-up annually by the Centre for 
Higher Education Development (CHE) are to an increasing extent, con-
sulted by students (Spiewak 2005, p. 79). Nevertheless, the conditions 
appropriate for competition between HEIs in this area can only be 
brought about by an improved and concerted effort on all sides. 
It is fair to conclude that a reduction in the above restrictions on 
competition in Germany is being pursued. However, there is a question 
as to the appropriate degree of competition between institutions in the 
current transitional phase of German higher education. In this phase, 
governments are attempting to solve structural problems, which have re-
sulted from previous large-scale higher education expansion without un-
dertaking the necessary system adaptation (Wolter 2004). Unlike the 
previous examples, where reforming efforts are being made to facilitate 
competition and allow the proverbial ‘invisible hand’ to take its course,
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these programmes are clear examples of government intervention.5
Rather than list such programmes by state, it is perhaps more instructive 
to investigate a single case (Berlin) where a clear conflict between the 
goals of increasing competition between institutions and government 
steering of the sector was recently observable. 
5. Funding in  Berl in  within a context  of  
 restructur ing and budget  constra int  
Berlin is a particularly good example of system restructuring, budget 
constraint, and the instruments that are currently being used to steer 
HEIs towards policy goals of performance and efficiency. Despite hav-
ing only three universities, Berlin is one of the larger German higher 
education systems. In 2002, one hundred and thirty-one thousand stu-
dents, or roughly 7% of the total student population in Germany, studied 
in Berlin; 93% of students were enrolled in a state university or Fach-
hochschule (see table 5 for further details). 
Table 5: Number of students and graduates in Berlin public higher  
   education system 2002 
Institution No. of stu-
dents 2002
 in % Gradu-
ates 2002 
(rolling
av.)*
 in % 
Universities (without medicine)
Free University 36,724 38% 2,719  39%  
Humboldt University  32,018 33% 2,213  32%  
Technical University 29,012 30% 2,030  29%  
Total universities 97,754 100% 6,962  100%
5  Expert Commissions to advise the restructuring of higher education sys-
tems have been used in most of the German states in recent years. In many 
cases they have had significant effects on the size and structure of the sys-
tems. In Niedersachsen a so-called Higher Education Optimisation Con-
cept (HOK) was drawn up to facilitate the restructuring of the system and 
facilitate budget cuts of €50 million by 2007, necessary due to a reduction 
in the total public budget of the state.  
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Institution No. of stu-
dents 2002
 in % Gradu-
ates 2002 
(rolling
av.)*
 in % 
Fachhochschulen
Alice-Salomon FH 1,256 5% 217  6%  
Technical and Business FH 8,205 36% 1,226  34%  
FH for Administration and 
Law 2,222 10% 535  15%  
FH for Business 3,077 13% 547  15%  
Technical FH 8,194 36% 1,109  31%  
Total Fachhochschulen 22,954 100% 3,634  100%
Grand total 120,708  10,596    
Source: Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin (2004). Rolling average for universities over 
two years, for Fachhochschulen over three years. 
5.1 Policy framework 
Budget constraint 
Budget constraint has been one of the main restrictions on higher educa-
tion policy since the early 1990s, when German Reunification brought 
East and West Berlin back together and led to the formation of a new 
higher education system. Previously, the Free University had grown to 
become one of the biggest universities in West Germany and the Hum-
boldt University had been the elite university in the German Democratic 
Republic. It was clear that capacity had to be consolidated and subject 
provision over the whole of the system re-evaluated.  
The first budget cuts occurred between 1993 and 2000 and were 
guided by the double objective of saving by consolidating some courses 
at particular universities or Fachhochschulen and improving the overall 
efficiency of institutional performance (Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin 
1997). Budget pressure has continued since 2000 and a current agree-
ment between universities, Fachhochschulen, and the Berlin Senate 
stipulates a further budget saving between 2003 and 2005 of over €80 
million. A historical comparison between annual total budgets for uni-
versity and Fachhochschule sectors (without medicine) shows a mone-
tary decrease of €81 million – or 8% – in the relevant budgets for 1995 
and 2003 (Strobel 2003, p. 29). The total budget for 2003 was one bil-
lion Euros. 
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Student numbers 
A significant dimension of budget cuts has been the decrease in planned 
study places. Originally a reduction from 115,000 to 100,000 was con-
sidered, but this figure has lately been further reduced to the current 
85,000 planned study places. It was argued that achieving this goal 
would necessitate reductions in both the numbers of non-academic and 
professorial staff, but that there was also significant room for improve-
ment in teaching processes themselves, particularly in three areas: 
• Some courses suffered from supply and demand matching problems; 
supply should be reorganised within HEIs to better match the actual 
needs of prospective students; 
• Many students prolonged their studies over the normal study dura-
tion for their courses and this led to unnecessary resource expendi-
ture;
• Because of the aforementioned problems, among other things many 
courses had a high attrition rate, which led to resource wastage.  
Recent figures for the years 2000 through 2003 show the current situa-
tion in Berlin in the university and Fachhochschule sectors (see table 6). 
The indicators signify a positive matching of supply and demand in both 
sectors, with values near to or above 100%. The proportion of students 
successfully completing their courses in Berlin, however, continues to 
leave much room for improvement, although this reflects a general prob-
lem in German higher education and is not specific to Berlin. 
Table 6: Selected performance indicators for Berlin HEIs 2000-2003 
Indicator
Higher education 
sector
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Universities 93% 99% 111% 112
%
Supply and 
demand 
quota* Fachhochschulen 102% 98% 97% 99% 
Universities 53% 51% 46% 48% Success
rate** Fachhochschulen 60% 58% 59% 66% 
*Supply and demand quote: students within normal study duration/number of study 
places
**Success rate: total graduates/students per (normed) study year 
Source: Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin (2004) 
Fachhochschule restructuring fund 
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The indicator for survival rates is more positive for the Fach-
hochschulen, since these institutions are much more focused on teaching 
and tend to have shorter courses, better supervision, and better advice 
structures than universities. A long-term plan for Berlin is to increase the 
proportion of students studying in Fachhochschulen and to this end a 
Fachhochschule restructuring fund was established in 2003. Just over 
€2.5 million are redistributed from the three universities to Berlin’s 
Fachhochschulen annually, with the aim of a total investment of €38.4 
million after 15 years. To receive funding, the institutions have to pro-
pose new innovative study courses, which are evaluated by a group of 
experts. Courses that are granted funding subsequently have to apply for 
formal accreditation and – on approval – the project funding flows into 
their state subsidy permanently. In the first phase of this restructuring 
initiative (between 2003 and 2005) nearly 2000 new study places have 
been created in Fachhochschulen.
Given the situation sketched above, what degree of competition has 
been installed between institutions within this framework and is it ap-
propriate? The answer to the first part of this question is to be found in 
the allocation method for the state subsidy. 
5.2 Contract-funding with an element of competition 
The current system of funding in Berlin is founded on a consensus be-
tween institutions and the state that the financial constraints and restruc-
turing efforts of the state can only be realised if all higher education in-
stitutions in Berlin can rely on a degree of financial stability. Indeed 
leaders of these institutions see the funding contract as an immovable 
element in the current coordination framework (Leszczensky et al. 
2004a, p. 8). At the same time, there is further agreement that funding 
allocations cannot continue to be based purely on historical budget allo-
cations simply rolled-over into the next year. Even within the current fi-
nancial straitjacket, an element of performance-based funding is neces-
sary. Berlin, therefore, combines multi-year contracts that declare com-
mon policy goals with guaranteed budgets to achieve those goals. One 
stipulation of the individual contracts is that the individual institutions 
will take part in a budget redistribution procedure whereby a certain 
proportion of their promised budget may be lost or supplemented de-
pending on each institution’s real performance. 
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Contract
The first contracts between state and institutions were signed in 1997 
and were renewed in 2003 with little change. These contracts lay down a 
set of policy objectives including: 
• Improvement of competitive strategy and development of an indi-
vidual performance profile (laid down in a strategic plan); 
• Improvement of resource efficiency and exploitation of rationalisa-
tion potential; 
• Reduction in study duration and improvement in student supervi-
sion;
• Implementation of internal financial controlling; 
• Strengthening cooperation between institutions; 
• Gender mainstreaming. 
The annual budget of an institution is stipulated in paragraph 1 of the 
agreement. In paragraph 3 institutions agree to take part in the competi-
tive funding redistribution model. However, it is clearly stated that wins 
or losses will be calculated each year and the basis for redistribution the 
following year will be the original budget and not the performance-
orientated corrected budget. Therefore, even if an institution loses 5% of 
its budget in one year, it will still begin the new round of redistribution 
with 100% of its original budget. This was introduced to prevent a 
downward spiral, whereby a bad performance in one year is perpetuated 
by a permanent budget reduction in the following years. 
Performance-based funding 
As mentioned above, one component of the multi-year contracts is the 
stipulation of annual budgets. A set percentage is then subtracted from 
each university’s budget and redistributed on the basis of relative per-
formance. This initial budget is discretionary in type and its volume is 
not based on transparent criteria, but largely on each institution’s his-
torical budget. The continued use of rolled-over budgets as a starting 
point for re-distributional efforts is common in Germany; the underlying 
philosophy is that these budgets are the result of iterative negotiations 
between the state and the HEI and therefore reflect institutional costs to 
some degree.  
The performance-based funding component has the explicit objec-
tive of recognising competitive strengths and weaknesses among institu-
tions. However, efforts have been made to level the playing field be-
tween competitors so that each institution is benchmarked against simi-
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lar institutions. This is achieved through a number of stages in the com-
petitive process (see figure 2): 
Figure 2: Framework for performance-based funding in Berlin 
Firstly, universities and Fachhochschulen do not compete directly, since 
they are seen to offer different services with inherently different cost 
structures.
Secondly, as there are significant differences in performance dimen-
sions between academic disciplines (e.g., success rates, gender perform-
ance, and third-party research contracts), only similar disciplines com-
pete directly against each other. To this purpose, academic disciplines 
have been amalgamated into two subject groups for each institutional 
type:
• Universities: a) Humanities and social sciences, and b) Natural and 
engineering sciences; 
• Fachhochschulen: a) Social and business sciences, and b) Technical 
sciences and design. 
Competition takes place not between institutions, but between the insti-
tutions’ subject groups. A consequence is that little further weighting of 
indicators based on discipline characteristics is necessary, since only 
similar disciplines compete directly. 
Thirdly, as table 5 shows, there are significant differences in institu-
tional size (see also bubble size in figure 2). The majority of indicators 
used in this funding model are, however, quotas that set measures of in-
49% 51%
52% 48%
23% 77%
100%
100%
100%
33% 67%
7% 93%
Universities Fachhochschulen
KEY: bubble size: number of enrolled students; lefthand percentage: 
budget for subject group humanities and social sciences; righthand 
percentage: budget for subject group natural and engineering sciences
KEY: bubble size: number of enrolled students; lefthand percentage: 
budget for subject group social and business sciences; righthand 
percentage: budget for subject group technical sciences and design
Free University
Humboldt University
Technical University
Alice-Salomon FH
Technical and Business FH
FH for Administration and Law
FH for Business
Technical FH
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put against measures of output. This practice has the advantage of relat-
ing outputs to inputs but the disadvantage of leading to values that bear 
no relation to the volume of output. For example, two thousand students 
and two hundred graduates give the same quota as twenty thousand stu-
dents and two thousand graduates, although clearly the latter requires 
more resources. To solve this problem, relative performance is scaled 
against the size of an institution’s historical budget.  
The current model utilises eleven indicators for each institution type 
and cover comparative quotas for research, teaching, and gender per-
formance. Ultimately, they have been constructed with the aim of en-
couraging institutions to develop their own performance profile; to bol-
ster their strengths and minimise their weaknesses. In contrast to the 
funding models in Hamburg and Bremen, however, the set of indicators 
is fixed and applies to all universities and Fachhochschulen in Berlin, as 
are the weightings of the individual indicators (Leszczensky and Orr 
2004).
One example of such a profile is shown in figure 3 for the Free Uni-
versity’s two subject groups in 2004. In this year the university gained 
6% in this competitive component of its budget or €1.6 million (15% •
6% = 1% gain on total state subsidy). This gain resulted in a propor-
tional loss for the other two universities. Gains and losses in the order of 
1% of total state subsidy occurred in both university and Fach-
hochschule sectors and a significantly higher volatility is not currently 
wished for (Leszczensky et al. 2004a, p. 36, 10). 
Figure 3: Performance profile Free University Berlin (2004) 
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Figure 3 shows comparative strengths (i.e., values above 0% as average 
performance) inter alia in success rate, study duration quota, proportion 
of doctorates, and international researchers with stipends from the Alex-
ander-von-Humboldt Foundation. This institution, however, also made a 
significant gain on the basis of a badly constructed indicator (Leszczen-
sky et al. 2004a, p. 31). When working with small numbers, the propor-
tion of new female professors reacts highly sensitively and in this case 
the result (+200%) is due to the fact that in the subject group natural and 
engineering sciences the other two competing universities did not hire a 
single female professor in the relevant period. This last point highlights 
the importance of an evaluation of the effects of indicator-based funding 
methods on a regular basis, to ensure that the intended goals are being 
reached.
Funding by vouchers? 
An analysis of the funding structure in Berlin shows a marginal element 
of competition between institutions. Recently, a model for funding the 
institutions in Berlin on the basis of vouchers was proposed by Dohmen 
(2003). This model would increase competition between institutions as 
they attempted to increase the proportion of students spending vouchers 
on their courses. The basis of the transaction would be vouchers related 
to credits obtained in course modules. This small unit of transaction was 
chosen to encourage students to pick and mix various modules from dif-
ferent institutions. Apart from the currently restrictive framework condi-
tions for competition in German higher education considered above, the 
main argument for not finally implementing this model – which was ini-
tially hotly debated – was that in no way did it correspond to the basic 
coordination framework currently in place. In particular, the fixed budg-
ets laid down in the contracts with the state, seen as an important pre-
condition for reform and restructuring efforts, would no longer have any 
worth. The general consensus, then, was that the restricted degree of 
competition currently in place remained appropriate for Berlin. The de-
bate on the implementation of tuition fees and vouchers which has re-
emerged following the decision of the Constitutional Court allowing 
such models of cost-sharing will require a reassessment of this decision 
in the near future. 
6.  More competi t ion in Germany in the future?  
It may seem obvious, but the answer to how much competition should 
be installed in a higher education system depends on the dominant ap-
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proach to higher education coordination in a given context. Seen from 
the perspective of marketisation, it is a question of the extent with which 
the state relaxes interventionalist rules. The more this happens, the more 
important competition between institutions becomes as a framework for 
coordination. Seen from the perspective of the state, the ultimate ques-
tion is the extent to which strategic policy goals can be achieved by a 
competitive mechanism.
Jongbloed sees the ideal compromise between these two views of 
coordination as the roundabout-analogy, where a minimum set of 
framework conditions assures the efficiency of the sector’s operation. 
Competitive funding can achieve a lot through careful crafting of the 
steering mechanisms – for example, through the choice of performance 
indicators. However, what happens when the inevitable coordination 
problems occur, for example, as a result of unintended effects?  
With regard to Berlin – and more or less generalised for Germany – 
the state shows little sign of leaving the market to regulate such coordi-
nation problems. Competition is used by the state more as an additional 
lever with which to re-structure German higher education; it is not the 
dominant force. In Berlin, the performance-based funding method sup-
ports the goals of improving efficiency and effectiveness of the institu-
tions’ operations by making specific performance measures directly 
relevant to the ultimate budget, albeit at a low level. 
In the medium-term this situation is unlikely to change much since 
the majority of the Länder seem reluctant to give up their powers of in-
tervention in regional higher education systems. A federal initiative to 
stimulate competition between top universities and research centres in 
Germany through a national funding programme, which would alleviate 
some institutions’ budget problems, has still to be implemented despite 
signs of general agreement, because the Länder want to retain their sov-
ereignty over regional educational policy. This programme – originally 
called Brain-Up – would increase the budgets of top universities by up 
to 10% for five years (Labi 2004).
In the long-term this situation will change as HEIs become more and 
more exposed to competition from institutions outside their regional 
context. This may lead to regional states in Germany being relegated to 
just one agent of many that influence institutions. The progressive Euro-
peanisation and internationalisation of national higher education systems 
(e.g., Bologna and GATS) will force a relaxation of regulations, which 
restrict competition between institutions in different countries; HEIs will 
consequently become more autonomous. Furthermore, the introduction 
of tuition fees in Germany will certainly strengthen the private voice of 
students in the higher education system. But will this influence be ulti-
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mately good for the system as a whole? This is a question for the public 
coordination framework (OECD 2004, pp. 22-24).
In this scenario it might be argued that the construction of intelligent 
systems of public higher education funding may be the most effective 
way of maintaining a regional influence on higher education institutions. 
Both competitively allocated and mission-based funds will remain im-
portant instruments of government steering. In this case, the proportion 
of funding based on historical budgets would necessarily decrease, be-
cause it is not possible to link this type of funding to specific policy 
strategies or goals. The task of such public funding will ultimately 
change, however, since promoting competition between institutions will 
no longer suffice as a policy task – competition will be a given. It is the 
state, which is ultimately left with the challenge of detecting and correct-
ing coordination errors in line with higher education policy (Peters 1996, 
p. 119; OECD 2004, p. 31). This change of approach could be typified 
by a move from injecting ‘the private’ into ‘the pubic’ to injecting ‘the 
public’ back into ‘the private’. 
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Five Somersaults in Enschede: Rethinking 
Public/Private in Higher Education for the 
Global Era1
SIMON MARGINSON
1.  Introduct ion 
The public/private divide is a distinction basic to higher education stud-
ies, one of the primary coordinates in the analysis of institutions and na-
tional systems, and central to liberal political philosophy. But higher 
education is undergoing multiple transformations amid the impact of 
global flows and relationships, new patterns of social demand, the 
changing role of the state, and the ‘position-taking strategies’ of institu-
tions themselves within the field (Naidoo 2004). The qualities tradition-
ally associated with ‘public’ and ‘private’ in higher education have be-
come unstable and unclear. In the national dimension, higher education 
is first of all understood as ‘public’, aside perhaps from the USA where 
the prior concept is the market. But the ‘private’ aspect of higher educa-
tion is growing in incidence and importance. At the same time, global-
isation is impacting both public and private goods in higher education. 
Global, meta-regional, national and local changes blend in unfamiliar 
ways. This does not mean that the new public/private landscape in 
higher education cannot be defined; only that conclusive new definitions 
are yet to be devised; and if the terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ are not to be 
abandoned, they need to be used in new ways.  
Following a preliminary statement of method and scope, the paper 
critiques two conventional approaches to public/private drawn from lib-
eral political economy, noting also the tensions between them. These are 
                                             
1 Grateful thanks to Jürgen Enders, Eric Beerkens and Gary Rhoades for 
their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
SIMON MARGINSON
188
the statist approach, which rests on a juridical boundary between public 
and private ownership; and the neo-classical economic approach, where 
public and private are determined by the nature of what is produced. The 
paper then develops its own definitions of public and private goods and 
applies these successively to higher education in general, to national 
higher education systems, and to global relations in higher education. 
The conceptual leaps here create a better fit between analytical frame-
work and empirical terrain. Perhaps a more precise term for these con-
ceptual leaps is ‘somersaults’. At five different points, the reader is 
asked to radically shift perspectives on public/private by inverting those 
terms, performing conceptual somersaults in which one’s assumptions 
(and oneself) are turned upside down. Hence the title ‘Five Somersaults 
in Enschede’. It is hoped that the reader finds herself/himself the right 
way up at the end! 
2.  Method and scope of  the inquiry 
10 points about method: Much depends on how public/ private in higher 
education are analysed. By setting out the method at this point, and 
thereby summarising part of the argument, it is hoped the rest of the pa-
per will be easier to understand.
• The purpose of inquiry is to understand, explain and interpret higher 
education. This means that the conceptual and methodological tools 
of inquiry should be shaped by the purpose of inquiry and appropri-
ate to the empirical terrain, rather than the inquiry being distorted to 
fit the tools. Also, any theories and methods that can enhance under-
standing have something to offer. 
• Because in the first instance the purpose is explanatory, not norma-
tive, the test of concepts is how useful they are in illuminating reali-
ties, not whether they confirm a theory or a pre-given teleological 
narrative, or they sustain political or discursive authority. From the 
explanatory standpoint, neither theories nor configurations of power 
are the horizon: these are merely two inputs into the process of ex-
planation. It is better to recognise policy values explicitly, not bury 
them implicitly in theories or (as is often the case) methods so as to 
surreptitiously prejudge the explanation.
• It is unhelpful to treat public and private as fixed or natural attrib-
utes. Firstly, these concepts shift and transform over time in re-
sponse to two kinds of changes, not correlated in linear fashion: 
epistemological and historical.  
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• Further, even within a given historical context and using a fixed set 
of categories the teaching, research and the service functions of 
higher education are never intrinsically or ‘naturally’ public or pri-
vate. They fall into either camp, depending on the social arrange-
ments. Whether higher education is public or private, is policy sensi-
tive, nested in culture (Calhoun 1998), and varies by time and place. 
Activities such as education are often shifted from the private sphere 
to public sphere, and from public to private. 
• It is unhelpful to treat public and private as universal attributes: to 
describe whole institutions, or whole higher education systems, as 
totally public or private. This move obscures complexities that can 
be readily identified.
• As used here the public/private distinction is based on the social ef-
fects of the aspect of education in question. The paper uses an adap-
tation of Samuelson’s (1954) neo-classical economic definition of 
public and private goods, with significant caveats. Here the pub-
lic/private distinction is not identical to the core liberal dualism 
(Hayek 1960), the state/market distinction, based on the opposition 
between government and polity, and market economy and family.2
• It is possible for state-owned institutions to produce private goods, 
and privately owned and for-profit institutions to produce public 
goods. (Ownership does affect the potential for public or private 
goods though. Distinctions between state, private non-profit, and 
private for-profit, institutions are other and useful distinctions to 
make).
• Public and private do not constitute a unitary set, either by the ab-
sorption of one into the other, or by combining the two. Public and 
private goods are too different, too heterogeneous, to enable a neat 
mathematical reconciliation. Higher education has plural affiliations 
(Sen 1999) and diverse effects. It is not ‘one thing’. The idea of a 
single logical set is tempting. But the price of this reduction, with its 
simplicity and clarity, is to block from view phenomena central to 
understanding higher education.
• Thus first, it is unhelpful to reduce the public goods produced in 
higher education (or its total ‘public good’) to the aggregation of all 
private goods, as in a utilitarian calculus in which the individual is 
prior to the social. One reason is that public goods include collective 
goods that cannot be individualised, such as the benefits of peaceful 
                                             
2 Nor is it identical to the juridical distinction between government and pri-
vate ownership; or the distinction between communal economy and mar-
ket economy; or between civic space and private home. 
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association.3 Second, it is unhelpful to treat public and private as 
necessarily zero sum. They are sometimes but not always mutually 
exclusive. The terms are commonly used dualistically (Dow 1990). 
In a dualistic framework, the more that higher education is private 
the less it is public, and vice versa. But this again obscures many 
cases in the real world. For example, growth in the number of indi-
vidual benefits produced in higher education may lead to more spill-
overs to other individuals, and more collective benefits (these terms 
are discussed below). In this instance private and public goods are 
positive sum. In fact, public and private goods are often inter-
dependent, in that the production of one kind of good provides con-
ditions enhancing the potential for the other. But where higher edu-
cation is reorganised into a competitive economic market with high 
tuition, the relationship is more zero-sum: private goods are en-
hanced while some public goods are diminished. Whether and to the 
extent that public and private goods are inter-dependent and feed 
into each other, or are mutually exclusive, is, like the public/private 
boundary itself, sensitive to policy and material limits. The norma-
tive bias of this paper is to maximise both public and private goods.  
• It is unhelpful to use concepts of public/private that mean one thing 
in the national dimension and another in the global dimension. This 
is how the conventional notions work. Now that global effects have 
moved from the margins to the centre of societies, and the national 
and global dimensions constantly affect each other , it is essential to 
use concepts of public/private that work consistently globally, na-
tionally and locally. 
Scope of the inquiry: The conventional meanings of public and private 
are drawn from liberal political philosophy, law and political economy. 
In this tradition there is a long history of discussion about the ‘public’ or 
‘commons’ (Powell and Clemens 1998), which turns on problems of lib-
eralism including private legal identity, private and collective benefits, 
and the potential for markets. Despite its unorthodox character, this pa-
per generally remains on that terrain. Because of its capacity to form 
self-altering agents (Castoriadis 1987, p. 372) and critical intellectual re-
flexivity’s, and its fecundity in creating relationships across traditional 
boundaries, higher education is potentially potent in building democ-
racy. This is explicitly recognised in some national policy traditions, 
3 Further, private goods may be produced in a Hobbesian war of all against 
all, constituting a fractious and insecure world in which there are as many 
collective public ‘bads’ as public goods. 
FIVE SOMERSAULTS IN ENSCHEDE
191
such as Mexico and Argentina (Ordorika 2003; Mollis, 1999/2000). An 
adequate understanding of higher education’s contribution to democracy 
cannot be read from liberal political economy alone as some have tried 
to do (Friedman 1962; Hayek 1979). At best definitions of public/private 
taken from law and political economy can address the contribution of 
higher education to democracy only as a subordinate aspect of collective 
public goods. But the paper does not discuss the contribution of higher 
education to democracy except in relation to distribution. An investiga-
tion of public and private higher education in relation to democracy 
would complement the present paper.  
Likewise the notion that animates this paper, of higher education as 
producer of multiple and heterogeneous public and private goods; acces-
sible to empirical observation, judgement, and sometimes measurement; 
is different to concepts in political theory such as the normative ‘public 
good’ (Mansbridge 1998) or historical-institutional ‘public sphere’ 
(Habermas 1989; Calhoun 1992). Again this is not to say that these no-
tions of public are invalid for higher education. One way to conceive the 
public dimension in higher education is to argue that the sector consti-
tutes – or could constitute – an umbrella ‘public sphere’ that makes the 
more narrowly defined public goods possible. The public sphere is dis-
cussed by Habermas is ideally articulated by discursive relations, rather 
than by the money economy or by relations of power. Potentially it is 
comprised by ‘flat’ social relations in which status differences are virtu-
ally eliminated (Habermas 1989, p. 36). For a review of the potential 
relevance of the aggregated or generic “public good” and “public 
sphere” to higher education, see Pusser (2004). However, such a notion 
of the ‘public sphere’ is heterogeneous to the explanatory project in this 
paper, in which higher education is understood in terms of articulations 
of money and social power not of discourse per se (Marginson 2005b).4
3. Conventional  meanings of  publ ic /pr ivate  
Two notions dominate the conventional liberal approaches to pub-
lic/private. Both are shaped by the state/market dual on which orthodox 
liberalism turns. Both treat public and /private as mutually exclusive. 
The first notion is the definition of public/private arising from neo-
classical economics, where the boundary is determined by the intrinsic 
4 Marginson (2005b) discusses and compares the respective potentials for 
theorisations of higher education, of Samuelson’s (1954) political econ-
omy of public/private goods, and Habermas’ political theory of the public 
sphere (1989) and communicative action.  
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character of the goods, and particularly by whether they are accessible to 
full market production or not. Goods capable of full market production 
are ‘private’, while other goods are defined in at least some sense as 
‘public’. The second notion is the juridical definition of public/private 
where the boundary is determined by legal ownership. These two views 
reflect the respective political claims of economic liberalism centred on 
the market, which is equated with the private side of the dual; and a sta-
tist social democracy centred on governmental institutions, which are 
equated with the public side of the dual. Both notions are flawed. 
3.1 The neo-classical economic notion of public/private
The neo-classical economic definition of ‘public’ goods is outlined by 
Samuelson (1954). Samuelson defines public goods (or services)5 as 
goods that are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Goods are non-
rivalrous when they can be consumed by any number of people without 
being depleted, for example knowledge of a mathematical theorem. 
Goods are non-excludable when the benefits cannot be confined to indi-
vidual buyers, such as social tolerance, or law and order. Few goods are 
both fully non-rivalrous and fully non-excludable but many have one or 
the other quality in part. Goods with neither quality are classified as 
fully private goods. As Samuelson sees it, ‘public’ and ‘private’ are in-
trinsic to the character of the good. Goods are normally private and open 
to private ownership and full market production unless they have quali-
ties that prevents this. He also notes that public and part-public goods 
are under-provided in economic markets; for example it is unprofitable 
to pay for goods that can be acquired free as the result of someone else’s 
purchase. Hence there is a case for state financing and/or provision of 
public goods. Samuelson’s theorisation of public/private opens the way 
to argue for at least some government intervention but has a prima facie 
bias in favour of market organisation.6
Samuelson’s notion of the public/private distinction holds a broad 
sway in policy circles, used by neo-liberal policy makers and UN devel-
opment advocates alike (Kaul et al. 1999). Another relevant concept 
5 In this paper the term ‘goods’ is used in a generic sense to refer to all 
forms of production including those industries conventionally character-
ised as ‘services’ such as education. ‘Goods’ refers to benefits obtained, 
which includes benefits that are intangible/ non-corporeal, as well as those 
manifest in corporeal commodities. 
6 Samuelson believed that as the economy evolved technological change 
would allow some goods that were formerly non-rivalrous and or non-
excludable to become market goods and hence produced more efficiently. 
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from economics is that of ‘externalities’ or ‘spill-over’ effects. External-
ities are benefits not fully captured by the individual who pays for the 
costs of education. For example, the training of a manager may render 
not only her or his work, but the work of others, more profitable and 
productive.
3.2 The juridical notion of public/private 
In the juridical definition, whether an institution and its outputs are pub-
lic or private is determined simply by whether it is state-owned or non-
state owned. ‘Public’ is necessarily associated with government or state. 
All else is private. This is the most common sense and commonly used 
understanding of public/private, and the categories used in policy analy-
sis, except where it goes to questions of economic value. 
At first glance the juridical public/private divide corresponds to the 
economic public/private divide. Public goods in Samuelson’s economic 
sense benefit a broad citizenry, and are distributed in open and egalitar-
ian fashion. Because of market failure, governments and publicly-owned 
institutions take responsibility for those public goods. These institutions 
exercise broad responsibilities on behalf of the whole people. Even 
when the public goods they produce are not accessible to all (like librar-
ies) then they are valuable to all (like basic research) and worth paying 
taxes for. On the other side of the dual, private universities produce pri-
vate goods such as scarce places in prestigious Law faculties. There is 
no reason why the government should pay on behalf of the community 
for these private goods. Private universities have a lesser compass of re-
sponsibility and greater freedom to engage in markets and otherwise 
pursue their own ends free of state intervention. The price is that they fi-
nance their own operation. The public/private symmetry seems simple 
and transparent. But it is not. 
3.3 Problems with the traditional approaches to  
  public/private 
There are deep-seated difficulties with both the economic and the juridi-
cal definitions of public/private.  
Samuelson’s notion of public/private offers an outcomes-centred ap-
proach that focuses on measurable qualities. The concept of public 
goods as defined by non-rivalry and non-excludability, and the notions 
of externalities and collective benefits, take analysis into the difficult 
terrain of goods whose values are not market-determined. Used wisely 
Samuelson’s notion enables recognition of a broad and heterogeneous 
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range of outcomes: market and non-market-produced, short-term and 
long-term, individualised and collective. Analysis comes closer to the 
complex and multiple social practices of the sector, and a broad range of 
policy options come into view. Mostly Samuelson’s approach has not 
been used so wisely. It has been reworked to fulfil narrower projects 
such as attempts to devise a single number for the outputs or value of 
higher education, for example an aggregated private and social ‘rate of 
return’; or has been interpreted selectively so as to focus on some out-
puts and not others. Lip-service is paid to the notion of public goods 
even while these are largely ignored.  
The neo-classical economic version of public/private has two inher-
ent limitations. First, the normative bias in favour of individualism and 
markets. Efficiency is always treated as primary and this predisposes 
policy makers to market solutions. There is a corresponding methodo-
logical bias in favour of that which is measured in money terms. It is 
comparatively simple to calculate the private earning power of degrees 
(though other kinds of private benefit might prove more elusive) but ex-
ternalities and collective goods constitute a more formidable challenge. 
Mostly the challenge is avoided. It is difficult for the economist to imag-
ine these qualities, especially collective outcomes such as community 
literacy or the contribution of education to social tolerance. Likewise it 
is easier for the economist to imagine the immediate exchange value of 
commercial intellectual property than the use value of basic research, 
which has an open-ended long-term potential. Calculations of external-
ities are assumption-determined and vary widely.7 In the outcome exter-
nalities and public goods have been grossly neglected (Pusser 2002; 
Marginson 1997, pp. 27-50). In providing policy advice, the emphasis 
falls on private economic returns; for example the long tyranny exer-
cised by private rates of return to education in World Bank lending pro-
grams (Taskforce 2000; Singh 2001); and most economists focus atten-
tion on policy options that extend the scope for market competition 
where feasible, while obscuring from view policy options that enhance 
the contributions of higher education to public goods.. Here the problem 
primarily lies in the commodity-logic of economics itself and its uses in 
education policy (Marginson 1997, pp. 92-130; Marginson, 2005a), in-
cluding the typically narrow interpretation of human capital (Sen 2000, 
pp. 292-297). 
7 Some neo-liberal economists even argue that the net value externalities 
created in higher education (Fane 1984) or vocational education (Fried-
man & Friedman 1980) is zero. 
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Second, the neo-classical economic definition is a historical in treat-
ing public and private as natural and universal qualities. There is nothing 
intrinsic about human needs for complex cultural and economic goods. 
Higher education, like health, can be organised either predominantly as 
the production of public goods in Samuelson’s, sense, or as private 
goods. Whether universities are public, in the sense of producing non-
rivalrous or non-excludable goods under-produced in markets, is deter-
mined not by nature but by public policy and social practices. Universi-
ties can be free, open to all and focused on research designed to solve 
problems such as ecological instability or international conflict. Or uni-
versities can be costly, closed and focused on the privately valuable de-
grees and technologies sold to the highest bidder. The nature of the 
goods does not determine the character of production. The character of 
production determines the nature of the goods. The public/private char-
acter of higher education is always open to social and cultural variation, 
it is multiple (different parts can be more or less public in relation to 
each other), and it is policy determined.8 This has led to markedly dif-
ferent configurations of higher education around the world. 
Private/public as defined in statist terms is more problematic. First, 
the dividing line is ambiguous. ‘Private’ is treated as the obverse of pub-
lic; so that private variously refers to any non-state production, legally 
alienated production subject to private ownership, the market, and the 
home and family. Here usage readily becomes loose and eclectic and 
corrupted by symbolic politicking. Second, in the real world, the pub-
lic/private distinction based on the economic character of the goods fre-
quently conflicts with the juridical distinction. In the neo-liberal era 
governments and state agencies typically form and regulate competitive 
markets in higher education, steering these markets from the medium 
distance with tools such as output control, audit and licensing of market 
entry.9 Such government-ordered markets often take in both publicly 
owned and privately owned institutions. But if public/state is understood 
8 Often economists attempt to develop economic and policy analyses of 
education on the basis that it is intrinsically public or private or a fixed 
kind of intermediate case. For example some economists argue that educa-
tion is a ‘club good’, meaning that is non-rivalrous in consumption but is 
excludable, like a film screening (Kaul et al. 1999, p. 509). However the 
concept of education as a club good does not do justice to the historically 
variable character and also the multiple character of higher education. For 
example basic research is not excludable, or at least not for very long. 
Education is potentially rivalrous or non-rivalrous, excludable or non-
excludable. 
9 The literature is briefly discussed below. See for example see the country 
chapters in Teixeira et al. (2004). 
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as fundamentally separated from and opposed to private/market, it is 
impossible to explain this state-driven marketisation though much of the 
politics of higher education lie there. Further, state ownership or funding 
alone do not guarantee open production or collective distribution; and 
most publicly owned universities produce private goods, in the form of 
scarce degrees conferring private income benefits. This happens even in 
systems where tuition is free or close to free, as in Germany, France or 
Mexico.10 Likewise private universities can contribute to public goods in 
Samuelson’s second sense, such as basic research and collective literacy. 
To further complicate matters, some public universities charge high fees, 
as do Australian universities in relation to many students; while many 
private universities are subsidised by governments so as to levy low or 
no fees, for example private universities in the Netherlands. Sector loca-
tion and funding source matter. All else being equal, state-owned institu-
tions are more directly accessible to policy makers from above and de-
mocratic politics from below; and state funding brings with it some state 
control, de facto or de jure. High fee private institutions tend to maxi-
mise the production of private goods vis-à-vis public goods. But clearly, 
a definition of public/private determined by legal ownership alone is not 
explanatory.  
Finally, the juridical definition neglects the possibility of global pub-
lic goods. This is a fundamental and crucial difficulty. Where ‘public’ is 
defined to mean state or government sector, “in the international sphere, 
where there is no government, how are public goods produced?” (Kaul 
et al. 1999, p. 12). So how then can common international benefits and 
cross-border effects be identified and discussed? A definition of pub-
lic/private based on legal ownership treats higher education within the 
nation as a public and state matter, while cross-border higher education 
is a private and market matter. National higher education is seen as pub-
lic; global higher education as private … the nation is intrinsically pub-
lic, the global is intrinsically a market (?!!) Here the global environment 
as defined juridically by the statist, coincides with the global environ-
ment as defined by the neo-classical economist, even though the two 
parties disagree sharply about the national environment. But this is an 
impoverished view of the global. It retards understanding of higher edu-
cation.
10 A comparative international study by the Education Policy Institute (2005) 
provides data on both price and accessibility. The data indicate some di-
verge between the two sets of rankings. Some expensive systems are me-
dium on access, while some low price systems rank less well on access 
due to a high degree of student selectivity. In higher education there is 
more than one way to stratify value and form commodities. 
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4. A preferred approach to publ ic /pr ivate  
A working definition of public/private is one that can be readily and 
widely used. It draws on what is useful from inherited approaches, while 
adopting a non-dualistic and non-formalistic conception incorporating 
scope for historical relativity and policy choice. It is consistent and co-
herent and enables empirical purchase on the realities of the sector. It is 
not be asked to do too much, for example be a general economic model 
or comprehensive theory of democracy.  
 In this paper, public goods in higher education are defined as fol-
lows:
“Public goods in higher education as goods that (1) have a significant element 
of non-rivalry and/or non-excludability, and (2) are goods that are made 
broadly available across populations; and are inter-generational in that they 
meet needs in the present generation without jeopardising future generations. 
Goods without attributes (1) and (2) are private goods.” 
To repeat and summarise, higher education is intrinsically neither public 
nor private. It may be either. It may be predominantly private, or pre-
dominantly public, or achieve an (unstable) balance between them. 
Whether higher education is located in private- or state-owned owned 
institutions, whether it is produced and distributed as a market commod-
ity, whether it is predominantly private or predominantly public: none 
are determined by its ‘intrinsic nature’ but are a matter of social and pol-
icy choice. Policy makers have the capacity not just to marketise higher 
education, but to expand the elements of non-rivalry and non-
excludability, for example through the broader distribution of the bene-
fits of degree programs and the findings of research. The public/private 
boundary is not identical to the boundary between public and private 
ownership, or the boundary between non market and market production 
(though it is nearer to the latter than the former). State-owned universi-
ties produce some private goods; private universities produce some pub-
lic goods. Even fully commercial institutions produce public goods; such 
as the spill-over benefits to other employees created by the literacy ac-
quired in professional university degrees. However Samuelson is right to 
point out that public goods are not produced, or are under-produced, in 
markets.11
11 It should be noted briefly (though it deserves a longer discussion) that 
non-rivalry and non-excludability are not in themselves unambiguous vir-
tues; nor do they necessarily provide neat solutions to policy problems. 
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5. Publ ic/pr ivate  in  higher  educat ion 
This preferred approach to public/private is now applied to the outcomes 
of higher education.  
The ownership of higher education can be exclusively public, or 
mixed, or exclusively private. Almost everywhere in the world, what is 
actually produced is a mix of public and private goods. Though the pub-
lic goods and private goods are heterogeneous to each other, they are 
produced at the same time, often in institutions committed to all of 
teaching/learning, research, community and national service. The pub-
lic/private mix is variable by time and place. Within each nation this mix 
is constantly in motion. Public/private mixes are one element that distin-
guish institutions from each other, and distinguish national policies and 
practices within world higher education. Some institutions and some na-
tional systems, especially those in which higher education is explicitly 
organised as a market, tend to place greater emphasis on private goods, 
than do other institutions and systems. To the extent that public/private 
are zero sum this reduces the potential for public goods.12
5.1 Private goods produced in higher education  
The principal private good produced in higher education are individual-
ised status benefits or positional goods, often but not always distributed 
in a competitive market of institutions (Hirsch 1976; Frank and Cook 
1995; Winston 2003; Geiger 2004; Marginson 1997, 2004a, 2006. 
Higher education institutions allocate scarce places that provide students 
with opportunities to secure superior incomes and social satus. These 
opportunities are arranged in a hierarchy of value. Prestige universities 
allocate the highest value status goods. The production of status goods is 
integral to research universities in most of the world. Though revenues 
There are often distributional issues, and potentials for public/private 
trade-off, in the case of public goods. The protection of the environment is 
a non-excludable and non-rivalrous public good that benefits everyone in 
common. At the same time it may disadvantage members of the commu-
nity that benefit from environmentally damaging activities. Those persons 
might gain a non-exclusive and non-rivalrous public good (a pristine envi-
ronment); while losing part of another public good that is non-exclusive 
but sometimes rivalrous (economic freedom); while also experiencing a 
‘private bad’ zero-sum to the first public good (lost income). Policy ac-
tions to augment public goods can involve complex tradeoffs between one 
public good and another, and between public and private goods, in higher 
education as in other social sectors. 
12 A comparative survey is beyond the scope of this paper, but would com-
plement it. 
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are important for these institutions, revenues constitute not the ultimate 
ends but a means to those ends, which are academic and social prestige 
and power. The standing of prestige institutions as producers of high 
status goods helps them generate the revenues needed to reproduce their 
power.
It is essential to recognise that higher education distributes individ-
ual benefits of unequal private value on a partially or wholly selective 
basis, and thereby plays a pivotal role in the allocation of social oppor-
tunities, even when it is entirely state-owned and free of tuition charges. 
Egalitarian systems in which status and resources are relatively flat 
across the higher education sector, and relations between institutions are 
governed by cooperation and a managed division of labour, rather than 
competition, provide optimum conditions for the allocation of socially 
powerful opportunities (such as places in Medicine) on the basis of aca-
demic merit and/or social equity. Free universities might be associated 
with the broadening of access to private benefits and even the flattening 
of status distinctions, enhancing the elements of non-rivalry and non-
excludability and reducing the role of private goods. Herein lies the de-
mocratic case for free education. Nevertheless, even in such an egalitar-
ian regime, the private goods as such do not disappear.13 Because private 
goods provided in higher education are subject to economic scarcity, and 
both production and consumption are subject to competition – students 
compete for access to status goods, universities compete with each other 
for the best students and for status leadership – the production of these 
private goods is readily turned into an economic market. Marketisation 
is attractive to governments in the neo-liberal era because it defrays fis-
cal costs.14 It might be either a near-pure commercial market as in the 
education of foreign students in the UK and Australia, or a subsidised 
semi-market as in the higher education of domestic students in the USA. 
As noted the system-ideology of American system is that of a market, 
and status competition can be very fierce (Kirp 2004). Nevertheless the 
US system is heavily subsidised by governments and by universities 
from donor sources. The overall national ratio of tuition price to cost is 
about 0.4 (Winston 2003).  
13 Unless close to everyone receives a degree and all of the degrees have 
similar standing: this has yet to happen anywhere. 
14 In policy, both public spending on higher education and reductions in pub-
lic spending are variously understood as public goods. It depends on 
whether public spending is defined as a benefit-creating public investment, 
or as a cost to those taxpayers receiving zero private goods from higher 
education.
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5.2 Public goods produced in higher education 
At the same time higher education produces some public goods whether 
it has been marketised or not. Perhaps the classic public goods in higher 
education lie in its contributions to knowledge and to common literacy 
and culture; but its formation of human attributes and relationships, in-
cluding social values and affects such as cosmopolitan tolerance and cul-
tural awareness, are probably just as important.  
Stiglitz (1999, p. 308) notes that knowledge is about as close as pos-
sible to a ‘natural’ public good. The mathematical theorem retains its 
value no matter how many times or how many people use it. Nor can its 
benefits long be confined to particular individuals. Knowledge become a 
temporary private good via intellectual property regimes, but does not 
stay so confined, especially in a networked environment. It is non-
rivalrous and only temporarily excludable. It is more a collective than an 
individual good, and is always under-produced in markets. Literacy and 
cultural formation are both individualised and collectivised. Like knowl-
edge, they have many and unforeseeable externalities, both short-term 
and long-term. Aside from specialised idioms, literacy is non-rival and 
in large part non-excludable. Cultural formation can be rivalrous and ex-
clusive. Bourdieu (1986, 1988) notes that the cultural capital acquired by 
individual university students segments society in a vertical hierarchy 
and facilitates exclusive networking. Further, universities generate spe-
cific forms of academic and scientific capital which constitute socially 
recognised values, while being deployed by individual faculty in their 
private interests.15 However cultural formation can also be democra-
15 Bourdieu’s analysis of higher education in Homo Academicus (1988) is 
the most sophisticated and suggestive theorisation specific to the sector, as 
distinct from theorisations that are derived simply by importing discipli-
nary frameworks from outside the sector, from the generic parent disci-
plines, as in most applications of economic or sociology to education. 
Bourdieu’s notions of the field and habitus have much to contribute to un-
derstandings of higher education (for a useful discussion see among others 
Naidoo 2004). Despite the fact that the empirical base of Bourdieu (1988) 
was 1960s France, prior to neo-liberal policy and to the last three decades 
of globalisation, it retains much of its power. Nevertheless this analysis is 
heterogenous to the Samuelson formula and cannot be effectively combi-
ned with it, and so plays a very minor role in this paper. This is not so 
much because Bourdieu works from sociology rather than political eco-
nomy; rather it is because his conceptions of capital tend to occlude the 
distinctions between individualised and collective goods. By moving furt-
her to break down the public/private dual than does the present paper, 
Bourdieu opens up a different analytical terrain, bringing some new ob-
jects into view while suppressing others. All theorisations are only ever 
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tised; and even without that, a universal bedrock of collective common 
culture is acquired by all who pass through education, one that is under-
provided in markets.  
Although the social opportunities allocated in higher education often 
take the form of private goods, that actual function of social allocation is 
itself a public good. As suggested, equitable social access tends to be 
underprovided in markets. Mediation by private capacity to pay, compe-
tition between producers for status, and the fostering of student entry as 
an exclusive commodity, tend to increase absolute barriers to entry 
and/or stratify opportunities between high cost high value and low cost 
low value places. The provision of an equitable structure of opportunity 
is a principal driver of state regulation, financing and provision of higher 
education throughout the world; and the subject of on-going public de-
bate in many nations (Pusser 2003, 2004; Ordorika 2003). Nevertheless, 
this structure of opportunity often brings with it complex distributional 
issues and political tradeoffs. For example, by improving the access of 
under-represented groups, affirmative action creates a more equitable 
system. But programs that create more places for some students also 
subtract places from other students. Affirmative action is ambiguous: it 
has both a common public good aspect (it contributes to fairness) and a 
private good aspect subject to rivalry and excludability (access to scarce 
university places). There is also contest about which aspect of the public 
good, fairness, is more important: the principle that higher education 
should representative of the population, which favours affirmative ac-
tion; versus the principle that all applicants should be subject to identical 
treatment. In the USA there have been intense debates around these is-
sues, for example in relation to the University of California system 
(Pusser 2003). In themselves conceptions of public/private goods cannot 
solve distributional issues. However, they can contribute to policy 
frameworks in which the issues are identified, negotiated and resolved. 
5.3 Implications of state ownership and of markets  
While juridical ownership does not determine the public/private mix of 
goods, state-owned institutions are more amenable to the broad distribu-
tion of public benefits, than are private institutions. Democratic values 
are more readily brought to bear on agencies subject to democratic ac-
countability. Whether this happens is a matter of practical politics. There 
partial theorisations. But the potential for reconciliation of political econ-
omy, Marx, Bourdieu, Habermas, Foucault etc. in the analysis of higher 
education is a matter for another paper.  
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is no guarantee that state-controlled production will be more accessible 
to the community. All that can be stated is that all else being equal, pub-
lic ownership is more conducive to public goods production than is pri-
vate ownership.  
What is decisive in determining the character of the goods produced 
is not ownership as such, but the purposes of the institution or unit. Pur-
poses are closely affected by the mode of production (Marginson 1997, 
2004a), whether for-profit market competition, non-profit market com-
petition in a classical university status market, or non-market produc-
tion. In the case of for-profit markets the primary goal is the accumula-
tion of revenues. In the case of non-profit market competition it is 
maximisation of the competitive standing or prestige of the institution. 
In the case of non-market production the agenda is open-ended. The dif-
ferent purposes are associated with distinct incentives and behaviours; 
for example in research. Commercial research want to maximise the 
length of time knowledge remains excludable, confined to private own-
ership and accessible to exploitation, before entering the public domain. 
Likewise, if the purpose of teaching is exclusivist – the reproduction of 
an elite profession, or interpolation of cultural capital in the heads of a 
favoured few – this enhances the private character of the goods. Gener-
ally marketisation renders the goods more private in character in 
Samuelson’s sense. For example it may increase the value of superior 
status goods by driving up cost and exclusivity, and it may diminish ac-
cess to the goods; that is, diminish equal educational opportunity to ac-
quire those goods. Equal educational opportunity is a public good that is 
readily lost in the transition from state-run systems to markets.  
Policy moves in the other direction, for example steps to the democ-
ratisation of planning and production of higher education, provide fa-
vourable conditions for enhancing the relative role of public goods com-
pared to private goods, and enhancing their ‘publicness’ by rendering 
them more transparent and encourages a broader distribution (Kaul et al. 
2003, p. 73). Democratisation is achieved by making public goods more 
explicit and involving the range of state and non-state agencies, and ac-
tors in the institutions, in policy discussion and formation. Of course 
ownership, mode of production, policy and the mix of public/private 
goods are only some of the inputs that determine the social character of 
higher education. Other relevant inputs include legal structures and regu-
lation, economic/ financial flows and systems, democratic relations with 
localities and nations, knowledge economy relations with business and 
industry, disciplinary networks, interface with the learned professions, 
internal cultures organisation and management; its technologies, and last 
but not least, international networks. 
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5.4 In sum  
Public and private goods are particular rather than universal attributes. 
Higher education is potentially rivalrous or non-rivalrous, excludable or 
non-excludable. It produces a complex and variable mix of public and 
private goods. Though public and private are not necessarily zero-sum, 
all else being equal a move to market production augments rivalry and 
exclusion in the products, and reduces the incidence of goods character-
ised by non-rivalry and non-exclusion. Thus marketisation furthers the 
zero-sum element in relations between public and private goods: note 
that the incidence of ‘zero-summism’ is not intrinsic but is policy vari-
able. Pro-market ideologies and policies tend to conceal the potential for 
public goods. But under-recognition and under-production do not elimi-
nate public goods altogether.  
6. Publ ic/pr ivate  in  nat ional  h igher  educat ion 
This definition of public/private in higher education is now applied to 
national higher education, followed by global higher education. The 
reader will be asked to perform five conceptual somersaults, in order to 
obtain new perspectives on public/private.  
6.1 Putting private goods into the nation  
Among national systems of higher education there is a worldwide 
though not quite universal trend to growth in the absolute and relative 
production of private goods through the extension and intensification of 
market mechanisms, and the associated development of positional com-
petition. Marketisation has several aspects: increases in the incidence 
and size of tuition charges, the sale of other services as private goods, 
re-organisation of systems as competitive quasi-markets, growth in the 
role of private institutions, and the rise of for-profit education including 
on-line (Marginson 2004b). In many nations state and institutions have 
become semi-autonomous corporations. These tendencies, which are 
readily investigated empirically, are enhanced by globalisation: for ex-
ample full fee places for international students may cut across national 
policies on equitable distribution. The vast recent literature includes the 
theorisations in Shumar (1997), Meek (2000), Marginson (1997, 2004a, 
2006), Naidoo and Jamieson (2005). The American case is addressed by 
Bok (2003), Kirp (2004), Geiger (2004), Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) 
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and Washburn (2005). Teixeira et al. (2004) provide a compilation of 
varying national cases.  
These tendencies are not universal. They are manifest and under-
stood differently according to national system. Both the material starting 
points are different, and the prior notions of public/private are different. 
(The epistemological variation is related to but not in linear correspon-
dence with the historical variation). In most of Western European, tradi-
tional analysis is statist. This imposes a limit on perspective. Because 
higher education is typically placed in government sector institutions it 
is assumed, reading off the formal juridical structure, the outputs and 
processes of higher education are universally ‘public’.16 But this precon-
ception (1) obscures the actual role of private institutions, and (2) ne-
glects the incidence of private goods within the outcomes of all higher 
education. It is important that private goods in higher education are rec-
ognised, whatever the policy purpose: expansion of the number or 
weight of private goods, enhancement of their value, more equitable dis-
tribution of those private goods, a narrowing of the value differentials, 
and so on. 
This suggests Somersault 1, the first necessary change in perspec-
tive:
Somersault 1 
“National higher education is not universally or overwhelmingly public in 
character. In all national higher education systems, regardless of formal own-
ership or fee systems, a substantial part of the goods produced are private 
goods.” 
National policy making and data collection should make transparent the 
incidence and value of private goods, including variations by institution 
and type, and field and level of study, and for students of different social 
and cultural groups, nationalities, ages and genders.  
6.2 Putting the public goods back into the nation  
The starting position is different in the English-speaking countries where 
marketisation is now relatively advanced, especially the USA, Australia, 
New Zealand and the UK. The idea of higher education as a producer of 
private benefits is entrenched in national policy and in economic studies 
of higher education. In the UK, Australia and New Zealand Somersault 
16 This was also the preconception in the Westminster system nations, the 
UK, Australia (Marginson 1997), New Zealand and Canada, prior to the 
emergence of neo-liberalism in policy in the mid 1980s. 
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1 took place some time ago. In the USA it was never needed. In these 
nations, also, perspectives are limited but in the opposite way to most of 
Western Europe. Instead of private goods being downplayed, they re-
ceive the main emphasis. The policy focus on private goods is often de-
signed to provide rhetorical support for a partial shift from taxpayer fi-
nancing to student fees; and/or a shift from state-funded basic research 
to industry-funded commercial research. Data collection tends to focus 
on private benefits such as the private rates of return to degrees. With 
the analytical framework closely congruent to a one-sided policy, the 
claims about predominantly private benefits become self-fulfilling. Pol-
icy neglects public goods, both collective benefits and externalities, such 
as the long term contributions of basic research and advanced literacy.17
So having made Somersault 1 to invert the existing perceptions in 
Western Europe, it becomes necessary to make the opposite movement, 
Somersault 2, to invert the existing perceptions in the Anglo-American 
nations:
Somersault 2 
“National higher education is not universally or overwhelmingly private in 
character. Regardless of formal ownership or fee systems, a substantial part of 
the goods produced are public goods.” 
National policy and data collection should make transparent the inci-
dence and value of public goods, including variations by institution and 
type, and field and level of study, and for students of different social and 
cultural groups, nationalities, ages and genders. Public goods pose more 
difficult problems of identification and measurement than do private 
goods. A single combined number for ‘the public good’ is a chimera. 
Some public goods are open to cardinal measurement; though the num-
bers for different goods are often heterogeneous. Others are not capable 
of cardinal measurement but may be capable of ordinal measurement: 
for example it may be possible to say if the incidence of a particular col-
lective public good such as equity of access has increased or decreased 
using an umber of different measures and judgements. Other public 
goods can only be assessed using complex synthetic judgements. De-
spite these difficulties it is vital that public goods are made as transpar-
ent as possible.  
17 Following Friedman (1962) on public/private there is a tendency to focus 
on the cost to the taxpayer without acknowledging the benefits to the tax-
payer. 
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6.3 Putting private sector agents back into   
  national public goods
Responsibility for the production and distribution of public goods ex-
tends beyond state agencies and publicly-owned institutions. Private in-
stitutions and organisations also contribute, both incidentally and delib-
erately. An example of the latter is the support of philanthropic organisa-
tions for basic research programs or access scholarships allocated to stu-
dents from poorer communities. In some nations this contribution of pri-
vate sector organisations to public goods in higher education is recog-
nised and encouraged through state subsidies such as tax concessions 
(tax expenditures). Such mechanisms do not always reach all relevant 
agents.
Somersault 3 
“In addition to governments and other public sector agencies, the identification 
and measurement of national public goods in higher education, and policies 
designed to augment such goods, should encompass the role of civil and pri-
vate sector agents including autonomous education institutions, disciplinary 
communities, professions, philanthropic organisations and relevant market ac-
tors.”
6.4 In sum 
National higher education institutions and systems produce a mix of 
public and private goods, regardless of fees or ownership structures. 
Both state-owned and privately-owned agents contribute to each of pub-
lic and private goods. The mix is highly variable and policy sensitive. In 
some nations private goods are under-recognised. In other nations public 
goods are under-recognised. In both cases the public and private goods 
need to be made more transparent, with greater attention to identification 
and measurement, as necessary conditions for the evolution and imple-
mentation of policies designed to enhance both kinds of good.  
7. Publ ic/pr ivate in  global  h igher educat ion 
Globalisation is “the widening, deepening and speeding up of world 
wide interconnectedness” (Held et al. 1999, p. 2). In the world-wide and 
meta-regional dimensions, the latter including the European Union, 
growing cross-border flows of people, communications, knowledge, 
ideas, policies and money (Appadurai 1996; Marginson and Sawir 2005) 
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are forging ‘thicker’ and more fecund relationships and convergences 
(Held et al. 1999) that impact nations and local institutions. Globalisa-
tion is often associated with enhanced cross-border production and trade 
liberalisation in relation to private goods. But globalisation also creates 
capacity for more and additional kinds of public good. Global inter-
dependence increases the potential for cross-border externalities; 
whereby actions in one nation create benefits or costs for people in an-
other nation; for example better public health, or pollution with down-
stream effects. There are also tendencies towards world-wide systems; 
for example in finance and communications.  
 Questions of public/private in the global dimension are discussed 
in two collections prepared under the aegis of the UNDP: Global Public 
Goods (1999), and Providing Global Public Goods (2003).18 This work 
is particularly helpful in focusing on the distributive aspect of ‘public’ 
and exploring policy mechanisms for providing global public goods. 
7.1 Global private goods in higher education 
Global private goods are neither non-rivalrous nor non-excludable, are 
subject to the transfer of benefits across national borders, and have value 
in more than one nation. In higher education one set of private goods is 
generated in commercial research and intellectual property. However the 
main global private goods are degrees obtained by crossing national 
borders. About 1.8 million students do so each year, either by travelling 
to study in a foreign country or via programs offered by a foreign insti-
tution and accessed in the home country either as distance education or 
face-to-face teaching. The largest export nations are the English-
language providers, especially the USA, UK and Australia; and Ger-
many and France (OECD 2004a; OECD 2004b). Foreign education is 
largely self-financed. Most cross-border students pay tuition fees, and 
about half are unsubsidised. Educational capitalism plays a larger role in 
the markets in global mobility and status goods in education, than in the 
national markets in status goods, with the UK and Australia the main 
commercial providers (Marginson 2004a). In the US doctoral sector 
much of international education is part financed by universities them-
selves, donors or one or another state agency. The incidence of commer-
cial provision is greater in the two and four year higher education insti-
tutions than in the doctoral institutions.  
18 The implications of globalisation for the definition of public/private are 
specifically discussed (Kaul et al. 1999, pp. 2-19; Kaul et al. 2003, pp. 22-
23).
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Foreign degrees are global goods in two senses: they are obtained in 
border-crossing, and they can be utilised in more than one nation. The 
principal growth of global private goods is in globalised fields of em-
ployment such as business studies, information technology and research, 
where reputable foreign degrees open opportunities in many nations. 
The education of foreign students, including commercial provision, can 
also constitute global public goods in those importer nations where off-
shore places significantly extend national educational capacity and indi-
vidual student choice. However, high private costs tend to reduce this 
potential distributional ‘publicness’. Note also that in those nations 
where a foreign degree carries higher prestige than degrees obtained at 
home, a growing incidence of global private goods obtained by student 
nationals may also be associated with a process of devaluation of value 
of the private goods obtained from institutions within national higher 
education.
7.2 Global public goods 
Global public goods are defined as follows: 
“Global public goods are goods that have a significant element of non-rivalry 
and/or non-excludability and made broadly available across populations on a 
global scale. They affect more than one group of countries, are broadly avail-
able within countries, and are inter-generational; that is, they meet needs in the 
present generation without jeopardising future generations.” (Kaul et al. 1999, 
pp. 2-3) 
Global public goods include collective global goods, and positive or 
negative global externalities. Negative externalities are known as public 
‘bads’. Collective global goods are obtained by nations and/or institu-
tions from cross-border systems common to the world or a meta-national 
region, via regulation, systems and protocols; such as the Washington 
Accords in Engineering, and the Bologna Declaration of a common 
European higher education space. Global externalities arise when higher 
education in one nation affects significant numbers of people in other 
nations; either for better, for example some research; or worse, for ex-
ample ‘brain drain’ of national faculty. Global public goods are under-
provided in markets while global public bads are over-provided in mar-
kets. Governments can also constitute public bads. Multilateral forums 
can directly create global public goods, particularly collective goods. 
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7.3 Global public goods in higher education 
The potential for both global public goods and ‘bads’ is enhanced in in-
ternationalised sectors such as higher education that are extensively and 
intensively networked. In higher education there are many cross-border 
externalities and collective goods. There is knowledge in its different 
fields, and the consequences flowing from movements of ideas and 
knowledge, and cross-border research collaborations. There are systems 
and processes for facilitating cross-border recognition of universities, 
qualifications and individuals. There is cross-cultural exchange, and 
augmented international understanding and tolerance. Often doctoral 
universities are cosmopolitan communities, with spin-offs for both the 
nation of education and all nations ultimately affected by the transforma-
tion of individual sensibilities. Higher education is a fecund site for 
global association. Like business, it links not just members of kinship 
and affinity groups but erstwhile strangers. To borrow a term from the 
social capital literature, it is effective in creating ‘bridging’ relationships 
(Woolcock 2001) across traditional divisions. It also provides infrastruc-
tures and resources that assist economic production, marketing and in-
ternational trade; and supplement the foreign relations practices of na-
tional governments, for example expertise in languages.  
It is useful to distinguish between intermediate global public goods 
and final global public goods (Kaul et al. 1999, p. 13). In higher educa-
tion final global public goods include such outcomes as the spread of 
knowledge and of cultural understanding. Intermediate global public 
goods make these outcomes possible, such as protocols that sustaining 
people mobility, including recognition of qualifications and institutions; 
and the systems for transmitting, publishing and codifying academic 
ideas and knowledge. Along with communications and finance the 
knowledge system is a primary global system. Final global goods are 
produced by both public and private intermediate goods. The global 
market in degrees generates institutional revenues, and leads to private 
careers and international understanding. Intermediate global public 
goods facilitate final global private goods. Recognition protocols are es-
sential to global markets in higher education. All of this underlines the 
point that far from being always zero sum, public and private goods are 
often inter-dependent. 
Global externalities are not singular or universal goods, even in the 
case of world-wide systems such as those for academic publication. 
Global networks are inclusive but can also be exclusive. The effects of 
globalisation vary substantially by nation and also according to the re-
gion within the nation. As noted some nations, and regions, experience 
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global public bads as a result of net brain drain of students going abroad 
for study. Many cross-border students do not return. This net brain drain 
is maximised in those developing nations with the least capacity to at-
tract inward flows of students and graduates to compensate for outward 
flows. On the other hand, for some developed nations the cross-border 
people flows generated in higher education constitute positive external-
ities. The USA retains a high proportion of foreign doctoral graduates as 
migrants. They play a significant role in national research effort both 
during study and after graduation (OECD 2004b).19 However, empirical 
tracking of brain drain issues is more complex than it first appears be-
cause some graduate migrants eventually return to their nation of origin, 
or collaborate with institutions in it, or invest economic capital in it. 
Analysis refers to not just ‘brain drain’ but ‘brain gain’ and ‘brain circu-
lation’. Some other forms of global public good/bad are still more diffi-
cult to quantify. Communications and knowledge flows are dominated 
by the English language and the English-speaking nations, particularly 
the USA. The global spread of knowledge in English creates negative 
externalities where it displaces academic conversations in other lan-
guages. For nations with developed academic cultures of their own, such 
as those in Spanish and Arabic, the present world-wide extension of 
academic discourse generates substantial public goods and public bads. 
Global externalities are nationally, regionally and culturally specific. 
The relevant question always is whose global public goods/bads are 
they?  
In general, developed nations have a superior capacity to access both 
global private and global public goods in higher education. They contain 
more people with the ability to pay for global private goods as foreign 
degrees or commercial intellectual property. They contain better re-
search infrastructures and more trained personnel able to utilise research 
knowledge and turn it into technology transfer. Less developed nations 
benefit more from the potential for global public goods than global pri-
vate goods. As noted, access to international education is often associ-
ated with brain drain; while PhD graduates who return often lack oppor-
tunities to continue work in their area of training. International education 
is less valuable to those nations than is growth in higher education ca-
pacity at home. This more than foreign education augments the pool of 
19 Among 1996 PhD graduates from US universities in Science and Engi-
neering, more than 90 per cent of those from China and more than 85 per 
cent of those from India stayed in the USA in the 1997-2001 period. The 
US also retained more than half of the PhD graduates from some devel-
oped nations, such as Canada, New Zealand and the UK (OECD 2004b, p. 
281).
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professional skills and the capacity of national research and knowledge 
infrastructures, with multiple long-term potential for national private and 
public goods.  
7.4 Under-recognition of global public goods 
In some respects global relations in higher education have become more 
visible and their effects for better or worse are more widely acknowl-
edged. Universities in most countries are more transparent to global 
knowledge and recognition systems. The effects of global ‘brain flows’ 
are discussed in policy circles (OECD, 2002). Overall, however, global 
public goods are not well understood and are under-recognised in com-
parison with global private goods. A key difficulty is that public goods 
can only be effectively considered and regulated in a policy space. But 
there is no global policy space in higher education. Higher education in-
stitutions are located in a world that is increasingly inter-dependent, but 
is also defined by a zero-sum legal and geographical alignment, a Hob-
besian world of autarkic and contesting nation-states with no integral 
necessity to cooperate. With the important but limited exception of Eu-
ropeanisation, global forums such as the United Nations and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice have marginal influence. International agencies 
and protocols have a larger role than does global governance, but remain 
marginal except in those developing nations where state structures are 
weak. The problem has been defined as a ‘jurisdictional gap’. There is a 
“discrepancy between a globalised world and national, separate units of 
policy-making” (Kaul et al. 1999, p. xxvi). 
7.5 WTO/GATS 
In the absence of a global policy space where global public goods can be 
considered, international higher education is treated as predominantly a 
trading and market environment where the only recognised global goods 
are tradeable private goods. Where public goods are considered, these 
are confined to the category of national public goods, and typecast as 
sectional national ‘interests’ which retard the common global interest in 
open flows of trade and financial capital. In the principal and only global 
instrumental forum in higher education, the negotiations concerning 
trade in services within WTO/GATS (2005), global higher education is 
understood in exactly the manner suggested by both neo-classical eco-
nomics and juridical statism: the nation is seen as the terrain of public 
goods, the global as the terrain of private goods. The open normative 
policy agenda is to extend the scope for global trade as far as possible. 
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Little consideration is given to the common value of free flows of 
knowledge, or of the need to align national recognition protocols, except 
to the extent these structures may augment or inhibit global trade. Nor is 
there recognition of the dangers of generating public goods/ private 
goods trade-offs, or of the need to configure a positive-sum relation be-
tween global private and public goods, or of the educational asymme-
tries between developed and developing nations. Within the framework 
of WTO/GATS there is no way to consider such public bads as the un-
evenness between national education systems in capacity, resources, cul-
tural power and opportunities for individual citizens that inhibit human 
development. These matters are side-lined to the non-instrumental talk 
in UN forums.  
But this policy framework is sustained only by denying certain reali-
ties. For example, universities that are public non-profit institutions at 
the national level become categorised as private providers in another na-
tion’s space, indistinguishable from for-profit providers.20
7.6 Putting the nation-state into the (private) global  
To supplement this impoverished and deceptive analytical and policy 
framework it is necessary to factor back in the global role of the nation-
state. First, whereas the notion of the global environment as a trading 
environment suggests the market constitutes the main development path 
for emerging national systems, governmental provision is a viable stra-
tegic alternative for development. Higher education should be provided 
as public goods in situations where there is market failure; and/or in or-
der to increase the elements of non-rivalry and non-excludability in the 
production and distribution of the goods; and/or to evade the opportunity 
costs and direct costs of marketing and competition.21 In some cases 
non-market state provision is unambiguously superior to market provi-
20 It is true that universities from the UK, Australia and the USA operating 
off-shore often work through a private university-controlled company; but 
that is a symptom of the discursive construction of global higher education 
as global trade, rather than the cause. Even when foreign universities op-
erate in their normal national-public legal guise they are treated as private 
providers.
21 As Pusser notes: ‘The fundamental arguments for public supply [i.e. non-
market production by government agencies] are that it offers the most di-
rect utilisation of public subsidies, and that it is the organisational type 
best suited to the rapid expansion of higher education… there is no diver-
sion of the public subsidy to profit, hence more of the subsidy goes to the 
production of preferred goods’ (Pusser 2002). The argument is stronger if 
the ‘preferred goods’ are externalities or collective goods. 
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sion, regardless of one’s political preconceptions, for example in the 
most impoverished nations (Taskforce 2000; OECD 2004b). Second, 
“governments must assume full responsibility for the cross-border ef-
fects that their citizens generate” (Kaul et al. 1999, p. xxvii. Global ex-
ternalities affect national system for good and for ill. Global collective 
goods can facilitate both global flows, and the growth of local/national 
higher education.  
This suggests two kinds of initiative are required. First, creation of 
an inter-governmental global space focused on higher education where 
the costs and benefits of global externalities are defined and managed, 
encouraging national governments to incorporate cross-border external-
ities and prices into their routine national decision-making; and enabling 
collective goods to be negotiated and developed, for example recogni-
tion and quality assurance systems  and other means of lowering barriers 
to global mobility. Second, units within each national governmental 
enabling them to account for and take responsibility for positive and 
negative externalities, negotiated cost sharing, and identification of op-
timal cross-border flows. The common global policy space would con-
sider issues of balanced global development in higher education, includ-
ing national educational capacity in the developing world, and cultural 
diversity in educational and linguistic contents. The Bologna common 
higher education space constitutes such a global policy space in embry-
onic form. Specific institutions and programs of the United Nations, the 
World Bank, OECD and regional agencies such as the Asian Develop-
ment Bank currently provide forums suggesting the potential for a col-
laborative global approach to higher education: for example UNESCO’s 
discussions of quality assurance and the OECD (2005) project on inter-
nationalisation in higher education. Equally important, however is the 
reciprocal evolution of global perspective, national responsibility and in-
strumental capability within national governments. This is the key 
change that would give international negotiations ‘teeth’.  
But to develop the required perspective it is essential to perform 
Somersault 4, which puts public goods, and the nation-state as agent of 
global public goods, into a marketised, private goods producing, GATS-
determined global educational sphere: 
Somersault 4 
“In the global environment, higher education involves not just the production 
of private goods in a trading environment, but the production of significant 
public goods. It is necessary to create an inter-governmental space in which 
global public goods are recognised, negotiated and facilitated and global pub-
lic bads are minimised.” 
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7.7 Putting the private sector into the (public) global 
Higher education is located in a world of plural identities and affiliations 
(Sen 1999). Neither the nation as imagined community, nor the state as 
governmental machine, constitute the horizon of interest or identity. 
Non-government associations and institutions, including education insti-
tutions and commercial companies, have claims on people’s loyalties. 
They often operate across borders and can be meta-national and global 
in form. Higher education institutions are increasingly important global 
actors in their own right, particularly the research-intensive universities. 
Research is the quintessentially global aspect of university life; and the 
free flow of knowledge and communications depends crucially on the 
exercise of self-restraint by governments. As noted, like higher educa-
tion public goods are not state bound. Governments are not the only 
source of public goods; and they should not block other sources of pub-
lic goods.
Thus Somersault 4 (which put the nation-state’s role in public goods 
into a global picture hitherto dominated by private good) must be fol-
lowed by one more public/private inversion. Somersault 5 adds the pri-
vate sector into the responsibility for those global public goods: 
Somersault 5 
“In addition to national governments and international agencies, global nego-
tiations concerning global public goods in higher education should also take in 
civil agents, including autonomous higher education institutions, disciplinary 
communities, and professions, and also the relevant market actors given that 
their production of private goods can also create public goods.” 
7.8 In sum 
In the global dimension also, higher education produces a mix of private 
and public goods. Potentially, globalisation enhances both kinds of 
goods. It can also enhance global public bads. The mix is policy sensi-
tive, but there is an absence of forums for global policy making. Global 
private goods are broadly understood, but global public goods/bads, and 
the potential contribution of inter-governmental forums and non-
government agents to the production of those goods, are not. To manage 
global public goods/bads it is necessary to develop both national gov-
ernmental machinery for data collection, monitoring, pricing and com-
pensatory transfers; and global forums and protocols. Global public 
goods need the same level of attention hitherto given only to private 
trading goods in the WTO/GATS framework.  
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8. Conclusions 
Higher education studies is trapped in dualistic concepts of ‘public’ as 
state, versus ‘private’ as market; and global versus national. But states 
and markets are only means to the end that matters, which is the multiple 
social contributions of higher education. Further, in a globalised envi-
ronment, analytical concepts that work consistently across all geo-spatial 
dimensions (global, national and local) are needed. To arrive at a more 
useful notion of public/private in higher education, it is necessary to in-
vert traditional perspectives to (1) acknowledge both private and public 
goods at the national level; (2) factor in global public goods, which hith-
erto have been largely ignored, so higher education is no longer under-
stood solely as a trading environment; and (3) acknowledge the role of 
non-government agents in public goods.  
The paper argues that it is more fruitful to apply the categories pub-
lic/private not to the legal identity of institutions, but to the outcomes of 
higher education as public or private goods, using a modification of 
Samuelson’s (1954) idea of public goods as non-rivalrous and non-
excludable. Otherwise the approach is realist rather than nominalist and 
owes more to global sociology and political economy/ sociology than to 
neo-classical economics. Public and private goods are treated as particu-
lar rather than universal attributes; as multiple and partial in coverage; as 
variable by time and place, and policy sensitive; as heterogeneous to 
each other; as partly capable of numerical measurement and partly ob-
servable via synthetic judgement; and as both zero-sum and positive-
sum in relation to each other, depending on the conditions. Market forms 
of higher education tend to enhance the zero-sum element. But policy 
should optimise ‘win-win’ interdependencies between public and private 
goods.
“Whether – and how – global public goods are provided determines 
whether globalisation is an opportunity or a threat” (Kaul et al. 2003, p. 
2, p. 73). Global public goods are the key to a more balanced and posi-
tive sum worldwide higher education environment. Analytical tools are 
needed that will facilitate the logging of cross-border externalities (posi-
tive and negative) and for the assessing of the value of global collective 
goods. In governance what is needed is dedicated national machinery 
focused on global transfers in higher education, and inter-governmental 
global spaces for multilateral negotiations on public and private goods. 
Finally, the democratisation of planning and production of national and 
global public goods can render them more transparent and encourage a 
broader distribution. Democratisation enhances their ‘publicness’. De-
mocratisation is achieved by making public goods more explicit, by en-
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couraging policy discussion, and by involving the range of non-state 
agencies and actors.  
References 
Appadurai, A. (1996). Modernity at Large. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Bok, D. (2003). Universities in the Market-place: The commercializa-
tion of higher education. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (1986). Distinction: A social critique of the judgment of 
taste. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Bourdieu, P. (1988). Homo Academicus, trans. P. Collier. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.  
Calhoun, C. (1992). ‘Introduction: Habermas and the public sphere’, in 
Calhoun, C. (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, pp. 1-48. 
Calhoun, C. (1998). The public good as a social and cultural project, in 
Powell, W. and Clemens, E. (eds.), Private Action and the Public 
Good, Yale: New Haven, pp. 20-35. 
Castoriadis, C. (1987). The Imaginary Institution of Society. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Dow, S. (1990). ‘Beyond dualism’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
14, 143-157. 
Education Policy Institute (EPI) (2005). Global Higher Education Rank-
ings: Affordability and accessibility in comparative perspective. Ac-
cessed on 17 April 2005. http://www.educationalpolicy.org/ 
Fane, G. (1984). Education Policy in Australia. Canberra: Economic 
Planning Advisory Council.  
Frank, R. and Cook, P. (1995). The Winner-Take-All Society. New York: 
The Free Press. 
Friedman, M. (1962). The role of government in education, in Capital-
ism and Freedom (ed.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 
85-107.
Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. (1980). Free to Choose. Melbourne: 
Macmillan. 
Geiger, R. (2004). Knowledge and Money. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press.
Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. Cambridge: 
The MIT Press.  
FIVE SOMERSAULTS IN ENSCHEDE
217
Hayek, F. (1960). The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
Hayek, F. (1979). Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vols. 1-3. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Held, D. and McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999). Global 
Transformations: Politics, economics and culture. Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press. 
Hirsch, F. (1976). Social Limits to Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M. (1999). Global Public Goods: Inter-
national Cooperation in the 21st century. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
Kaul, I., Conceicao, P., le Goulven, K. and Mendoza, R. (2003). Provid-
ing Global Public Goods: Managing globalisation. New York: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Kirp, D. (2004). Shakespeare, Einstein and the Bottom-line: The market-
ing of higher education. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Mansbridge, J. (1998). ‘On the contested nature of the public good’, in 
Powell, W. and Clemens, E. (eds.), Private Action and the Public 
Good, Yale: New Haven, pp. 3-19. 
Marginson, S. and Sawir, E. (2005). ‘Interrogating global flows in 
higher education’, Globalization, Societies and Education, 3, 3, No-
vember, 281-309.  
Marginson, S. (1997). Markets in Education. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.  
Marginson, S. (2004a). ‘Competition and markets in higher education: a 
‘glonacal’ analysis’, Policy Futures in Education, 2, 2, 175-245. 
Marginson, S. (2004b). ‘Don’t leave me hanging on the Anglophone: 
The potential for online distance education in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion’, Higher Education Quarterly, 58, 2/3, 74-113. 
Marginson, S. (2005a). ‘Education and human capital’, in Saunders, P. 
and Walter, J. (eds.), Ideas and Influence: Social science and public 
policy in Australia. Sydney: UNSW Press [in press]. 
Marginson, S. (2005b). ‘Putting the ‘public’ back in public universities’, 
Thesis Eleven, December [in press]. 
Marginson, S. (2006). ‘Dynamics of national and global competition in 
higher education’, Higher Education, 52, 1-39. 
Meek, L. (2000). ‘Diversity and marketisation of higher education: in-
compatible concepts?’, Higher Education Policy, 13, 1, 23-40. 
Mollis, M. (1999/2000). ‘The reform university in Argentina’, Austra-
lian Universities Review, 42, 2, & 43, 1, 64-69. 
SIMON MARGINSON
218
Naidoo, R. (2004). ‘Fields and Institutional Strategy: Bourdieu on the 
Relationship between Higher Education, Inequality and Society’, 
British Journal of Sociology of Education, 25, 4, 446–472. 
Naidoo, R. and Jamieson, I. (2005). ‘Empowering participants or corrod-
ing learning? Towards a research agenda on the impact of student 
consumerism in higher education’, Journal of Education Policy, 20, 
3, 267-281. 
Ordorika, I. (2003). Power and Politics in University Governance: Or-
ganization and change at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de 
Mexico. New York: Routledge. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
(2002). International Mobility of the Highly Skilled. Paris: OECD. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
(2004a). Education at a Glance. Paris: OECD. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
(2004b). Internationalisation and Trade in Higher Education: Op-
portunities and challenges. Paris: OECD. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
(2005). Website of OECD project on the internationalisation of ter-
tiary education. Accessed 11 September. 
 http://www.oecd.org/document/47/0,2340,en_2649_34859749_3139
2495_1_1_1_1,00.html 
Powell, W. and Clemens, E. (1998). Private Action and the Public 
Good. Yale: New Haven. 
Pusser, B. (2002). ‘Higher education, the emerging market and the pub-
lic good’, in Graham, P.A. and  Stacey, N.G. (eds.), The Knowledge 
Economy and Postsecondary Education: Report of a Workshop. Na-
tional Academy Press: Washington, D.C., pp. 105-126. 
Pusser, B. (2003). ‘Beyond Baldridge: Extending the political model of 
higher education organization and governance’, Educational Policy,
17, 1, 121-140. 
Pusser, B. (2004). ‘Reconsidering Higher Education and the Public 
Good: The role of public spheres’. Draft paper, Charlottesville. 
Samuelson, P. (1954). ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’, Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 36, 4, 387–389.  
Sen, A. (1999). ‘Global justice: beyond international equity’, in Kaul, I. 
Grunberg, I. and Stern, M. (eds.), Global Public Goods: Interna-
tional cooperation in the 21st century, New York: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 116-125. 
Sen, A. (2000). Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books. 
Shumar, W. (1997). College for Sale: A critique of the commodification 
of higher education. New York: Falmer Press. 
FIVE SOMERSAULTS IN ENSCHEDE
219
Singh, M. (2001). ‘Re-inserting the ‘Public Good’ into Higher Education 
Transformation’. Paper to conference on ‘Globalisation and higher 
education – views from the South’, Pretoria. 
Slaughter, S. and Rhoades, G. (2004). Academic Capitalism and the 
New Economy: Markets, state and higher education. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press. 
Stiglitz, J. (1999). ‘Knowledge as a global public good’, in Kaul, I. 
Grunberg, I. and Stern, M. (eds.), Global Public Goods: Interna-
tional cooperation in the 21st century. New York: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 308-325.
Taskforce on Higher Education and the Developing World (2000). Peril 
or Promise, report. Washington: World Bank. 
Teixeira, P., Jongbloed, B., Dill, D. and Amaral, A. (2004). Markets in 
Higher Education: Rhetoric or reality? Dordrecht: Kluwer.  
Washburn, J. (2005). University Inc.: The corporate corruption of 
higher education. New York: Basic Books. 
Woolcock, M. (2001). ‘The place of social capital in understanding so-
cial and economic outcomes’, in Human Resources Development 
Canada and OECD, The Contribution of Human and Social Capital 
to Sustained Economic Growth and Well-being, International Sym-
posium Report, September, pp. 65-88. 
Winston, G. (2003). ‘Towards a Theory of Tuition: Prices, peer wages, 
and competition in higher education’. Discussion Paper Number 65, 
Williams Project on the Economics of Higher Education, Williams-
town.
WTO/GATS (2005). World Trade Organization website on negotiations 
on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in relation 
to educational services. Accessed 11 September 2005. http://www. 
wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/education_e/education_e.htm 

221221221
The Bologna Process and the Role of Higher 
Education: Discursive Construction of the 
European Higher Education Area 
TERHI NOKKALA
1.  Introduct ion  
The changing boundaries of public and private spheres of higher educa-
tion discussed in this volume (including the definition of higher educa-
tion as simultaneously a public and private good),,are not just operating 
on the level of policy and practise, but also on the level of discourse. 
The perceptions of the social reality are constructed, negotiated, and 
fought over in policy texts, speeches, and memoranda. This article fo-
cuses on the analysis of the central documents of the Bologna Process. 
We argue that looking at Bologna Process discourse provides us with 
important insights not only about the Process but also the wider change 
in the legitimating discourse of universities and higher education as so-
cial institutions rather than just individual organisations. The Bologna 
Process is a rich topic for discourse analysis because it incorporates 
many slogan-like concepts, such as the Europe of Knowledge and the 
European Higher Education Area, painting the picture of the European 
higher education system in the future; albeit a future with a content that 
is still vague and open to various national interpretations. The aim of 
this paper is therefore to a) place the Bologna Process within the context 
of the globalisation and knowledge economy, b) argue that theoretical 
considerations drawn from critical discourse analysis may contribute to 
an understanding of the Bologna Process, and c) demonstrate through an 
example analysis how the abovementioned theoretical framework can be 
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used, arguing that the Bologna Process discourse reflects and contributes 
to the renegotiation of the tasks of  universities and other higher educa-
tion institutions in society and the redefinition of the public good ele-
ments of higher education. Special emphasis is placed on the linguistic 
and conceptual ways of constructing higher education as a social institu-
tion based on the notions of its relevance to the competitiveness of states 
as knowledge economies.
2.  The Bologna Process and Global isat ion 
The Bologna Process is possibly the most discussed process in European 
higher education, influencing the structures of higher education 
throughout the whole of Europe. Despite its intergovernmental origins, 
the Bologna Process has also gradually integrated higher education insti-
tutions and students and their respective organisations, as well as the or-
ganisations of higher education employees, business, and industry into 
its structures. Even though the process first  started outside the frame-
work of the European Union, the European Commission has gradually 
gained an increasingly prominent position within the process; not least 
because of the integration of the Bologna Process in what is known as 
the Lisbon Agenda, which aims to transform the European Union into 
‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion’, as well as the recent EU enlargement. 
Universities and other higher education institutions, both as institution-
ally embedded organisations and on a wider scale as enduring social in-
stitutions with assigned tasks in the functioning of society, are at the 
core of the Bologna Process and its desired outcome: the European 
Higher Education Area.  If the Bologna Process is the widest and most 
profound change in European higher education, we may justifiably ask 
whether the change is taking place only on the level of degree structures, 
quality assurance, and recognition mechanisms; or whether it also 
touches upon the conceptualisation of higher education as a social insti-
tution.
The Bologna Process operates in the niche created by and embedded 
in the complex web of distinct but related concepts and processes: Euro-
peanisation, internationalisation, and globalisation. As these concepts 
have reached a somewhat stable definition in the European context of 
higher education research, it may be said with a certain degree of com-
mon understanding that as internationalisation, the Bologna Process is a 
form of inter-governmental cooperation taking place as a voluntary ac-
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tion between nation-states; as Europeanisation, it emphasises the spe-
cifically ‘European’ character of higher education in European coun-
tries; and as related to globalisation it emphasises the competitive and 
market-oriented aspects of higher education (Teichler 2004; Enders 
2004).  For the purposes of this paper it is most useful to concentrate on 
globalisation as the wider societal change influencing the process and 
foundation of intellectual study and academic work, provision, and envi-
ronment of higher education. The contentious concept of globalisation is 
used to refer to a process of dis-embedding previously national institu-
tions such as higher education It is related to a restructuring of the tasks, 
functions, and authority of nation-states which share their power with 
various international institutions, thereby leading to a restructuring of in-
ternational activities in territorially different frameworks and by direct 
networking of global actors (Held et al. 1999; Held and McGrew 2000).  
Globalisation changes their role in the provision and steering of higher 
education leading them to fulfil their role and use their steering capacity 
indirectly (e.g., via international organisations and regulations) and thus 
forcing them to play according to the general logics of globalisation. Al-
though the wider historical, social, and economic European context can-
not be underestimated, especially when defined in terms of ensuing 
competition between the nation-states and their institutions globalisation 
is undoubtedly one of the changes (possibly the most important one) be-
hind the Bologna Process.  Even other ailments for which the Bologna 
Process is seen as a remedy are often derived from globalisation discus-
sion: the pressures of financial stringency of public higher education 
systems, prolonged duration of studies, difficulties of graduate mobility 
across European countries.
The social shift into what is commonly called knowledge-based so-
cieties emphasises knowledge and therefore education, research, and in-
novation as the building blocks of the national competitiveness. This has 
created tensions and competition among the largest economies in the 
world. The response of the European Union has been the introduction of 
the Lisbon objectives, aiming to make EU the most competitive knowl-
edge economy in the world by 2010. This agenda places education on 
centre stage. In a more narrow perspective the Bologna Process and the 
resulting creation of the European Higher Education Area can be seen as 
attempts to increase the competitiveness and attractiveness of European 
higher education in the eyes of both prospective and current students and 
academic staff, especially vis-à-vis the United States (Van der Wende 
2001; Huisman and Van der Wende 2004). In a wider perspective, the 
Bologna Process, like the internationalisation of higher education in 
general, may be seen as “a systemic, sustained effort at making higher 
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education more responsive to the requirements and challenges related to 
the globalisation of societies, economy and labour markets” (Kälvemark 
and Van der Wende 1997, p. 19). This view can be seen as a way of con-
trolling globalisation, moving away from seeing it as something external 
to the states just taking place around the state actors, and towards a con-
ceptualisation of it as a process constructed and contributed to by the 
state, albeit to a different degree by different states.  
3.  Changing legi t imat ion of  HE  
Two elements should be taken into account when considering the Bolo-
gna Process from a theoretical perspective. The first addresses the 
change in the underlying legitimating idea or rationale of higher educa-
tion which Gumport (2000) has identified as a shift from a social institu-
tion into an industry. The second perspective addresses the way in which 
the discourses may contribute to this shift.  
The view of higher education as a social institution is inextricably 
linked to the national projects of the nation-states, devoted to national 
identity- and elite-building, sustaining cultural continuity, developing 
human capital, generating new knowledge and a skilled labour-force, as 
well as enhancing individual learning and fulfilment (Gumport 2000; 
Bowen 1980; Castells 1991). In its capacity of enhancing social and in-
dividual well-being, higher education has been considered a human right 
and a public good, thereby making it a public responsibility (Nyborg 
2003).
As Enders (2004) pointed out however, the role of universities and 
higher education as social institutions has been complicated by the 
fragmentation of society:  
“…there seems no longer to be a single society to which a university can now 
be expected to respond. There are only governments, academics and students, 
labour markets and industries, professions and occupations, status groups and 
reference groups, communities and localities, and the dis-localities of the 
global.” (p. 363) 
This requires new modes of governance of higher education, many re-
lated to tighter connections with various local, national, and interna-
tional level stakeholders (Enders 2004; Neave 2002). As a result of 
growing influence of international stakeholders such as intergovernmen-
tal organisations and international business on higher education, there is 
a growing convergence in higher education policy around the world, of-
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ten carried by the global discourse disseminated by experts and organi-
sations (Ball 1998; Rhoades and Sporn 2002; Dale 1999). Carter and 
O’Neill (1995, p. 9) argue that a new, nearly global orthodoxy of educa-
tion policy can be identified based on the connection between competi-
tiveness and trade and reducing government responsibility while increas-
ing private contributions and involvement in education. Higher educa-
tion policy discourse can said to be influenced by ideas and theories 
such as neo-liberalism, new institutional economics based on devolution 
of authority, incentives and self-management, ‘performativity’ (a steer-
ing mechanism based on target setting and accountability), public choice 
theory, and finally the new managerialism inserting the ideas and tech-
niques of business management into higher education (Ball 1998). States 
have two ideal types of policy responses to the challenges of globalisa-
tion; creating market flexibility through reduction of social overheads 
and trade, privatisation, and competitive individualism; or striving to 
shape the direction of their national economy through investing in key 
economic sectors and the development of human capital (Brown and 
Lauder 1996). In this context the relevance of higher education for em-
ployment, trade, and competitiveness becomes a central issue. The Bo-
logna Process fits the latter description to the degree that it is clearly an 
attempt to guide the direction of the European higher education to 
achieve desired outcomes; i.e., more competitiveness and attractiveness 
of Europe and its higher education. In his critical account of the Euro-
pean Higher Education and Research Areas, Kwiek (2004, p. 763) ar-
gued that the whole Bologna Process is based on the underlying assump-
tions of  Europe and the world having entered a new era of knowledge-
based and market-driven economies competing against one another, ren-
dering ‘production, transmission, dissemination and use of new knowl-
edge’ the conditions for the growth and survival of knowledge-based so-
cieties; thus underlining the aims, practises, and conceptualisations of 
the Bologna Process and the kind of higher education it aims to build. 
Similarly, although somewhat contentiously, Amaral and Magalhaes 
(2004) argue that the Bologna Process may be interpreted as another 
step in the neo-liberal movement to decrease the social responsibility of 
the state, in essence converting education into a private good.  
The paradigm shift in higher education as well as other public ser-
vices warrants change in the legitimating idea of higher education; from 
a social institution aimed at the related notion of education and knowl-
edge as a public good, to an industry with the related notion of a private 
good and the notion of HEIs run like businesses. The new view of higher 
education is as part of the economy, industrial production units produc-
ing goods and services within competitive markets and for the benefit of 
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the organisations themselves as well as the nation states and taxpayers 
financing their operations. Universities are increasingly perceived, de-
scribed, and discussed in terms of “a production metaphor” (Gumport 
2000, p. 70) or by using market terminology (Fairclough 1995). Clark 
(1998) has researched the characteristics of “entrepreneurial universi-
ties”, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) analysed “academic capitalism” and 
Shumar (1997) the “commodification of higher education”.  Such firmly 
established concepts as the ‘learning society’ or the ‘knowledge-based 
economy’ also “serve and symbolise the increasing colonisation of edu-
cation policy by economic policy imperatives” (Ball 1998, p. 3). These
examples may be taken as indications that even academia has begun to 
analyse itself through the prism of market terminology, reflecting a 
change in the discourse of higher education. Drawing on the ideas of 
Ball (1998) and Kwiek (2004) this paper argues that a similar strength-
ening of the economic notions of higher education linked to the ques-
tions of the relevance of higher education can also be found in the cen-
tral documents of the Bologna Process. Adding to Ball and Kwiek’s 
work, I show the way in which this understanding is linguistically con-
strued in the documents 
Every moment of language use is a social action shaped by and 
shaping wider social structures, practices, and institutions. Discourses, 
defined as particular ways of speaking which give meaning to experi-
ences from a particular perspective, are central carriers or even definers 
of those socially constructed meanings. They may be collateral or com-
petitive, and some discourses may gain hegemonic positions over other 
discourses, developing into commonly shared and taken for granted 
truths, which displace other alternative truths (Jorgensen and Phillips 
2002; Jokinen et al. 1993). 
Our ways of speaking about something do not neutrally reflect our 
world, identities, and social relations; but instead play an active role in 
creating, shaping, and changing them. Discourses do not merely reflect 
or mirror objects, events, and categories pre-existing in the social world; 
but rather actively construct those things, thereby having social and po-
litical implications (Potter and Wetherell 1987). This argument implies 
that the emergence of certain discourses as “institutional facts” or domi-
nant conceptualisations of the world points towards a certain course of 
action as the only ‘rational’, ‘logical’, or ‘legitimate’ option. New fea-
tures of social institutions need to be legitimised by appearing as parts of 
the natural order of things, based either on nature or reason. This also 
means that as certain institutional facts or conceptualisations of the 
world are legitimised, competing options are de-legitimised. The most 
successful institutional facts are not necessarily the most efficient ones 
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but those “that prove most successful at imposing a collective meaning 
and function on physical reality” (Adler 1997, p. 340). Fairclough 
(2001) argues that those in a position of power have the potential of im-
posing their meanings on the discourse. By adopting the imposed mean-
ings as given, we acknowledge their authority and thereby reproduce 
and strengthen the discourse. Discourse is both consciously and uncon-
sciously produced and helps to produce, reconstruct, or deconstruct 
power relations. This is not to say that those in the position of power 
would always be unanimous amongst themselves or be driving for a 
change. Similarly, the authority of different producers of discourse is not 
necessarily uncontested by others. Instead, there is a constant negotia-
tion and power struggle taking place in the production of discourse. 
Therefore it is always worthwhile to ask whose interests the discourse 
serves.
From a discursive perspective, the Bologna Process is essentially a 
political communication and negotiation process, where texts are used to 
communicate the aims and procedures of the process leading to the es-
tablishment of the European Higher Education Area. From a discourse 
analytical perspective it may be argued that because the discursive con-
ceptualisations are part of the ‘rule-making’ of any social institution, the 
discourse of the Bologna Process is as essential to the outcome of the 
process as the other types of social actions taking place during the proc-
ess. We may therefore argue that the Bologna Process does not only 
change the organising of ‘higher education’ and ‘university’ through ex-
plicit changes to the degree structures, or the introduction of quality as-
surance and recognition mechanisms. Instead, the discourses of the Bo-
logna Process also crystallise the renegotiation of the legitimate func-
tions and roles of the higher education as a social institution. The Bolo-
gna Process documents create a conceptual understanding of universities 
and other higher education institutions as producers of knowledge and 
the skilled labour force needed by Europe to survive in global competi-
tion, breaking with the more traditional notions of higher education 
along the lines suggested by Gumport (2000) and Kwiek (2004). By 
promoting the creation of a shared identity for the participants of the Bo-
logna Process as actors within the process, the Bologna Process dis-
course may significantly contribute to the consolidation of the more 
practical and organisational changes introduced in higher education sys-
tems and institutions.
However, a few considerations should be taken into account to en-
able a critical discussion on the research. Firstly, the trickling down of 
international discourse is not a clear-cut or unidirectional phenomenon 
and the authority of the ministers to produce the dominant discourse 
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does not always go uncontested. The interpretation of the Bologna dis-
course on the national higher education policy arena and agents is de-
pendent on context; including the political and social situation of the 
given country, interests and aspirations of the actors etc, therefore lead-
ing to different understandings of what the Europe of Knowledge or the
European Higher Education Area comprise and how they relate to the 
social role of higher education and its institutions. It is naive to assume 
that universities or governments would present homogenous interpreta-
tions on the Bologna Process and how it should be conducted. A flexi-
bility of interpretations lends legitimacy to the process in the varying na-
tional contexts. Secondly, it is worth remembering that like texts, inter-
pretations made of them and discourses as analytical categories pro-
jected onto texts are also contextual and discursive in, construing and 
constructing a certain kind of social reality. Therefore the researcher is 
also embedded in a certain set of knowledge and values and cannot 
completely separate that from the research. Critical discourse analysis as 
an approach discards the foundationalist assumption that everything can 
be referred to some unalterable, objective truth. It has been debated 
whether the traditional discussion around the quality of research related 
to objectivist research approaches, namely the criteria of reliability, va-
lidity and objectivity can be transferred to subjectivist paradigm at all, 
and if so, in what form (See e.g., Jorgensen and Phillips 2002; Antaki et 
al. 2003; Kvale 1995.)  The first criterion in enabling a critical discus-
sion on the research is clearly stating the set of presumptions guiding the 
analysis. This interpretation, drawing its inspiration from the ideas of 
Ball (1998), Kwiek (2004), and discussion on globalisation and knowl-
edge economy presented above, is only one among many interpretations. 
As this paper illustrates the means through which the Bologna Process is 
being produced as a legitimate, rational, or indeed crucial process for the 
European higher education; in the following section I account for the 
persuasive linguistic features used to do this and how they are featured 
throughout the texts. Instead of analysing the text from every possible 
angle, based on the texts I identify three categories in which I pay spe-
cific attention to in the next section. The most illustrative examples of 
quotations are chosen, as it its likely that the reader of the communiqués 
would most likely be influenced by them in terms of making an interpre-
tation of the social reality and what is ‘meant’ by the texts.  The quota-
tions which present a strong truth, such as ‘taken-for-granted’ expressed 
truths or causalities, are usually the most persuasive ones. In the quota-
tions I try to show the features which contribute to the creating of the 
specific kind of ‘reality’ of the Bologna Process and the European 
higher education.
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4.  The discourse of  the Bologna Process 
The five key documents of the Bologna Process include the Sorbonne 
Declaration (SD) signed by the ministers of education of United King-
dom, France, Germany, and Italy at the 800th anniversary of the Sor-
bonne University in 1998; the actual Bologna Declaration (BD) signed 
in 1999 by the ministers of education of 29 European countries which 
gave the name for the whole process; and the communiqués of Prague 
(2001, PC), Berlin (2003, BC), and Bergen (2005, BGC) – ministerial 
follow-up meetings which have somewhat concretised the initially vague 
concept of the Bologna Process and the creation of the European Higher 
Education Area – the ultimate aim of the process.  Although some may 
view these documents as meagre material for analysis, they encompass 
the five highest level official documents of the process: the ultimate 
framework for the proliferating interpretations of the Bologna Process 
discourse.
Certain common concepts can be found throughout the documents. 
The existence of certain concepts however, does not imply that their 
meanings remain constant. I wish to concentrate on certain concepts and 
elements found in the Bologna Process documents but which have been 
framed in different ways, giving them different connotations in the dif-
ferent documents. The elements I concentrate on are the conceptualisa-
tions constructed a) for the Europe of Knowledge as the concept used to 
argue for the worthiness of the process, b) for the European Higher 
Education Area as the aim of the process, and c) for the role of higher 
education in general and the universities and other higher education in-
stitutions more specifically. The first two concepts are explicitly men-
tioned in the texts; the third category, the role of higher education HEI’s, 
arises from the more general research question of the paper and the con-
textualisation of the paper in the aforementioned theoretical and contex-
tual considerations. Throughout the documents, a duality of meaning in 
the key concepts may be noted much on the lines of what is argued by 
Gumport (2000) and Kwiek (2004). This relates to the break between, 
and the related retranslation of, the more traditional, cultural, and public 
good notion of higher education on the one hand; and a contemporary, 
economy-oriented, and competitive private good notion of higher educa-
tion on the other. I show this duality, together with the evolution of their 
relationship in the Bologna Process documents. I also analyse how the 
strength of these arguments is lexically and grammatically achieved. 
It is useful to briefly identify the linguistic means through which the 
texts are constructed as cohesive, convincing, and persuasive entities. 
The means of persuasion and building the strength of the discourse are 
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the same throughout the documents and relate to all three concepts. In 
elaborating the persuasive means of the texts, I draw on the ideas of 
Fairclough (2001) as well as Jokinen (1999) who see argumentation and 
persuasion as a primarily social activity aimed at strengthening the posi-
tion adopted by the writer/speaker, and weakening the opposing posi-
tion.1  Jokinen (1999, pp. 156-157) points out that it is a means of in-
creasing our understanding about the many ways in which the use of 
language constructs our social reality; specifically, how facts are con-
structed; identities produced; and different categorisations created, 
strengthened, or questioned. It contributes to the understanding of how 
certain things, processes, and events are normalised and justified, or al-
ternatively made to seem unnatural or undesirable.     
The first means of persuasion to elaborate is constructing the agency 
(Fairclough 2001, pp. 100-102), “actorness”, or the speaker’s category 
by assigning a right for a certain kind of knowledge – and therefore 
power or duty to act (Jokinen 1999, p. 135). Though the documents im-
ply several different agencies or even un-assignment of the agency, two 
constructions of agency or speaker categories are highlighted for the 
purposes of this analysis. The first agents are the ministers who have 
signed the declarations and communiqués. They are presented as the be-
nevolent, yet somewhat distant supervisors of the process, or ‘wise 
men’, who underline, acknowledge, agree, and reassert, thereby guiding 
the process. The ministers are convincing agents due to their formal 
powerful position.
“Ministers underline2 the importance of consolidating the progress made, and 
of improving understanding and acceptance of the new qualifications through 
reinforcing dialogue within institutions and between institutions and employ-
ers.” (BC) 
Secondly, the agency is assigned to a collective, inclusive ‘we’, which 
refers to all stakeholders of higher education in Europe, or even all citi-
zens of European countries. This collective agency contributes to an un-
derstanding of the Bologna Process as something collectively embraced 
by a large number of countries, higher education actors, and general 
public with joint interests; encouraging everyone to embrace the pre-
sented conceptualisations and proposed activities, and obliging everyone 
                                             
1 It may be noted however, that not all of this persuasion is deliberate, but 
along the lines of established conventions of writing official, international 
policy documents. They therefore also strengthen the conventions. 
2 My emphasis. 
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to act accordingly, making the inclusive ‘we’ a convincing agency 
(Jokinen 1999, p. 139; Fairclough 2001, p. 106).
“We owe our students and our society at large a higher education system in 
which they are given the best opportunities to seek and find their own area of 
excellence.” (SD) 
Another means of persuasion is the utilisation of expressions with posi-
tive connotations (Fairclough 2001, p. 98; Jokinen 1999, p. 141) to lend 
legitimacy to the Bologna Process. It is not possible to give an exhaus-
tive account of all such expressions, but in general it can be said that 
references to progress, development, cooperation, future, taking steps 
forward, promoting, and enabling something tend to have positive con-
notations. Positive verbs also tend to lend the positive connotation to the 
objective of the verb. Similarly references to culture, citizenship, heri-
tage, and democratic values tend to have positive value. Sometimes 
positive connotations may be detected in the analysis only when replac-
ing seemingly neutral expressions with their opposites, which may con-
vey more distinctly negative connotations. The argumentation can also 
be strengthened by means of extreme expressions (Jokinen 1999, p. 
150), for instance by claiming that something must be done or is irre-
placeable, indispensable, the best, or excellent. The Prague Commu-
niqué illustrates several of these persuasive tools.
“Ministers are affirmed that efforts to promote mobility must be continued to 
enable students, teachers, researchers and administrative staff to benefit from 
the richness of the European Higher Education Area including its democratic
values, diversity of cultures and languages and the diversity of the higher edu-
cation systems.” (PC)
Other persuasive features include the listing of two or three features, 
which strengthen the argument by repetition and the appearance of in-
cluding large segments of society or a large number of people as benefi-
ciaries of the process. This can also convey a notion of multiple benefits 
or gains, or present the context of the Bologna Process as factual and 
generally known through declarative factual sentences and passive sen-
tences (Jokinen 1999, p. 140, p. 152; Fairclough 2001, pp. 103-105). 
The next section elaborates the conceptualisations of the Europe of 
Knowledge, the European Higher Education Area, and the role of the 
universities and other higher education institutions.
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4.1 The European Process and the Europe of Knowledge   
The contextualisation of the Bologna Process in the first two documents 
– the Sorbonne Declaration and the Bologna Declaration – is anchored 
in the vague but imagination-provoking concept of a ‘European Process’ 
which has ‘moved some extremely important steps ahead’ and ‘become 
an increasingly concrete and relevant reality for the Union and its citi-
zens’.  The European Process is not explicitly explained, but is implicitly 
defined in terms of the economic integration and development of the 
European Union and contrasted with the ‘Europe of Knowledge’ which 
is more explicitly defined as a cultural and intellectual project:
“The European Process has very recently moved some extremely important 
steps ahead. Relevant as they are, they should not make one forget that Europe 
is not only that of the Euro, of the banks and the economy: it must be a Europe 
of Knowledge as well. We must strengthen and build upon the intellectual, cul-
tural, social and technical dimensions of our continent.” (SD) 
“We are witnessing a growing awareness in large parts of the political and 
academic world and in public opinion of the need to establish a more complete 
and far reaching Europe, in particular building upon and strengthening its in-
tellectual, cultural, social and scientific and technological dimensions.” (BD)  
The Europe of Knowledge is also presented as:  
“Widely recognised as an irreplaceable factor for social and human growth 
and as an indispensable component to consolidate and enrich the European 
citizenship, capable of giving its citizens the necessary competencies to face 
the challenges of the new millennium, together with an awareness of shared 
values and belonging to a common social and cultural space.” (BD)
This makes the Europe of Knowledge a very strong legitimating dis-
course for the Bologna Process, as social and human growth and Euro-
pean citizenship with its shared values are positively charged concepts 
and the passive form (is widely recognised) strengthens its presentation 
as a universal truth.
A few years later, an interesting shift is noticeable in the Prague 
Communiqué (PC) and the Berlin Communiqué (BC). In the Prague 
Communiqué the concepts “the European Process” and “The Europe of 
Knowledge” are not mentioned, but instead “the future Europe” and ‘fu-
ture’ more generally are used to serve the same purpose as an argument 
for the Bologna Process. However, the nature of the argument has 
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clearly shifted from culture, shared values, and intellectual pursuits to 
more economic and innovation oriented contexts.
“In the future Europe, built upon a knowledge-based society and economy,
life-long learning strategies are necessary to face the challenges of competi-
tiveness and the use of new technologies and to improve social cohesion, equal 
opportunities and the quality of life.” (PC) 
“Ministers particularly stressed that the quality of higher education and re-
search is and should be an important determinant of Europe’s international at-
tractiveness and competitiveness.” (PC) 
In the Berlin Communiqué the Europe of Knowledge makes a reappear-
ance, consolidating the economic and competitive connotation intro-
duced in the Prague Communiqué with the ‘future’.
“Ministers agree that efforts shall be undertaken in order to secure closer links 
between the HE and research systems in their respective countries. The emerg-
ing European Higher Education Area will benefit from synergies with Euro-
pean Research Area, thus strengthening the basis of Europe of Knowledge. 
The aim is to preserve Europe’s cultural richness and linguistic diversity, 
based on its heritage of diversified traditions, and to foster its potential of in-
novation and social and economic development through enhanced cooperation 
among European Higher Education Institutions.” (BC) 
It may also be noted that the Prague and Berlin Communiqués were 
written after the introduction of the Lisbon Agenda in March 2000 in 
which the reference to the knowledge based society and economy be-
came prominent in the EU discourse. The concept of the Europe of 
Knowledge made its first appearance in a European Commission com-
munication ‘Towards a Europe of Knowledge’ in November 1997. This 
aimed at building up an open and dynamic European education area by 
making ‘knowledge-based policies’ (innovation, research, education, 
training) one of the fundamental pillars of the EU’s internal policies, and 
raising the level of knowledge and skills of all Europe’s citizens to pro-
mote employment. This is an example of intertextuality as defined by 
Fairclough (2001, p. 129): a trickling down of the meanings from one set 
of texts to another in the production and renegotiation of the Bologna 
discourse. The reappearance of the Europe of Knowledge with the eco-
nomic connotation in the Berlin Communiqué seems to refer either to 
the European Commission gaining more power within the Bologna 
Process, or the interest of the ministers in pleasing the commission.  
TERHI NOKKALA
234
Interestingly, the concepts of European Process or Europe of 
Knowledge do not appear in the Bergen Communiqué of 2005. 
Throughout the document, the European Higher Education Area is taken 
as the starting point which seems to legitimise itself without the need to 
refer to any external entities. Even Europe only warrants few mentions 
in the document.
4.2 The European Higher Education Area 
The conceptualisation of the European Higher Education Area remains 
fairly constant in all the documents, even though the notion of the 
‘European Higher Education Area’ and its acronym EHEA was only 
consolidated in the Prague Communiqué of 2001.  
In the Sorbonne Declaration there seems to be two main ways of 
framing the European Higher Education Area, instrumental (i) and cul-
tural (c) framing. The cultural framing is more literary in style and refers 
to Europe’s cultural diversity, citizenship, and personal growth. In its 
stylistic elegance it is fairly vague and noncommittal, drawing from 
pleasant images rather than concrete benefits. It is also interesting to 
note that by presenting cultural diversity and different traditions in 
higher education in connection with citizenship and personal growth, 
they acquire a positive connotation and are presented as a positive, 
strengthening element instead of an inhibiting, confusing factor for a 
unified European higher education system- another possible interpreta-
tion.
“We call on other member States of the Union and other European countries to 
join us in this objective and on all European Universities to consolidate 
Europe’s standing in the world through continuously improved and updated 
education for its citizens.” (c, SD)
“The anniversary of Paris offers us a solemn opportunity to engage in the en-
deavour to create a European area of higher education, where national identi-
ties and common interests can interact and strengthen each other for the bene-
fit of Europe, of its students and more generally of its citizens.” (c, SD)
By contrast, the instrumental framing with its reference to notions of at-
tractiveness and competitiveness and its down-to-earth style and con-
crete content, draws on rationality and practicality rather than eloquent 
imagery. In the Sorbonne Declaration, the instrumental framing appears 
less frequently than the cultural framing.
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“The international recognition and attractive potential of our systems are di-
rectly linked to their external and internal readabilities.” (i, SD) 
“Much of the originality and flexibility of the systems…” (i, SD) 
In the Bologna Declaration and the Prague Communiqué the cultural 
framing is markedly reduced and the instrumental framing is more pro-
nounced than in the previous document. Especially in the Prague Com-
muniqué the way in which the Bologna Process slowly begins to concre-
tise is apparent, therefore making it less necessary to rely on elevated 
images. There is also a clear trend which indicates that increasing the 
competitiveness and attractiveness of European higher education and 
higher education institutions becomes more pronounced in the Bologna 
discourse, whereas in the Sorbonne Declaration they are less pro-
nounced.
“The achievement of greater compatibility and comparability of the systems 
of HE nevertheless requires continual momentum in order to be fully accom-
plished.” (i, BD) 
“We must in particular look at the objective of increasing the international 
competitiveness of the European system of Higher Education.” (i, BD) 
“We need to assure that the European higher education system acquires a 
world-wide degree of attraction (i) equal to our extraordinary cultural and 
scientific traditions.” (c, BD). 
“Taking advantage of recognition tools so that citizens can effectively use their 
qualifications, competencies and skills throughout European Higher education 
Area.” (i, PC) 
The Berlin Communiqué and especially the Bergen Communiqué further 
consolidate the practical nature of the European Higher Education Area 
by emphasising tangible structures such as the two-tier degree structure, 
the quality assurance system, and the recognition tools; as well as in-
creasing the emphasis on attractiveness and competitiveness.
In terms of the development of the discourse, what is most interest-
ing is the aforementioned connection between the European Higher 
Education Area, the European Research Area, and the Europe of Knowl-
edge. It may be that research, even though often assumed to be an in-
separable part of the concept of ‘higher education’, is not an obviously 
integral part of the European Higher Education Area but is rather some-
thing which must be explicitly mentioned as worthwhile. This speaks of 
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a certain separation of higher education and research, and the impor-
tance of other research organisations along the lines of Mode 2 knowl-
edge production (see Gibbons et al. 1994).  The need to reconnect those 
two is especially clear and pronounced in the Bergen communiqué, 
where it is stated as one of the four main priorities and strongly con-
nected with the notions of quality and competitiveness.
“Ministers agree that efforts shall be undertaken in order to secure closer links 
between the HE and research systems in their respective countries. The emerg-
ing European Higher Education Area will benefit from synergies with Euro-
pean Research Area, thus strengthening the basis of Europe of Knowledge.
The aim is to preserve Europe’s cultural richness and linguistic diversity, 
based on its heritage of diversified traditions, and to foster its potential of in-
novation and social and economic development through enhanced cooperation 
among European Higher Education Institutions.” (BC) 
“Conscious of the need to promote closer links between the EHEA and ERA in 
a Europe of Knowledge, and of the importance of research as an integral part 
of higher education across Europe, Ministers consider it necessary…” (BC) 
“We underline the importance of higher education in further enhancing re-
search and the importance of research in underpinning higher education for 
the economic and cultural development of our societies and for social cohe-
sion.” (BGC) 
“We therefore emphasise the importance of research and research training in 
maintaining and improving the quality of and enhancing the competitiveness 
and attractiveness of the EHEA. With a view to achieving better results we 
recognise the need to improve the synergy between the higher education sector 
and other research sectors throughout our respective countries and between the 
EHEA and the European Research Area.” (BGC) 
Instead of the cultural framings above, it can be debated whether another 
framing has emerged to replace it; namely that of social aspects and so-
cial equality, which seem to have emerged as a counterbalance to the 
emphasis on competitiveness and the instrumental framing.  In the Ber-
lin Communiqué it is rather vague in terms of the content and instead re-
lies of elaborate images.  In the Bergen Communiqué, however, it is 
mentioned as one of the priority areas, and is also more concrete in na-
ture. Interestingly, it has also been directly linked with the notion of 
competitiveness and attractiveness: instead of a counterbalance, it has 
become a precondition.
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“Ministers reaffirm the importance of the social dimension of the Bologna 
Process. The need to increase competitiveness must be balanced with the ob-
jective of improving the social characteristics of the European Higher Educa-
tion Area, aiming at strengthening social cohesion and reducing social and 
gender inequalities both at national and at European level. In that context, 
Ministers reaffirm their position that higher education is a public good and a 
public responsibility.” (BC) 
“Ministers stress the need for appropriate studying and living conditions for 
the students, so that they can successfully complete their studies within an ap-
propriate period of time without obstacles related to their social and economic 
background. They also stress the need for more comparable data on the social 
and economic situation of students.” (BC) 
“The social dimension of the Bologna Process is a constituent part of the 
EHEA and a necessary condition for the attractiveness and competitiveness of 
the EHEA. The social dimension includes measures taken by governments to 
help students, especially from socially disadvantaged groups, in financial and 
economic aspects and to provide them with guidance and counselling services 
with a view to widening access.” (BCG) 
The Bergen Communiqué also otherwise seems to have taken a swing 
back towards the ideas of the Sorbonne and Bologna Declarations. 
Firstly, the emphasis on cultural heritage as well as intercultural under-
standing and respect has reappeared. Secondly, the public good notions 
of education in society are stronger than earlier but also explicitly con-
nected to the notions of attractiveness and competitiveness.
“We see the European Higher Education Area as a partner of higher education 
systems in other regions of the world, stimulating balanced student and staff 
exchange and cooperation between higher education institutions. We underline 
the importance of intercultural understanding and respect.” (BGC) 
“We must cherish our rich heritage and cultural diversity in contributing to a 
knowledge-based society. We commit ourselves to upholding the principle of 
public responsibility for higher education in the context of complex modern 
societies. As higher education is situated at the crossroads of research, educa-
tion and innovation, it is also the key to Europe’s competitiveness.” (BGC) 
“The European Higher Education Area must be open and should be attractive 
to other parts of the world. Our contribution to achieving education for all 
should be based on the principle of sustainable development and be in accor-
dance with the ongoing international work on developing guidelines for qual-
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ity provision of cross-border higher education. We reiterate that in interna-
tional academic cooperation, academic values should prevail.” (BGC) 
4.3 The tasks and roles of universities and other higher 
  education institutions 
A similar dichotomy between the traditional, cultural aspect and the 
more instrumental aspect may be found in the conceptualisation of the 
task of the universities and/or other higher education institutions. The 
first two documents, especially the Sorbonne Declaration, feature the 
traditional, cultural influence of the universities. However, the docu-
ments also seem to contrast ‘the glorious past’ with a somewhat ‘dire 
present’ and aim for ‘a bright future’, indicating that the old means and 
tasks no longer serve their purpose. This is also evident in the way in 
which the ameliorative verbs change, restructuring, moving ahead, en-
hancing, and other such expressions are used throughout the documents 
to make a break with the past.
“We must strengthen and build upon the intellectual, cultural, social and tech-
nical dimensions of our continent. These have to a large extent been shaped by 
its universities, which continue to play a pivotal role for their development.”
(past, SD) 
“Universities were born in Europe, some three-quarters of a millennium ago. 
Our four countries boast some of the oldest, who are celebrating important an-
niversaries around now, as the University of Paris is doing today. In those 
times, students and academics would freely circulate and rapidly disseminate 
knowledge throughout the continent. Nowadays, too many of our students still 
graduate without having had the benefit of a study period outside of national 
boundaries.” (present, SD) 
“The Sorbonne declaration of 25th of May 1998, which was underpinned by 
these considerations, stressed the Universities’ central role in developing 
European cultural dimensions. It emphasised the creation of the European 
area of higher education as a key way to promote citizens’ mobility and em-
ployability and the Continent’s overall development.” (future, BD) 
The two later documents seem to feature more strongly what may be 
called a conditional role for universities: the existence of universities 
and/or other higher education institutions does not automatically guaran-
tee the emergence of all good things in society, but is only conditional: if 
the universities/other higher education institutions act in a certain way 
i.e., implement the structural arrangements of the Bologna Process, then 
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good things will ensue. This may be because the context of the docu-
ments was the ministerial meetings rather than any national governmen-
tal or academic arena, but it may also be an indication of the nature of 
the Bologna Process as primarily a top-down international and national 
policy process as opposed to a bottom-up process initiated by the uni-
versities. However, it does seem to indicate a shift from the independent 
to the instrumental role of the universities.
“As the Bologna Declaration sets out, Ministers asserted that building the 
European Higher Education Area is a condition for enhancing the attractive-
ness and competitiveness of higher education institutions in Europe.” (PC) 
“Ministers strongly encouraged universities and other higher education institu-
tions to take full advantage of existing national legislation and European tools 
aimed at facilitating academic and professional recognition of course units, 
degrees and other awards, so that citizens can effectively use their qualifica-
tions, competencies and skills throughout the European Higher Education 
Area.” (PC) 
“Aware of the contribution strong institutions can make to economic and so-
cietal development, Ministers accept that institutions need to be empowered to
take decisions on their internal organisation and administration.” (BC) 
“Ministers will make the necessary effort to make European Higher Education 
Institutions an even more attractive and efficient partner. Therefore Ministers 
ask Higher Education Institutions to increase the role and relevance of re-
search to technological, social and cultural evolution and to the needs of soci-
ety.” (BC) 
This trend continues in the Bergen Communiqué, where university 
autonomy is mentioned in connection with implementing the agreed re-
forms.  The Bergen document also emphasises the commitment and sup-
port of various ‘partners’, broadening the scope of the stakeholders of 
higher education from students, governments, and universities to the 
employer and employee organisations, both on the level of discourse and 
in practise by accepting them as partners in the follow-up structures of 
the Bologna Process.
“As we move closer to 2010, we undertake to ensure that higher education in-
stitutions enjoy the necessary autonomy to implement the agreed reforms, and 
we recognise the need for sustainable funding of institutions.” (BGC)
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“We welcome the support of organisations representing business and the so-
cial partners and look forward to intensified cooperation in reaching the goals
of the Bologna Process.” (BGC)
Finally, it may be noted that there is a clear evolution from the Sorbonne 
Declaration to the Bergen Communiqué in using the term ‘university’. 
In the first two documents, only the word university is used, in the Pra-
gue Communiqué the phrase “universities and other higher education in-
stitutions” is used consistently, whereas in the Berlin and Bergen Com-
muniqués only “higher education institutions” is used. This may be for 
several reasons, for instance the non-university higher education sector 
is also integrated into the Bologna Process. The use of the word ‘univer-
sities’ seems logical in the Sorbonne Declaration as it was signed in the 
context of the 800th anniversary of the Sorbonne University. On the 
other hand, the shift of the concept may signal the erosion of the 
‘uniqueness’ of the university by equating it unreservedly with non-
university higher education sector organisations, and therefore also bind-
ing it by the rationales and operating logics as any other organisation, as 
argued also by Scott (2003). This is not to say that the development is 
necessarily a negative one. 
5.  Discussion  
A certain fluctuation of the discourse of the Bologna Process seems ap-
parent. Firstly, there has been a shift in the way in which the Europe of 
Knowledge as the background and legitimisation of the Bologna Process 
has been conceptualised, from cultural and intellectual to economic and 
innovation-oriented framing, and back to one connecting the two.  Sec-
ondly, the actual intended outcome of the Bologna Process, the Euro-
pean Higher Education Area, seems to be framed somewhat differently 
with the shift from primarily cultural to primarily practical and competi-
tive framing, with a social and equality-centred framing emerging 
gradually. Thirdly, the conceptualisation of the role of the universities 
and other higher education institutions seems to have shifted from more 
autonomous and automatically beneficial to something more instrumen-
tal and conditional. They are expected and encouraged to adopt and im-
plement the proposed Bologna Process measures in order to contribute 
to the creation of the Europe of Knowledge.
As noted in the analysis however, the Bologna Process documents 
raise a lot of questions. Why does the ‘Europe of Knowledge’ have an 
economic framing in the later documents? Why have the notions of 
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competitiveness and attractiveness become more pronounced in the 
course of the process, and why has the social framing emerged as a 
counterbalance to the economic framing in the Bologna Process dis-
course?  This may be because of the increasingly vivid globalisation dis-
cussion, which emphasises the challenges of globalisation for developed 
and developing countries alike and the ensuing need for competitive-
ness, as hailed especially by the corporate world, as well as the poten-
tially negative effects of globalisation and the need to work against 
them, as promoted especially by the various civil society actors.
In this light it is especially interesting to consider what is left unsaid, 
namely the loud absence of the term ‘globalisation’ from the Bologna 
documents. Even though the Bologna Process is often presented as a re-
sponse to globalisation in much of the contemporary research (e.g., 
Amaral and Magalhaes 2004) this argumentation is, most probably in-
tentionally, due to the contentiousness of the concept and process of 
globalisation, not present in the actual Bologna documents but presented 
in a more subtle manner. The first two Bologna documents hint at the 
‘change’ faced by higher education and the ‘challenges’ of the new mil-
lennium for which the Bologna Process implicitly seems to be offering 
solutions. It is left to the reader to connect these with globalisation, 
which undoubtedly has been done in most cases. The latter documents 
only refer to various ‘needs’ for increasing competitiveness and attrac-
tiveness, but these seem to emerge from nowhere, as no cause for the 
need is given. This gives the documents an aura of technicality which 
connotes neutrality in values and masks the ideology behind the docu-
ments. Both choices: implicitly offering solutions to challenges, and the 
seemingly value-free technical notion of the process, increase the legiti-
macy of the Bologna Process and help avoid confrontations related to 
globalisation especially as an economic phenomenon.  The presentation 
as purely technical in nature makes it easier to digest and accept for the 
heterogeneous audiences and stakeholders of the process, because it 
does not seem to invade the sovereignty of the nation-states or higher 
education institutions to ultimately define those institutions, or force the 
actors to take a stand regarding the positive and negative connotations of 
globalisation.
This is also reminiscent of the way in which discourse should always 
be considered in relation to the producers and audiences of the dis-
course. The text of the Bologna Process documents was written by a 
preparatory team instead of the ministers themselves and is a result of 
successive rounds of formulations and reformulations, discussions and 
negotiations dependent on the power positions and emerging coalitions 
between the different actors of the process: the different national minis-
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tries, the European Commission, the stakeholders, and other related as-
sociations such as the Council of Europe, EUA – The European Univer-
sity Association and ESIB – The National Unions of Students in Europe. 
Similarly, it may be that part of the increase in the practical, technical 
veneer of the later Bologna documents may be attributed to being aimed 
at convincing different audiences. The first documents may be aimed 
more at convincing the ministers themselves of the viability of the proc-
ess, whereas after the process achieved political legitimacy, the latter 
documents are aimed more at a wider audience of higher education insti-
tutions and administrators on whose life the process has substantial bear-
ing.3
It is clear that the Bologna Process is not discursively ‘complete’ or 
‘hegemonic’ yet, but instead continues to be subject to discursive power 
struggles. The discourse is not consistent but instead both the ‘old’ and 
‘new’ elements continue to exist in parallel, and the meanings of differ-
ent concepts have been retranslated on the way.  We must also not fall 
victim to the general change discourse around higher education policy 
and research, which tends to depict the current trends in higher educa-
tion as representing the biggest change of all times in higher education, 
therefore making us predisposed to seeing change even when there is 
none.  The balance between real change faced by higher education in the 
past, and perceived and depicted change and the specific teleology’s 
created by it should not be forgotten either.  
Despite these reservations, I argue that the observations presented in 
this analysis are consistent with Kwiek (2004) who has noted that the 
vocabularies of the European Higher education Area and the European 
Research Area are converged and linked to a wider renegotiation of 
what higher education, teaching and research, functions and financing, 
and the roles of students and staff are supposed to be about. On the other 
hand, it may equally well be argued that the discursive change within the 
Bologna Process documents within the time span of barely seven years 
is insignificant, and that it would be more significant to discuss the con-
ceptualisations of the social roles of higher education and HEI’s in a 
wider time span. The elements discussed in the context of globalisation, 
such as the restructuring of the relationship between nation-states and 
higher education institutions, increased competitiveness between knowl-
edge-based economies, and the aim of states to control and respond to 
globalisation through investing in higher education and emphasising its 
responsiveness to perceived change for instance, are certainly elements 
echoed in the Bologna discourse. Although it may be noted the discur-
                                             
3 I am indebted to Don Westerheijden for this idea.  
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sive shift towards the private good nature of higher education is not clear 
in the Bologna documents and the later documents of the Bologna Proc-
ess pay sufficient attention to the public benefits accruing from higher 
education, we may question the precise conceptualisation of those public 
benefits. The public good nature of higher education seems to take a 
new shape: the public benefits do not operate on an abstract level of 
general good but are specifically related to the aspirations of the states to 
become knowledge societies and economies. Higher education has to be 
relevant, and relevance is increasingly defined in terms of the employ-
ability of graduates and direct contributions by the higher education in-
stitutions to the economic competitiveness of states and regions.
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Global Opportunities and Institutional 
Embeddedness: Cooperation in Higher 
Education Consortia 
ERIC BEERKENS
1.  Introduct ion 
This paper presents the findings of a recently finished research project 
on globalisation and the changing nature of international cooperation in 
higher education (Beerkens 2004). The study focuses on international in-
ter-organisational arrangements and attempts to identify critical features 
of a specific type of inter-organisational arrangement: the Higher Educa-
tion Consortium. Higher education consortia can be defined as multi-
point groupings of organisations with limited amounts of members and 
where membership is restricted to particular organisations allowed by 
the other partners to enter the arrangement (Beerkens 2002). They also 
have an indefinite time-span, therefore they are not meant to be dis-
solved at a particular moment. Cooperation takes place in several activi-
ties, covering multiple disciplines and/or themes. International higher 
education consortia can be seen as horizontal arrangements between 
higher education institutions based on equity where collaboration takes 
place through coordination. The arrangements exceed loose cooperation, 
since an additional administrative layer is created above the participating 
organisations. On the other hand, the arrangements are not meant to lead 
to amalgamation, at least not in the foreseeable future. 
The starting point of this study was the assumption that the nature of 
internationalisation activities in higher education has changed and that 
the emergence and increase of international higher education consortia 
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was related to processes of globalisation and regionalisation. To provide 
a sound background for the study of higher education consortia, the 
meaning of the concepts of globalisation and regionalisation and their 
relation to (international cooperation in) higher education were first ana-
lysed. In the literature, globalisation appears to be approached from dif-
ferent temporal perspectives. These approaches are identified as geo-
graphical, political, cultural, and institutional in nature. On the basis of 
these approaches globalisation is defined as a process in which basic so-
cial arrangements become disembedded from their spatial context due to 
the acceleration, massification, and flexibility of transnational flows of 
people, products, finance, images, and information (Beerkens 2003). 
This process is also apparent in basic social arrangements within and 
outside universities. Regionalisation was approached as a subset of 
globalisation, where a similar process of disembedding occurs, but 
where arrangements become re-embedded in a regional context. Al-
though it is argued that globalisation and regionalisation processes are 
significant, one also must acknowledge that in many ways, society is 
still very much rooted in nationally constructed institutions. This is es-
pecially true for universities, the majority of which were established and 
developed in a national institutional context. The study shows that this 
paradox – in which universities face global opportunities while being 
strongly embedded in national institutional environments – also be-
comes apparent in higher education consortia. 
The study is interdisciplinary, relating approaches from international 
political economy to theories in the fields of public and business admini-
stration. The empirical analysis was based on four case studies of higher 
education consortia in Europe and Southeast Asia. This paper situates 
the subject of study in the contemporary context of globalisation and 
ongoing regional integration and provides a theoretical framework for 
inter-organisational cooperation in higher education. On the basis of the 
results of the empirical data analysis, answers to the research questions 
are provided, the theoretical notions are confronted with reality, and the 
conclusions of the study are presented. This paper mainly attempts to 
explore what features of international higher education consortia can ex-
plain the performance of these consortia and looks at the types of 
mechanisms that can be adopted by international higher education con-
sortia to increase performance. 
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2.  Higher educat ion consort ia  in a global  
 environment:  the paradox of  cooperat ion 
For the study of cooperation between organisations, various disciplinary 
perspectives can be applied. There are theories from policy studies and 
political science on policy networks, perspectives on cooperation from 
international relations theorists, approaches from sociology such as so-
cial network analysis, and psychological and anthropological perspec-
tives on cooperation. Various studies on cooperation have also been 
conducted in the field of higher education research. An exploration of 
approaches in various disciplines ultimately led to theories from strate-
gic management and international business. Here, after the strong in-
crease in inter-firm constellations such as strategic alliances and joint 
ventures in the 1980s, a wide range of studies on international coopera-
tion between firms has emerged. In examining determinants of consor-
tium performance, the study focuses on a unique aspect associated with 
the characteristics of partners involved in an alliance, namely inter-
organisational diversity (Parkhe 1991). An interesting paradox, which 
forms the core of the argument, is that alliances or consortia are based 
on both compatibility as well as complementarity. It is suggested that 
performance is likely to be enhanced when organisations are able to 
manage the paradox involved in choosing a partner that is different, yet 
similar. Different in the sense that the resources of the universities in a 
consortium are complementary to each other; similar, in that the back-
grounds of the participating universities are compatible with each other. 
Successful consortia thus require partners who process similar character-
istics on certain dimensions and dissimilar characteristics on others.
This principle can be traced back to two theoretical perspectives on 
firms, or in this case, universities. The idea that organisations cooperate 
to gain access to resources finds its origins in the resource based view of 
the firm (RBV). In the RBV (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991), organisa-
tions are seen as a bundle of resources. The RBV introduced an alterna-
tive perspective for the prevailing models of strategic management in the 
1980s, where analysing a firm’s opportunities and threats in the com-
petitive environment was emphasised (Caves and Porter 1977; Porter 
1980, 1985). This model claims that firms within a particular industry 
are identical in terms of the resources they control and the strategies they 
pursue and that, where heterogeneity occurs, this will be very short lived 
because resources are highly mobile. According to Barney (1991), the 
RBV substitutes these for two alternative assumptions. First, it assumes 
that firms within an industry may be heterogeneous with respect to the 
strategic resources they control. Second, the perspective assumes these 
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resources may not be perfectly mobile across firms, and thus heteroge-
neity can be long lasting. The RBV thus suggests that a degree of het-
erogeneity tends to be sustained over time (Peteraf 1993). Some re-
source characteristics that prevent firms from moving toward resource 
homogeneity have been identified as: imperfect mobility, imperfect 
imitability, and imperfect substitutability (Barney 1991). The resource-
based view claims that the rationale for alliances is the value-creation 
potential of firm resources that are pooled together (Das and Teng 
2000). Reciprocal strengths and complementary resources, or a ‘fit’ be-
tween partners are identified as a premise for successful consortia. A key 
implication of the RBV is that organisations will search for partners that 
bring about some sort of fit or synergy between their resources and those 
of their targeted partner. This view can also be applied to cooperation 
between universities. The strategic resources of a university interesting 
to international partners can be very diverse, ranging from physical re-
sources such as research facilities or library collections to educational 
resources such as specific programmes or teaching methods, human re-
sources, or more symbolic organisational resources such as reputation 
and prestige. Although these are not traded on factor markets, these can 
be accessed through engaging in a cooperative arrangement.
The theoretical origins of the second issue – compatibility – can be 
traced back to economic sociology. The argument that more compatible 
partners will be more successful in collaboration is related to Evans’ 
(1963) ‘similarity hypotheses’: the more similar the parties, the more 
likely a favourable outcome. While the resource-based view propagates 
an economic rational perspective on organisational behaviour, sociologi-
cal theories look upon the university as an institution embedded in pow-
erful cognitive, normative, and regulative structures (Scott 1995). In 
neo-institutional and embeddedness theories, the social, political, and 
cultural environment is included. Much of embeddedness research seeks 
to demonstrate that market exchange is embedded in larger and more 
complex social processes. This builds on Polanyi’s (1944) notion of em-
beddedness which puts forward that “the human economy is embedded 
and enmeshed in institutions, economic and noneconomic”. The institu-
tional embeddedness of organisations provides opportunities as well as 
constraints for their behaviour. On the one hand, the context in which 
they are embedded, provides them legitimacy, clarity, relationships with 
their stakeholders etc. On the other hand, it places organisations in an 
‘institutional straightjacket’ or an ‘iron cage’ (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). This is what Uzzi labels the paradox of embeddedness: the same 
processes by which embeddedness creates a requisite fit with the current 
environment can reduce an organisation’s ability to adapt (Uzzi 1997, p. 
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57). In this way, traditional ‘core competencies’ have the potential to 
become ‘core rigidities’ that inhibit subsequent adaptation and success 
(Leonard-Barton 1992). If applied to inter-organisational combinations, 
this notion claims that differences in the organisations’ institutional en-
vironments can impact cooperation in a negative way. Interorganisa-
tional differences that can frustrate the performance of the collaboration 
are frequently related to the historical conformance of universities to 
their national institutional environment and to organisational structures, 
procedures, and routines that have emerged and become institutionalised 
in this national context. 
The resulting paradox of cooperation becomes even more apparent if 
Parkhe’s (1991) terminology of Type I and Type II diversity is used. 
The former refers to diversity in resources, which positively affects the 
performance of cooperation. The latter type entails the differences in in-
stitutional contexts in which the universities are embedded and is as-
sumed to negatively influence cooperation. This paradoxical situation is 
illustrated by figure 1.  
Figure 1: The paradox of cooperation 
The problem with the theoretical framework above however, is that once 
a consortium is established, its level of performance would be set (as 
long as the composition of members would not change). However, like 
any other organisation, a consortium can adapt to changing circum-
stances. In other words, consortia can employ mechanisms to enhance 
compatibility and complementarity in situations where these are not op-
timal. Mechanisms to cope with a lack of complementarity – which I 
have termed strategic coping mechanisms – are instruments that make 
possible a better fit of resources between the members. This can, for in-
stance, take place by making resources of the various members transpar-
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ent, stimulating individuals from member universities to exploit com-
plementary resources more effectively, or acquiring resources that can 
exploit complementarity between member universities. Institutional cop-
ing mechanisms on the other hand, are employed to lessen the effect of 
the contextual differences of the participating universities to increase 
compatibility between the participants. 
In sequential terms, one can thus approach cooperation as a process 
where a joint decision on consortium objectives and a corresponding 
portfolio of activities is made, and where activities are subsequently im-
plemented to make use of value creating resources. After implementa-
tion begins, the consortium can let those activities take their course, with 
a particular performance as the end result. However, pressures for effi-
ciency and effectiveness will create a demand for more complementar-
ity, which in turn will be handled through the employment of strategic 
coping mechanisms. Pressures for conformity and resistance will create 
a demand for greater compatibility, for which institutional coping 
mechanisms will be employed. The employment of such coping mecha-
nisms will then improve the end result of the collaborative activities. 
The framework above enables us to formulate four basic hypotheses 
on cooperation in consortia: 
Explanatory propositions:  
1: The higher the level of complementarity between partners in a con-
 sortium, the higher the level of performance of the consortium.  
2: The higher the level of compatibility between partners in a consor-
 tium, the higher the level of performance of the consortium. 
Exploratory propositions: 
3: In a case of insufficient complementarity, consortia will employ stra-
 tegic coping mechanisms to enhance performance.  
4: In a case of insufficient compatibility, consortia will employ institu-
 tional coping mechanisms to enhance performance. 
3.  Methodology and operat ional isat ion 
3.1 Research design 
This study is based on both quantitative and qualitative data based on 
four case studies and a combination of explanatory and explorative re-
search. The explanatory part is based on the two basic explanatory 
propositions which can be tested on the basis of a sound operationalisa-
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tion of the concepts of performance, compatibility, and complementar-
ity. The explorative part is aimed at exploring the ways consortia adapt 
to circumstances of incompatibility and a lack of complementarity, with 
the objective to identify specific types of institutional and strategic cop-
ing mechanisms. 
A case study approach was chosen to detect the relations between 
compatibility, complementarity, and performance. It is necessary to un-
derstand the nature of the consortia and the context it operates in. Yin 
defines a case-study as
“…an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real life context; when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” 
(1984, p. 23) 
These criteria also apply to this research. The next question then relates 
to the number and the choice of case studies. In my opinion, a limited 
amount of cases (four in this study) enables us to make general claims 
on the relation between compatibility, complementarity, and perform-
ance, while the sample remains small enough to conduct in-depth analy-
sis of each case. The choice of case studies was rather problematic be-
cause the theory does not concern the visible features of consortia. For 
instance it was not possible to make a selection beforehand of comple-
mentary and uncomplimentary consortia and compatible/incompatible 
consortia. If these concepts were directly visible, four case studies could 
have been chosen that would fit this two by two matrix. This forced me 
to take a rather random sample of consortia. In the end a choice was 
made for a sample of consortia that are very diverse in size (ranging 
from 4 to 38 universities), consortia that existed for at least five years, 
and consortia that possess a rather high level of visibility. Europe was a 
logical region to focus on as it shows a high level of activity in the field 
of inter-university cooperation. To not focus solely on European devel-
opments, a single consortium was chosen outside Europe. The choice 
was made for Southeast Asia because the ASEAN region also displays a 
rather high level of integration and because of prior knowledge about 
higher education in this region. Other obvious criteria were that the con-
sortia should still be active and that the consortia would be willing to ac-
tively cooperate in the research. Ultimately this led to the choice for four 
consortia: 
• The Coimbra Group: a consortium of 38 traditional comprehensive 
universities spread over Europe, including countries outside the EU. 
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• The European Consortium of Innovative Universities: a consortium 
of ten innovative and entrepreneurial universities spread over West-
ern Europe. 
• The ALMA Network: a group of four universities from the Meuse 
Rhine Euregion covering parts of the Netherlands, Flanders, Wal-
lonia (the Dutch and French speaking parts of Belgium, respectively) 
and Nordrhein Westfalen (Germany). 
• The ASEAN University Network: a consortium of 17 comprehen-
sive universities from the ten ASEAN member countries. 
The data were obtained through a survey of the individual members of 
the participating universities. We received 188 questionnaires (a likely 
response of 39.2%) from 61 universities in 38 countries. Additionally, I 
interviewed a limited number of persons that represent the consortium as 
a whole (instead of the participating university) to analyse the develop-
ment of the consortia over time, and their origins and the mechanisms 
that they employ. Documents were also used such as memorandums of 
understandings, strategic plans, policy plans, minutes of meetings, 
workshops etc.
3.2 Operationalisation 
In the operationalisation phase, the main concepts are translated and 
broken down into measurable items. Resources that determine the level 
of complementarity and factors that control the level of compatibility 
had to be deduced from secondary sources and logical reasoning. For the 
case of complementarity, the resource based view does list particular 
types of strategic resources, and these have consequently been ‘trans-
lated’ for the case of universities.1 For this list of strategic resources re-
spondents were asked to state whether these form an important motive 
for cooperation and whether they were present at the partner universi-
ties. The combination of these two questions for the total list of re-
sources forms the measure for complementarity. For the operationalisa-
tion of compatibility, other typologies and categorisations of institutions 
were used (Ingram and Clay 2000; Ingram and Silverman 2002) and 
                                             
1 The following sources for complementarity were identified in relation to 
partner universities: proximity; country; access to new student markets; 
language of instruction; financial resources; physical infrastructure and fa-
cilities; academic quality in research; academic quality in education; man-
agement and leadership quality; the existing external relations of a univer-
sity; reputation; and standard of the use of ICT. 
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again, applied for the specific cases of universities.2 Respondents were 
asked to state whether differences in these items negatively or positively 
affected cooperation and whether the consortium could be seen as ho-
mogeneous or heterogeneous for this specific item. Eventually, this 
leads to a certain level of compatibility. Three different measures were 
used for performance. The first is ‘Consortium Performance’: a com-
bined measurement of the importance and attainment of the consortium 
objectives. These formal objectives obviously differ for each of the con-
sortia. Because measuring performance in this way makes it dependent 
on the level of ambition of the consortium, the respondents were also 
asked to indicate the impact that cooperation within the consortium had 
on a list of core activities of universities.3 This second indicator was 
termed ‘Individual Performance’. The third measure, ‘Relational Per-
formance’, is not so much related to the results of cooperation but to the 
process of cooperation. In this measure, respondents were asked how 
satisfied they were with the communication, coordination, division of 
responsibilities, and the commitment within and among the universities. 
In the further presentation of the results of the analysis, only the first 
performance indicator will be used in this paper. The second indicator 
did not provide sufficient variation to include it in the further analysis 
and interpretation of the data. On the basis of both the quantitative and 
qualitative data, the third indicator was actually found to be an interven-
ing variable rather than a dependent variable (see next sections). 
Since the concept of coping mechanisms in the research needs to be 
explored in this study, this cannot be operationalised in a detailed way. 
Respondents were however, asked if measures were taken for a list of 
possible obstacles in cooperation and if so, what kind of measures and 
by whom were they taken. Unlike the previous concepts, mainly meas-
ured through indications on a five point Likert Scale, the questions on 
measures taken were open questions. As indicated above, three sources 
                                             
2 The following sources of incompatibility were identified: heterogeneity of 
legislation on higher education and the national higher education systems; 
heterogeneity of national culture of the countries in which the universities 
are located; heterogeneity of conceptions of academic work and ideas 
about how academic work should be organized; heterogeneity of the divi-
sion of authority between government/universities/faculties/academics; 
heterogeneity of formal organisational procedures of the universities; and 
heterogeneity of the character of the universities (based on size, scope and 
age).
3 These core issues were: the quality of teaching; the quality of research; the 
socio-economic development of the region; the quality of organisation & 
management; the competencies of the graduates; the reputation of the uni-
versity; the enrolment of students; and the university’s access to funding. 
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were used: questionnaires for the individual members of the participat-
ing universities, interviews for the consortium representatives, and 
documents of the consortia. The questionnaire was designed on the basis 
of the operationalisation of the concepts above. In addition, questions 
were asked about the position of the respondent, his or her involvement 
in the consortium, and his/her affinity with internationalisation and in-
ternational cooperation. The questionnaire was sent to all known univer-
sity members that are or were involved in consortium activities. The 
questionnaires could be filled out in printed form as well as through a 
web based form and were sent in October 2002, with a reminder in De-
cember and the closing date in January 2003. The interviews were 
loosely structured and focused on the establishment of the consortium, 
the general development, and changes that have taken place in the 
strategies and policies of the consortium on specific items related to 
complementarity and compatibility. Documents were obtained through 
the secretariats or offices of the consortia, web searches, and articles 
published in journals. 
4. Performance in consort ia:
ref lect ing on theory and adapting to real i ty  
Although this paper will not present a detailed analysis of the data (see 
Beerkens 2004), a summary is presented in the two tables below. The 
values of the dependent and independent variables are given in weighted 
Z scores in table 1. The relation between ‘Consortium Performance’ and 
the independent variables is presented in table 2 and expressed in the R2
and the Beta coefficients that resulted from the multiple regression 
analysis.
Table 1 Performance Indicators and Independent Variables (weighted Z 
   scores) 
Performance Indicators ALMA AUN Coimbra ECIU 
Overall Consortium 
Performance
-0.49 0.42 0.42 -0.42 
Independent Variables 
Complementarity -0.23 0.42 -0.02 -0.17 
Institutional Fit -0.40 0.31 0.18 -0.09 
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Table 2: R2 and Beta coefficients of regression equations 
ALMA AUN Coimbra ECIU 
R2  .398 .144 .301 .118 
Beta (Complementarity) -.279 .331* .322** .327+
Beta (Institutional Fit) .567** .063 -.089 .072 
+ Significant at the 0.1 level 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
The analysis of the quantitative data made apparent that our theoretical 
models of cooperation did not predict the performance of cooperation 
and explain the process of cooperation to a full extent. This could to a 
great degree be explained on the basis of the qualitative data obtained 
from the questionnaires, interviews, and documents. This section reflects 
on the theoretical approaches and the proposed models of cooperation. 
4.1 Reflection 1: 
Universities and the Resource-based view
Our proposed relation between complementarity and compatibility was 
based on a resource-based view of universities. This approach stems 
from the field of strategic management where it has become popular as a 
counterpart of prevailing theories on competitive advantage in the 1980s 
that took the external environment as their point of departure. The re-
source-based view on the firm argues that firms can achieve a competi-
tive advantage if they possess the right resource base and that this com-
petitive advantage can be sustainable if its strategic resources are valu-
able, inimitable, immobile, and not substitutable. A resource-based view 
on inter-organisational arrangements perceives collaboration between 
organisations as an opportunity to gain access to these strategic re-
sources; resources that would otherwise not be available to a firm be-
cause they are valuable, immobile, inimitable and not substitutable. Two 
valid questions on the use of this approach in this study are whether this 
strategic management perspective can also be applied to universities and 
whether it is applicable to Higher education consortia. 
Strategic management principles have frequently been applied to 
universities and have been amply used in higher education research. The 
resource-based view however, is rarely applied in the study of universi-
ties or university management. An explanation could be that strategic re-
sources are hard to identify in contemporary universities. Obviously, the 
quality of education and research are important resources, but at the 
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same time they are difficult to identify, let alone measure. Furthermore, 
many universities also try to distinguish or market themselves by em-
phasising other resources such as location, facilities, or external rela-
tions. It became apparent in this study that the quality in education and 
research and the reputation of partner universities are the most important 
characteristics to look for in possible partners for cooperation. Accord-
ing to the respondents, cooperation in the consortia has the most positive 
impact on the university’s reputation. This seems to point to the impres-
sion that membership and cooperation in higher education consortia is 
partly symbolic in nature, and that overall no real value is added to the 
resource bases of the participating universities. The reluctance and per-
ceived needlessness of transferring authority to the consortium level
and the unwillingness of partners to (financially) commit themselves
strongly to consortium activities supports this impression. 
The resource-based view sees the exchange of resources as the most 
important rationale for cooperation and for engaging in higher education 
consortia. It was observed that it is not fully in line with reality to per-
ceive higher education consortia merely as vehicles for obtaining strate-
gic resources. Although using this perspective in this study has proved 
useful, other approaches to cooperation in consortia are also applicable. 
Higher education consortia can for instance also be perceived as vehicles 
to reduce transaction costs, something that was mainly seen in the case 
of Coimbra. Through integration of specific activities, transactions such 
as student mobility and staff exchange can take place in an administra-
tive framework by which such transactions can be executed more effi-
ciently. Another, more political, rationale for cooperation is also appar-
ent in some of the case studies. This is the collective representation of 
universities vis-à-vis international and regional authorities such as the 
EU or ASEAN. By operating collectively, consortia can open up policy 
channels to gain better access to these authorities. From the point of 
view of this rationale, higher education consortia act as associations (in 
the meaning of representative bodies or lobby organisations as defined 
in chapter four). Another rationale is more instrumental in nature: uni-
versities simply cooperate because this is demanded by several financial 
providers. Many of the EU programmes in education and in research 
provide funding for cooperative research and education under the condi-
tion that applications come from multiple universities from multiple 
countries.
In spite of these alternative explanations, the resource-based view as 
a new way of looking at cooperation has been valuable. Inherent to stra-
tegic management research, the resource-based view is prescriptive in 
nature, and therefore makes us aware of the opportunities that arise 
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through cooperation in an international context. At the same time, it 
makes clear that from this perspective, these international opportunities 
remain rather unexploited by the consortia analysed in this study. Some-
times this was because universities simply did not aim for it. In other 
cases, it became clear that many universities – and countries – are not 
yet prepared or able to engage in intense and close collaboration with 
foreign partners.
4.2 Reflection 2: 
Universities and their Institutional Embeddedness
The lack of willingness or capacity to be involved in close and intense 
cooperation is related to the institutional contexts in which the universi-
ties operate and have developed. This institutional perspective was used 
to support the notion that members in a consortium also have to share 
some similarities in order to cooperate. This proposition was based on 
the assumption that universities are, much more than firms for instance, 
embedded in their (nationally and organisationally moulded) institu-
tional contexts. The study has shown that this assumption does not need 
to be rejected. The impact on cooperation however, is less straightfor-
ward than expected. 
First, it has become clear that different institutional forms influence 
cooperation in different ways. In all consortia studied, the impact of dif-
ferences in centralised institutional forms such as national laws and or-
ganisational rules were perceived to have a negative impact on coopera-
tion. This was much less the case for the differences in decentralised in-
stitutional norms such as culture and beliefs. The latter were seen by 
many as one of the interesting factors involved in cooperation. Aca-
demic and cultural diversity thus can – with the right attitude – be a 
main source of complementarity instead of incompatibility. 
It was also observed that non-academics seem to place more empha-
sis on the institutional differences in their assessment of the performance 
of the consortia (while academics seem to be place more emphasis on 
complementary factors). This would mean that the institutional em-
beddedness of the university is more apparent in the eyes of non-
academics than for academics. This could be explained by the reasoning 
that the activities in which academics cooperate are of a more universal 
nature than for non-academics. In this respect it would be interesting to 
compare cooperation in different academic disciplines. For instance, sci-
ences could be assumed to be less context-related and more universal 
than social sciences and humanities, and would in this line of thinking 
present less sources of incompatibility in cooperative activities. 
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In general, there is not a strong relation between performance suc-
cess and compatibility. Only when the institutional fit between the uni-
versities is perceived as low has this hampered cooperation. This leads 
us to conclude that a minimum level of institutional fit is required, but 
universities and their staff are quite capable of handling obstacles that 
arise due to incompatibility. On the other hand, it was also observed that 
most consortia do not pursue very close cooperation and tight integra-
tion. It is likely that if the intensity of cooperation increases, the discrep-
ancies in institutional contexts become more apparent and more obstruc-
tive to cooperation. In this regard it is useful to pay attention to compati-
bility factors in cooperation, especially in cases where tight integration 
is foreseen such as (private) joint ventures set up by universities from 
different countries and (future) mergers between higher education insti-
tutions from different countries. 
This conclusion and the data do not necessarily point to a conver-
gence of the institutional contexts of universities. On the contrary; the 
differences in national institutional contexts are still widely apparent and 
still substantially influence the activities of universities in the eyes of the 
respondents. What can be observed however, is that universities also be-
come embedded in international regional contexts. Naturally, this re-
gional institutional context is likely to become a bigger influence when 
regional institutions are stronger. Even though the national context is 
evidently predominant, for European universities the regional context 
has an increasing influence on a university’s behaviour. In the case of 
ASEAN the building of regional institutions is still in an earlier stage 
compared to Europe, but aspirations such as joint accreditation and joint 
credit transfer systems give the impression that this region is going in a 
similar direction (albeit not necessarily at the same rate). What is espe-
cially relevant for the study is that adaptation to this regional context is 
beneficial for the performance of consortia. The consortia that were very 
much connected to regional (political) institutions and had adapted their 
activities to the programmes and policies (and the available funding) of 
these institutions (e.g., the European programmes for mobility and coop-
eration), seem to be more successful. Thus, just as in organisational 
studies where the adaptation to the external environment of organisa-
tions is seen as an important determinant for an organisation’s perform-
ance, this argument can be extended to consortia as well: regional higher 
education consortia that adapt to their international regional environment 
are more successful.  
Higher education consortia can be approached from an organisa-
tional point of view internally as well. If higher education consortia are 
seen as a specific type of organisation, characteristics can be detected 
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that are also typical for universities as specific types of organisations. In 
this respect Van Vught (1989, pp. 52-54) points to the authority of pro-
fessional experts, the knowledge areas as the basic foci of attention, the 
related organisational fragmentation, and the extreme diffusion of deci-
sion making power. These characteristics are also apparent in higher 
education consortia. The ‘leadership driven’ character of these consortia 
can then partly explain the dissatisfaction found by academics. In the 
case of universities, Van Vught (1989, p. 54) puts forward an argument 
that can easily be extended to higher education consortia: 
“Confronted with detailed regulation and an extreme restriction of their behav-
iour, the scientists and teachers within the higher education institutions (and in 
our case: higher education consortia; EB) may feel the disillusionment of not 
being able to explore the paths in which their professional consciousness 
stimulates them to go.” 
4.3 Adaptation 1: The process of collaboration 
Above, a perspective on cooperation in sequential terms was also given. 
Cooperation was approached as a process where a joint decision on con-
sortium objectives and a corresponding portfolio of activities was made, 
and where activities were subsequently implemented to make use of 
value creating resources. After projects are implemented, the consortium 
can let activities take their course, with a particular performance as the 
end result. However, in the implementation phase, pressures for effec-
tiveness and efficiency will call for more complementarity, while pres-
sures for conformity and resistance demand greater compatibility be-
tween the partners.
This approach has proved useful as a way of looking at cooperation, 
but nevertheless it does include some flaws. First, it looks at the consor-
tium as a whole, while it might be better to perceive the consortia under 
investigation as a collection of cooperative activities. One of the dimen-
sions distinguished was the fact that the HEC’s are multi-point alliances, 
engaged in a wide array of activities. This is also likely to result in dif-
ferent outcomes and levels of success for different consortium activities. 
It is also possible that different types of activities develop in different 
ways and that it therefore is difficult to develop a general sequential 
model for the process of cooperation in consortia. It was observed that in 
some projects in some consortia, the consortium as a whole plays an im-
portant role in the initiation of the projects and the facilitation in the 
early stages, but then continue more or less outside the framework of the 
consortium after they have matured. 
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The most evident flaw in the approach has been the lack of attention 
paid to the relations between partners. This of course is because rela-
tional performance was initially regarded as a performance indicator. It 
has become clear through the case studies however, that the relations 
among the individuals of the member universities play an important role 
(in the employment of complex coping mechanisms) and have an impact 
on the achievement of the consortium objectives. Because of the impor-
tance of the relations between the persons involved, communication, or-
ganisation, and commitment within the consortium become imperative 
factors in the ultimate outcomes of cooperation. The attention for rela-
tional issues should therefore also be incorporated in the model. Improv-
ing relations between those involved in the activities is best focused on 
the provision of sufficient and good communication, providing a clear 
organisational structure for the activities, and promoting commitment of 
the member universities and their representatives. The attention for the 
relational issues should be apparent throughout the process of coopera-
tion; from decision making on the broad objectives to the implementa-
tion of concrete activities.
A final adjustment to be made to this sequential model of collabora-
tion and coping mechanisms is the inclusion of ‘feedback loops’. Once 
coping mechanisms are employed, this does not automatically lead to 
the progress or finalisation of projects: coping mechanisms frequently 
imply that the consortium needs to take a step backwards. This can take 
the form of seeking new members, finding new objectives or new activi-
ties, or applying different incentives in the implementation of activities. 
In some cases this would imply minor adjustments, while in others this 
might lead to a whole new direction. These mechanisms will then be 
employed with the expectation that the activities will develop correctly 
after implementing them. If new problems are encountered due to a lack 
of complementarity or due to incompatibility, new coping mechanisms 
need to be employed and one needs to return to the appropriate phase. 
The consortium attempts to arrive at an ultimate result which is suffi-
ciently satisfactory for the members. The last statement adds an impor-
tant issue. Most objectives of consortia are rather ambiguous and do not 
contain a specific and concrete end result. Consortia will not always 
continue until optimal results are achieved but will strive to an end result 
where there is a consensus on the adequacy of the level of goal 
achievement. In other words, consortia appear to be more geared to-
wards performance satisfaction than towards performance optimisation. 
The resulting sequential model of cooperation is portrayed in figure 2. 
GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES AND INSTITUTIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS
263
Figure 2: A sequential model of cooperation 
4.4 Adaptation 2: An explanatory model of collaboration 
In our explanatory model of collaboration and coping mechanisms, we 
argued that there is a positive relation between complementarity and per-
formance and between compatibility and performance. The case studies 
have shown that this is valid only under particular conditions.  
Performance will be affected positively by the existence of comple-
mentarity if the complementary resources are actually recognised, util-
ised and exploited; which can be accomplished if the appropriate strate-
gic coping mechanisms are employed. In turn, strategic coping mecha-
nisms can be more effectively applied if there is adequate communica-
tion, organisation, and commitment. The proposed positive relation be-
tween complementarity and performance can thus be maintained if suit-
able coping mechanisms are employed to recognise, utilise, and exploit 
the complementarity in resources. Furthermore, this positive effect will 
benefit from the presence of good communication, clear organisation, 
and a high level of commitment.  
Compatibility is also related to performance, but not as linear as 
proposed. In this case, it might be better to claim that the level of in-
compatibility is negatively related to performance. A minimum level of 
compatibility is needed to achieve objectives. If the level of institutional 
fit is insufficient, this negatively influences performance. If minimum 
requirements are met, this influence diminishes. However, it is uncertain 
whether this holds true for more complex forms of integration of activi-
ties. It remains likely that the need for a good level of fit becomes all the 
more necessary if complex forms of cooperation are aimed for. In our 
cases, the activities within the frameworks of the consortia in general did 
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not require a high level of integration. It is probable that if tight integra-
tion was required, the compatibility of institutional contexts would have 
affected the success of cooperation. According to the complexity of the 
cooperation, consortia can employ institutional coping mechanisms to 
make differences transparent, and communicate them to the persons in-
volved. More complex institutional coping mechanisms can be em-
ployed when it is necessary to reduce or totally nullify the differences. 
Such complex mechanisms encompass mutual adjustment or incorpora-
tion of differences. Again, such complex mechanisms require adequate 
communication, organisation, and commitment. 
The employment of coping mechanisms will thus not always have a 
(positive) impact, but they need to be suitable for the level and nature of 
incompatibility or lack of complementarity encountered in the course of 
cooperation. It is thus the mixture of existing complementarity and com-
patibility with the appropriate strategic and institutional coping mecha-
nisms that affect performance. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the em-
ployed coping mechanisms will benefit from good relation management 
in the form of ample communication, clear organisation, and sufficient 
commitment.
This brings us to the final and most significant change to the model: 
the quality of relationship management as an intervening variable. Rela-
tion management refers to measures consortia take to improve commu-
nication, create a stable and clear organisational structure, and increase 
commitment. A good communication strategy and a clear and transpar-
ent organisation of a relatively stable nature support processes of sociali-
sation in sub units of the consortium which then will reflect on the con-
sortium as a whole. It is argued here that consortium management is a 
combination of the employment of coping mechanisms to increase com-
plementarity and compatibility in combination with ‘relationship man-
agement’; that is the facilitation of the rise of commitment through 
communication and organisation. If this relationship management is 
conducted adequately, more complex coping mechanisms can be em-
ployed, and in turn, complementarity and compatibility between mem-
bers can be better exploited, which again increases the chances for suc-
cess for the consortium as a whole. 
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Figure 3: An explanatory model of cooperation 
The alteration of our perception on the relations between complementar-
ity, compatibility, and performance leads to the revised model displayed 
in figure 3. Compatibility thus matters up to a specific level and coping 
mechanisms need to be appropriate for the level of complexity of the ob-
jectives. The new variable in the model is the quality of relationship 
management, or in other words, the satisfaction with communication, 
organisation, and commitment in the consortium. Furthermore, the im-
portance of this added variable increases as the complexity of the objec-
tives increases.
This model differs substantially from the hypothesised explanatory 
model on four points: 
• The model only attempts to explain consortium performance in the 
meaning of the attainment of substantial consortium objectives, and 
does not focus on the impact of cooperation on individual member 
universities.
• The employment of institutional and strategic coping mechanisms in 
the new model does not impact the performance of cooperation 
autonomously. Their impact on the performance in the revised 
model is situated in their appropriateness or suitability in relation to 
the level and nature of complementarity/compatibility.
• The relation between compatibility and performance is no longer as-
sumed to be linear. The new model claims that a particular minimum 
level of compatibility is required for the consortium to perform.
• The most obvious change is the inclusion of ‘relation management’; 
where the management of the relations between those persons in-
volved in consortium activities positively improves the effectiveness 
of the coping mechanisms employed. 
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5. Conclusions: Cr i t ical  factors in 
the performance of  consort ia
We argued that the performance of consortia can be explained on the ba-
sis of the complementarity and compatibility in the consortium, and the 
coping mechanisms employed by the consortium. On the basis of the 
comparative analysis of the case studies, the following critical aspects of 
higher education consortia can be identified: 
First, the consortium has to consist of members that possess re-
sources that are strategically valuable for the other members. The part-
ners in a consortium have to be able to offer each other something. If 
this is not the case at all, the consortium as a vehicle for resource ex-
change is pointless. In general it was observed that various sources of 
complementarity can nearly always be found between groups of univer-
sities. The fact that complementarity is present however, does not al-
ways mean that they are known by the right persons and that they are 
utilised and exploited. 
This brings us to the second aspect. Sources of complementarity 
need to be accompanied by the appropriate strategic coping mecha-
nisms. These coping mechanisms are aimed at the acquisition, identifi-
cation, dissemination, and exploitation of complementary resources. In 
general, closer cooperation and tighter integration requires more com-
plex coping mechanisms than are aimed at the exploitation of comple-
mentary resources. This can be done by creating sufficient incentives 
and motivations for staff of universities to commit themselves to consor-
tium activities. This can be accomplished by adapting the consortium ac-
tivities to the existing activities in the universities, adapting them to 
wider regional programmes to access funding, or by creating internal 
(financial) incentives or obligations to become active in the consortium. 
A third critical aspect of higher education consortia is related to the 
differences in the institutional contexts in which the members operate. It 
was claimed that higher compatibility in the consortium leads to higher 
performance. It was observed however, that the condition of compatible 
backgrounds is required for cooperation to be successful. Only a mini-
mum level of institutional fit has to be present in the consortium for less 
complex forms of cooperation. It is argued however, that when coopera-
tion becomes more complex, a higher level of institutional fit becomes 
necessary.
The fit between institutional contexts is not something that universi-
ties fully control. They can employ institutional coping mechanisms to 
deal with the problems that arise through differences, to lessen those dif-
ferences, or to abolish them. Dealing with obstacles generally occurs 
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through information on existing differences in institutional contexts of 
the members; as well as through familiarisation with existing institu-
tional contexts through meetings, seminars or courses. Another way of 
efficiently addressing such obstacles is to set up joint administrative 
structures to efficiently deal with specific exchange requirements. More 
complex institutional coping mechanisms are aimed at actively changing 
the differences between members. Here one can refer to mutual adjust-
ment of universities and the abolishing of differences through incorpora-
tion.
Additional characteristics that contribute to the performance of 
higher education consortia are related to what I have termed relationship 
management. This becomes more important in the case of close coopera-
tion and tight integration. Relation management refers to measures that 
consortia take to improve communication, create a stable and clear or-
ganisational structure, and increase commitment. A good communica-
tion strategy and a clear and transparent organisation of a relatively sta-
ble nature support processes of socialisation in sub units of the consor-
tium which then will reflect on the consortium as a whole. 
A final point is that a consortium, like any other organisation, needs 
to adapt to its internal and external environments. This means that ac-
tivities are more likely to be successful when they are compatible with 
the prevailing norms and beliefs in the universities, and with the ongo-
ing developments on the regional level. However, when this results in a 
risk avoiding strategy, this will not always correspond with the strategic 
global needs and opportunities that a consortium and its universities face 
in an increasing competitive environment. The seizing of those opportu-
nities frequently requires taking risks that are not in line with traditional 
views of the university, but that will more effectively exploit the com-
plementarity in the consortium. 
6.  Closing Remarks:  Global  Opportunit ies and 
 Inst i tut ional  Embeddedness  
This study analyses the performance of higher education consortia in the 
context of opportunities universities face in the contemporary environ-
ment. The behaviour of universities across national and organisational 
boundaries is fascinating as universities can be considered organisations 
strongly embedded in their national and organisational contexts. This 
paradox manifested itself in higher education consortia as well. In this 
respect, the main focus was on the ‘diversity paradox’ in international 
cooperation, where partners need to be ‘similar yet different’. This study 
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showed that inter-organisational arrangements do not only have to bal-
ance similarity and diversity, but also have to find the right balance in 
the margins between conformity and innovativeness, ambition and real-
ity, and the adages of ‘cooperating to compete’ and ‘cooperating to co-
operate’.
It was shown that conformity to both the internal context of partici-
pating universities and the external regional context has been a success-
ful strategy in cooperation. Conformity to existing structures might, 
however, restrict universities in their entrepreneurial behaviour. Univer-
sities, and the consortia they are involved in, can decide to avoid the 
risks of new innovative ventures through compliance with existing pol-
icy actors and prevailing attitudes of their stakeholders. This also relates 
to the balance that needs to be found between ambition and reality. It 
was observed that activities which correspond with widespread and pre-
vailing ideas, beliefs, and attitudes have been more successful than those 
that challenge the existing order. This can lead however, to situations 
where opportunities and complementary resources in consortia are not 
(fully) exploited. If ambitions are set too high, one runs the risk of too 
much resistance which can ultimately lead to a lack of concrete activi-
ties. The adage of ‘cooperating to compete’ has been repeatedly coined 
to typify contemporary inter-organisational arrangements in business, 
but also in higher education. The replication of business terminology, 
under the heading of strategic alliances, joint ventures, and consortia in 
the field of higher education, illustrates this. We present arguments that 
support the perception of the contemporary environment as increasingly 
(internationally) competitive. The study indicates however, that the ad-
age of ‘cooperating to cooperate’ shows more conformity with existing 
ideas of the university, at least in the consortia analysed in this research. 
We conclude that opportunities that are available, or could be avail-
able, in higher education consortia (and probably also in other inter-
organisational arrangements) are rarely fully exploited. The most suc-
cessful forms of cooperation are still based on rather loose structures 
that do not significantly impact the organisations of the member univer-
sities. This does not imply that they fail in their task, since a tight inte-
gration of activities is not part of their agenda. Where this is the case, 
less than optimal outcomes of projects or activities are more likely. 
Close cooperation between organisations that attach considerable value 
to their autonomy and independency will be very difficult, since univer-
sity leaders will be hesitant to delegate authority to a higher level and 
academics will be hesitant to shift their loyalties.
Nevertheless, in the national domain, circumstances have frequently 
led to a move from voluntary cooperation towards imposed amalgama-
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tion. Parallel developments on the global or regional level are not likely 
to occur in the near future, but pressures for increased efficiency and ef-
fectiveness alongside demands for broader international opportunities 
for staff and students are likely to push universities into closer and more 
solid arrangements with foreign partners. Together with an increasing 
emphasis on entrepreneurialism and the copying of business practices, 
this might lead to unanticipated arrangements between universities in the 
future. If such developments are accompanied by closer integration in 
the political and European domain, and also in that of higher education 
(such as in the European Bologna process), obstacles in the way of inte-
gration are also likely to be reduced. For now it is clear that cooperation 
in fields where it is seen as an inherent part of academia are more likely 
to be the standard than where cooperation is moulded on a business-like 
model. The cooperation that emphasises cross-cultural exchange and in-
tercultural learning for students and staff is still most successful, at least 
in the higher education consortia in this study. 
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Brokering the Public-Private Dynamics
of Higher Education through
Strategic Alliances in an Australian
‘Hybrid’ University
BOBBY HARREVELD, PATRICK A. DANAHER, DARYL ALCOCK AND 
GEOFFREY DANAHER
1.  Introduct ion 
Changes introduced in the Australian education system from the 1980s 
to the present day have had far reaching effects on the funding structures 
of Australian higher education programs and their modes of delivery, 
which have resulted in a diversification of the student ‘catchment’ mar-
kets (Dawkins 1988a, 1988b; Emmanuel and Reike 2004; Nelson 2003, 
2004). These changes have three common themes: (i) recognition of the 
need for multiple funding sources for institutions operating within the 
higher education system; (ii) an emerging globalisation of the higher 
education market environment; and (iii) a view of higher education that 
positions it as serving intra- and international professional learning 
needs for social, economic and environmental sustainability.
The notion that such changes are ‘brokered’ has emerged from pre-
vious research into funding-induced changes in the vocational education 
and training sector in which educators were found to weigh-up, to assess 
and indeed to evaluate the worth or otherwise of their own, their stu-
dents’ and the system’s interests, values, beliefs, assumptions, represen-
tations of themselves and perceptions of others (Harreveld 2002). Ac-
cordingly, these funding–induced changes in higher education have been 
BOBBY HARREVELD, P.A. DANAHER, DARYL ALCOCK AND GEOFFREY DANAHER
272
brokered at a number of levels: by individual educators, by students via 
their choices of study sites and types and by university management. 
Competition among universities for market-share, together with infor-
mation communication technology (ICT) advancements, has had a sig-
nificant impact on Australia’s public universities’ structures, their stake-
holders and their markets. This has led to the emergence of the ‘hybrid’ 
universities which are not-for-profit public institutions acting in a com-
mercial manner with for-profit business partners (Marginson and 
McBurnie 2003).
From within this context, we explore the implications of these com-
petition-inducing funding shifts for the future governance of public uni-
versities that rely substantially for their survival on funds generated 
through strategic alliances. Eckel, Afolter-Caine and Green’s (2003) 
broadly ranging research in North American and European higher edu-
cation systems confirmed that:
“Competition, coupled with new opportunities created by emerging technolo-
gies, has spurred higher education institutions to become increasingly entre-
preneurial and seek new ways to become more agile, offer new programs, and 
enhance their standing.” (p. 5) 
Social standing and economic survival are enhanced through strategic 
alliances which are created through networks of purposeful partnerships 
among individuals, community groups, companies, institutions, organi-
sations and/or governments. For universities in the Australian higher 
education sector, these strategic alliances position individual institutions 
within their constituent communities and constructed marketplaces. 
Strategic alliances also expose the public-private dynamics at work 
in higher education and highlight the fundamentally different roles of 
public and private partners in alliances. Public partners are understood to 
be ‘not-for-profit’ individual institutions or governments primarily 
funded by nation states. Private partners are ‘for-profit’ organisations 
operating in local and global markets. Partnerships are borderless in the 
sense that they may cross socio-cultural, sectoral and national bounda-
ries. Our colleagues (Marshall et al. 2003, p. 225) have argued for a 
“glocal networked model for higher education in a borderless world”. 
Their analysis of strategic alliances at our own university focused on the 
international education arena, which is but one of many sites in which 
strategic alliances are used to broker the changing political, social, cul-
tural and economic borders of higher education. Conceptual contradic-
tions between notions of ‘borderless’ and ‘border-crossing’ education 
are highlighted in our focus on international education because the ex-
BROKERING THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DYNAMICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
273
pectations have been so high, the developments so commercially and 
culturally sensitive and the outcomes so mixed (see for example Chan 
2004; Marshall et al. 2003; Willis 2000). 
The issue of university governance in a globalised marketplace will 
become even more important as Australian public universities face in-
creasing competition from within their own nation state when govern-
ment policy actively fosters the further development of private universi-
ties. Coupled with the massification of higher education initiatives in 
developing countries, it is timely to analyse a public-private dynamic 
that is at a crucial stage of maturation in university governance. Accord-
ingly, this paper will follow a somewhat different sequence from that 
traditionally expected because we want to focus on phenomena and their 
effects through the lens of a particular type of international education 
that has relied on strategic alliances between public institutions and pri-
vate organisations. We intend this sequence to function as a catalyst for 
further research around the discourses of strategic alliances in the pub-
lic-private dynamics of higher education. Throughout the paper, we will 
be deploying a research method that combines data from quantified sta-
tistical analyses using aggregated data at the national and international 
levels and qualitatively sourced data at the level of the individual.
First, we explore the concept of globalisation through its effects on a 
constructed higher education marketplace. Second, using the example of 
‘hybrid’ universities, current strategies taken to exploit perceived win-
dows of opportunity in this globalised higher education market are re-
viewed using statistical evidence and modelling of potential profitability 
and risk involved with globally-oriented strategies. Third, the chapter 
investigates university relationships with strategically aligned partners, 
the infrastructure of those relationships and the implications for human 
resource management associated with those alliances and other stake-
holders in those relationships. Recommendations to ensure sustainability 
in quality, profitability and reputation through the delivery of higher 
education programs are then proposed. Finally, we use the notion of 
governance to interrogate our analysis and test its efficacy for further 
comparative investigations. 
2.  Global isat ion and higher educat ion 
From the dissolution in the late 1980s of the ‘binary’ between Australian 
universities and colleges of advanced education, higher education insti-
tutions have sought to satisfy the complex and sometimes contradictory 
expectations of their stakeholders. By the beginning of this century, the 
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Australian Vice Chancellors’ Committee (AVCC) noted a “diversity of 
institutions, courses, student mixes, educational practices and modes of 
delivery” (Australian Vice Chancellors’ Committee 2004, p. 1). Yet this 
diversity has seen remarkably similar responses that are influenced by:
• government (for planning objectives, targets, priorities, funding ini-
tiatives and reporting requirements); 
• industry (for supply of graduates and results of research); 
• professional bodies (for program/course content and other certifica-
tion requirements); 
• staff (for salaries, conditions of service and access to facilities); 
• business and government services (for purchase and supply of teach-
ing, research and consultancy services); 
• national and international markets (for students, in/outputs from re-
search and teaching, networks and partnerships); and
• current and prospective students’ expectations (for new course/
program combinations and availability of courses and services in
ways and at times convenient to them) (Australian Vice Chan-
cellors’ Committee 2004; Gallagher 2001). 
This complexity of opposing forces has developed over time. Internally, 
university cultures derived from: different institutional histories; cultur-
ally framed social expectations from communities; and varying political 
and economic contexts at local, state and national levels. Externally, the 
Australian Commonwealth government’s policy framed funding and in-
dustrial relations agendas have changed the structure of incentives 
within which universities must operate.1 From his perspective within the 
Higher Education Division of the (then) Commonwealth Department of 
Education, Training and Youth Affairs, Gallagher (2001) identified the 
crux of the problem at an institutional level. On the one hand, the gov-
ernment would not allow universities “to vary either their student num-
bers or the prices they charged for the bulk of their business” but, on the 
other hand, they had to “fund salary rises not supplemented by govern-
ment grants” (p. 8 of 24). It was this conundrum that caused publicly 
funded universities to seek other sources of income and consequently 
many became ‘hybrid’ universities that forged various types of alliances 
                                             
1 OECD comparative data include Australia and illustrate the extent of 
autonomy in universities plus cross-country examples of new methods for 
allocating recurrent funding, models of governance and the appointment of 
university leaders (retrieved 31 July 2004 from: http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/7/36/19815693.pdf)
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with ‘for-profit’ partners (Koelman and De Vries 1999; Marginson and 
McBurnie 2003).
The Commonwealth government has progressively devolved finan-
cial responsibility to universities through a diminishing fund model 
while at the same time controlling subsidised growth in the domestic 
market. The government has enabled public universities to respond to 
the pressures of this challenge by seeking further sources of revenue in 
the growing international education export sector, especially through 
South East Asian and Pacific nations. Australia has a substantial capac-
ity for higher education with 38 universities.2 As an education exporter 
nation, Australia has used its development of borderless professional 
learning in the higher education sector to expand not only its education 
markets, but also its market penetration in many areas of business, en-
trepreneurial endeavours and aid programs in the Asia-Pacific region.
As a recently-named yet centuries-old phenomenon, globalisation 
has received both good and bad press depending on people’s conceptu-
alisations, perceptions, understandings and lived experiences with what 
they believe to be its causes and effects. At one and the same time, glob-
alisation is positioned as a neo-conservative Anglophone force of capi-
talism that “gathers, redefines and creams off local human and environ-
mental cultures for uses elsewhere” in localised contexts, and also as an 
“empowering and liberatory discourse” with the capacity to foster 
re/negotiation of public goods such as social justice, human rights, peace 
and security cooperation across nation states and whole continents 
(Singh and Shore 2004, pp. 269-270). 
Enders (2004) interprets globalisation as a process of restructuring 
the nation state “through the deregulation of legal and financial controls, 
the opening of markets or quasi-markets (including in higher education), 
and the increasing primacy of notions of competition, efficiency and 
managerialism” (p. 367). He draws distinctions among the processes of 
globalisation, internationalisation, denationalisation and regionalisation 
(in the European context) yet concedes that they are “frequently used in-
terchangeably to highlight the international activities and widening out-
                                             
2 This does not include the Australian Defence Force Academy and the 
Australian Graduate School of Management, but does include the private 
Bond University (retrieved 7 August 2004 from: http://www.australian-
universities.com/list/). However, the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘pri-
vate’ is becoming increasingly blurred as public universities can now enrol 
domestic students, as well as international students, on a full-fee paying 
basis (i.e., as private students); and private universities can receive pub-
licly funded student places (see for example “Pell, Howard buy a univer-
sity” in Online Catholics, 11, August 4 2004. Retrieved 7 August 2004 
from: http://www.onlinecatholics.com.au/issue11/) 
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reach of higher education” (2004, p. 367). Teichler (2004) continues the 
distinction and defines internationalisation as the “totality of substantial 
changes in the context and inner life of higher education relative to an 
increasing frequency of border-crossing activities amidst a persistence of 
national systems” that is characterised by “increasing knowledge trans-
fer, physical mobility, cooperation and international education and re-
search” (pp. 22-23). 
Such conceptual and procedural distinctions are useful for our pur-
poses because they serve to illustrate the tensions of governance in pub-
lic sector universities as they become embroiled in the public-private 
dynamics of globalised higher education. In their foreword to an OECD 
report investigating internationalisation and quality assurance in higher 
education, Knight and De Wit (1999, p. 3) position internationalisation 
as “both the concept and the process of integrating an international di-
mension into the teaching, research and service functions” of universi-
ties. Now in both its concept and process globalisation is a paradox that, 
in the context of higher education, is evident in the ‘go global’ decisions 
made by governing bodies of public universities that were initially estab-
lished to service the learning needs of local communities.
3.  The higher educat ion marketplace 
Universities have flirted with overseas markets over a long period of 
time. However, with the growth of the Asian markets within the last 
decade (notwithstanding the recession in the late 1990s), the relatively 
low cost to Asian students of Australian degrees, when combined with 
Australia’s proximity and way of life, has given Australian universities a 
competitive edge in the Asian marketplace. Universities can charge full-
cost fees for international students and entry for publicly funded Austra-
lian students is restricted. The following table (Table 1: Foreign stu-
dents enrolled in selected Asia-Pacific countries, by origin, 2001) illus-
trates Australia’s strong position as a ‘player’ in a globalised higher 
education market. 
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The data show that, in 2001, Australia cornered over 50 per cent of the 
Asia-Pacific higher education market for foreign students (110,789 out 
of a total foreign student enrolment of 220,433). Penetration in this mar-
ket has been facilitated by ongoing ICT changes, and influenced by the 
cultural similarities/differences and geographical dispersion of the mar-
ketplace. The table (Table 2: Top ten source countries for Australian 
higher education 2001-2003) below depicts the Australian-specific 
situation in more detail. While the discrepancy between OECD data 
cited in Marginson and McBurnie (2003) and that provided by the 
Commonwealth government’s Department of Education, Science and 
Training (Nelson 2004) is noted, it is not significant for the purposes of 
this discursive analysis. 
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From 2001 to 2003, the above data show an approximate 59% increase 
in Australia’s combined on/offshore enrolments from countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region. They also illustrate the cultural, social, geographical 
and linguistic diversity of the student cohorts. However, a recent news-
paper article warns of a potential funding crisis for universities reliant on 
this type of international student market as “applications from overseas 
students wanting to study at Australian institutions fell 10 per cent in the 
first six months of this year compared with the same period last year” 
(Illing 2004, p. 10). The independent not-for-profit organisation, IDP 
Education Australia, that is owned by the 38 universities and that was 
named in the newspaper report, does not dispute the statement, but notes 
that, while enrolments from countries such as Malaysia, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand have decreased, China and India’s 
enrolments have increased substantially, as the following table (Table 3: 
Comparative data 2003-2004 for international onshore enrolments) illus-
trates.
Table 3: Comparative data 2003-2004 for international onshore
   enrolments 
Country Semester 1, 
2003
Semester 1, 
2004
Change 
China 6290 9265 47.3% 
India 3331 5059 51.9% 
Malaysia 4311 3859 -10.5% 
Hong Kong 3074 2784 -9.4% 
Singapore 2849 2704 -5.1% 
Indonesia 2648 2401 -9.3% 
Thailand 1568 1389 -11.4% 
South Korea 1127 1203 6.7% 
Canada 895 1032 15.3% 
Japan 861 1007 17% 
Total all countries 39805 42423 6.6% 
Denotes full degree students in Australian universities. 
Source: International Development Program (IDP) Education Australia, 
International Students in Australian Universities – National Overview for Semester 1, 
2004 (extract retrieved 16 August 2004 from: http://www.idp.com/mediacentre/) 
Generally speaking, the development of the Australian international 
higher education market has developed in three stages: 
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• stage One could be considered as export education through the dis-
tance education mode, and an early introductory phase in the devel-
opment of a growth strategy; 
• stage Two was a more mature model using a foreign agency as a fa-
cilitative tool; and 
• stage Three was the creation of partnerships and alliances with an-
other party as an institution moved into a maturation phase in its life 
cycle. (see Figure 1: Stages in global growth and strategic alliances) 
Figure 1: Stages in global growth and strategic alliances 
    
Stage 1 Stage 2  Stage 3
Source: Adapted from Robbins et al. (2003)
Stage 1 – Export Education 
Universities entered this first stage of ‘export education’ by delivering 
their own programs through distance education programs to international 
students offshore. Distance education programs were essentially corre-
spondence courses written for Australian consumption, which provided 
consistency of the programs through standardised learning resource ma-
terials. Assessment was administered centrally from the university. The 
product (higher education) was seen to be in demand by the Asia-Pacific 
region as a prerequisite to compete and develop in an emerging global 
economy. However, the programs reflected a Western bias which ex-
posed a limited understanding of the cultures into which the operation 
was extended. There was a growing awareness that more was needed to 
service these potential niches if they were to grow in number. One strat-
egy was to acquire an offshore presence which could offer students more 
pastoral assistance, and this was facilitated via the use of a foreign 
agency.
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Stage 2 – Use of a Foreign Agency 
This second developmental stage still relied heavily on printed learning 
materials, but was supported with face-to-face teaching by a university 
academic who would visit the site and deliver lectures, workshops or 
seminars, and then depart. Process and content were dependent on the 
institution’s inclination. This premise could be considered as the princi-
pal-agent model, and is predicated on an argument that the educational 
institution (not-for-profit partner), designated as the principal, is respon-
sible for compliance with Government legislation such as Educational 
Services for Overseas Students (ESOS) 2000 that assures an educational 
set standard is rendered to a student. Should the for-profit partner, des-
ignated as the agent, fail to comply with such standards the responsibil-
ity for noncompliance rests with the principal, that is, the institution. 
The agency acted as a recruitment centre and a ‘postage’ depot for stu-
dents. This stage of development highlighted the deficiencies in institu-
tional capability to operate at a distance.
Financial difficulty with the collection and reconciliation of fees and 
expenses, together with a potential conflict of interest in an agency’s re-
cruitment practices, led to difficulties in managing this model. Growth in 
technology, coupled with perceptions of an increasing educational mar-
ket pool, encouraged the more entrepreneurial institutions to consider al-
ternative strategies to service the market.
Stage 3 – Joint Ventures 
Universities began to realise that there was a need for a more structured 
approach to the delivery and teaching of their programs. However, capi-
tal financing was always going to be an issue for universities as not-for-
profit institutions. Risk analyses ordained that finance should be gener-
ated through joint venture partners from the private sector. These could 
take the shape of licensing/franchises, foreign subsidiaries or alliances. 
As these models developed, so too did the need for institutions to 
aspire to a level of management maturity that could ensure quality con-
sistency in their product offerings, as well as continued profitability. 
Throughout the latter period of the 1990s and early 2000s, Australian 
universities experienced growing pains and a steep learning curve for 
management skill and expertise to cope with strategic alliances.
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4. The publ ic-pr ivate dynamics of
strategic al l iances
Historically, not-for-profit public sector institutions have been what can 
be termed “slow cycle industries” (Hitt et al. 1997), that rely heavily on 
clearly defined markets. Conversely, private, for-profit organisations are 
considered to have a sharper focus on marketing niches and changing 
demands of their particular market. Hence their responses to market de-
mand are more rapid and their product cycles in relation to the market 
are much faster. For-profit organisations are in the business of education 
while public universities have a mission to provide education. The es-
sential difference between the two partners is that the public partner has 
a public responsibility in terms of offering a wide variety of services 
while the private partner has a for-profit motive.  
This presents a fundamental values and cultural difference that 
frames assumptions about “curriculum, the nature of faculty, research 
and service functions, institutional governance, admissions, services, 
and the like” (Morey 2004, p. 143). When two such organisations form 
an alliance, negotiation of these public-private dynamics is crucial if the 
relationship is to develop with positive outcomes for both parties. Ironi-
cally, the public university enters into such an alliance for the same rea-
son as the private organisation: to make money, i.e., for profit. Further-
more, this highlights the anomalous position of a university being con-
figured as a ‘for-profit’ institution that may incur loss which would pre-
sumably have to be underwritten by public ‘not-for-profit’ infrastruc-
tures and/or direct funds. In principle, though, the public university en-
ters into an alliance only to use the profit to underwrite operating and/or 
investment costs related to its core mission, whereas the private partner 
might consider it as ‘cherry picking’.  
Key areas where public universities have risk exposure when part-
nering with private, for-profit organisations in the higher education mar-
ketplace are summarised below: 
• one partner (not-for-profit organisation) being bound in tradition 
with a commitment to the maintenance of academic quality of its 
programs, with the other (for-profit) partner being bound by the need 
to grow revenue and to operate on low cost/unit margins, i.e., to en-
sure profit maximisation; 
• potential competition between two alliance partners in a single geo-
graphical market segment (i.e. two universities both using the same 
for-profit organisation in separate partnership arrangements within 
the same section of the market); 
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• different staffing structures and industrial awards between the part-
ners;
• the complexity of operations in product delivery (e.g. ICT infrastruc-
ture issues, interoperability of content management and learning 
management systems); 
• an over-time divergence of partnership objectives and control func-
tions;
• either or both organisation’s/s’ value chain partners potentially be-
coming its or their competitors (e.g. the for-profit organisation de-
veloping new partnerships with other higher education providers 
competing in the same marketplace); 
• irreconcilable differences of organisational missions, cultures and 
values;
• changing strategic positioning of the public ‘not-for-profit’ univer-
sity to comply with government policy, legislative requirements and 
funding processes;
• conflicting ‘cost management’ strategies of each organisation; and 
• ongoing changes to the learning needs and requirements of students 
and other stakeholders.
All universities have a central generic growth strategy. To achieve this 
goal, one of the most common strategies used in the Australian context 
has been a commitment to continued recruitment from a perceived ever-
expanding international market. However, as Hofstede (1980) warns, 
“managing international business means handling both national and or-
ganisation culture differences at the same time” (retrieved 12 August 
2004 from: http://spitswww.uvt.nl/web/iric/hofstede/page4.htm). The 
delivery of programs to international students from diverse national cul-
tures through different organisational cultures presents particular bur-
dens on strategic alliances operating in global marketplaces. 
Definitions of strategic alliance are legion. Broadly speaking, an al-
liance is the formation of a partnership between two or more organisa-
tions with mutually beneficial objectives (Hill and Jones 1995; Porth 
2002). Each partner brings knowledge and/or resources into the relation-
ship. Pearce and Robbins observed that “more than 20 000 alliances oc-
curred between 1992 and 1997, quadruple the total five years earlier” 
(cited in Wheelen and Hunger 2002, p. 127). Strategic alliances are usu-
ally found in industries where supply chain management is of prime im-
portance and they are generally acknowledged as being an attractive al-
ternative to vertical integration because they avoid many of the bureau-
cratic costs of ownership. Strategic alliances are also a useful strategy 
for organisations that can have congruent goals. For example, one or-
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ganisation can be asset rich but suffer from cash flow. Conversely, a 
firm with good cash flow may not have the potential to overcome barri-
ers to entry into a complementary industry. An asset rich partner could 
provide that entrée.
Alliances among public sector bodies such as telecommunications, 
railways, power and more recently higher education institutions could be 
used to exploit a competitive advantage in expanding markets, to reduce 
the risk of financial exposure and to increase revenue. Such public sec-
tor, slow cycle organisations may choose to partner with a private or-
ganisation for a number of reasons. For example, a skilled marketing 
and recruitment agency can be used to recruit students for a university 
that does not have the expertise in this value chain activity. Generally 
the alliances are non-equity, which means that neither partner has an eq-
uity share of the other’s assets. One example of a successful alliance is 
the consortium of 38 Australian universities and IDP (International De-
velopment Program) Education Australia, which acts as a recruitment 
agency for all universities3.1
Hill and Jones (1995) suggest that successful alliances depend upon 
three factors: (i) partner selection; (ii) alliance structures; and (iii) rela-
tionships management. Our preliminary research to date has used these 
three factors to frame our analysis of emerging qualitative data from one 
Australian university, focused initially on the words of an academic with 
considerable and direct experience of the possibilities and tensions at-
tending that university’s international education operations.
4.1 Partner Selection
As already noted from the review of previous research, the selection of a 
partner is a critical factor for an alliance. Partners must be able to con-
tribute to the institution’s strategic goals and they must enjoy a reputa-
tion for integrity and credibility in the markets in which they operate. 
“In this instance [the] relationship between venture partners is founded on a 
mutual commitment to education through the delivery of a ‘western’ degree to 
the host country’s students.”
                                             
3 From his study on higher education consortia, Beerkens (2004, n.p.) found 
it “an interesting paradox” …that “alliances or consortia are based on both 
compatibility as well as complementarity. In the IDP example of a strate-
gic alliance, performance is enhanced because the partners are different 
(with complementary resources) yet with compatible backgrounds. 
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However, conflicts of interest do occur. There will always be a potential 
for conflict of interest when a commercial partner (i.e., a private ‘for-
profit’ organisation) finds that there are other commercial opportunities 
available. The private organisation may then seek to be an agent for a 
number of higher education providers of academic programs, all of 
which are in competition with similar ‘products’. 
“For example, the Singapore partner acting as an agent for a number of HE 
[higher education] institutions from Great Britain, or offering a…product in 
Hong Kong where another partner is also offering programs.” 
It has been found that 30-50 % of all alliances perform unsatisfactorily 
(Das and Teng cited in Wheelen and Hunger 2002) and in order to 
minimise risk, the partner selection process requires careful planning. 
The partner must have three principal characteristics.  
• It must be able to help its partner achieve its strategic goals; in this 
case successful penetration into the export education market.
• The partner must share the organisation’s vision of the alliance’s 
purposes. If two companies approach an alliance with radically dif-
ferent agendas it could end in divorce.  
• The partner must be one that is unlikely to try to opportunistically 
exploit the alliance for its own ends. For example, two educational 
institutions would have the same mission and goals; that is, higher 
education, whereas an organisation with a successful recruitment 
process, underpinned by an effective marketing strategy as its core 
business would need to be considered with a strong awareness of po-
tential risk of ethical divergences.
4.2 Alliance Structures 
In principle, contractual safeguards in alliance structures are designed to 
ensure that technology and/or intellectual capital is difficult if not im-
possible to transfer without appropriate agreements. Alliance structures 
have been found to be at risk if they do not address operational issues re-
lated to three key areas of: academic credibility and quality; program 
administration; and human resource management.  
There are perceived ‘threats’ to academic credibility when interna-
tional students choose Australia on the basis of cost (not all students are 
from wealthy families) and/or as a way of gaining residency: 
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“Students who enrol in Australian universities do so for two reasons. Firstly, it 
is cheaper than the northern hemisphere and secondly…[there is] the fact that 
it is a ‘western’ degree which will provide them with increased employment 
opportunities at home or the opportunity for permanent residency in Austra-
lia.”
Academic quality and credibility can be placed at risk if the private part-
ner expands their portfolio of activities to include segments of the core 
business of the public partner, for example, teaching. Program admini-
stration at both the academic and general levels can also be at risk with 
the dialectic tensions of competing goals. 
As employees of the public partner, academic staff who are based at 
domestic campus sites and who develop courses for the international 
market may face increasing pressures as student numbers grow. Staff 
are:
“Laden with the academic management and administration of the academic 
operations and quality control systems across the campuses…. [They] may not 
have the time or resources to ensure that the program courses are of a recog-
nised standard of quality.”  
At both on-shore and off-shore international campus locations where 
courses are taught by the private partner, academic staff are usually con-
tracted on a sessional basis. Previous studies have found that such ses-
sional staff have little ownership of courses taught (Bassett 1998; 
McKenzie 1997). Furthermore, they were found to have no commitment 
to the contracted work requirement other than their appearance at the 
contracted teaching times (see Table 4 below). These factors are per-
ceived to engender little organisational loyalty to the employing private 
‘for-profit’ partner, much less to the university. 
“They are usually overcommitted to personal consultancies and maintain the 
same contractual arrangements with any number of higher education institu-
tions…all committed to the same economic rationalist argument in education 
today….[The university] becomes just another source of easy revenue.”
Alliance structures are such that administrative staff on all off-shore and 
local on-shore international campuses are employed by the private part-
ner or through an agency contracted by that partner. Loss of corporate 
knowledge in student administration processes is always at risk with 
high staff turnover. Again, there are consequences to be brokered if in-
stitutional credibility and quality are to be maintained. 
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“The economic imperative of cost savings is the overriding objective by the 
partners as these savings contribute to the maximisation of profit with no off-
setting costs of quality…. Again, these costs are borne by the faculties after 
distribution of profit.” 
4.3 Academic staff in a strategic alliance 
As identified in the previous section, within an educational alliance the 
organisational/institutional design reflects a duality in the academic 
structure and mirrors the ‘normal’ university structure that incorporates 
both tenured and sessional (casual) staff. A focus group of five sessional 
academics discussed a range of topics that were linked to satisfaction 
surveys. The group was drawn from geographically dispersed campuses 
employed by a for-profit venture partner. The group members were 
asked to respond to statements that referred to degrees of satisfaction 
across a range of topics. Preliminary results are shown in the table (Ta-
ble 4: Sessional lecturers’ comments) below. 
Table 4: Sessional lecturers’ comments 
Topic Strength of response 
Satisfaction with teaching                        Positive
Sense of accomplishment Positive
Co-worker relationship Positive
Opportunities for advancement                      Negative
Opportunities for research                    Negative
Conducive teaching environment Negative
Collegial membership of a unified teaching 
team
Negative
Source: Focus group comments (August 2004) 
The general consensus of the group was a perception that there was a 
lack of professional respect given to them and their role. It was rein-
forced by the perception that there was a reluctance to commit enough 
resources to the task. There was also the perception that they were not 
encouraged by university academics to contribute input into the courses 
taught. Such results are consistent with earlier research carried out with 
sessional staff at a number of Australian universities (Bassett, 1998; 
McKenzie, 1997). They are typically at the margins and could be cate-
gorised as a marginalised workforce.  
Thus while committed sessional academics are task oriented, they 
also feel marginalised. Commitment to the employer is minimal. Ironi-
cally, the alliance will benefit from this teaching commitment by default. 
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Unfortunately students do not benefit in a similar way, as the lecturers 
work only to the contracted hours. Further research in this area could 
usefully identify the factors that impact on sessional and contracted staff 
employed through separate remuneration schemes by partners in a 
profit/not-for-profit alliance. The implications of any proactive action to 
address the perceptions of academic staff would have to be considered 
within the complexity of the public-private dynamics of salaries, work-
ing conditions and identity re/formulation of educators in all sites of 
higher education. A successful alliance requires commitment to balanc-
ing these key issues. 
Consequently, the challenge for alliance partners, in the pursuit of 
sustained market share, is to manage Beerkens’ (2004), paradox of co-
operation, within the criteria of complementarity and compatibility be-
tween partners; if efficiency, effectiveness and mutual profitability are to 
be achieved. In addition, quality assurance must also be factored into 
these criteria.
4.4 Education and Quality Assurance 
In an educational context, quality assurance programs such as ISO 9001: 
2000 serve to ensure that operational quality and consistency is main-
tained across partnership operations. Quality assurance of the integrity 
of the programs themselves is secured through moderation and course 
validation, and student satisfaction is confirmed through feedback sur-
veys that provide continuous improvement in the teaching function. In 
addition, government legislation such as the ESOS Act (2000) and statu-
tory bodies such as Australia’s Commonwealth Government, Depart-
ment of Education, Science and Training (DEST) provide a monitoring 
program on services for international students. In addition, to ensure 
consistency irrespective of where an institution offers its programs, uni-
versities’ quality standards are assured through the Australian Universi-
ties Quality Agency (AUQA) audits. 
Accordingly, risk for the public (not-for-profit) partner can be mini-
mised through the adherence to quality assurance principles such as the 
following:
• Design alliances such that it is difficult, if not impossible, to transfer 
intellectual capital or technology that is not meant to be transferred.
• Write contractual safe guards into the alliance agreement.
• Agree in advance that both parties will exchange skills and/or tech-
nologies that each wants from the other, thereby ensuring a chance 
for equitable gain. 
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• Decrease the risk of opportunism by extracting in advance a signifi-
cant credible commitment from the partner, which  would make it 
less likely that the alliance would end with the institution giving 
away much and receiving little in return. 
• Introduce a management company for alliance operations. 
A precautionary measure in this risk minimisation process would be to 
ensure that members of a ‘Board of Directors’ do not have the potential 
for conflict of interest with partners in the alliance.
4.5 Relationships Management 
Many lessons have been learned about the management of relationships 
in strategic alliances between public institutions and private organisa-
tions. While much discussion focuses on partnership and structure, rec-
ognition must also be given to the potential for conflict between oppos-
ing organisational/institutional cultures. Every organisation possesses a 
unique organisational culture consisting of “the pattern of basic assump-
tions, values norms and artefacts shared by the organisation’s members” 
(Waddell et al. 2004, p. 426). Merging such cultures suggests that “their 
disparate cultures [and] size…may present too wide a gulf to bridge” 
(Hoff 2001; cited in Porth 2002, p. 149). The challenge for partners is 
the management of an emerging culture that is shaped by the dialectic 
tension between two opposing pairs of values existing simultaneously in 
a single entity organisation (or higher education institution).
The seminal work in this area is attributed to Hofstede (1980), who 
suggested that decisions regarding organisational practices should be 
made on the basis of scores for a country across four national culture 
dimensions: power distance; uncertainty avoidance; individualism-
collectivism; masculinity-femininity. Power distance is the measure of 
the extent to which a society accepts the fact that power in institutions 
and organisations is distributed unequally. Uncertainty avoidance distin-
guishes how comfortable one feels in risky or ambiguous situations. In-
dividualism identifies how much one values independence and the no-
tion of self over the group or community (collectivism). Finally gender, 
like individualism and collectivism represents a dichotomy in which 
quantity of life (masculinity – assertiveness) reflects values such as as-
sertiveness whereas quality of life (femininity) values sensitivity and 
concern for welfare for others.
Organisations have the same cultural divergences, and if the alliance 
is to survive the divergences must be acknowledged and managed if the 
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opposing values are to lead to cultural change and therefore conver-
gence. An action plan to facilitate this convergence would include:  
• creation of informal networks between partners complementary to 
the formal network; 
• development of an ability and commitment to learn from each other; 
and
• education of all employees about each partner’s strengths and weak-
nesses through systematic operational information exchange.  
At the operational level, relationships among administrative staff need to 
be managed so that quality assurance systems and processes are under-
stood and adhered to. In many instances, 
“the remedial and recovery costs for breakdowns in administrative systems are 
ultimately borne by the faculties.” 
In one off-shore operation,
“poor administration, delays in the systems for academic controls and stan-
dards and poor monitoring of student enrolment procedures…[meant] that this 
vision has never translated into reality and borne fruit commensurate with the 
optimistic projections of student numbers.” 
Where relationships have been built upon a sensitivity to the cultural dif-
ferences of the partners (fast cycle private organisations and slow cycle 
public institutions), alliances have been successful.
5.  Governance of  the publ ic-pr ivate dynamics in 
 strategic al l iances 
So what does the combination of educators’ lived experiences, a national 
reform agenda (Nelson 2003, 2004) and the global growth of public-
private dynamics in higher education mean for the future governance of 
universities? Governance in higher education is a key policy issue, not 
only for governments but also for non-government organisations and 
communities in the 21st century (Kennedy 2003). Conceptually, govern-
ance is a melange of state-mandated authority, responsibility and ac-
countability reflecting the values of the civil society/ies in which an or-
ganisation or institution operates. Traditional notions of governance 
have relied upon shared values which have facilitated reconciliations of 
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competing interests as they occurred. However, competing national in-
terests and local/global conflicts have increased economic and religion-
fuelled tensions throughout the world such that, for globalised higher 
education institutions engaged in strategic alliances, reconciliation of 
values-infused competing interests is indeed a challenge.
In Australia, a recently released report from the Commonwealth De-
partment of Education, Science and Training for the International Man-
agement of Higher Education (Emmanuel and Reike 2004, pp. 38-39) 
identifies the following challenges for university governance arrange-
ments in the new, post-reform era: 
• cumbersome government layers (i.e., State/Territory and Common-
wealth jurisdictions competing and/or contradicting each other); 
• composition of university governing bodies (e.g., number of people 
on councils, nature of appointments);
• development, implementation and monitoring of appropriate risk 
management strategies, accountability processes and internal con-
trols in respect of their commercial entities.
The Commonwealth government has developed a uniform national pro-
tocol (National Governance Protocols) for university governance. Com-
monwealth funding increases will be tied to the demonstrated implemen-
tation not only of these protocols but also of workplace reform. Thus the 
funding will be used to craft compliance.
In a view shared by Duckett (2004), Emmanuel and Reike (2004) 
acknowledge that this will “create new challenges for the Common-
wealth to ensure that the substantial past and ongoing public investment 
is protected and the best possible return on the public investment is 
achieved” (p. 39). For strategic alliances between public universities and 
private, for-profit organisations, relationships may have to move into a 
fourth stage of maturation to broker these changes (thereby building on, 
and also learning the lessons gleaned from, the first three stages depicted 
in Figure 1: Stages in global growth and strategic alliances presented 
earlier).
In this fourth stage, the issues of teaching and learning will be cen-
tral because:
“The centrepiece of the Nelson Report is a series of proposals that focus on 
teaching and learning initiatives in universities. These proposals are compre-
hensive, covering access initiatives (including the number of places available, 
the discipline mix, and equity arrangements), initiatives designed to improve 
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the quality of teaching and learning, and strategies to enhance internationalisa-
tion.” (Duckett 2004, p. 217) 
There is the potential here for universities to broker the changes through 
foregrounding notions of ‘internationalisation’ of pedagogy and curricu-
lum. Obviously the lessons learned from operating in local–global envi-
ronments will stand ‘hybrid’ universities in good stead as previous and 
current partnerships and well-developed networks are mobilised in stra-
tegic alliances to foster internationalisation in a globalised education 
marketplace.
Significantly, though, the new National Governance Protocols will 
(hopefully) be robust enough to assist university councils and senior 
management to negotiate their way through the implications of the new 
funding relationship with the Commonwealth government (through the 
Department of Education, Science and Training). There is the potential 
for the Commonwealth government to regulate the discipline mix with 
individual universities, with consequences for both the university and 
the Commonwealth. If a university gets its discipline mix wrong and 
cannot meet the agreed-upon effective full time student load (EFTSL) 
for a particular year, then the university will be financially disadvan-
taged, a transition fund notwithstanding. If the Commonwealth miscal-
culates the discipline mix needed to satisfy local, regional, state and na-
tional labour market needs, then the Commonwealth is exposed to a pol-
icy risk (Duckett 2004). Either way, higher education governance is a 
key policy issue and instrument of practice for the future survival of all 
universities, particularly those established as public sector institutions. 
In the Australian higher education context, Kennedy (2003, p. 64) 
has identified “a pronounced trend towards executive led university 
management and away from collegially driven management”. However, 
policy framed, legislatively sanctioned and funding-induced changes to 
university behaviour call for both strong, transparent management -and
vibrant, well-informed collegial participation at all levels of the organi-
sation. Koelman and De Vries (1999) suggest a set of principles that 
could be used to guide the activities of ‘hybrid’ universities in their ne-
gotiations of strategic alliances with their private, for-profit partners: 
• universities’ public duty (teaching and research) may not be endan-
gered;
• students should not become the victims of entrepreneurial activities; 
• the prestige of the university as a public institution may not be 
harmed; 
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• commercial activities should connect with the core business of the 
university; and 
• entrepreneurial risks should not be shifted onto the taxpayer (p. 176). 
Using such principles to scaffold the ‘business’ practices of higher edu-
cation in a globalised marketplace offers a socially inclusive internation-
alisation of curriculum and pedagogy that would ensure public universi-
ties remain relevant to their constituent stakeholders.
6.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have used both quantitatively and qualitatively 
sourced data to examine the ways in which the public-private dynamics 
of higher education’s strategic alliances may be brokered. We found this 
to be a constructive way forward because it has enabled both complexity 
and context to be reflected and considered. This blended method en-
gages with the aggregated statistical data used by national and state gov-
ernments for funding and reporting purposes on the one hand and the 
discursive texts of participants’ socially constructed realities on the 
other.
Growth in the international higher education market continues to ex-
pand as tax-payer funded federal funding is diminishing. So far, the 
market pool for Australian universities has been predominantly the 
Asian markets. Countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and China are ea-
ger to be participants in this growth industry, and opportunities for the 
development of profit/not-for-profit strategic alliances exist for the dar-
ing. While the profit potential is high, alliances between for-profit and 
not-for-profit organisations will have risks. There are a number of viable 
alliance models that can be assessed by the potential entrants to these 
markets while a cautionary note of care is advised. However, there is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that the benefits will outweigh the costs if 
the partnership is managed properly. 
In a globalised higher education market, there is a great deal at stake 
for hybrid universities that must negotiate the public-private dynamics 
of strategic alliances. Funding-induced changes, and such universities’ 
current responses to those changes, place considerable pressure on their 
capacity to broker their relations with their multiple student constituen-
cies, their private, for-profit partners, the Commonwealth government 
and other stakeholders in ways that will ensure their long term sustain-
ability. The future governance of these universities will need to enable 
flexibility and responsiveness to sometimes competing drivers, yet also 
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to ensure – and assure – appropriate quality of its teaching and research. 
The expectations, developments and outcomes accompanying these re-
quirements are and will remain complex, contextualised and contradic-
tory – yet with the potential for constructive and transformative new al-
liances and relationships. 
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R&D Funding in US Universities:
From Public to Private Support or
Public Policies Strengthening Diversification?
PEDRO CONCEIÇÃO, MANUEL V. HEITOR AND HUGO HORTA
1.  Introduct ion 
Most research and development in industrialised countries today is 
funded by private sources. This clearly shows that we live in knowledge-
based economies; firms set out to accumulate knowledge and produce 
new ideas to improve their performance in increasingly global and com-
petitive markets. Economic incentives are increasingly designed to re-
ward skills, creativity, and innovation; with high valued-added activities 
linked with producing ideas rather than things. There is an ‘innovation 
race’ in which firms invest in R&D because they fear that other firms 
will take over their market with a new process or product if they don’t 
keep up. Private dynamics are increasingly dominating OECD S&T sys-
tems, accounting for more than 63% of R&D funding in OECD coun-
tries in 2001 (OECD 2003a). Though increasingly widespread in devel-
oped and developing countries, this dynamic is particularly strong in the 
United States, which has one of the highest business expenditures on 
R&D of all OECD countries.
The United States innovation system relies heavily on a high level of 
private R&D funding and performance, but also on a set of private in-
centives and available venture capital funds, usually allocated to high-
technology sectors. The success of the United States economy, together 
with the apparent sustainability of its R&D and innovation system fu-
elled by private funds and sets of incentives, is attractive to many policy 
makers from less developed countries. However, as Conceição et al.
(2004) demonstrated, replicating US policy in different national and 
economic contexts may not only be misguided, but even ineffective and 
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possibly harmful. Given the path dependence of the science, technology, 
and innovation systems, and despite perceptions and what one might be 
inclined to conclude from the above discussion, actual US policies to 
promote innovation and to support science and technology are more 
complex than a mere swing of the pendulum from public to private in-
centives. Conceição et al.’s analysis shows that the US has been able to 
shift from public to private incentive structures because of its long his-
tory of channelling significant public funds to science and technology. 
This enabled the accumulation of knowledge through massive invest-
ment in basic research and constructing infrastructure that could then be 
used by the private sector. Furthermore, despite the extensive and inten-
sive use in recent decades of intellectual property rights and other mar-
ket-based incentive structures, public support for core areas and those 
fields for which there is a perception that market incentives are not suf-
ficient to meet the strategic targets of the US policy, has not been com-
promised; indeed, it has been reinforced.  
It is necessary to understand the diversity of its policies and mixture 
of public and private incentives if the US S&T system is to be taken as a 
reference. Moreover, its long history of past investments and the current 
division of labour (specialisation) cannot be replicated in systems of 
lesser scale and complexity. The key elements of the US story are those 
of diversity of policies and increasing institutional specialisation and of 
the clarification of the unique roles of private and public incentives to 
support S&T.  
Just as the US S&T system as a whole is taken as a worldwide refer-
ence, the US university system is also used as a role model for its re-
sponsiveness to economic changes and contribution to wealth creation 
(Hall 2007). Recently, there is a clear understanding, mainly by Euro-
pean counterparts (EC 2003), that the universities are generally viewed 
as important engines of economic growth and development rather than 
mere institutions of higher education (Saxenian 1994), as there is in-
creasing evidence of their importance as promoters of regional industrial 
and technological development (Cooke and Huggins 1997). This is a 
role that US universities, especially research universities, have assumed 
throughout the second half of the 20th century. Here too, as with the 
whole US S&T system, there is the perception that private funding asso-
ciated with a high level of industry-science relationships is plentiful and 
encourages a highly dynamic academia that contributes much more di-
rectly and with greater impact to social and economic development at 
both regional and national levels. In this context, the possibility of ob-
taining funding from private sources and private incentives (such as 
IPRs) makes itself highly appealing for European universities struggling 
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with increasing financial difficulties arising from public budget con-
straints and demands for change and closer engagement with society.  
This paper argues that transforming the European university land-
scape into the image of its American counterpart is not feasible because 
of wide differences in history and different sets of incentives and institu-
tional frameworks. Even so, some lessons can be learned from analysing 
the US higher education sector and its R&D function. Another important 
objective of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the 
reality of the US university landscape, beyond superficial notions popu-
larised by the media, interest groups, and even some policy analysts. 
First, we confirm that public financing continues to be the largest source 
of funding of US universities for R&D by far, and that this financing is 
more critical for universities than for the rest of the US S&T system. It 
is then shown that expenditure per researcher in the whole system is bal-
anced between public (universities, Federal laboratories) and private in-
stitutions (business sector), while in Europe there is an imbalance to-
wards the private sector. We also show that in the US science and tech-
nology system the university is gaining importance as an R&D per-
former. We conclude that most US R&D funding is heavily concentrated 
in the top one hundred universities, but that the US higher education sys-
tem is extremely diversified, with various revenue sources, unlike the se-
lected European research universities. Furthermore, we identify two 
trends: 1) the US higher education system’s diversity is maintained by a 
range of federal R&D funding agencies that allocate funds to narrower 
or wider sets of universities according to the scientific complexity or 
goal of their research objectives. Given this situation, the vast majority 
of universities specialise in R&D for certain agencies’ research interests; 
2) the share and composition of the groups of universities receiving the 
largest R&D income has remained reasonably stable over the last 30 
years.
To make these points, section 2 discusses the funding evolution pat-
terns of the US S&T system. Section 3 then examines the development 
of the university system within the US R&D system over the last 50 
years. This analysis will focus on the US universities R&D revenue 
sources, funding concentration, and diversification issues as well as their 
responsiveness to shifting patterns of economic requirements. This sec-
tion analysis is concluded by discussing the concentration of R&D fund-
ing and universities’ revenue sources for select US and European uni-
versities. Section 4 briefly presents our conclusions. 
PEDRO CONCEIÇÃO, MANUEL V. HEITOR AND HUGO HORTA
304
2.  Our evidence:  on the role of  pr ivate and 
 publ ic  R&D funding in the US S&T system 
Awareness of the importance and commitment of the university in the 
innovation process emerged in what Bruland and Mowery (2004) call 
the third industrial revolution, though links between industry and formal 
science were first forged during the 19th century in continental Europe 
(especially in the German chemical industry) and in the United States. 
The third revolution is an ongoing process that started after 1945, ini-
tially in the United States, and then spread globally. It was fostered by 
Vannevar Bush’s Endless Frontier report, which led to the creation of 
the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950. There was unprece-
dented support for public R&D funding, especially at the federal level, 
motivated by national defence and public health concerns and political 
support for basic research. US public support for science and technology 
was extended with the creation of new agencies such as the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and support for re-
search in areas of strategic national interest such as health (through the 
National Institutes of Health) and energy (through the Department of 
Energy). However, despite constant shifts defence-related R&D funding 
as a proportion of total R&D was higher than non-defence related fund-
ing for most of the period between 1949 and 2004.1 During this time, the 
Department of Defence was (and still is) the agency providing most 
R&D funds for the entire US S&T system; in 2004 reaching the highest 
budget in its history (65 billion dollars). Of non-defence related R&D 
funding since 1997, health-related research, represented mostly by the 
National Institutes of Health, has accounted for more than 25% of total 
non-defence research and continues to grow apace (it reached 31% of to-
tal non-defence related R&D in 2004). This immense and continuous 
public investment was only surpassed by private funding in 1979 (NSB 
2000), as reliance on private funding gained the necessary strength and 
sustainability based on the infrastructure created by public funding, 
IPRs, and public-based incentive mechanisms to grow at a much faster 
pace than public funding from then onwards.
There has been a steady decline in the ratio of public to private fund-
ing since 1979, as the private sector took an increasing share of overall 
funding for R&D. The private funding of R&D has been increasing at a 
constant rate, while public spending has decreased (in real terms) from 
its peak in 1987, remaining stable during the 1990s (NSB 2002). There 
                                             
1 See AAAS reports I through XXIX, based on OMB and agency R&D 
budget data. 
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has been a stagnation of public funding and a swing of the pendulum 
towards intellectual property-based incentives. However, in cumulative 
terms, only very recently has public support been surpassed by private 
funding (Conceição et al. 2004).
The cumulative effect of decades of sustained large-scale public 
support for science and technology is of great importance because it is a 
proxy for the effects associated with long-lasting investments in R&D. 
Knowledge is cumulative in nature. Innovations are built upon basic sci-
ence and previous innovations, which have had to be supported in the 
past. Similarly, the cumulative support is reflected in equipment and, 
much more importantly, institutions such as the modern US research 
university on which both private and public R&D and people-training 
depend. Few if any other countries can lay claim to the sustained and 
large-scale public sector support found in the US. Even if the pendulum 
is now swinging towards the private, the US in a sense can afford it. 
Other countries without the history of capacity-building reflected in the 
US’s cumulative public spending may be attempting to stimulate crea-
tivity and innovation where no raw materials exist. Despite the swing of 
the pendulum to the private side, public support for basic research – one 
of the goals of the Vannevar Bush influential report – continues to in-
crease, sustained mainly by public funding, and leading other sources of 
funding by a large margin. It can even be argued that public funding is 
encouraging private spending on basic R&D, though this may be a re-
flection of the emergence of the biotechnology business sector. The con-
tinued funding of basic research is evidence that the US government is 
investing in its long-term future, using mostly public rather than private 
incentives.2 But where do the US universities stand in this process? 
3. US universi t ies research funding:  
sources, responsiveness,  concentrat ion,  
and diversi f icat ion
To address this question, we discuss the data given above under three 
major headings: public funding of university research, US universities’ 
responsiveness, and the concentration and diversification of funding 
sources.
                                             
2 For a detailed discussion on this matter see Conceição et al., 2004. 
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3.1 Public financing and university research 
Unlike the European university, the US research university is a very re-
cent creation that emerged as a result of the post-war economic envi-
ronment, public funding, and shaping by federal government. Since the 
post-war period, there has been a close link between the development of 
universities and the development of the R&D system in the United 
States. A huge amount of mostly federal public funding has poured into 
university R&D in the form of grants, contracts, and other financing for 
specific research projects. Universities in the US have increasingly be-
come major performers of R&D, especially basic research. Rosenberg 
(2002) argues that the idea of the appropriate role of universities to con-
duct basic research is itself a post-war notion in the US, and thus this 
type of research is usually financed by public funds. It is therefore not 
surprising that since the late 1950s academic R&D has been concen-
trated at the basic research end of the R&D spectrum and  strongly sup-
ported by federal funding; nowadays considered to be “virtually the only 
source of support for basic research” (NAE 2003, p. 7). 
US universities’ R&D performance depends upon federal, state, and 
local government funding. Public funding accounted for 66% to 83% of 
total university R&D funding received yearly from 1953 until 2001, as 
shown in Figure 1. However, the share of federal funding for academic 
R&D has been declining from 1966 since its peak in the mid-sixties 
(73%), accounting for about 58% of the total funding allocated to US 
universities in 2000. State and local funding for targeted academic R&D 
has fluctuated between 7% and 8% since the 1980s, though its impor-
tance for the overall US academic research system is understated in this 
figure as they also fund universities (especially public ones) through 
general purpose appropriations used to cover uncompensated indirect 
costs or to apply in separately budgeted research.  
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Figure 1: R&D expenditure at US universities and colleges, by source 
   of funds: fiscal years 1953-2001 
Note: Fiscal year 1978 data are estimated based on data collected from doctorate-
granting institutions only 
Source: National Science Foundation/Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey 
of Research and Development 
Although the private funding of R&D has surpassed public funding in 
the US science and technology system, US university R&D continues to 
be overwhelmingly supported by public funds, mainly from the federal 
government. In this respect, it should be noted that federal R&D funding 
is allocated through various departments and agencies, unlike in most 
OECD countries in which public funding is mostly concentrated in a 
single state structure. Federal agencies cover a wide range of science and 
engineering fields when they fund academic research.3 These agencies 
concentrate or diversify their funding according to their primary goals. 
For example, the National Institutes of Health tend to concentrate their 
funding on life and medical sciences, while the National Science Foun-
dation has more diversified funding patterns (NSB 2002). In addition, 
agencies vary considerably in their funding instruments: the Department 
of Defence (DOD) and NASA favour funding of extramural R&D ac-
tivities through contracts; the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and NSF 
prefer to work through formula or project grants. As a consequence, 
universities obtaining funds from the latter agencies have a high degree 
of autonomy in pursuing R&D activities, as federal government control 
over R&D conducted through grants is limited. Moreover, the federal 
government usually attaches rights on R&D outcomes under R&D con-
                                             
3 There are 24 funding agencies, though 96% of the federal budget trans-
ferred to US universities comes from six. 
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tracts and not under grants, thus enabling the universities to profit from 
intellectual property rights over federally funded R&D results. Accord-
ing to Fossum et al. (2004), the majority of federal R&D funds trans-
ferred to universities are conveyed in the form of project grants. This re-
inforces the argument that with regard to universities, the US federal 
S&T funding system is by definition a decentralised archetype “with 
relatively low top-down control, hardly any institutional funding apart 
from mission-oriented programs, and a strong research base in universi-
ties” (OECD 2003b, p. 41).
Having distinct missions and goals, the funding agencies request re-
search in the form of competitive grants or contracts for specific re-
search projects in a variety of universities, public and private, which are 
dependent on federal funding but determined to remain autonomous 
(Mowery and Rosenberg 1993). As seen in Figure 2, the main provider 
of obligations for science and engineering to universities and colleges is 
the Department of Health and Human Services, mostly through the Na-
tional Institutes of Health. This is unlike non-university components of 
the S&T system, in which the Department of Defence is by far the larg-
est R&D funder. Between 1970 and 2001, DOD’s share of academic 
R&D funding in US universities was never higher than 17%, which 
shows that the US university sector is above all performer of non-
defence related R&D. Nevertheless, for some universities, such as the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, defence related R&D provided 
to be essential for the consolidation of R&D activities and its continuous 
development in this university along the 20th century (Geiger 1993). 
According to NSF data4, more than four-fifths of total obligations for 
academic R&D derive from three agencies: the Department of Health 
and Human Services (funding academic R&D mostly through the Na-
tional Institutes of Health) which accounts for 60%, and the National 
Science Foundation and the Department of Defence, accounting for 15% 
and 9% respectively. The growing share of health-related research marks 
a major change in federal academic research funding by the HHS, as 
other agencies’ share of funding remained the same or decreased slightly 
between 1970 and 2001. The increase in federal support for health-
related research in the 1970s and 1980s was mainly related to cancer and 
AIDS research (Jankowski 2001). In the 1990s, in addition to cancer and 
AIDS, this was reinforced by a growing interest in directing research 
towards other diseases, the opportunities afforded by advances in bio-
technology, and the influence of lobbying groups (NSB 2002). How-
ever, the increased concentration of funds in the life and medical sci-
                                             
4 Withdrawn from the Webcaspar data system. 
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ences is raising concerns about uneven distribution and its impact on the 
academic research enterprise. 
Figure 2: Federal obligations for academic R&D, by agency: 1970-
   2001 
Notes: Values in constant 1996 dollars. NIH: National Institutes of Health; NSF: 
National Science Foundation; DOD: Department of Defense; NASA: National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration; DOE: Department of Energy; DA: 
Department of Agriculture. Data for the National Institutes of Health include the 
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration. Data for 1970-73 are for 
the Atomic Energy Commission; data for 1974-76 are for the Energy Research and 
Development Administration; data for 1977 and thereafter are for the Department of 
Energy.
Source: National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Studies 
(NSF/SRS), Federal Funds for Research and Development: Fiscal Years 1999, 2000 
and 2001, Detailed Statistical Tables, Vol. 49, NSF 01-328 (Arlington, VA, 2001); 
and NSF, annual series 
The continuing and increased support for university R&D from public 
funds reinforces the argument presented by Conceição et al. (2004) that 
the US government continues to support research in core areas of na-
tional importance where private funding is insufficient. It also means 
that the US private sector performs most of the research that it funds, 
and that it only provides universities with a small fraction of their over-
all R&D funding capital. In 2000, the industrial sector performed 98% 
of total industry-funded R&D, while universities and colleges performed 
1%.
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Despite the long record of research partnerships between industry 
and universities, funding provided by the private sector did not represent 
more than 6.8% of total university financed R&D in 2001 (Table 1). 
Private funding of university R&D was higher in 1955 than it was in 
2001, which leads us to argue that the sustainability of the university re-
search sector is strongly based on public funding and public policies, not 
on private sources. However, several surveys undertaken during the 
1990s show that industry accounts for an important share of funding in 
academic R&D in specific fields, particularly in engineering (Morgan et 
al. 1994). Close contact with industry is recognised as critical for en-
couraging rapid and constant technology transfer (NAE 2003). Further-
more, the role of private funding for R&D activities became critical for 
the development of some research universities in the US, such as the 
case of Stanford University (Geiger 1993). 
Table 1: Percentage of total university financed R&D and total industry 
   funding for selected fiscal years 
 Industry Industry funding 
(millions of dollars) 
1955 8% 25 
1960 6.2% 40 
1965 2.8% 41 
1970 2.6% 61 
1975 3.3% 113 
1980 3.9% 236 
1985 5.8% 560 
1990 6.9% 1127 
1995 6.7% 1489 
2001 6.8% 2234 
Source: National Science Foundation/Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey 
of Research and Development 
This continuous R&D funding for universities also lets them compete 
with private sector institutions, thus allowing them to retain top-quality 
faculty and researchers. This is not the case in European countries, 
where a smaller private sector can offer much better salaries than the 
higher education sector. As Figure 3 shows, expenditure per researcher 
in the private sector in the United States represents 79% of this expendi-
ture in the European Union (25 countries), while the expenditure per re-
searcher in the higher education sector in the European Union (25 coun-
tries) is 53% of that in the United States. This clearly shows that US 
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universities are much more competitive in terms of R&D funding per re-
searcher than their European counterparts. It also displays an imbalance 
in Europe between universities and industry in terms of recruiting the 
best researchers and providing them with the best equipment and labora-
tories.
Figure 3: Researchers (FTE) – Total numbers and by performance  
   sector, 2001  
Notes: The figure refers to 2001 or the last year available. The sectors do not add up 
to 100%: AT, UK: 1998; BE, DK, EL, US: 1999; FR, IE, IT, NL, EU-15, EU-25: 
2000; (2) EU-15, EU-25 data are estimated by DG RTD and total numbers do not 
include LU or MT. Data on EU-25 by sector exclude LU, CY, EE, LT, LV and MT. 
Source: DG Research; Data: OECD, MSTI 2003/Vol. 1, for non-OECD members: 
Eurostat/Member States; Source: Eurostat, Key Figures 2003-2004 
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Figure 4: R&D expenditure per researcher in the private sector and in 
   the higher education sector, 2001 
Notes: (B) – The figure refers to 2001 or the last year available: AT, UK: 1998; BE, 
DK, EL, US: 1999; FR, IE, IT, NL, EU-15, EU-25, TR, CH:2000. 
Source: DG Research; Data: OECD, MSTI 2003/Vol. 1, for non-OECD members: 
Eurostat/Member States; Source: Eurostat, Key Figures 2003-2004 
3.2 The responsiveness of US universities
The role of the universities as performers in the US R&D system is well 
established and their importance as a vital national asset recognised 
(Popper and Wagner 2002). While federal labs and private industry have 
historically received most federal funds (private industry with two large 
peaks in the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s), if current trends continue 
universities will become the main receivers of public R&D funding in 
the US (Figure 4). Between 1953 and 2000, academic R&D increased 
more than fourfold, rising from 0.07 to 0.30 percent of gross domestic 
product, with a stronger average annual growth in R&D than any other 
R&D performing sector. The growth of federal funding for universities 
indicates a strategic aim to use them as critical performers in the R&D 
system. The government’s use of industrial research laboratories to scan 
university R&D for potential commercial importance is a policy tool to 
maintain US universities’ responsiveness to changing patterns of eco-
nomic needs and opportunities through transferring knowledge and 
technology to the private sector.  
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Figure 5: Evolution of US Federal Public Allocation of R&D 
Note: FFRDCs: Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
Source: adapted from US NSB, 2002 
As with funding, the responsiveness of universities is associated with the 
evolution of the US R&D system. This system began to benefit from 
massive federal investment in military research, some of it conducted in 
the universities. With the intensification of the cold war the federal gov-
ernment used procurement contracts (mainly associated with military re-
search), a push type of incentive that created a huge demand for high-
tech products and enabled high-tech industrial sectors to be developed 
around universities; especially in electronics, computers, and later on, 
biotechnology5 (NAE 2003). Conceição et al. (2004) argue that the 
growth in non-defence public R&D expenditure has mainly been in 
health and basic science. As mentioned previously, life sciences account 
for 58% of the total R&D expenditure allocated by the federal govern-
ment to US universities.6 This availability of funds in life sciences en-
sures a strong motivation for the universities to do research in this area. 
Consequently, as Rosenberg (2002) points out, universities are investing 
in the life sciences because they expect high economic and social pay-
offs to accompany the investment trend of the federal government. As he 
compares the responsiveness rates of US universities with their Euro-
pean counterparts, Rosenberg states that US universities have learned to 
respond quicker to the perception of a new set of economic opportuni-
ties. This is a major advantage, as Nelson (2004) points out; to a great 
                                             
5 Through the increase of the National Institutes of Health funding. 
6 The life sciences account for $ 11.178.689 of a total of $ 19.190.873 total 
Federal R&D expenditure for universities and colleges in 2001. 
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extent, the development of modern science needs to be understood as the 
result of institutionalised reactions to challenges and opportunities. 
This responsiveness may also be linked to the fact that there is no 
US Higher Education ministry. The US higher education system is de-
centralised, with universities and colleges competing as if the higher 
education system were like any other market. Mowery and Rosenberg 
(1993) argue that linkages between industry and universities in the US 
have been strongly influenced by this decentralised structure and con-
stant federal funding, mainly for public universities. The fact that uni-
versities are not directly controlled or dependent upon a strict set of rules 
fosters differentiation and forces each university to establish its own 
governance to compete for research funding, better students, and better 
faculty. The universities’ fund-raising offices and Offices of Technology 
Licensing are a reflection of the existing decentralised and competitive 
environment. 
A recent misperception, which originated in part as a result of the 
proliferation of the Offices of Technology Licensing and interest groups 
promoting their activities, is that licensing revenues and royalties are 
important sources of university financing. The proliferation of these of-
fices resulted in part from the Bayh-Dole act, which allowed small busi-
nesses and universities to license technologies and research results 
funded by public sources (that is, from the federal government). How-
ever, as Table 2 shows, licensing and royalty revenues are typically only 
a small percentage of total university revenues – just over 0.5% for all 
US universities. Even for those universities with more income of this 
type, the figure is perhaps only 10 times as much (that is, around 5%). 
Furthermore, these revenues tend to be associated with a very small 
number of licenses, often less than half a dozen, and in many cases are 
based on a single technology. To be fair, the intent of the Bayh-Dole 
legislation was not to help universities obtain funding. Rather, it was to 
promote technology transfer from the lab to the economy – whether the 
policy is effective in this constitutes an on-going debate beyond the 
scope of this analysis. The point is that universities’ IP-related revenues 
are minute. 
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Table 2: Gross Revenues and Patent Licensing Revenues of Selected 
   Universities 
Total revenues 
($ million) 
Licensing and 
royalties ($ 
million)
% of total 
All universities $ 227,000 $ 1270 0.56% 
Columbia 
University
$ 2,038
$ 193
$ 100-20
(see notes)
9.5%
4.9-5.9%
University of 
California
$ 8,500
$ 100
$ 75 (net)
1.18%
0.88%
Stanford
University
$ 2,400
$ 43
$ 36.6
(see notes)
1.79%
1.52%
Florida State 
University
$ 2646 $ 36 1.36% 
University of 
Wisconsin – 
Madison
$ 1696 $ 32 1.89% 
University of 
Minnesota
$ 1135
$ 26.5
(see notes)
2.33%
Harvard (03) $ 2349 47.9 2.03% 
Cal Tech (03) $ 531
$ 26.7
(see notes)
5.02%
Notes: Columbia University: There is considerable uncertainty because the 
technology transfer office reports increased revenues for year-end 2003 as $178M 
without reporting expenses; the University Annual Report reports licensing revenue 
with all ‘revenue from other educational and research activities’, and reports a 10% 
decline in this category, attributed to reduced licensing revenues from the $133M for 
the previous year-end, 2002. The table reflects an assumed net contribution to 
university revenues of $100-120M. Stanford University: Minus direct expenses, not 
including expenses for unlicensed inventions. University Minnesota: University Office 
of Patents and Technology Marketing, 2002, gross revenues only.  Cal Tech: Almost 
half of this amount is in income from a single initial public offering, and therefore 
does not represent a recurring source of licensing revenue. 
Sources: Aggregate revenues: U.S. Dept. of Education, National Center for 
Education Statistics, Enrollment in Postsecondary Institutions, Fall 2001, and 
Financial Statistics, Fiscal Year 2001 (2003), Table F: Association of University 
Technology Management, Annual Survey Summary, FY 2002 (AUTM 2003), Table S-
12. Individual institutions: publicly available annual reports of each university and/or 
its technology transfer office. 
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3.3 Concentration and diversification of funding sources 
The concentration of R&D funding is an important way to characterise a 
country’s university R&D system. According to the Carnegie Founda-
tion classification, there were 3941 institutions of higher education in 
the US higher education system in 2000. Of these, only 6.6%, or 261, 
were considered doctoral/research universities. However, the top re-
search universities correspond to just 3.8% of the total, no more than 
110 universities. The United Kingdom university system consists of 171 
institutions; most perform R&D. 
If we compare these two university systems we can conclude that 
R&D funding for universities in the US is much more concentrated than 
in the UK university system, as the total R&D funding for academia in 
the US goes to about 3% of the universities, while in the UK it is dis-
tributed among about 58% of the universities. However, if we analyse 
only the one hundred institutions with the most R&D income in the US 
and in the UK, it can be seen that there is a much more even distribution 
of funds among the one hundred largest R&D income US universities. 
Thus, there is less differentiation between universities and more even 
competition for R&D funds in this set of US research universities than 
in the UK. The confirmation of this is that the top fifty US universities 
receive 59% of the total R&D funds, while the top fifty UK universities 
receive 89% (Figure 5).
Figure 6: Distribution of R&D funds for the 100 highest R&D income 
   US and UK universities, 2001 
Source: NSF, Academic Research and Development Expenditures, Webcaspar 
database; HESA, Resources of Higher Education Institutions 
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If we deepen the analysis of R&D funding distribution among US uni-
versities, we can identify two trends: a specialisation in the distribution 
of federal funds by the agency towards specific types of universities; and 
the concentration of R&D funds in the one hundred universities with the 
highest R&D income has remained relatively stable at least since 1972, 
in both share of academic R&D funding and group composition, though 
a decline in the R&D share of the largest ten receivers of R&D was 
identified confirming previous analyses (Geiger 1999; Geiger and Feller, 
1995).
Concerning the first trend, by analysing the distribution of federal 
research funds by agency to the one hundred US universities receiving 
the most R&D funds (Figure 6), a process of specialisation in the alloca-
tion of funds can be identified. This group of universities, mostly com-
posed of research extensive/intensive universities, received about 80% 
of total federal funds for R&D in 2000. Thus, Figure 8 shows that the 
one hundred universities with the most R&D income concentrate the al-
location of federal R&D funds in health, engineering, military, and en-
ergy-related areas. The concentration on these areas is especially high in 
the first fifty universities, which account for more than 50% of funds 
provided by the HHS, DOD, NASA, DOE, and NSF to the overall US 
higher education system. The fact that 90% of the Health and Human 
Services Department’s R&D budget is allocated to this group of univer-
sities is explained by the fact that the university research hospitals are 
mainly situated at research/doctoral universities, which form the core of 
the one hundred universities with the greatest federal R&D income. 
Moreover, in 2002 45% of all federal funds went to medical schools, 
showing that the presence of a hospital on a university campus strongly 
affects the amount of federal R&D funding that the university obtains. 
At the same time, the high degree of complexity of military and engi-
neering research explains why the Department of Defence and the Na-
tional Science Foundation focus about 80% of their R&D funding on 
these universities, which have more qualified faculty and researchers, 
more promising students, and better-equipped laboratories than most 
other universities in the US higher education system whose mission is 
more oriented towards teaching and providing research with lower levels 
of complexity for state or local needs. But as Fossum et al. (2004) con-
cluded, funding allocation specialisation is also a university specialisa-
tion, as universities were only able to get significant funds from all ma-
jor federal R&D agencies in four states7, if medical R&D funds are ex-
cluded. These authors also showed that in most states, universities tend 
                                             
7 California, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
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to specialise in R&D in specific scientific fields, supported by just one 
or two major federal R&D agencies.
Figure 7: Federal distribution of funds by agency among the 100
   universities and colleges receiving the largest amounts, fiscal 
   year 2001 
Note: DOD – Department of Defence; HHS – Department of Health and Human 
Services; NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration; DOE – 
Department of Energy; NSF – National Science Foundation; USDA – Department of 
Agriculture; EPA – Environmental Protection Agency; Com – Department of 
Commerce; ED – Department of Education. 
Source: National Science Foundation/Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey 
of Federal Science and Engineering Support to Universities, Colleges and Non-profit 
Institutions, fiscal year 2001 
The accumulation of and competition for federal funds among the re-
search universities, along with the scarcity of critical resources at their 
disposal, explains the second trend. Figure 7 shows that the share of 
academic R&D of universities and colleges by rank of R&D expendi-
tures has remained relatively stable since the early 1970s. Despite a 
slight decline in the share of funds among the ten institutions receiving 
the most R&D funding, it can be argued that their share has remained 
relatively stable during the considered period. The same stability can be 
observed when considering the historical concentration of academic 
R&D funds among the 100 universities receiving most R&D funding. 
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Figure 8: Share of academic R&D of universities by rank of funding 
   among the top 10 and 100 largest receivers of R&D funds 
Source: NSF, Academic Research and Development Expenditures, Webcaspar 
database 
More significant than just showing stability in the concentration of aca-
demic R&D funds is the composition of both the ten and one hundred 
largest receivers of academic R&D funding. Based on recent NSF data 
and considering the 30-year period between 1972 and 2002, we identi-
fied only two universities that have remained among the top 10 largest 
R&D fund receivers throughout, the University of Michigan (comprising 
all campuses) and the University of Wisconsin (Madison campus). If we 
only consider the last ten years, the number of universities always pre-
sent in the top ten rises to four.8 Apparently, there are constant changes 
among the top 10 academic R&D funding receivers, as only two univer-
sities have kept their place during the last 30 years and 4 during the last 
10 years. From 1972 to 2002 however, Stanford and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology were only out of the top ten for three years, 
Washington University (Seattle campus) and University of Minnesota 
(all campuses) for five, and John Hopkins University and the University 
of California (San Diego) for seven. Moreover, since 1972 only univer-
sities positioned among the top 23 largest receivers of R&D funds ever 
reached the top 10, and some remained there for less than 10 years.9
Analysing the one hundred institutions with the largest share of R&D 
funds during the same period, 74 universities were always present in this 
group. In this group of universities, as also found in the top 10 group, 
                                             
8 University of Michigan, all campuses; University of Wisconsin, Madison; 
John Hopkins University; and the University of Washington, Seattle (three 
public and one private universities). 
9 Such as Columbia University (New York). 
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several other universities were within the top 100 for most of the period, 
only falling out for a few years. 
Analysis of the data clearly shows that despite the high competitive-
ness in the US higher education system, lifting a university into the first 
10 or even the first 100 largest receivers of R&D income is a hard task. 
The issue is that the research university’s vital resources are very scarce; 
from exceptional students, competitive grants, and publication opportu-
nities to high-quality and productive faculty. Using faculty as an exam-
ple, research universities compete for faculty mostly regarding their re-
search abilities, but candidates with these characteristics are much less 
predictable or available than teaching-oriented faculty. This scarcity 
makes the competition very intense. US research universities compete 
for such particularly R&D-oriented faculty worldwide in the expectation 
that they will add quality to the university’s research; bringing in more 
research funding and top quality students. In this regard, the ability to 
mobilise resources to assure the best faculty is critical, and the top re-
search universities have it along with another added value: brand reputa-
tion. But difficult internal career upgrading, pressure, and quality stan-
dards for scientific production are also critical in maintaining research 
quality and assuring that the universities at the top continue to receive 
the most R&D funds. In this respect, Lombardi et al. state that “the ad-
vantage in the competition goes to those who have the money today to 
buy the services of talented people and the equipment and resources 
needed,” adding that “what matters most is the cash generated by these 
assets and other activities, which the university can immediately spend 
to compete” (2001, p. 10). Following these authors’ views, research uni-
versities are seen as quality engines whose goal is the accumulation of 
the largest amount and the highest level of quality by obtaining scarce 
elements in a competitive environment, thus making it hard for other 
universities with less resources to upgrade. 
The diversity of the US higher education system can also be seen in 
the revenue sources (Table 3). The main income source of the major re-
search universities in the US, classified by the Carnegie Foundation as 
‘doctoral/research-extensive’, comes from research revenues. This is es-
pecially evident in the case of MIT where research revenues account for 
almost 54% of the university’s total revenue. The difference is striking 
between doctoral/research-extensive universities (who obtain the lion’s 
share of R&D funding in the US university system and thus have large 
budgets) and doctoral/research-intensive universities such as Illinois 
State University or Michigan Technological University. In doctoral/re-
search-intensive universities budgets are much lower and income 
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sources are based more on tuition fees10 than on research. Master’s col-
leges and universities, usually supported by state and local governments, 
have the lowest budgets and their incomes are based on tuition fees and 
government funds. In 1996/97, state and local sources allocated 45% and 
89% of their total budgets to higher education institutions such as Mas-
ter’s universities and Baccalaureate and Associate’s colleges respec-
tively. For the same year, only 18% of the total federal budget went to 
these types of universities.11
                                             
10 Illinois State University also accounts for an important share of govern-
ment funds. 
11 Data from the National Center for Education Statistics 
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However, these two types of institutions have different missions, pur-
poses, and students; additionally, it is known that research universities 
are supported by a wide range of colleges and universities that by offer-
ing education at undergraduate levels provide a large pool of human re-
sources for the research universities’ graduate schools and research-
related careers. This reveals a dichotomy in the US higher education sys-
tem between the research university (analysed in this paper) and the 
teaching university, and shows that the sustainability of research univer-
sities depends upon conditions in the teaching universities. 
In Europe, the same analysis shows a very similar picture among 
several selected ‘research universities’ from different countries (Table 
4). All the selected universities depend mainly upon government funds, 
though the University of Manchester has more diversified revenue 
sources. A comparative analysis between the two tables reveals that the 
role of the state as a funding source is of utmost importance for universi-
ties. In the US it provides research funding for doctoral/research-
extensive universities and government funds for education and research 
(mainly at state and local level) for other university types; in Europe it is 
the main income source of all the selected universities. However, it is 
clear that the European universities are under-funded in comparison with 
US universities. This is evident not only by the total budgets of Euro-
pean universities compared to doctoral/research-extensive universities in 
the US, but also by the low expenditure per researcher (as seen in Figure 
3).
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4.  Conclusions 
The structure and financing of science and technology is undergoing a 
slow but profound change. This change can be briefly characterised as a 
shift from relying on the state to support science to a stronger emphasis 
on market-based incentives. This paper analyses this shift from a histori-
cal perspective, discussing both the analytics and the empirics of the on-
going change. We argue that much of the shift has been driven by the 
perception of a swing of US policy towards market-based rather than 
public incentives for science and technology. This, in turn – given the 
strong economic performance of the US during the 1990s – has influ-
enced policies in most OECD countries, especially in Europe.
In this context, European universities suffering from increasing fi-
nancial difficulties arising from public budget constraints, expect that 
closer links between research and application and usefulness in society 
will translate into more direct and immediate financial flows (Neave and 
Van Vught 1994; Neave 1995). This perception can lead to an institu-
tional convergence between what universities do (and are supposed to 
do) and what firms and other agents do. Conceição et al. (1999) consider 
this convergence a threat to the institutional integrity of the university 
and the future of scientific research due to the commoditisation of 
knowledge (Nelson 2004). The issue is not to ‘save the university’, but 
rather to understand who will play the fundamental and unique role that 
universities have played in the overall cumulative system of knowledge 
generation and diffusion. It appears that the US is not willing to allow 
their integrity to be jeopardised. By misinterpreting US policies towards 
university-based research, there is a grave danger that a European uni-
versity policy towards market-incentives will destroy these basic func-
tions. This would be detrimental to the global production of knowledge 
and would certainly harm the development prospects of Europe itself, 
particularly in comparison with the US. 
The analysis of the trajectory of US incentives for science and tech-
nology shows that during the second half of the twentieth century there 
has indeed been a steady shift of support from the public to the private 
sector. Additionally, intellectual property rights and other market-based 
incentive structures have been extended and used more widely. This 
trend has been identified and shown to be reason for concern by re-
searchers in the field. We share these concerns, but also find that there 
has been a core of science and technology in which the state has not 
pulled back in the US. We find that this is particularly the case for US 
universities.
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The main lesson we take from our analysis is that the US has not 
compromised public support for core areas or in those fields where there 
is a clear perception that market incentives are not adequate to meet the 
strategic targets of US policy. In particular, support for basic research 
and for university-based research by the public sector in the US has re-
mained strong and steady. Despite the widely-held belief that private 
revenues linked to R&D results are important sources of university in-
come, we show that this is not the case. A more general implication, be-
yond the importance of continued public support for universities, is that 
there is a considerable diversity of policy in US practice, and that all as-
pects of this diversity should be considered when taking the US as a ref-
erence.
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The Distributed Knowledge Base of
the Oil Industry in Venezuela and
Private-Public Dynamics
HEBE VESSURI, MARÍA VICTORIA CANINO AND
ISABELLE SÁNCHEZ-ROSE
1.  Introduct ion 
The research function was generalised in North American universities 
within the framework of 20th century industrialisation, together with 
those of preserving and transmitting knowledge in an organisational 
model for cognitive production that was exported to the entire world. 
This research function became part and parcel of the conventional wis-
dom of contemporary technological development (Arora and Rosenberg 
1998). It has come to be commonly accepted that the innovation process 
depends on dynamic links between the production of new knowledge, 
knowledge transfer, and economic performance. Although these factors 
are accelerators, there are also a few brakes – finance is one, but so also 
is research capability. Particularly in developing countries, attempts to 
restructure higher education to more efficiently and effectively serve as 
an economic driver have often floundered. The interface between aca-
demia and industry, particularly as concerns economic development and 
national welfare, has remained a difficult and elusive subject (Arvanitis 
and Villavicencio 1998; Vessuri 1998a, 1995a).
In connection with the public-private dynamics in higher education, 
we take a particular approach to the subject in this context, by looking 
into how currently (particularly in contexts of underdevelopment) the 
public and the private are interconnected, encompassing much broader 
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sectors of activity beyond higher education with contradictory implica-
tions and effects. Different from what happens in many wealthy econo-
mies where the university system affords the necessary training to a 
technically skilled labour force that also carries out the basic research 
supportive of a country’s industrial clusters, universities in developing 
nations, traditionally hailed as the engines of development and moderni-
sation, have typically had a limited role in the innovation process. In-
deed, higher education and the national industry have often remained 
distant (Vessuri 1995b). Understanding both innovation and higher edu-
cation in developing country contexts needs concrete analysis and theo-
retical reflection. To explore these issues in greater detail, this paper 
looks into the complex relations of knowledge in industry; the legacies 
of economic and intellectual elites and state power; the encounter of dif-
ferent forms of knowledge carrying unequal social prestige; and the 
roles of academic research, taking as empirical support the Venezuelan 
experience in connection with its oil industry.
Our analysis concentrates on five different settings or knowledge 
domains. The boundaries demarcating them are fuzzy; one will often en-
tail or involve the other. In our presentation we try to show that each re-
flects an important aspect of the same reality, illuminating a particular 
dimension. Understanding requires consideration of multiple interac-
tions whose cumulative effect results in peculiar configurations of forces 
and dimensions. Technical groups and their social environments create 
stabilised interdependencies that shape further action-including work 
toward new technology. They may be richer or poorer depending on the 
variety and density of elements and interactions that characterise them. 
In some sense this is an exploration of the notion of technological re-
gime:
“The rule -set or grammar embedded in a complex of engineering practices, 
production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, 
ways of handling relevant artifacts and persons, ways of defining problems-all 
of them embedded in institutions and infrastructures. Regimes mediate be-
tween specific innovations, as these are conceived, developed and introduced, 
and overall sociotechnical landscapes. Regimes are outcomes of earlier 
changes and they structure subsequent change.” (Rip and Kemp 1998) 
Each knowledge domain highlights specificities of its own, but shares a 
common basic universe (the oil industry) and a common history. How-
ever, as suggested, each inevitably gives only a partial view of that 
shared reality, while part and parcel of a complex universe of interac-
tions and meaning. The literature on determinants of innovation focuses 
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strongly on the private-for-profit sector, neglecting other actors and do-
mains involved in the co-evolution of technology and society. Since 
much analysis of knowledge creation as found in industrialised countries 
rests on R&D data (particularly intramural R&D carried out by firms) 
developing countries, whose firms are usually not innovative, are usu-
ally described as being ‘knowledge poor’. When one finds modern tech-
nology in place in the public sector in a developing country it often em-
bodies and expresses knowledge and value choices that, in their use and 
effects, are enforced upon the recipient host. These impose a greater de-
pendence on further outside knowledge in the form of actual operation, 
maintenance, and spare parts and simultaneously render local capabili-
ties less relevant and valuable. In our analysis we posit that a public in-
dustry that has inherited many features of the former private foreign 
concessionary companies and a public research establishment that ac-
cepts the tacit knowledge dynamics of the corporate culture and techno-
logical regime, will most likely determine the ultimate irrelevance of the 
local knowledge base to the corporate strategy. Before elaborating on 
this idea, we present the knowledge places examined to make up our ar-
gument. 
2.  The knowledge content  of  the oi l  industry 
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) is one of the world’s largest en-
ergy corporations, whose manufacturing and marketing network encom-
passes Venezuela, the Caribbean, the United States, and Europe. Before 
the intense process of merging, alliances, and fusions that globally re-
structured the oil sector between 1999 and 2001, PDVSA was third larg-
est among international refining industries; today it is the fifth largest oil 
exporter and eighth producer in the world. The history of this national-
ised oil industry is known in general terms, including the technological 
situation the country faced when nationalisation became effective (CE-
PET 1989; Brossard 1993). During nationalisation, the great challenge 
for PDVSA became to acquire commercial legitimacy. Thus it engaged 
not only in production activities in the areas of petroleum and petro-
chemistry, but also in technological R&D, education, and training in 
sectors linked to the energy industry. In the 1990s, to have influence and 
to be able to compete in the new global environment, PDVSA restruc-
tured its business fusing refining with marketing through the creation of 
a new business (Refining and Marketing). The six existing refineries in 
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Venezuela1 that had belonged to three different affiliate companies be-
came integrated under a single refining system in a move within PDVSA 
international refining circuit (with its eight refineries in the United 
States, nine in Europe and two in the Caribbean).2
In charge of R&D, basic engineering, technological support, and 
specialised technical services for the national oil industry, its technology 
affiliate – the Venezuelan Oil Technology Institute (INTEVEP) – be-
came a respected institute, with a staff of almost 2000 persons in the 
early 1990s, 40% of whom were qualified professionals in strategic dis-
ciplines for the industry’s business.3 It has been argued that the sui
generis features of INTEVEP made it a world class innovative company 
with little connection with other local institutions or set of firms; this 
would be one of the features of the Venezuelan experience, emphasising 
a key limiting aspect with regard to the innovative domestic capacity 
(Porter 1990). In other words, if long-term ability to translate domestic 
innovative capability into broadened international competitiveness rests 
on having strengths in multiple areas, then the existence of only a few 
fields of expertise will very unlikely produce long term national com-
petitive advantages. This is an additional reason for trying to understand 
the features of this industry’s knowledge base and cultural underpin-
nings.
If we are dissatisfied with the implicit technological determinism of 
the ’modern-looking’ industry approach to the relationship between in-
novation and growth – that makes it coterminous with R&D – then we 
must squarely face the question of the sources and determinants of tech-
nically useful knowledge. We need to consider under what circum-
stances industry decides to invest in the complex of physical and intan-
gible assets that make up a knowledge-intensive approach to production. 
This is an issue of corporate strategy and control. Recognition of the fact 
that firms interact with other institutions in a variety of ways leads us to 
                                             
1 They are: Paraguaná Refining Center,  Bajo Grande, El Palito, Puerto La 
Cruz, San Roque, and Isla. 
2 The net margin of refining is the difference between the value of elabo-
rated products and the value of the basket of processed crudes.  The first 
depends to a large extent on the complexity of the refinery, which is de-
termined by the capacity and nature of its plants. The second is given by 
the kind and quality of the processed crudes, being smaller to the extent 
that the crudes are heavier. Thus, the greater the complexity of a refinery 
and the heavier its diet, the larger its net margin. 
3 Some 10% had doctoral degrees, 15% were masters and 37% engineers 
and ‘licenciados’, with 17% of university technicians (técnicos superiores 
universitarios-TSU).
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consider two main relevant knowledge bases as far as petroleum is con-
cerned.
The specific knowledge-base of the international oil industry com-
prises the component available in the oil industry as a whole and the one 
that is produced and taken care of by the national company. There is also 
the generally applicable knowledge in Venezuelan society, with empha-
sis in the academic context and local engineering consulting firms. At 
the general level of the oil industry, firms in different countries often 
share scientific and technological parameters; there are shared intellec-
tual understandings concerning the technical functions, performance 
characteristics, use of materials, and so on of products. This part of the 
industrial knowledge base is a body of knowledge and practice that 
shapes the performance of all operating firms in an industry; it is acces-
sible knowledge which in principle is available to all firms. This knowl-
edge base does not exist in a vacuum, however. In the oil industry, it is 
developed, maintained, and disseminated by institutions of various 
kinds, and requires resources (often on a large scale) underlying the ex-
istence of a world market for oil and petrochemical technology that ac-
companies the evolution of organisational learning capabilities.
When the challenges and opportunities for chemical development in 
Venezuela are mentioned, the shocking news is that out of the 1,300,000 
barrels of crude per day that are refined, less than 1% is destined for lo-
cal industrialisation. This is indicative of the low domestic refining-
petrochemical integration and is in clear contrast with elsewhere in the 
world where a large portion of their chemical business is supported in 
refinery currents (Rosa et al. 2002).4 The extensive base of raw materials 
in natural gas, olefins, methanol, and refinery currents, together with the 
consumption of chemical products used in every stage of the construc-
tion of wells and oil production, offers opportunities to reverse this 
situation and develop a chemical industry integrated with the oil sector. 
This would take advantage of abundant raw materials and domestic de-
mand. Indeed, it is possible to take advantage of the state company 
PDVSA as a lever in two directions for national chemical development: 
(a) through its demand of chemical products for its oil production opera-
                                             
4 The ‘chemical activity’ of the large oil companies, such as TotalFinaElf, 
ExxonMobil and BP-Amoco, has been a consequence of factors such as 
power, experience, market, technology, environment, etc. Considering the 
technology factor, in average, disbursements in research and technological 
development have represented from 3% to 5% of sales. This has allowed 
them to mitigate the reduction in earning margins during periods of low 
prices, affording greater stability to total earnings and optimisation of in-
vested capital.
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tions, and (b) as a generator of the basics and/or intermediaries within its 
business lines, with the aim of promoting a domestic production system.   
However, the country has had only limited success in learning to ex-
ploit existing processing potential for products of greater added value 
such as petrochemicals. The development of this sector in Venezuela 
falls short of expectations. Only recently has a greater awareness of the 
importance of downstream industrialisation of refinery currents used 
mainly in the production of fuels developed in products of high added 
value that may be manufactured directly by third parties or in associa-
tion with one of PDVSA’s affiliates. The main barriers to greater indus-
trialisation have been identified as financial, associated with the fields of 
manufacture and product development, policy insufficiencies, inade-
quate juridical and regulatory framework, a limited physical and service 
infrastructure, and a limited technological absorption capability. The 
small scale of firms, a lack of integration, deficient technology, long 
times of execution, high costs of plant construction, etc. are also men-
tioned. Additionally, reference is made to a persistently limited effort at 
marketing and sales, which require other capabilities; the country has lit-
tle knowledge and experience in exports, particularly of technology. 
Thus, although education is conventionally highlighted as one of the ef-
ficacious elements for the achievement of economic and social devel-
opment, in practice the significance of education and educational tasks 
in development is very complex and requires the accompaniment of 
other sources of production to make optimal use of the educated labour 
force.
The knowledge base of INTEVEP as the technology arm of the oil 
industry is highly specific to its very specialised features, with some 
technologies that it understands well and which form the basis of its 
competitive position. Founded in 1976, it came to have a very good 
laboratory infrastructure (16,000 m2) with advanced instrumentation and 
an extensive network of computers and workstations, a technological in-
formation centre-library with international databases, a complex of 27 
pilot plants and 11 service units for the simulation of processes that al-
lowed solving operational problems of varied complexity, as well as en-
gine benches for testing lubricants and fuels. An ‘Experimental Produc-
tion Centre’ in the state of Zulia, comprising an experimental well or 
field laboratory and a bench of perforation fluids and well cementing al-
lows simulating and reproducing the real conditions of Venezuelan oil 
wells.5 Its research areas include heavy and extra-heavy crude exploita-
tion, upgrading and conversion, clean fuel process, exploitation and 
                                             
5 http://www.pdvsa.com/intevep/espanol/intevep_recur_es.html 
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drilling technologies, petroleum activities in materials science and envi-
ronment, industrial use of natural gas, product quality, and specialties 
and chemicals.6
Since this is an industry with reputedly high international standards, 
it might well be claimed that this should be the most knowledge-
intensive sector in the entire economy.  However, although much con-
ventional analysis of technological innovation rests on intramural R&D 
data, it would be mistaken to over-identify knowledge creation with only 
this kind of activity, for both conceptual and practical reasons. Concep-
tually, R&D data tends to rest on a view of innovation that overempha-
sises the discovery of new scientific or technical principles as the point 
of departure of an innovation process. It sees innovation as a set of de-
velopment stages originating in research (as a consequence of the al-
leged prior significance of research behind the use of R&D as a key 
knowledge indicator).
A different notion, one of learning, has been preferred by some so-
cial analysts for a number of reasons. Learning need not necessarily en-
tail discovery of new technical scientific principles, and can equally be 
based on activities that recombine or adapt existing forms of knowledge 
(Smith 2002). Many relevant activities are not measured or visualised in 
R&D data, such as training, market research, design, trial production and 
tooling up, and IPR costs; R&D appears as just one component of inno-
vation activities, and by no means the largest.7 This does not deny the 
importance of R&D, but repositions it in the innovation process as a 
problem-solving activity rather than an initiating act of discovery. By 
the same token, it means re-valuing the significance of the contribution 
of other sources of knowledge. Many of the relevant complexes of in-
struments and specialised materials as well as the skills and technologies 
needed to utilise them, lie outside the scope of R&D and even of indus-
try. They can be found in the sciences and in technology/technologist 
supplying institutions, in the wider circles suggested earlier.  These other 
inputs are supported by little explored, indirect links with universities, 
research institutes, and supplier companies. This brings us to our second 
knowledge place – the supplier firms.
                                             
6 Among its major results or products is fuel for power generation, proc-
esses for heavy crude conversion, environmental bioremediation technol-
ogy, diverse drilling additives, and fluids. It came to have a portfolio of 
over 260 technological developments generated throughout almost 30 
years of experience in research, development, and technical services. For a 
socio-historical study of some of these technologies see Vessuri and Can-
ino (1996); Canino (1997).
7 The figures for R&D in INTEVEP varied in time around a proportion that 
changed from a R&D/service ratio of 70%-30% to one of 30%-70%. 
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3.  Suppl ier  f i rms to the oi l  industry 
If we return to our initial argument that countries in general terms do not 
achieve outstanding performance by means of isolated firms or sectors, 
but rather by the grouping of associated sectors that maintain intense co-
operation and competition interactions, then the structure of customer-
supplier relations appears as a key element in the strategies for creating 
and consolidating competitive advantages and adding value in produc-
tive chains.  When there is a close work relation between suppliers and 
customers, both tend to act in a fast track for the diffusion of firm to firm 
information. This has a direct effect on innovation and improvement 
processes throughout the chain, creating a mechanism for the generation 
and mobilisation of information that allows agents to get the guidelines 
for resource deployment and the emerging techniques and opportunities 
at lower transaction costs. 
When we turn to Venezuela, we find three different industrial pro-
ductive structures in the national economy (Pirela 2004). At its core lies 
a productive structure constituted almost entirely by process industries 
directly linked to oil production, almost totally in the hands of the State. 
In principle, their high relative productivity determines a broad access to 
the most advanced scientific and technological resources and the most 
sophisticated managerial tools available in the global business world. In 
this, not only PDVSA is involved but also large foreign corporations ac-
tive in the country through their local affiliates.  Other public oil firms 
are also involved: large petrochemical firms, power generation, trans-
mission and distribution companies, Guyana’s large metallurgical firms, 
and public services such as water.  
A second productive structure, mostly private and made up both by 
product and process industries, was essentially created with the indirect 
support of the oil wealth. This structure consists of traditional invest-
ment spaces that in general have not demanded high investment levels 
and are targeted to end – and mass consumption (food; beverages; cloth-
ing; textiles; metallurgy, particularly automobiles and auto-parts; and 
inputs for the construction industry). Industrial policy has traditionally 
considered only this structure as an object of policy. Indeed this produc-
tive structure has been conceived as an alternative rather than as a com-
plement to the oil economy, in the absence of a real interest to knit 
denser productive processes. Industrial policy was kept apart from any-
thing associated with the industrialising role of the oil industry; this sec-
tor has been uncompetitive.  
A third productive structure or group of firms, almost totally private 
and often linked to foreign companies through consortiums, produces 
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goods and services for the oil and petrochemical industries and process 
industries in general. These firms have managed to acquire a consider-
able competitive potential, precisely because of their condition as sup-
pliers to the oil sector. However, this group of firms has been almost to-
tally beyond the scope of industrial policy, while its successes or failures 
have been related to the effects of market forces or the ups and downs of 
PDVSA’s policies. Even in this case, PDVSA has historically seen any 
special attention in developing the competitiveness of domestic suppliers 
as sheer backward protectionism. Added to this is corporate conduct fa-
vouring opacity and confidentiality; the result has been placing regular 
domestic suppliers at a disadvantage vis à vis foreign suppliers. Domes-
tic suppliers have not been able to count on reliable and disaggregated 
estimates about PDVSA’s investment and acquisitions plans except for 
very general estimates about volumes of investment, generally written in 
English and first appearing in the large acquisition centres of Texas or 
Europe.  
This sector, producer of goods and services, which attends the do-
mestic demand of the oil industry, is complex and quite atomised. It is 
formed by several hundred firms, with a great variation in size, activity, 
geographic location, and source of capital. These are firms producing 
specialised metal-mechanic manufactures; electric and electronic 
equipment; engineering consulting and development; support of infor-
mation and communication technologies; building and assembling; spe-
cialised field services, including maintenance and repair; environmental 
services; assessment of operational technical variables; work safety and 
health; and many other aspects related to the process industries, whose 
experience was built to a great extent on the basis of demand from the 
oil industry and the technical standards imposed by PDVSA (Pirela 
2000).
During the ‘oil opening’ in the second half of the 1990s, expecta-
tions were high in this sector; most firms opted for increasing their op-
erational capabilities, getting new partnerships with technology or capi-
tal suppliers, and/or by sub-contracting production operations or ser-
vices.8 Frustration at not finding an adequate response in PDVSA’s
high management to incorporate them effectively to the ‘growth loco-
motive’ that the ‘oil opening’ was supposed to be, resulted in what may 
be described as the worst crisis of the sector during 1998-2003. The in-
                                             
8  It has since become clear that although the publicised intention of the so 
called ‘oil opening’ was to transform the national oil company into the 
‘locomotive of the national economy’, the international privatist orienta-
tion that prevailed left few opportunities to unleash a really national proc-
ess of technology production. 
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coherence of PDVSA’s behaviour and of the ‘oil opening’ process with 
respect to domestic suppliers became evident. The firms’ excessive de-
pendence on PDVSA – excluding possibilities of diversification of their 
customers’ portfolio and/or opportunities for exploring new business ar-
eas – entailed their extreme vulnerability to the ups and downs of the in-
ternational oil business, with adverse implications for the investment of 
fixed capital, plant expansion and technological development. A macro-
economic context that was adverse to the growth of competition by the 
domestic suppliers of the oil industry and the volatility of oil prices in 
the international market could only result in the adoption of a conserva-
tive behaviour characteristic of a survival strategy by those firms.
Another indication is PDVSA’s inability or lack of sufficient trust to 
produce and make available to its own buying systems, huge databases 
built over many years of assessment by INTEVEP and the results of 
contracts with its domestic suppliers. There is no doubt that a database 
of this sort is strategically valuable for PDVSA and the country, particu-
larly in terms of industrial and technological policy. It may be men-
tioned that domestic academic institutions such as the Center for Devel-
opment Studies (CENDES), the Institute of Higher Studies in Admini-
stration (IESA), other public and private agencies such as the National 
Institute of Statistics, the Science Council, PetroLatin, CONINDUS-
TRIA, Venezuela Competitiva, and others had been working and accu-
mulating data with this orientation for quite some time. What transpires 
from the relationships between the oil industry and domestic suppliers is 
that although there has been a local infrastructure for building a consid-
erable amount of equipment and other parts for the industry, PDVSA 
preferred systematically to buy everything abroad leaving only the de-
sign to be done locally at most. Since the design engineering cost is 
probably 10% of the value of a plant, while a significant amount of 
money is involved in construction, one begins to understand the function 
of engineering within PDVSA and its domestic suppliers vis à vis for-
eign procurement. Its engineers were engineers-administrators who 
managed contracts without carrying projects through; that was done by 
consulting firms. 
Some analysts argue that a negative view with regard to Venezuelan 
firms among PDVSA executives had influenced the public opinion ma-
trix (Pirela 2004). Venezuelan society and different governments have 
traditionally had mistrust as starting point for negotiating with domestic 
entrepreneurs. Dominant culture does not perceive that the will for profit 
of an entrepreneur may not only be honest but also positive for devel-
opment. Be it as it may, the fact is that the foreign firms that participated 
in the ‘oil opening’ process were well established corporations in the 
THE DISTRIBUTED KNOWLEDGE BASE OF THE OIL INDUSTRY IN VENEZUELA
339
world market and most have fostered very broad, complex, and costly 
programs of supplier development and supply chains in their traditional 
areas of operation. Some examples are the CRINE program (U.K.) and 
NORSOK (Norway), where firms such as Shell, British Petroleum, and 
others also present in Venezuela, participate. Within the setting of the 
‘oil opening’ contracts, issues concerning the supply of domestic goods 
and services remained as part of the unfulfilled rhetoric, with very little 
that could effectively serve as an explicit policy of direct incentive to the 
national component within the process.  
It is known that process industries tend to employ few people. This, 
among other things, produces ‘the enclave effect’ recognised in under-
developed economies. However, the combined result of the oil industry 
with that of its suppliers in the domestic economy could result in a more 
balanced situation with positive social effects, because the related sec-
tors are labour intensive, employing workers with different levels of 
qualification. These firms need to grow, since most are too small by in-
ternational standards and must develop competitive advantages in tech-
nology, prices and quality, and delivery conditions. There is potential for 
hundreds of private firms to be strengthened and acquire a stable com-
petitive capacity and export scale.
4. Capabi l i t ies and know-how in 
the communit ies of  pract ice
Our third setting refers to technological communities of practice. Our 
evidence comes from refinery operators, that is, technicians attending 
the needs of the oil plants both in the open air maintenance of a valve 
and at the console of automated functions within the refinery’s control 
units. In the context of the refinery, the organisation of work involves re-
lationships between different generations (masters and apprentices; old 
workers and freshmen), institutions (technical colleges, schools, firms,  
unions) and cultural, social, and political identities that combine tacit 
and codified knowledge. Observation, imitation, empirical experience, 
the process of doing together, the exchange of experiences, and the re-
flection upon what is done constitute the basis of tacit knowledge that is 
partially converted into codified knowledge through linguistic commu-
nication, abstract concepts, formal knowledge, codification, and simula-
tion programs, etc. What we look at in this context is the technology’s 
cognitive locus as embodied in a community of practitioners and the tra-
ditions of practice which the community possesses (Constant II 1984).  
HEBE VESSURI, MARÍA VICTORIA CANINO AND ISABELLE SÁNCHEZ-ROSE
340
Oil technical systems have meanings with multiple impacts and 
serve to establish and systematically sustain asymmetrical power rela-
tions. An instance of such asymmetry is expressed in the tensions be-
tween procedural manuals (identified with the engineering function) and 
actual practice (perceived as part of operational experience), according 
to the different positions in which workers find themselves in the hierar-
chical oil technical system. There is ambivalence toward such manuals 
that in theory embody the mode of work within the firm; they are in fact 
constantly under revision because the daily routine makes evident the 
presence of failures, errors, and insufficiencies. The main trouble with 
procedural manuals lies in the difficulties of establishing a correspon-
dence between the generality of the norm and the particularity of prac-
tice. The way traditions are built in routine oil technological practice in-
volves the application of general norms to individual and concrete situa-
tions, but include the possibility that the individual operator may even-
tually act in the form of an exception to the rule in singular and contin-
gent situations (Aranciaga n.d.). 
The notion of ‘efficiency’ offers a powerful discursive mechanism in 
which the consideration that the aim of the firm is to obtain profit from 
the productive relationship prevails. Efficiency can be translated into or-
der legitimated by the interests of all the stakeholders in the technical 
system. When there is a distinction between management and operation 
groups, as in the refinery, it is possible to observe a polarisation of inter-
ests where order is imposed. The work organisation is not determined by 
the strictly technical aspects of the system, but by those in condition of 
imposing order and those subjected to it. Concrete problems of legiti-
macy derive from this division of labour between management and op-
erators. It may be evident that operations by means of the procedural 
manual are ultimately an imposition. Normatively, no worker can escape 
it despite its recurrent errors, although tacitly he can do it, while in the 
operation a traditional type of legitimacy prevails.
Domination is defined by the expected obedience of the others. Obe-
dience is the result not only of the power of the oil firm (especially 
through its capacity of providing employment) but also the result of the 
belief of operators in the technological function of managers. A contin-
gent event allowed us to put in evidence the structure of domination ex-
erted by management and to revalue the importance of tacit and informal 
knowledge embodied in the community of practitioners made up of re-
finery operators. The refinery of Puerto La Cruz was the only one that 
did not stop operations in the country during the strike of the oil industry 
aimed to depose the government between December 2002 and February 
2003. Keeping the plants functioning allowed insuring the supply of 
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gasoline to the eastern part of the country during the early stage of the 
crisis and later to the entire country, significantly contributing to defeat 
the attempt to paralyse the Venezuelan economy. On this occasion, we 
were able to look at the bouleversement of the work hierarchy explicitly 
anchored in formal codified knowledge stratification.9
The technical operators were unexpectedly ordered by management 
to stop plant operations between December 2nd and 6th (Canino and Ves-
suri 2005)10 in a context in which they feared that they were being 
passed wrong information by their higher ups who were perceived as 
sabotaging production. Jumping over the line of command and out of 
sheer confusion and panic at their responsibility in the handling of op-
erations within the refinery, they started to exchange views and informa-
tion with their immediate fellow workers and realised that the informa-
tion they were delivered by the managers was untrue. The international 
delivery portion in this refinery was also barred in a combined action by 
management that controlled a number of related activities, with the con-
nivance of the foreign tankers stationed outside the local port. The do-
mestic truck filling station (‘el llenadero’) was also barred. The same 
happened with all the informatics component of the refinery: bills, or-
ders, lists of salary and wage payments, system of health insurance, 
payments to suppliers, lists of clients, etc. Indeed the five floors of the 
Management and Service building in the refinery were almost empty. A 
few people remained working at the piers but none at the port; most op-
erators that remained active were from the refining area.
The decision to continue operations in such irregular conditions im-
plied that the workers from different units that did not join the strike had 
to work together, eating and sleeping in the same place because in addi-
                                             
9 This could be seen in analogy with Garfinkel’s ‘breaching experiment,’ a 
research procedure that disrupts ordinary action so the analyst may “detect 
and expose some expectancies that lend commonplace scenes their famil-
iar life-as-usual character, and to relate these to the stable social structures 
of everyday activities” (Garfinkel 1967).  The refinery in question was a 
relatively small and old facility with a low level of complexity (HHC op-
erations), which because of this probably caused less interest among the 
leaders of the strike.  In the context of a situation of uncertainty, bewil-
derment, anxiety, and confusion that ensued, there was a breach with the 
normative order and everyday structures of surveillance, governance, and 
control were brought into question (Mann et al. 2003). 
10 According to formal rules of management, a stoppage in a refinery can 
only happen either to repair or to enlarge it. In either case it has to be care-
fully programmed in a very detailed process which involves hiring a lot of 
people and getting parts and inputs in large quantities that must be avail-
able on the spot. A repair and maintenance stoppage was programmed for 
April 2003. 
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tion to the lack of staff they had to remain vigilant against the possibility 
of sabotage. Because the automated systems had been blocked, opera-
tions had to be carried out manually and they sought the help of retired 
personnel and of other staff who had been expelled by the firm and were 
remembered by their fellow workers for their know-how and experience 
in operations. Equally workers from contracting companies that operated 
within PDVSA lent their services in view of the crisis in the refinery in 
critical areas. The campaign to discredit the workers capacities by local 
media became a huge psychological pressure. They were frequently 
frightened at the public visibility they acquired in the emergency; they 
also started to receive threats against themselves and their family, urging 
them to abandon their struggle. During the emergency, everyone did 
everything in what turned to out be in practice an extreme flattening of 
management. The authority structure was maintained by the presence 
and action of the people from INTEVEP and technical operators that 
remained loyal to the company, but they had to rely heavily on the sev-
eral groups of unskilled workers that helped insure operations and pro-
tected the facility against sabotage, in a highly dangerous environment. 
Some of those people did not even belong to the oil industry but were 
residents of neighbouring shanty towns who were pro government and 
politically organised in the so called ‘círculos bolivarianos’.
This experience showed many things. Of interest to our case is that 
there is also a significant knowledge source for industry in people not 
usually included in the descriptions of human capital or when talking 
about the human capabilities of a nation. With this striking example we 
simply want to call attention to this ignored component of the industrial 
knowledge base and the importance of recognising it. 
5.  The Universi ty Knowledge Domain  
We need to understand how and under what circumstances knowledge-
creating institutions actually generate and sustain cognitive flows be-
tween themselves and into the production system. This is our fifth 
knowledge domain. The private or non-private nature of science is not 
an intrinsic property. Degrees of ‘appropriability’ and rivalry are the 
outcome of the strategic configurations of the relevant actors and the in-
vestments they have already made or are thinking of making. In the co-
operation between industry and university the strategies of exchange and 
pooling of knowledge between partners who dispose of a monopoly over 
the investments necessary for the use of knowledge makes science ap-
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pear as public, while in fact it could be seen as nothing other than a pri-
vate good shared between several owners, as proposed by Callon (1994).
Through the years, the nationalised Venezuelan oil industry made 
small, clearly insufficient, steps to develop science and technology re-
sources in the domestic academic context. This seems odd as in view of 
the nationalisation of the oil industry one would have expected the role 
of the local research universities to be enhanced. A possible interpreta-
tion why this was not the case is that the institutional development poli-
cies pursued by the nationalised oil industry were partly responsible for 
the gap between the high technical levels and work conditions achieved 
by the corporation in several areas and those prevailing in the rest of the 
economy and society. INTEVEP’s drive to create its own in-house 
knowledge base turned out to have negative effects as far as shaping up 
a domestic base of capabilities. An institutional policy for training hu-
man resources in the best foreign centres was put in place. When techni-
cal human resources began to be locally trained in the country, the oil 
industry persistently drained valuable professional cadres from the coun-
try’s institutions of higher education without simultaneously defining an 
ambitious and consistent long-term national science-technology-man-
agement training plan with a strategic vision with regard to the basic
source of national wealth.
When PDVSA created its own centre of oil advanced studies (CIED) 
it sent a clear signal to the public universities that it would invade their 
traditional spaces to solve its advanced technology problems. The 
boundary between a ‘public’ science that disseminates its results and one 
that assumes their confidentiality is a result of (private) strategic deci-
sions that may lead into a local public good, one possible mode of priva-
tisation. This is particularly the case in connection with public industries 
that, as far as they are companies, must assume business logic. Even 
when directed to publicly disseminated science, their support can easily 
be interpreted as aid for actors who, for strategic reasons (risk sharing, 
cooperative agreements for the purposes of profiting from complemen-
tary assets) have preferred to make a fraction of the knowledge that they 
produce non-rival and non-exclusive and another portion rival and ex-
clusive.
Initially this inward institutional growth in the oil industry may have 
been unavoidable to some extent in view of the lack of domestic redun-
dant capacity, which proved so important in the industrialisation of 
countries such as Germany in mid-19th century (Mendelsohn 1964). But 
in the long run, this policy weakened the national academic system and 
with it the very source of local production of knowledge. Distrust and 
caution vis à vis the demands originating in the public oil sector became 
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a common feature in the public universities, as had previously occurred 
with those coming from the foreign private sector. When one asks
what the role of the university has been, the answer is not strategic. It 
has provided basic training to the personnel that joined industry, geolo-
gists, geophysicists, chemists, oil engineers, etc., accepting a subordinate 
position. Why do we say this? Because the oil industry had a human re-
source development agenda which supposed that people had to take a 
battery of ‘technical’ courses to be internally assigned to the different 
jobs. Only after taking so many courses one was eventually ‘chan-
nelled’, not only technically but also absorbing the corporate culture. 
Courses were taught by Shell, Exxon, etc., that is, the matrixes of the 
former concessionary companies.
In connection with the university knowledge domain, we look at two 
complementary university contexts: the faculty of Engineering and the 
faculty of Science.
5.1 University-Industry Collaboration:
Exploration and Production
The situation commented in previous paragraphs is reflected in the Oil 
School at the Central University. Although it does not have the smallest 
number of students, it has always had the lowest budget in the engineer-
ing faculty, with much reduced physical areas available. With knowl-
edge increasingly a value asset, the school appeared as an institution 
bogged down with many resistances to change and internal disagree-
ments about how to interpret what being ‘committed’ to social and eco-
nomic development meant. Some of the faculty interviewed believed 
that the interest and good will of PDVSA was crucial to the school’s 
survival and updating. However, this view was clearly not shared by 
other members of the university community, or by elements in PDVSA 
and the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM). This helps explain the 
paradoxical weak situation in which these schools have always found 
themselves in this oil-producing country. The other side of the coin of 
the mistreatment of universities by the oil industry is attributable to the 
deep suspicion with which broad segments of the academic community 
have always seen the association of the university with the oil industry, 
as something ‘impure’.
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A special attempt of approximation of the oil industry to the univer-
sities occurred in 1998 in the context of the national oil opening pro-
gram, which was interpreted by some as a re-privatisation of the oil in-
dustry. A general cooperation agreement was signed between two 
PDVSA units (INTEVEP and CIED) and three national universities 
(UCV, LUZ and UDO) for national strengthening of the Geosciences 
and Petroleum schools.12 The underlying reasoning could well be that 
given the fact that the public university was the nation’s critical con-
science, giving it a share in the business would convince it to acquiesce. 
Albeit not very enthusiastically, PDVSA declared its interest to make 
the university more responsive to the needs of the oil business and its 
willingness to support academic initiatives with a business orientation, 
which in principle would lever the self-management of universities and 
improve academic R&D. However, this program became entangled in 
the nation’s political conflict of the last few years, in which the current 
government aimed to change the course of the nation and the oil indus-
try. None of the institutions involved was spared. By 2004, the time of 
our study, the school was once again languishing and mistrust between 
the national oil industry and the public university school was as high as 
it had always been (Vessuri and Canino 2004).  
To complete the story of the approximation of PDVSA to the three 
public universities having oil-related programs during the oil opening 
juncture we have to mention a PDVSA-universities business process 
model established through the PDVSA-Universities Mixed Firms 
scheme. This consisted in the establishment of mixed companies for the 
operation of oil fields of which PDVSA controls 51% and the university 
49%.13 The mixed company scheme was presented as ‘a model of inte-
gration between university and industry’. Start-up funds were provided 
by PDVSA as a loan to be repaid as operations progressed.14 University 
partners were expected to concentrate in the research and development 
of technologies for the enhanced exploitation of the fields. Through this 
deal it was expected that geology, geophysics, and petroleum engineer-
ing students would do practical work in the field beyond the knowledge 
acquired in the classroom. The explicit assumption was that this might 
not only result in more integral training but could also contribute to raise 
                                             
12 Interview M. J. Lazo, PDVSA-CIED, 07-06-2001. 
13 In the modality of the Third Round Operational Agreements PDVSA-
Universities. 
14 The fields are Socororo, in Anzoátegui state, operated by PETROUCV, 
S.A.; Mara East in Zulia state, operated by OLEOLUZ, S.A., and Jobo in 
Monagas state, by PETROUDO, S.A. Tryptic from PDVSA ‘Empresas 
mixtas PDVSA Universidades’, May 2001. 
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these schools to international standards since teachers and students 
would be continuously exposed to the real environment of work and 
business (Olivares 2001). 
The agreement also paid special attention to the promotion of the ex-
change of professionals in key positions, so as to develop operational 
and managerial skills among academics. Similarly, INTEVEP specialists 
(PhDs) were to be assigned to key posts in the universities as a way of 
fostering technological R&D, as well as transferring the industry’s ex-
perience in integral project management. Students and faculty would be 
involved in every phase of field development. Faculty exchange between 
highly recognised programs of national and foreign universities and 
teacher and student participation in international technical events would 
be fostered.15 Within a plan of intensive thesis work, short and longer-
term student internships, and promotion programs aligned with the de-
velopment plan of the allocated fields, INTEVEP was given the respon-
sibility of defining the contents of thesis work and research projects, 
search for tutors, etc. Technology and Information centres in the univer-
sities, and basic R&D in geosciences and petroleum engineering would 
be strengthened. A field-work semester would be implemented in the 
disciplines of Geosciences and Petroleum engineering. Finally ‘cross-
posting’ in teaching and research would be promoted within the strategic 
alliances with service companies, aiming at developing domestic capital 
through domestic firms of technical consulting and operating companies.
In November 2000 PDVSA signed agreements with the three  uni-
versities to exploit the fields granted to the mixed firms.16 Actual opera-
erations began in the PETROUCV business two years later. A thesis pro-
duced in the Engineering School largely based on a study carried out
by the UCV Oil Consulting Corporation (CORPOMENE), advised the 
university to admit the high risk levels in the Updated Development Plan 
of PETROUCV and recommended maintaining a conservative approach 
under which the materialisation of probable and possible reserves would 
be progressively gauged. It was estimated that the project would have a 
‘supported life’ of some 10 to 12 years. Although apparently the com-
pany was still operational at the level of the university leadership in 
                                             
15 Interview with Victor Escalona, vice general manager of PETROUCV, 
S.A. 23-05-2001. 
16 The working scheme required knowledge of the processes, application of 
technology and a level of competence for integrating coordinated teams, 
relative to four fundamental and six support processes: management of ex-
ternal relations; administration of financial resources, goods and services; 
coordination of  human resources; and prevention and control of active 
losses.
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2004 when this paper was written, the Petroleum school had ceased to 
have direct interlocutors in its areas of competence, leaving unfulfilled 
the teaching and research purposes originally envisaged. In the case of 
Petro-UDO, operations had not started in Oriente University because the 
university was in no condition to do it and had to hire an external firm. 
5.2 University-Industry Collaboration:
The role of university science
Venezuela has been training scientists in catalysis for the last 35 years; 
as a result it has a stock of highly qualified personnel. The country has 
grown a capacity of generating catalytic technologies in connection with 
refining and satisfying the needs of its oil industry within a wide range 
of applications. Since this is one of the knowledge fields that has experi-
enced a more continuous effort at building up national capacity in both 
industry and academy, it is interesting to reconstruct the way relation-
ships between both have evolved.  
Catalysis in Venezuela can be traced back to 1964 when the first 
course was taught in a Venezuelan university. Since then the subject has 
spread to other academic institutions and is found today in at least 12 in-
stitutions of higher education, where groups of different sizes and de-
grees of consolidation pursue some research activity. The oldest group is 
the Center of Catalysis at UCV’s Chemistry School that was also in the 
origin of the Catalysis activity at INTEVEP. Some of its members have 
been actively engaged in contract-research with the industrial technol-
ogy company at different times (Andréu et al. 2004).
Venezuela publicly funded many of the scholarships to train scien-
tists abroad. International collaboration with French catalysis schools 
began in the 1970s and became significant in the 1980s when economic 
crisis curtailed domestic fellowship programs (Arvanitis and Vessuri 
2001). Collaboration with the Ibero-American network framed under the 
CYTED was also instrumental in the development of research capabili-
ties, through its Catalysis and Adsorbents sub-program and the various 
thematic networks it promoted.  Although the main objective of these 
programs of scientific training and collaboration was articulating re-
search in catalysis to the interests of the oil and petrochemical industry, 
they basically reinforced academic research, and gave local scientists the 
opportunity of participating in international research programs. They fa-
voured collaboration with foreign institutions whose international pres-
tige helped validate the work and credibility of the growing domestic 
catalytic community (Vessuri et al. 2003). University labs in general are 
conducting good quality research although the lack of large and costly 
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equipment is among the main shortcomings of academic labs. In the ab-
sence of clear signals from the nationalised industry and ignorant of the 
industrial technological dynamic, academic R&D has proceeded on the 
theoretical assumption of the needs of the oil industry, making guesses 
in view of the special nature of its resource base of heavy and extra-
heavy crude.
As far as INTEVEP as the technology arm of the oil industry, the 
hard institutional learning it had undergone of identifying market oppor-
tunities and adjusting to rapid changes of course, handling secrecy and 
confidentiality, the false starts, wrong strategic decisions, a certain arro-
gance (real or perceived) on the part of affluent INTEVEP staff towards 
poorer university counterparts, did not favour its interaction with aca-
deme. Lack of familiarity in the academic domain with intellectual 
property arrangements and their implications have deterred industry 
from working more closely with university researchers.  Consequently, 
in view of the lack of effective demand from industry, a work style de-
veloped in universities that lacked competitiveness, had low productivity 
(according to a recent estimate, 0.30 to 1.0 paper per year depending on 
whether scientific papers or all publications, including patents,17 were 
considered (Vessuri 1998a) and little visibility (since most of the work 
was published in local and other non-mainstream outlets).
The 1980s were a particularly harmful decade for the academic 
community, with a recruitment gap because of budget insufficiencies 
compounded by the retirement of many members of the founding gen-
eration of professional researchers. In more recent years things improved 
somewhat with the emergence of new groups in the province. But in the 
1990s established groups had to compete with newer research special-
ties, under the unwarranted public perception that catalysis already had 
‘too many’ people and had in the past received inordinate public sup-
port. Thus cadres of researchers in this field began to get older without 
being replaced in proportion. This became particularly visible in the case 
of the largest academic group, the Center of Catalysis at UCV (Vessuri 
1998b, Vessuri and Canino 1996, 2002).   
In 1997 the largest national concentration in terms of catalysis capa-
bility was in INTEVEP with some 50 research staff in the Catalysis sec-
tion. That year reorganisation was attempted to fuse different groups 
with the aim of reinforcing the position of the company as technology 
supplier. A new scheme of work by project and expertise was expected 
                                             
17 The number of patents developed by INTEVEP in collaboration with uni-
versities is less than 5% of the national scientific production in the field of 
catalysis, much below other production modalities. 
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to bring INTEVEP’s process engineers and catalytic chemists closer to 
business opportunities, inducing them to define more concrete projects 
to be developed by the company in the short and medium term. The stra-
tegic decision was to become a technological leader in catalysts and ad-
sorbents, and the preferred supplier of PDVSA in catalytic technologies. 
This meant organising business units dedicated to customers, diffusion 
and sales of the product portfolio, and strategic units in charge of devel-
oping the knowledge that would be required in the long and short run. 
The needs of adding value to the resource base made up of mostly heavy 
and extra-heavy crude, was said to guide the institutional research strat-
egy in an increasingly exacting market. This move was apparently un-
successful, leading at the time to a great deal of frustration among ca-
talysis researchers, for it meant the disruption and abandonment of re-
search lines and its dilution as a knowledge area within the company. 
However, we have seen that in the case of the emergency described in 
section 4, those capacities were put to the test successfully as a conse-
quence of that reorganisation that had forced researchers to visit and get 
familiar with the operational fields, among other things.   
Today the government is aware that it is time to have existing capa-
bilities framed within a national strategy that makes optimal use of exist-
ing advanced personnel and foresees its renewal and enlargement in in-
dustry, universities, and other research centres in the medium term. Re-
search productivity must be raised; the institutional distribution of indi-
vidual researchers in the national territory must be revised for the inte-
gration of efforts. Among the reasons for inter-group and inter-
institutional collaboration are the rising costs of doing research in com-
petitive areas. Current fragmentation and isolation of research groups 
can be made functional by decentralising tasks and using fruitfully the 
specific knowledge advantages present in individual laboratories.
A project of a National Program for Chemistry and Catalysis is ac-
tively trying to coordinate efforts aiming at application. It seeks better 
formulae to insure a greater interaction between elements of the national 
innovation system, including how to link public R&D institutions with 
the private sector and higher education. A key to this is to focus direct 
investments in science and technology for long-term economic purposes, 
useful research in the broad sense that includes basic technology and 
also basic research. The government’s role in promoting the effective 
use and absorption of technology and knowledge in the economic do-
main is another key emphasis, as is the recognition that the use of a 
broad variety of policy tools and incentives (not only in R&D) is a ne-
cessity to guarantee an adequate mix.
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A joint effort by a carefully designed division of tasks is expected to 
create social and scientific connections between researchers, leading to 
greater efficiency and quality. Collaboration may also be stimulated by 
improved access to communication networks. Networking actively fos-
tered by INTEVEP might result in a stronger coalition and social con-
nection among researchers of both industrial and academic contexts, 
creating an environment conducive to the development of knowledge ac-
tivities with the desired speed. Industry must be at the helm in the inter-
action between the two contexts, causing a strong common drive that 
will affect all research areas involved. But surely this would not prevent 
the growth of an enriching collaboration at the horizontal level in the 
academic community.
Figure 1: Knowledge base of the Venezuelan Oil Industry 
6.  Discussion 
In the heading of this article we mentioned public-private dynamics. We 
feel that in their combination we may find a better understanding of the 
structural features of the problem. We argue that the distributed knowl-
edge base of the oil industry in Venezuela is an aspect of knowledge 
production that must be considered by the higher education community, 
although it is qualitatively different from higher education in several im-
portant respects. Under the conditions of the public-private dynamics, 
the required knowledge base becomes a more complex issue, touching 
on basic dimensions that lead to rethinking education and training. 
Hence, instead of concentrating only on higher education, we looked at 
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knowledge activities in five different settings or domains related to the 
oil industry and started our analysis by considering the industry’s gen-
eral knowledge base, its deployment of scientific and technological ca-
pabilities in production, finally looking more specifically into the local 
sources of useful knowledge. 
We examined first the knowledge content of the Venezuelan oil in-
dustry-Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) -, by far the largest in the 
country. We tried to focus on the way it organises relations to the local 
sources of provision of technical knowledge. The specific division of la-
bour which normally supports a diffuse social contract between corpo-
rate management and society is predicated on the idea that there is some-
thing special – technology – that is mastered by managers, who are 
mandated to work on technical progress (and thus insure progress in 
general), particularly in the case of public companies that are national 
property. They are given relative autonomy to work on the technology 
domain as long as they are perceived to be working toward progress. 
Four-and-a-half years ago a crippling strike (lock-out) led by the upper 
echelons of the publicly owned oil industry ended in the layoff of about 
20,000 workers of this 45,000 or so labour force, including some of the 
most highly trained local staff. During the strike, they abandoned their 
posts and ceased to be seen by the majority of the population as working 
for general societal progress and the public good, and thus became ille-
gitimate in their eyes.
Since then the issues of knowledge structure and capacity-building 
in this developing nation have acquired renewed saliency. Some people 
argue that this collective dismissal implies the destruction of the future 
of the industry and the national economy. By contrast, others observe 
that not necessarily capacity per se contributes to the public good, and 
indeed education and educational credentials may come to serve particu-
laristic ends contrary to the public good. Also, this has implied the be-
ginnings of a new exploration of knowledge, not only in terms of allow-
ing for more intense transactions with varying experiences, scale, geog-
raphy, and other elements. Further, it has disclosed the influence and 
power of the existing technological regime, which cannot be easily dis-
mantled after it has been put together. Irreversibility (i.e., inflexibility) 
once achieved, is what makes a technology hard, difficult to change, and 
a structural factor itself.
But we must also look elsewhere to better grasp the issues at hand: 
the setting offered by the domestic firms that supply goods and services 
to the oil industry. We see that these firms act as a transversal segment 
in the economy, not only serving the oil industry but also providing 
goods and services or competing with foreign suppliers for a good por-
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tion of the other private productive sectors, which are also for the most 
part process industries, such as CVG, electricity, aqueducts, etc. The 
productivity differential between the oil industry (including firms di-
rectly involved in the exploration, production, exploitation, transport, re-
fining, and commercialisation of hydrocarbons) and the rest of the pro-
ductive sectors as measured by the total income obtained and the num-
ber of workers directly involved in the production of those goods, 
should not be taken to be one of efficiency, competitiveness, or quality 
of the management and staff working in one or another productive struc-
ture. It may not be stated that one sector is more efficient or more com-
petitive than the other, nor that PDVSA has a better managed productive 
structure than other institutions. In particular, this can be appreciated in 
the group of suppliers of goods and services to the oil and petrochemical 
industry.
What is striking about this industrial segment of oil connected indus-
tries is their vulnerability and extreme dependence on PDVSA that has 
consistently ignored them. The criteria of adequacy and value used in 
this case have been commented above, showing that non-technical as-
pects may come to dominate the decision-making process, so that the 
‘scientific’ or technical’ quality ends up being distinctly less significant. 
When all sides have a reflective awareness, contact can be fruitful and 
creative; but when one side is too weak in relation to the other there is a 
strong imbalance of power and manipulation and corruption are likely to 
occur.
With this backdrop, a third knowledge setting was explored. The 
picture offered by the study of the organisation of workers keeping an 
oil refinery operational during the 2002-2003 political strike that was 
aimed at deposing the government offered a valuable perspective for 
considering changes underway in the knowledge structure and the need 
of reinterpreting the issue of organisational management. The vertical 
management line of the oil industry was broken during the strike. The 
traditional management-imposed work discipline embedded in the cor-
porate culture was turned upside down by the upper echelons of man-
agement when they urged lower echelons to halt operations. Appealing 
to the same corporate discipline and loyalty to the ‘national’ industry, 
workers decided to disobey higher orders and maintain operations. Ac-
tivities in the oil industry continued during the strike, while management 
and operational responsibility during the emergency were assumed 
largely by individuals who had an educational background as techni-
cians, leading even to the process being known as the ‘IUT-graduates 
revolution’. 
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The next knowledge setting explored .was closer to the traditional 
notions of knowledge production and reproduction, and the relations be-
tween higher education and the oil industry. We looked at two knowl-
edge domains: 1) the supply of capable engineering staff in technical 
fields of mining, petroleum engineering, and geosciences, and 2) the 
growth of academic research capabilities in the field of catalysis. This 
situated us in the network of institutions in the public sector whose ac-
tivities and interactions are supposed to initiate, modify, and diffuse new 
technologies. Our case study of the training of new professional engi-
neers in the schools of mining and geosciences raises a number of policy 
considerations including the difficulties to put in place new rationales 
for advanced training and research, the appropriate mix of universities, 
inter-disciplinary programs, and inter-institutional programs, as well as 
the minimum size of a credible national scholarly community. Vene-
zuela is a country whose institutional systems are experiencing substan-
tial changes. We believe that hindsight and modest and fragmented 
PDVSA attempts before and during the 1990s to articulate the world of 
academia to that of the oil industry help interpret current events. The 
prevailing distrust for over half a century between industry and academe 
should not be interpreted as caused simply by individuals as actors in 
particular institutions. There is no doubt that some of the present diffi-
culties result from human failings of this or that group of bureaucrats, 
managers, scientists, engineers, or politicians. However, it is more illu-
minating to identify structural features of the system in which knowl-
edge is used in production, which lead to situations where ordinary hu-
mans make consequential decisions. 
Local production and reproduction of formal knowledge must com-
pete with much more powerful structures of traditional and new foreign 
suppliers of educational and knowledge services to the oil industry, that 
not only transfer more updated and better quality knowledge but also a 
wealth of contacts and tacit components that are part of the ‘technologi-
cal culture and regime’. In the strategic approach historically adopted by 
PDVSA it was unsafe to assume that the relevant knowledge base (be it 
in the form of skills, information, or services) would be found in domes-
tic public sources, including public universities. These were then left to 
languish showing little real interest in them. Indeed, coherent with its 
corporate culture, PDVSA tried to develop its own corporate university 
(CIED), bypassing the public university system they distrusted. 
Our case study of a research community reinforces this basic find-
ing. It allows us to uncover the parallel existence of an academic and an 
industrial catalytic community sharing similar research interests, in both 
contexts more inclined toward research than development, and with less 
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reciprocal interaction than would be desirable, failing to coalesce into a 
synergistic dynamic to the detriment of both. Standard academic produc-
tion, research funding, coordination, execution, and evaluation all take 
place under the umbrella of public research and within public higher 
education institutions. In this setting, in the absence of a better integra-
tion with domestic industry, the academic community has deployed a 
survival strategy aiming among its best cadres at the articulation with an 
international establishment that may grant them recognition and credibil-
ity. This is an area where different values, norms, and policies play 
themselves out, providing new insights into the ways in which intellec-
tual landscapes are transformed, and prefiguring battles between public 
and private ends, institutional aims and scholarly values.
These snapshots show that the domestic knowledge base of the oil 
industry is internally differentiated. It is distributed across a range of 
fields, technologies, actors, and industries. By analysing interactions be-
tween academic institutions and groups on the one hand, and industry on 
the other, we described these knowledge settings in terms of their em-
pirical content and particular configurations in different contexts and 
degrees of control and autonomy. How individuals, organisations and 
indeed entire nations perceive and respond to the restrictions and oppor-
tunities they face are crucial. To make an optimal choice it is first neces-
sary to recognise that the effectiveness of specific forms of collaboration 
depends on a reasonable reciprocal understanding of the knowledge 
partners each with its different priorities. Second, it is necessary that 
they do not find themselves in too unequal power conditions. To be ef-
fective, the various actors involved must be capable of articulating and 
satisfying their particular needs and interests through a ‘mediation 
space’ that implies a set of key concerns, expressed in different ways 
depending on the forms of linking, and where particular aspects of em-
phasis and strength vary as well. This reinforces the conclusion that it is 
as much the context as the linkage model that determines institutional 
capacities in the transfer of knowledge and technology (Webster 1998).
That local actors largely failed to optimise their share and bargaining 
power might plausibly be related to the tremendous deterioration in the 
factorial distribution of income experienced by Venezuela during the 
past 30 years. Rigid production processes are not independent from in-
dustry structure. There is enough evidence suggesting that production 
highly concentrated in a reduced set of industries is likely to exhibit 
more rigidities than one with a widely diversified base, because a great 
part of the economy-wide substitution takes the form of substitution 
among industries. In particular, a broad set of export industries would 
probably have allowed Venezuela to overcome its problem of low elas-
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ticity of substitution. But it is suggestive that high concentration in en-
ergy-intensive industries is precisely the specialisation that Venezuela is 
pushed to by the forces of comparative advantages. In other words, it has 
been argued that Venezuela’s high participation in world trade-given its 
skewed structure of comparative advantage-may precisely be one of the 
causes of its low elasticity of substitution (Rodriguez 2004).  
Our examples focus attention on different domains with active 
groups of practitioners with restricted membership and fairly well-
defined boundaries. They draw together a diversity of knowledge carri-
ers: researchers, technicians, managers, specialists in industrial property, 
engineers, skilled and unskilled workers, students, machines, instru-
ments, samples, texts, and orders, all of which circulate among similar 
collectives. Every element in the collectives that make up the various 
domains plays an active role, interacting with the others. Problems 
posed, deciding between giving preference to experience or theory, fa-
vouring certain types of explanation, the aversion to or interest in appli-
cations, obviously depends on the concrete identity of the elements mak-
ing up the collective and on the organisation of their interactions. 
Change the composition of the collective, and you change the content of 
its production. The variety of knowledge produced and the capacity to 
shake up networks made irreversible by the market will in part depend 
on the composition of these collectives. The multiplicity of possible dy-
namics is enormous.  
Rules, practices, cultural forms, and relationships with things all 
vary from one domain to another. Diversity and the local are at the heart 
of science. Science is a public good which must be preserved at all costs 
because it is a source of variety, depending on a diversity of interests 
and projects. As clearly argued by Callon (1994) it causes new states of 
the world to proliferate. Without this source of diversity, the market – 
with its natural propensity to transform science into a commodity – 
would be ever more doomed to convergence and irreversibility. By con-
trast, private science firms up these worlds and makes them habitable. In 
this sense public and private science appear as complementary despite 
being distinct; each draws on the other. This definition is independent of 
the identity of the actors involved. We have found elements of the public 
and private dynamics in all five domains.  A firm that funds diversity by 
supporting new collectives is producing a public good while the gov-
ernment agency that contributes to a yet stronger linkage between the re-
search it funds and the perfecting of oil technologies is supporting a sci-
ence that can doubtless be called private.
Paradoxically, since oil nationalisation the dominant trend has been 
a steady fall in oil’s share of GDP. Behind the rising capital share was 
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an unprecedented collapse in wage rate unaccompanied by a fall in the 
rate of return to capital. Since a significant amount of GDP takes the 
form of oil rents, it might be argued that the effective distribution of in-
come would have been influenced by greater progress in the distribution 
of the state’s oil rents. However, this does not seem to have happened in 
Venezuela. The government redistributive component par excellence is 
wages and salaries. It is significant that the portion of wages and salaries 
in the government budget fell from nearly half to less than one-fifth over 
the period studied. Government purchase of goods and services also fell 
considerably. The factors that experienced the greatest increase were in-
terest payments on internal and external debt, and government subsidies 
and transfers. The bulk of this last component of government expendi-
ture is made up mainly of subsidies to state-owned enterprises, govern-
ment-owned financial institutions, and private enterprises.18
So, the conventional argument that places the onus of underdevel-
opment on the educational insufficiencies and lack of general capabili-
ties in developing countries, and its concomitant solution on simply 
more education and training, can be highly misleading. From what we 
have found, in the past 30 years the growth of a domestic knowledge 
base was not really part of the project of development of the nationalised 
oil industry. Instead of having only one very strong and fully function-
ing institution in the entire national economy, PDVSA (Vessuri 2005), 
in a different and more balanced scheme a rich tapestry of knowledge 
sites and domains would have fed and interacted with the oil industry. 
Today’s general petroleum policy entails, at least at the rhetorical level, 
aligning PDVSA’s business plan to national development concrete pur-
poses. It is envisaged as promoting the maximum participation of the 
domestic private sector and the formation of domestic capital in the de-
velopment of oil projects in Venezuela; in particular, it is aimed at the 
domestic industrialisation of hydrocarbons to significantly improve the 
export package of crude-products. Such developments would undoubt-
edly have a positive impact on knowledge supply and demand fostering 
virtuous cycles of improvement. 
                                             
18 This, in passing, would agree with the hypothesis that at least since 1983, 
PDVSA embarked on a strategy to reduce the public oil industry’s fiscal 
obligations through its internationalisation, as a mechanism for transfer-
ring earnings outside the reach of government (Mommer 2003).  That this 
was the motivation of PDVSA’s internationalisation goes a good way to-
ward explaining the extraordinary growth of its international network of 
refineries and other assets. In 1998, PDVSA defined itself as a world en-
ergy corporation dedicated to the business of crude oils, gas, petro-
chemistry, and carbon, with operations and industrial and service facilities 
in Venezuela and in over 50 countries. 
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Changing Patterns of University/Industry 
Relations in Italy1
MICHELE ROSTAN AND MASSIMILIANO VAIRA
A major process of change is affecting the Italian University. Starting 
from the second half of the 1990s, a reform process triggered changes at 
three different levels of the higher education system: the governance 
structure, the funding mechanisms, and the curricular organisation. In 
the same period a similar and parallel process of change affected the Na-
tional science and technology system. Both processes are having a 
strong impact on University/Industry (U/I) relations and fostering an un-
precedented situation in the country. 
This work provides an initial account of the Italian case: sections 1-2 
describe the structure and culture of both the higher education and the 
industrial systems, sections 3-4 the institutional changes in the last dec-
ade; sections 5-8 report some initial evidence of the ongoing changes in 
U/I relations, and finally section 9 provides an interpretation of these 
changes as a case of organisational field structuration process. 
                                             
1 Although this work is the result of a joint effort, sections 1, 3, and 4 were 
written by M. Vaira, while sections 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were written by M. 
Rostan. The Introduction and the Conclusions were written by both au-
thors.
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1. Structure and Culture of  
the I ta l ian Universi ty  
Since the 1859 University reform act, Italian higher education has coin-
cided and still coincides, with the University giving the system a low 
degree of structural differentiation. The university system has been and 
to a large extent still is, almost exclusively constituted of public univer-
sities sided by few private institutions. Curricula, study courses, and 
subjects have largely been the same across the Nation with very little 
room for differentiation. Only in the 1990s did the system start to 
change, reducing centralisation but preserving its public nature. As a 
consequence, structural differentiation is still lagging both in the crea-
tion of new private universities and in the institution of a tertiary voca-
tional education track. 
A second structural feature of the Italian University is its organisa-
tional articulation based on Faculties. Faculties play a major role in gov-
erning and managing the University at the local level and base their 
logic of functioning and their decision-making process on collegiality 
and alliances among disciplines. Although the reform project aimed at 
weakening the central role of Faculties, its normative implementation 
reaffirmed their centrality and to some extent strengthened their govern-
ance role (Boffo et al. 2003; Vaira 2003a, b, c). As a consequence, the 
University does not deal with or relate to the external environment as a 
unitary entity, but as a fragmented organisation where some parts are 
keener to enact certain relations than others depending mainly on the 
kind of disciplinary culture characterising each Faculty.
A third structural feature is related to academics’ recruitment dy-
namics and the age structure. Recruitment in Italian Universities has fol-
lowed and to some extent still follows an endogenous pattern with fi-
nancial resources spent by Faculties more on career advancement than in 
recruitment of new and younger personnel. As a consequence, the Italian 
University is a frozen and aging organisation (Boffo et al. 2003; Vaira 
2003c).
The centralisation, the lack of structural differentiation, and the very 
limited number of private universities has created a sort of state-
protected monopoly that allows academics to reproduce the traditional 
model of university – the one that Gibbons et al. (1994) call Mode 1 – in 
spite of the structural changes in society at large. 
The Faculty structure has played a major role in preserving the tradi-
tional model or at least in resisting the ongoing change process although 
with differences among disciplines, Faculties, and institutions. 
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These structural and cultural features have three main consequences 
for the possibility of building U/I linkages and collaborations.
First, the Italian academy is still rather cautious about pursuing these 
linkages and collaborations in a systematic and organic way. The public 
nature and monopolistic position of the University have not facilitated 
the creation of a different attitude towards the opportunity of creating 
and exploiting the collaboration with the industrial system. Second, the 
pursuance of U/I cooperation depends more on Faculties’ initiatives than 
on universities’. This means that quite often the involvement of universi-
ties in such collaborations is an indirect effect of one or more Faculties’ 
actions, oriented to support Faculties’ initiatives. Furthermore, since 
these collaborations are mostly pursued by Faculties, starting and realis-
ing them very likely depends on two related factors: the disciplinary 
fields and the structure of disciplines’ power relations within each Fac-
ulty. This entails that collaborations with industries are more likely to 
concern applied knowledge, hard sciences, and Faculties where applied 
disciplines are gaining prominence. 
Finally, it is plausible to expect that the more entrepreneurial Facul-
ties are those where the academics’ age structure displays average and 
modal age values lower than the entire University’s which is again more 
likely to be in hard sciences than in other fields. 
2. Structure and Culture of  
the I ta l ian Industr ia l  System
The Italian industrial system is characterised by very few large compa-
nies, a limited but growing number of medium size industrial groups, 
and a very consistent number of small and micro firms often gathered in 
spatially delimited clusters. These peculiar features are quite different 
from those characterising other advanced capitalist economies. The Ital-
ian distinctiveness is clearly evident if we consider the higher contribu-
tion SMEs give to the production of wealth and employment compared 
to other OECD countries (Eurostat-European Communities 2001; OECD 
2002a; Onida, 1999, 2004).
These peculiarities result from several factors. Within the interna-
tional division of labour, the Italian industrial system is specialised into 
two broad groups of economic sectors where Italian industries enjoy a 
competitive advantage. The first includes sectors producing traditional 
consumption goods related to persons and houses. The second includes 
firms producing mechanical equipment and specialised machinery and 
components mostly supplying firms operating in the first group. Both 
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areas of industrial activity – known as ‘The Made in Italy’ – are espe-
cially suited for small and medium size firms producing highly differen-
tiated goods for highly specialised or niche markets. 
Italy – with some relevant exceptions (e.g., STMicroelectronics, 
FIAT) – is underrepresented in two other broad areas of industrial activ-
ity: high-tech and highly innovative economic sectors based on intensive 
R&D activities, and sectors with strong economies of scale producing 
consumption or intermediate goods led by a few big oligopolistic com-
panies.
In past decades, national industrial groups and big firms – either pri-
vate or state owned – have been active in these two broad industrial ar-
eas accumulating an important wealth of technical expertise and market 
positions. Both private and public strategic errors, company crisis, sell-
off of Italian companies or divisions to foreign multinationals, a per-
verted link between the political system and state owned companies, all 
dissipated these important assets. In recent times, a massive program of 
privatisation did not promote the formation of new private big compa-
nies equipped to compete globally. In 2003, the ‘Fortune 500’ list in-
cluded only nine Italian groups; only three of them were industrial 
groups – FIAT, ENI, and Olivetti-Telecom – 34 British groups were 
listed, 35 German groups, and 40 French groups. 
Industrial districts are one of the more important components of the 
Italian industrial system. These clusters of spatially concentrated SMEs 
strictly linked to local communities – especially located in the so-called 
‘Third Italy’ including the Central and North-Eastern regions – have 
been, and largely continue to be, the backbone of Italian economic de-
velopment. Considered an alternative to the ‘Fordist’ model of economic 
development, they have built their success mobilising a wide range of 
social, cultural, and economical resources embedded in local societies – 
promoting a balanced mix of competition and cooperation, and provid-
ing firms with competitive advantages. Higher international market inte-
gration, increasing global competition, and the end of reliance on com-
petitive devaluations are putting the industrial district system under 
pressure. As a consequence, new evolutionary processes are affecting 
the industrial district system: increasing cross-district collaboration and 
integration, the emergence of medium-large firms acting as districts’ 
leaders, an organisational shift from a ‘network of firms’ to a ‘network-
firm’, and the establishment of so-called Meta-districts. 
Differing from traditional industrial districts, Meta-districts are not 
territorially but functionally identified entities connecting firms from 
different geographical locations. Their structure is based not only on 
firms but also on the Regional government, local institutions, and for the 
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first time and more importantly, on universities and public research cen-
tres. Furthermore, the role of SMEs is less important compared to that of 
big companies acting as projects’ leaders in some commodity-chains. 
Industrial districts and the Italian industrial system at large share a 
common problem widely debated in recent times: The proportion of 
small firms in the national economy is very high and small firms hardly 
ever grow to a larger dimension, weakening Italy’s position in the global 
economy. The dimensional growth of Italian SMEs is hindered by sev-
eral factors: firms’ and companies’ governance is strongly affected by 
family ownership and control (a feature not restricted to SMEs only); 
there is weak development of financial markets and operators (with capi-
tal venture especially lacking); there is a lack of infrastructures and mar-
ket barriers at the local level; inefficiency or malfunctioning of the pub-
lic administration; laws and regulations scarcely supportive of business; 
inefficiencies and anticompetitive practices both in services and profes-
sions etc. Despite this, in many highly industrialised areas – both within 
and outside industrial districts – new business groups, so called ‘pocket-
multinationals’, are emerging. These are fast growing industrial groups 
including the firm leader in their market and operating at the interna-
tional level, partially balancing the prevalence and difficulties of small 
firms and the decline of older big companies. 
The dimensional peculiarities and the sector specialisation of the in-
dustrial system are strictly matched with some traditional features of the 
Italian entrepreneurial culture.
Familial attitudes both in big and small businesses, preference to-
wards personal ties and interpersonal trust relations with customers and 
suppliers, suspicion towards non family managers, and orientation to-
wards dynastic management are widespread. The same holds for indi-
vidualistic orientations and hard work ethics especially in SMEs; praise 
and rewards are put upon personal creativity, craftsmanship, and incre-
mental innovation. These traits combine with low educational levels of 
SME owners, a strong preference for in-house training, a weak orienta-
tion to employ university graduates, a very scarce presence and in-
volvement of universities in the development of industrial districts, and 
tepid attitudes towards quotation on the stock exchange. Moreover, both 
entrepreneurs and managers – especially in SMEs – display very cau-
tious attitudes towards investments in hardware, software, and related 
organisational changes. 
These features continue to have a strong impact on U/I relations. 
They affect the general configuration of RandD activities, specifically 
the collaboration between firms and universities in this field, and the 
demand and the destination of graduates in the labour market. 
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Research, science, and technology indicators place Italy in a some-
how incongruent position compared to the size of the country’s GDP. It-
aly is falling behind its main competitors and partners and other indus-
trialised countries. Among OECD countries, Italy ranks in eighth place 
by gross domestic RandD expenditure (after USA, Japan, Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, South Korea, and Canada) but in 22nd place by 
gross domestic RandD expenditure on GDP. Moreover, in Italy the per-
centages of RandD activities financed by industry (43%) and performed 
by industry (49.1%) are far behind the EU 25 average (55.4% and 64%, 
respectively) and the OECD countries average (62.3% and 68%, respec-
tively). Finally, Italy can rely on 66,700 full time equivalent researchers 
compared to the 83,300 of Spain, the 177,300 of France, and the 
264,700 of Germany (OECD 2004). It is worth noting that firms’ expen-
diture in RandD fell from the 0.8% in 1992, to 0.5% in 2000 (OECD 
2001).
As far as RandD activities in industry are concerned, three points are 
worth mentioning (Onida 2004; Quadrio Curzio et al. 2002). First, the 
peculiar specialisation pattern and the size structure of the Italian indus-
trial system have a significant impact on the relatively low level of Ital-
ian firms’ RandD investments. Yet international comparative analysis 
shows that in almost all sectors and in almost each dimensional category 
Italian firms invest less than their competitors. Structural factors partly 
explain the Italian situation but part must be explained taking into ac-
count other cultural and institutional factors. Second, industrial RandD 
expenditures are strongly dimensionally and territorially biased: 75% of 
total expenditures are concentrated in firms with more than 500 employ-
ees; more than 50% of total expenditures are realised in Lombardy and 
Piedmont. Third, figures and international comparisons on industrial 
RandD activities must be interpreted with caution as they refer to formal 
research undertaken in labs. As a matter of fact, innovation in the Italian 
industrial system is carried out – especially in SMEs – through technical 
progress incorporated in machinery purchased by firms and through 
tacit, informal, and incremental technological innovation fostered 
mainly at the shop level. This special feature of the Italian industrial in-
novation process largely explains why U/I relations are weaker than in 
other industrialised countries and why formal research appears to be 
mainly carried out by universities and public research agencies. 
The structural characteristics of the Italian industrial system also 
have an impact on the educational levels of the labour force, and on 
graduate labour market. Before the University reform, the percentage of 
the labour force aged 25-64 possessing a university degree or some other 
university qualification was 10-12%, more or less half of the EU average 
CHANGING PATTERNS OF UNIVERSITY/INDUSTRY RELATIONS IN ITALY
367
(Associazione TREELLLE 2003; OECD 2002b; Moscati and Rostan 
2000). Though it is too early to assess the impact of the new ‘3 + 2’ 
higher education structure on the labour force, it is expected that it will 
raise the proportion of people possessing higher education qualifications 
and bridge the gap with other countries especially at the short pro-
grammes level. As the demand for highly qualified labour- especially in 
scientific and technological fields – depends on firms’ size and the spe-
cialisation of the national industrial system within the international divi-
sion of labour, Italian peculiarities yield a weaker demand of graduates 
compared to other countries, especially science and technology gradu-
ates. Finally, a weaker demand from industries combined with lower 
public investments in RandD also explains the ‘brain drain’ affecting It-
aly (Becker et al. 2003). 
3.  Universi ty and Research Reform Pol ic ies 
Between 1990 and 2000, a deep process of reform changed the structural 
and governance features of the Italian University system as well as its 
way of functioning. As a consequence, more room for institutional 
autonomy, performance indicators as financing criteria, and curricular 
innovation following the Bologna scheme have been provided  (Luzzatto 
and Moscati 2003; Vaira 2003a). 
These changes entailed a shift of the University toward an entrepre-
neurial model (Clark 1998; Slaughter and Leslie 1997), involving both 
its organisational articulations, such as Faculties and Departments, and 
single academics. 
The reform was meant to overcome the traditional gap between the 
university and the socio-economic environment, encouraging and press-
ing it to construct a wider network of relationships with external institu-
tional and organisational actors. 
The entrance of new external actors in the academic field has had 
two main consequences on universities: i) a process of re-hierarchisation 
of academic knowledge and disciplines; ii) a change in universities’ 
autonomy status. As universities are called to collaborate with industry 
and the economic sector, providing them with an adequate knowledge 
base and the personnel to better compete under new economic condi-
tions, and as it must drain more financial resources outside the public 
sector funding, it needs to concentrate more on applied knowledge or on 
pure knowledge capable of being transformed into applications interest-
ing to the economic sector and generating additional funding through 
their economic exploitation (e.g., selling knowledge; consultancy; pat-
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enting; various forms of collaboration with industry such as business in-
cubators, start-ups, spin-offs, and scientific-technological parks). This 
process is reshaping the previous traditional hierarchical structure de-
rived from the Humboldtian model and is experienced as an overturning 
of previous academic power relations among disciplines. 
The autonomy to do things for science and knowledge’s sakes, is 
slowly being replaced by a responsible and accountable autonomy in 
face of the society at large, its economic development, and of those who 
finance and support the university: primarily the state and private sector 
actors (Tapper and Salter 1995; Etzkowitz and Leyesdorff 1997). This 
different kind of autonomy allows universities to act more enterprisingly 
but simultaneously makes them more dependent on external actors other 
than the state and its resources (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Pfeffer and 
Salancick 1978). 
In addition to university reform, a stronger emphasis was also put on 
public policy for science and technology (S&T) and the reorganisation 
of the science system.
The OECD STI Outlook 2000 highlights (OECD 2000) that the 
structure and the organisation of the Italian S&T system changed from 
1989-1998 fostering a closer relationship and cooperation between in-
dustry and public scientific research institutions, namely universities and 
the National Council of Researches (CNR). Yet scientific and techno-
logical policies were still limited in scope and results and too often more 
formalistic than effective. In particular, the funding criteria were based 
on an ‘egalitarian’ model without evaluation in terms of quality of the 
research project proposals and the research teams. Thus, this kind of 
funding allocation gave something to everybody, disadvantaging the ex-
cellent research centres and/or teams which received almost the same 
funds as less efficient and effective teams and centres.
A second problem concerned the creation of public institutions for 
technology transfer functioning as institutional buffers and linking pivot 
between universities, public research institutions, and industry. The bot-
tom-up, or ‘spontaneous’ approach, undertaken by some universities and 
research centres to bridge the traditional gap was generally too limited 
and not always effective, even if some bottom-up realisations proved to 
work quite well. 
Furthermore, two kind of constraints slowed and made ineffective 
government support to research in industry: i) the scant propensity of 
Italian firms to invest in innovation and RandD activities and the peculi-
arity of the Italian industrial structure (see section 2), and ii) the lack of 
a wide strategic vision of actual national priorities for investments in 
science and technological developments and innovations. In addition, 
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firms tended to use public funds not to innovate but to finance projects 
they would have carried out anyway. 
Finally, although some steps toward an S&T policy were made in 
this period, its implementation was hampered by institutional and proce-
dural factors. Some of these factors are related to the lack of collabora-
tion and coordination between different Ministries in such policies. The 
Ministry of University and Research especially acted very much in isola-
tion from other ministries; namely those responsible for economy, in-
dustry, trade, and labour, as those ministries tended not to give up some 
of their responsibilities. In addition, it did not enjoy additional resources 
to manage and to support those policies and its bureaucratic structure 
and way of functioning entailed further difficulties in implementation 
and task management. From the procedural side, the complexity and the 
bureaucracy of the selection processes and criteria discouraged SMEs to 
apply for public financing of their RandD projects. 
As a result the gap between public research and industry remained 
pronounced. This gap became a policy issue in the period 1996-2001, 
entering as a part of a general institutional reform and modernisation 
agenda, and more specifically of the Education system reform. 
The reform of the S&T system was based on the reorganisation of 
the public research system, its governance, and on the revision of 
mechanisms supporting RandD. 
The government aimed at linking the S&T system to the country’s 
general economic strategies. In the National Act for Economic Planning, 
a chapter was devoted to set the guidelines and the financial amount for 
RandD, and there was a stronger effort to connect different Ministries 
for RandD policy and funding, especially through a special fund for spe-
cific projects of national relevance. Furthermore, small research institu-
tions were suppressed through merging or acquisition by larger ones in 
order to gain more room for autonomy, greater flexibility, a stronger 
evaluation of each institution, the reduction of bureaucratic constrains, 
more incentives for research personnel mobility, and the professional 
qualification of research institutions employees. Finally, some measures 
were intended and tailored to reduce the complexity and the bureaucratic 
burdens of the procedures both for application and funding allocation. 
The S&T system reform fostered the creation of a structure for the 
evaluation of research both at the macro and micro levels through the 
Committee for Research Evaluation and some Ministries’ departments, 
and the creation of an Evaluation Committee in universities and research 
institutions. The research evaluation system was set up in 1999 though 
its instruments, mechanisms, and evaluation criteria still need to be 
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tuned and refined, since in Italy there was no tradition for evaluating re-
search institutions and universities. 
Another important novelty of this period concerns a policy package 
jointly produced by the Ministry of University and the Ministry of La-
bour introducing three main innovations concerning university spin-off 
companies and the possibility for academics to participate in them. The 
package (Decree n. 297, July 1999) promotes: 1) the temporary place-
ment of academics and researchers within companies; 2) the creation of 
university spin-off companies and university incubators; 3) the participa-
tion of academics as well as public research institutions’ researchers in 
starting up new firms and getting involved in commercial activities; 4) 
U/I collaborations fostering industrial research projects both at national 
and trans-national levels supported by public funding; 5) the creation of 
university consortia and research centres; and 6) R&D policies involving 
regions, universities, and enterprises, supported by central Government 
funding.
It must be stressed that Italian academics and public research institu-
tions’ personnel were legally prevented as civil servants from being in-
volved in industrial and commercial activities, with the exception of 
part-time academics – in particular those belonging to the fields of law, 
medicine, engineering, and architecture – who were allowed to run pro-
fessional activities. This kind of legal constraint lasted until the 1999 
Decree, which – pivoting on the enlargement of university autonomy – 
deeply changed the normative framework enacting a favourable regula-
tive environment to support R&D projects (Giacometti 2001). 
4.  Industr ia l  Research and Innovat ion Pol ic ies  
On the side of the development of research and innovation in industry, 
the government’s commitment and efforts were devoted to tools and in-
novation in the existing policy framework and enforcing new specific 
measures.
The main policy tool was the Applied Research Fund. Instituted in 
1968, administrated by the former Ministry of Education and from 1989 
by the Ministry of University, Scientific Research and Technology, it is 
managed by the Italian Industrial Credit Institute (IMI). 
In 1994 new granting procedures were introduced aiming at reducing 
the timing of project examinations, increasing resources addressed to 
SMEs through the financing of individual and cooperative research pro-
jects. In 1997 the Applied Research Fund was reformed to improve its 
procedural efficiency. A co-financing mechanism was introduced, re-
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quiring the sharing of R&D projects’ costs from the applicant firm. This 
was established in the light of creating a multiplying mechanism of pub-
lic resources and a more direct responsibility and accountability of 
firms. In addition, more emphasis was placed by the Ministry of Univer-
sity and Research on SMEs. 
Another policy measure to stimulate industrial research and innova-
tion was the introduction of changes in the National Research Pro-
gramme (NRP) launched in 1982. In 1991, NRP underwent a major 
change with the introduction of a new scheme to stimulate SMEs, in par-
ticular those operating in industrial districts. The scheme included the 
possibility to create financial intermediaries able to share not only re-
search and innovation costs but also the economic risks of SMEs, and to 
promote consortia amongst firms. In 1997, the NRP was modified in its 
funding mechanism through the introduction of co-financing procedures 
to stimulate firms to be more involved in research and innovation pro-
jects.
A particular policy effort has been made since the early 1990s in the 
creation of science and technology parks (STPs) (OECD 2000). In par-
ticular, most of the 13 STPs created by 2000 were located in Southern 
Italy as an effort to boost economic development in this still less devel-
oped area. In 2000, about 50 projects dealing with scientific parks were 
completed, but a severe constraint to the full take-off of parks was that 
local firms’ financial involvement was still meagre. As a consequence, 
the majority of financial resources came from public investments. In 
Northern and Central Italy, the creation of STPs followed a different pat-
tern, fostered by private initiatives with the participation of companies, 
local public agencies, local governments, universities, and public re-
search bodies. European Union funds played a role in both cases al-
though for different reasons as Southern regions fall under one policy 
goal and some Central or Northern areas under another. By and large, 
the experience of STPs is still too recent to evaluate in the light of their 
research and innovation potentiality, especially because most have 
grown with little or no links to the market and a weak financial support 
by firms. 
Because the employment of graduate students and PhDs in Italy in 
science and engineering was, and largely still is, one of the lowest in 
Europe (Commission of the European Communities 2002), a last policy 
effort was made to stimulate firms, especially SMEs and those operating 
in industrial districts, to employ highly educated and qualified person-
nel.
During 2001-2004, the public policy for S&T and R&D slowed 
down, as the centre-right government was in charge. This slow down 
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concerns both financial support and policy initiative, due to the re-
trenchment of government’s funding and support for R&D activities, 
universities, public research institutions, and U/I  collaborations. 
On the whole, this set of policy initiatives has not been fully effec-
tive. It has proved difficult for firms to identify individual competencies 
and skills within university and PhD graduates. At the same time, uni-
versities found it difficult, at least up to very recent years, to set an ap-
propriate formative supply suitable for industry needs, although univer-
sity reform and bottom-up experiences like AlmaLaurea and Vulcano
(see section 8) should improve the situation. Universities and public re-
search institutions have not yet developed a policy for the temporary 
placement in and mobility towards, firms of their research personnel and 
are still reluctant to address the problem. Only a modest part of aca-
demic and public institutions’ researches has a direct industrial applica-
tion. The enduring culture in universities and public research institutions 
considers researchers’ involvement in industrial and commercial activi-
ties as a sort of ‘prostitution’ or betrayal of the ‘true’ science mission. 
Finally, the scientific field, and in particular the so-called hard science 
field, is suffering a shortage of matriculating students and PhD students 
which means a shortage in the supply of highly qualified personnel with 
scientific background. 
Notwithstanding difficulties and drawbacks, following the described 
policies changes in U/I relations are nonetheless emerging as is shown in 
the following. 
5.  Universi ty/ Industry relat ions in Northern 
 I ta ly:  The Employers’  View 
Since 1993, Confindustria – the Italian association of industrial employ-
ers – annually publishes a report documenting the activity of cooperation 
between universities and associated members. Thanks to two general 
agreements signed with the Ministry of University and Research and the 
Italian Universities Rectors’ Conference, many single initiatives born at 
the local level have acquired a formal status and have been recorded in 
an annual report called University/Industry Collaborations Inventory. 
Looking at activities developed during the last decade, it is possible 
to distinguish two main forms of partnership between industry and uni-
versity: i) the collaboration between single universities and single firms, 
and ii) the collaboration between universities and local employers’ asso-
ciations belonging to Confindustria.
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Grassroots collaboration generally involves single departments or 
faculties and single firms. University units can buy highly sophisticated 
machines from single companies, use their industrial labs and tools, or 
sign teaching contracts with managers and industrial researchers. They 
can provide firms with studies, enquiries, researches on demand, follow-
up courses and training activities for employees, lab and certification ac-
tivities, scientific consultancies, and technical assistance. For their part, 
companies can offer targeted dissertations, stages and internships, and 
students’ grants. Finally, universities and firms can cooperate in plan-
ning and carrying out study, training, and research activities often in-
volving the contribution of local governments, public research agencies, 
and international organisations.  
At a more institutional level, U/I collaboration involves not single 
firms but local associations of employers. Universities and local em-
ployers’ associations collaborate in several ways: signing agreements for 
cooperation, participating together in local associations or consortia pur-
suing specific goals, promoting or participating in scientific and techno-
logical parks, jointly organising or participating in initiatives fostering 
technology transfer and the diffusion of research results, participating in 
national  or international research projects, and acting together in the es-
tablishment of new university sites or campuses and/or in the creation of 
new study programs. 
The year 2003 Inventory includes 87 reports from local employers’ 
associations recording more than 500 U/I joint activities. Restricting 
data analysis to the five main Regions of Northern Italy – Piedmont, 
Liguria, Lombardy, Veneto, and Emilia-Romagna – it is possible to 
draw a picture of U/I relations in the economically more developed area 
of the country. This includes 33 local employers’ associations and 23 
universities. The most frequent forms of collaboration concern the field 
of didactics (49 cases). This form includes very different activities, from 
the establishment of new study programs to the organisation of stages 
and internships. The second most frequent activity is the approval of a 
general agreement of collaboration between a university or a Faculty and 
a local employers’ association (23 cases). The third most frequent form 
concerns the financial support offered by industrial employers to univer-
sities (20 cases) including differentiated fields and amounts of support 
including financial contribution to the creation of a new university site 
or campus, the ongoing contribution to the ordinary functioning of a 
university, and the supply of grants and awards for students. The fourth 
most frequent form refers to the creation of special associations or con-
sortia – generally also including other local actors (local governments, 
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banks, big companies, groups of interests etc.) – pursuing specific goals 
(18 cases).
Collaborations concerning research activities are less frequent, pos-
sibly because they are carried out at the grassroots level by single de-
partments and firms and are not recorded in the inventory. Only six 
cases of research contracts or consultancies are reported; two cases of 
collaboration in technology transfer or diffusion of research results; a 
single case of joint participation in a scientific/technological park, and 
no case of joint participation in national research projects. 
The relationship between Confindustria, local associated members, 
and some private HE institutions is very strict. Confindustria and As-
solombarda – the Milan based local association – strongly support Boc-
coni University and its business schools; a representative of As-
solombarda seats in the Board of the University. The local associations 
of Varese and Piacenza played a crucial role in the creation of the pri-
vate university Carlo Cattaneo at Castellanza and the Catholic Univer-
sity at Piacenza. Local associations also played a relevant role in the 
creation of public higher education institutions as was the case in the es-
tablishment of the Faculty of Engineering at Bergamo University, the 
creation of Bologna University campus at Ravenna, and the creation of 
the ‘twin’ University of Modena and Reggio Emilia. 
Publishing the inventory witnesses the extent and the growth of U/I 
relations during the last 10-15 years. At a more institutionalised level, 
employers’ associations have supported the expansion of the Italian 
higher education system and the development of new channels of com-
munication and cooperation between the economic and the education 
systems, especially at the local level. 
6. The Creat ion of  New Firms: 
Evidences from the Universi ty  of  Pavia 
The state University of Pavia – founded in the 14th Century – is a me-
dium size institution located in Lombardy with 22,000 students and 
4,000 graduates (in 2003). It consists of nine faculties (Law, Political 
Science, Economics, Humanities, Medicine, Mathematics-Physics-
Natural Sciences, Pharmacy, Engineering, and Musicology) and 51 de-
partments. Exclusively linked to the university is S. Matteo Policlinic,
one of the biggest and most reputed health institutions in Lombardy. 
Pavia was an important industrial centre up to the 1970s; since then 
strong processes of de-industrialisation set in. At present, the only im-
portant industrial reality in the area is the Industrial District of Vigevano 
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– located some 30 km from Pavia – which is a world leader in the pro-
duction of machines for shoes, footwear, and leatherwear and tannery 
industries. The local economy is also characterised by a rich agriculture 
specialised in rice fields and vineyards. 
It is common sense to think that U/I relations are badly lacking be-
cause of local processes of de-industrialisation and the small sizes of the 
existing firms. Yet, a recent investigation (Balconi and De Carlini 2002) 
yields different conclusions. 
During 1996-1999, eight scientific departments signed 132 contracts 
with industrial companies receiving €10 million of research project 
funding. The impact of private financing on the total research costs is 
higher in the Department of Electronics and the Department of Pharma-
ceutical Chemistry (over 10% of average annual costs). These figures 
underestimate the relevance of private financing because important pri-
vate funds finance the activity of university researchers through external 
agencies – such as the Nuclear Physics National Institute – or through 
health institutions, and are not recorded in departments’ budgets, the 
only source of information available to investigation. 
According to ISI data from 1993-1999, 331 scientific international 
articles were jointly written by professors and researchers from the uni-
versity and employees of big industrial companies: more than 50% were 
related to the chemical/pharmaceutical and biotech sector; 35% to the 
ITC sector, and 10% to the energy and aerospace sector. 
Local professors and researchers give an important contribution to 
the Italian System of Innovation. Matching data on the 22 years of activ-
ity of the European Patent Office and data on Pavia University staff in 
the year 2000, we find that 88 patents belonging to either private com-
panies or public agencies involve professors and researchers. This data 
places Pavia University in fifth place among Italian universities after 
bigger institutions like the University of Milan (149 patents), the Uni-
versity of Bologna (145), Milan Polytechnic (135), and the University of 
Rome La Sapienza (126) and before other important institutions such as 
the University of Padova (68), the University of Pisa (63), Turin Poly-
technic (50), and the University of Parma (48). Pavia’s contribution is 
especially important in the fields of pharmaceuticals, biotech, and chem-
istry but the single company owning the higher number of patents in-
volving university staff operates in the field of electronics. 
In the 1990s, eight high tech micro or small independent firms and 
five labs belonging to electronics multinational corporations were estab-
lished. Among independent firms located in Pavia and vicinities (mainly 
operating in the ICT sector), four were founded by professors and re-
searchers and can be considered ‘university spin-offs’, three were 
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founded by Pavia University students or graduates, and one by profes-
sionals not linked with the University. In one case, there is a strict rela-
tionship with a university lab (Laser Sources Lab), in five cases the uni-
versity is considered important as a supply of highly qualified labour 
force and in two cases firms and the university cooperate in student 
training before and after graduation. In the year 2000/2001, 142 people 
were working in these firms. 
Among multinational corporations (two based in the USA, one in 
Germany, one in France, and one a joint French/Italian venture), the 
main reason for locating a ‘design centre’ in Pavia and vicinities is the 
excellence of the Department of Electronics in analogic microelectronics 
and analog circuits design. The relationship with this Department and 
the Faculty of Engineering is considered crucial both for the supply of 
highly qualified and specialised labour forces and the transfer of knowl-
edge. In one case, a multinational corporation acquired a ‘design house’ 
started-up by graduates and professors from the university and in an-
other case the design centre (with a research lab) is directly located 
within the university. In 2000/2001, 79 people worked in these centres. 
Very recently a large chemical company has opened a new site spe-
cialised in systems and products for the preservation and restoration of 
artistic works at the Department of Earth Sciences. 
Pavia shows that it is quite misleading to continue to consider Italian 
universities as ‘Ivory Towers’. Even in a declining local industrial con-
text – albeit within the larger context of the economically strongest re-
gion in Italy – U/I relations are not lacking. Furthermore, not only big 
and prestigious institutions such as Milan and Turin Polytechnics – 
where U/I relations are traditionally stronger – but also medium size 
higher education institutions such as the University of Pavia are devel-
oping networks of relations with firms and companies both at national 
and international levels. Local departments’ scientific excellence and 
high qualification of graduates are appealing for foreign and domestic 
investments and foster the creation of new independent firms. A local 
knowledge and university driven economic development – albeit in a 
very initial phase – and the establishment of a local high tech commu-
nity are indeed possible and recent institutional changes at the national 
level support these processes. 
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7.  Universi ty/ Industry relat ions in Southern 
 I ta ly:  Catania Consort ium for  Research and 
 Etna Val ley 
In 1987, the University of Catania in Sicily together with the National 
Council of Research, a state holding (IRI), a multinational corporation 
(SGS Microelectronics, now STMicroelectronics) and a local economic 
institution (the Chamber of Commerce of Catania) promoted a non profit 
consortium called Catania Consortium for Research (http://www.unict. 
it/ccr/). Later, other national research institutions such as the Nuclear 
Physics National Institute (INFN) and local industrial firms operating in 
the fields of agro-industrial technologies and pharmaceuticals joined. 
The Consortium -employing some 25 people in 2004 – was created to 
link academic, public, and industrial research fostering technology trans-
fer, innovation diffusion, applied research, advanced training, services 
for companies, and local economic development. Its key operative tools 
were – and still are – four organisations: two service centres and two 
laboratories.
The ‘Innovation Centre’: a) promotes, coordinates, and manages re-
search and development projects together with universities, research in-
stitutions, and firms; b) supports firms, especially SMEs, in defining and 
implementing technological innovation strategies; c) develops new re-
search and service expertise in innovative areas; and d) promotes, coor-
dinates, and manages specialised training and cultural activities. The 
Centre provides local industries with an online database with updated in-
formation on some 1,500 Sicilian companies, research projects financed 
by EU, and technological reviews realised by experts from Catania Uni-
versity.
‘MEDIA Innovation Relay Centre’ is one of the seven Italian Relay 
Centres supported by the European Commission and the Ministry of 
University and Research to offer advanced services in the field of tech-
nological innovation, promote the transfer and the application of re-
search results, and support SMEs’ technological development. The Cen-
tre is hosted by Apindustrie, the local association of SMEs, and – thanks 
to the network connecting 68 EU Relay Centres in 30 European coun-
tries, the European Commission, and National Ministries – represents an 
‘international window for innovation’ for companies operating in Sicily 
and Calabria. 
The ‘Laboratory of Surfaces and Interfaces’ – also known as ‘The 
Superlab’ – was created in 1990 as a joint venture of the Catania Con-
sortium, the Department of Chemical Sciences of the University of Ca-
tania, and STMicroelectronics. Superlab is located within the STMicro-
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electronics plant in Catania and its research activities include all the as-
pects of material science dealing with the preparation, modification, and 
characterisation of solid surfaces and interfaces of relevant technological 
importance.
The ‘Biotechnologies’ Laboratory’ – also know as ‘Biolab’ – oper-
ates in the fields of innovative agro-food and biomedical technologies, 
especially those related to molecular diagnosis and monitoring methods. 
The Biolab is also located within an industrial plant in Catania. 
In 2004, Catania Consortium was involved in 80 research projects in 
10 different fields: agriculture and agro-industry, environment, art works 
and cultural goods, biotechnologies, chemistry and pharmaceutical, ma-
terials and interfaces, other materials, microelectronics, management and 
services, and ICT and applied mathematics. Supporting and participating 
in these projects are 24 industrial firms and several other actors: the 
European Commission, the Italian Ministry of University and Research, 
public research agencies, and the Catania Technological Park. 
The Consortium also carries out training activities and supports re-
cent graduates in their transition from school to work. Initiatives include 
providing degree awards for final dissertations, scholarships, job con-
tracts and internships, and ‘ad hoc’ training courses together with the 
University of Catania and local firms. As of 2004, the Consortium 
awarded about 100 Degree Awards and about 50 scholarships with the 
support of mostly Sicilian companies, and provided job placements and 
scholarships to about 100 graduates from Catania University.
The Consortium made an important contribution in starting the eco-
nomic and scientific experience known as ‘Catania’s Microelectronics 
Pole’ or the ‘Etna Valley’ connecting higher education and research in-
stitutions, big companies, and hundreds of small firms (see e.g., Finan-
cial Times, 17/03/2000, “A High-Tech Eruption in Etna Valley: Italy's 
Technological Revolution”). In addition to the local university with its 
faculties and the School for Advanced Studies; large companies such as 
STMicroelectronics, Nokia, Omnitel, Alcatel, Alenia, Philips; and po-
litical and economic local actors; a key role has been played by a public 
research agency: the ‘Institute for Microelectronics and Microsystems’ 
(IMM). IMM is an institute of the Italian National Council of Research 
(CNR). Founded in 2001 during the national re-organisation process of 
the CNR, the Institute, whose headquarters are in Catania, is organised 
in five departments located in Bologna, Catania, Rome, Lecce, and 
Naples. IMM Catania Department inherited both the activity and staff of 
a former CNR local institution founded in 1993. These institutions acted 
as a pivotal organisation establishing links and exchanges across the 
whole cycle of activities required for microelectronics: higher education 
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and basic research (the university), oriented research (IMM-CNR), R&D 
activities and production (STMicroelectronics, and other smaller com-
panies). The Department – with 25 staff – is hosted by STMicroelectron-
ics with which six research projects were ongoing in 2004. 
This Sicilian example shows that – though requiring strong support 
from the local political system and national policies – public/private and 
U/I relations fostering both scientific research and economic develop-
ment are indeed possible in less developed Southern Italy. Furthermore, 
the Catania experience is not alone as shown by the development of the 
ITC sector in Sardinia centred on a big company – Tiscali – with the 
participation of the University of Cagliari. These examples also wit-
nesses the positive and rather successful impact that both the higher 
education reform process and the re-organisation of the public research 
system can have – interacting with other factors – on U/I relations. 
8. Graduates’  Recruitment:  
The Case of  Alma-Laurea
While once only a few prestigious public institutions such as Milan 
Polytechnic or private ones such as the Catholic University or the Boc-
coni Business School had a formally established job placement service, 
nowadays the number of institutions is growing that offer their students 
and graduates post-graduate internships and stages programs, career 
days, job placement services etc. Especially important are joint initia-
tives among several institutions at the regional or the national level such 
as Vulcano – a consortium among the universities of Lombardy provid-
ing on-line CVs to companies – and ‘AlmaLaurea’.
AlmaLaurea is a consortium among, in the academic year 
2003/2004, 40 Italian universities out of the existing 76. Established in 
1994 by the Statistical Observatory of the University of Bologna, the 
consortium has grown very fast and represents 63% of Italian graduates 
in 2003/2004. It provides graduates, companies, and universities with 
several services. Graduates from member institutions are offered the 
possibility to publish their CVs on a website just before graduation, to 
continuously update their CVs after graduation, to view job offers pub-
lished by companies on the website, and to answer on-line to job offers. 
Companies and other organisations can publish their job offers on the 
website and can also select and purchase individual CVs of recent 
graduates and updated CVs of more mature graduates. Universities are 
provided with a common and centrally managed job placement service 
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offered to their students and graduates with a tool supplementing, updat-
ing, and enriching their administrative data. 
The core instrument of the consortium consists of a database inte-
grating data coming from different sources and collected in different 
points in time: official administrative data (field of study, type of degree 
earned, grades, study duration, thesis, supervisor); data provided directly 
by students prior to graduation (civil/military service obligations, peri-
ods of study abroad, work experience during studies, self-evaluation of 
foreign language proficiency and computer skills, willingness to move to 
get a job); and data provided directly by graduates after completion of 
study program (updated information on post-graduated study and train-
ing and early career). 
After operating for a decade, the database contained more than 
480,000 CVs in 2004. During 2003, 374,000 CVs were downloaded 
from the database. Since the beginning of its activity, more or less 60% 
of AlmaLaurea on-line services have been sold to companies; the rest 
has been supplied to associations, training agencies, and universities. 
Services provided to companies increased by 40% between 2003 and 
2004, while less than 5% of costumers were foreign companies.
Thanks to the data collected, AlmaLaurea provides universities, 
companies, policy makers, the scientific community, and the public at 
large with two important reports: ‘The Annual Graduate Profile Report’ 
and ‘The Annual Report on the Occupational Condition of Graduates’. 
The ‘Profile Report’ provides extended and detailed information assess-
ing the quality of human capital produced by universities, giving also 
the possibility to monitor the ongoing university reform. The ‘Occupa-
tional Report’ provides universities and other actors – firms and compa-
nies included – with a tool for assessing the effectiveness of higher edu-
cation and for monitoring local and regional graduate labour markets. In 
the near future, a new service will be provided as AlmaLaurea has been 
assigned by the Ministry of Education and University to set up the na-
tional register of graduates. 
AlmaLaurea is an important novelty both in the higher education or-
ganisational field and U/I relations. It is an unprecedented form of inter-
university cooperation strengthening communication and common ac-
tion among universities both at the staff and top levels, linking the 
higher education system to outside actors. In fact, the Assembly ruling 
the consortium consists of the Rectors of member universities and the 
Board of Directors is comprises seven members nominated by the As-
sembly, one Representative from the Ministry of University, and one 
Representative from administrative regional bodies. AlmaLaurea is also 
a case of successful externalisation as its organisational unit and staff 
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operate autonomously and independently from single universities. More 
important, it is a bridge fostering U/I  collaboration in graduate labour 
force recruitment contributing to a better match between demand and 
supply and the creation of a national (and perhaps a European) graduate 
labour market. 
9.  Conclusions 
It is possible to advance an initial interpretation of the ongoing changes 
in the Italian university sector and U/I relations. The interpretative 
framework is provided by the concept of organisational field structura-
tion (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). This concept highlights the process 
of growing interconnectedness, mutual dependence, and emerging 
power relations in an organisational field among heterogeneous organi-
sations in the face of institutional changes. The structuring process of an 
organisational field consists of four elements (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991, p. 65): i) an increase in the extent of interaction among organisa-
tions operating in the field, ii) the emergence of sharply defined inter-
organisational structures of dominance and patterns of coalition, iii) an 
increase in the information load with which organisations in a field must 
contend, and iv) the development in a set of organisations of the mutual 
awareness among participants that they are involved in a common enter-
prise.
The reported evidences can be interpreted as the structuration process 
of the academic field; an organisational field displaying peculiar fea-
tures. In Bourdieu’s terms, it is a social space with a certain degree of 
autonomy in relation to other fields. Therefore it is structured by pecu-
liar constitutive, generative, and definitive principles, logic of function-
ing, power relations and habitus (i.e., a system of cognitive and norma-
tive schemata embodied, deployed, and reproduced by collective and in-
dividual actors, Bourdieu 1988, 1992, 1998). These institutionalised fea-
tures are the main source of academics’ responses and resistances to 
changes.
The combination of structuration and academic field is useful to de-
scribe a contrasted process by which: first, innovations triggered by state 
policy reforms – introducing different constitutive and generative prin-
ciples and a different logic of functioning – impact a structured and rela-
tively autonomous field affecting both its power relations and habitus;
second, new organisational actors with their demands, needs, and re-
sources enter the field. This in turn entails that the field experiences a 
reduction of its autonomy and that it reacts to those threatening institu-
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tional pressures. It can be said that we are witnessing the emergence of a 
new structure of resources and constraints, as well as constitutive and 
normative rules, affecting the Italian academic field. 
The academic field (in Bourdieu’s sense) is thus changing into an or-
ganisational field (as DiMaggio and Powell conceive it) where Univer-
sity and the State are only two among many actors: local, regional, na-
tional, and supranational public institutions and administrations, banks, 
industries, R&D organisations, and departments both public and private 
etc.
There are several clues and evidences witnessing the construction 
and structuration of the organisational field in which U/I relations are 
embedded. Four points highlight the main findings supporting the exis-
tence of an ongoing process of structuration. 
• New actors are entering the academic field, new relations are set up, 
new rules (either formal or informal) are both implemented and 
emerging, and new organisational arrangements are taking form. 
First, universities – both as a corporate actor and a set of faculties 
and departments – are facing a range of new actors ranging from 
SMEs  and big companies to employers’ associations, local eco-
nomic institutions (e.g., Chambers of Commerce), local govern-
ments (especially at the regional level), public research agencies, and 
the European Union. Second, new relations are established including 
exchanges of information (e.g., on job vacancies and graduates pro-
files), mutual supply of resources (e.g., highly qualified labour force, 
know-how and technology, qualified staff for spin-offs; research 
funds and grants), joint participation in the pursuit of common ends 
and mutual understanding of being involved in a common enterprise 
(e.g., scientific and economic development, establishment of new 
study programmes or university sites). Third, new rules governing 
these relations are operating: both top-down regulations setting a 
new institutional environment (e.g., public policies and reform acts) 
and bottom-up agreements and contracts between firms and universi-
ties. Fourth, new organisational arrangements are emerging such as 
consortia, pragmatic collaborations (Withford and Zeitlin 2003),
and new organisational units siding and complementing the ordinary 
operation of university administrative offices. 
• The structuring of U/I relations is still in a very initial phase, yet 
some trends and problems can be detected. First, these relations are 
disciplinary and territorially biased. The greater part of reported col-
laborations involves hard science faculties and departments mostly 
located in more economically developed areas. Factors pushing col-
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laboration though, seem to be different in different areas. U/I col-
laboration is led by private actors’ initiatives supported by local 
governments in economically stronger areas such as Piedmont, 
Lombardy, and Emilia-Romagna, while it is promoted especially by 
universities, public research agencies, and the central government in 
other areas as a policy device fostering economic development. Sec-
ond, U/I relations reveal that public/private dynamics are quite com-
plex. On the one hand, the university system isn’t entirely public be-
cause it includes also private institutions; on the other, the industrial 
system is not entirely private because the state is still participating in 
or controlling important companies or groups. Furthermore, the 
boundaries between the two spheres have somehow become blurred: 
private universities receive public financing; public universities’ 
faculties and departments receive funds and grants by private firms; 
state controlled companies, private companies, public and private re-
search agencies, and universities increasingly interact; and private-
based organisational arrangement – such as consortia and associa-
tions – are promoted by public actors. 
• U/I relations do have a feedback effect on academic culture and 
practices. This can be seen in the more open attitude towards exter-
nal actors’ demands and needs in shaping the formative supply. Fur-
thermore, academics are pushed to pay more attention to fundraising 
activities and to match extrinsic criteria based on usefulness and ap-
plicability of their research and teaching activities. Nonetheless, the 
institutionalised traditional academic culture and habitus, strength-
ened by the university’s demographic inertia and the shortage of new 
(and younger) academic staff recruitment, are still the main break for 
a full-fledged cultural change in U/I relations. 
• Ongoing U/I relations have an impact – albeit still to be fully as-
sessed – on the construction of an effective and well established na-
tional graduate labour market, which is still quite underdeveloped in 
Italy. The operation of AlmaLaurea and other university consortia, 
as well as the signing of specific agreements at the local level are at 
least siding as institutional buffers the functioning of other matching 
devices between supply and demand; for example, networks of in-
formal social relations. Furthermore, the growing interaction be-
tween pure and applied research among a plurality of actors, as in 
the Catania and Meta-districts, suggest the emergence of a Mode 2 
type of knowledge production both within and outside universities. 
On the whole, although a complete survey on U/I relations in Italy has 
not yet been done, these initial insights witness and confirm that a struc-
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turation process is at work, with some contradictions and/or resistances 
typical of any process of change in its early stages. Comparing these 
with the definition of structuration, it is quite manifest that each of the 
four indicators of structuring is present with different degrees of 
strength. Ongoing changes make Italy a good laboratory to study the 
structuration of a new organisational field, and especially U/I relations 
in their early developments. 
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Changes in Funding University Research: 
Consequences for Problem Choice and 
Research Output of Academic Staff 
SVEIN KYVIK
1.  Introduct ion 
In the post-World War II period until the late 1970s, university research 
in most Western European countries was generally funded by general 
government grants via the state budget. Research councils for basic re-
search constituted an additional funding source, while the extent of con-
tract research was relatively modest. The scale of university research in-
creased more or less as a function of growth in student numbers and the 
subsequent increase in academic staff. As a general rule, individual staff 
members did not have to pay much attention to funding matters and had 
considerable freedom to choose research topics on the basis of scientific 
interest rather than external demands. The relationship between the gov-
ernment and the universities was relatively harmonic and based on the 
belief that it was the academic community that could best formulate re-
search problems and undertake the necessary priorities. In return, aca-
demic staff would produce new knowledge that in the short or long run 
would prove useful to society.
However, this relationship was to change. In most Western European 
countries, the large growth in student and staff numbers in the 1970s be-
came an increasing burden on state budgets, and the economic crisis to-
wards the end of the decade added to this strain considerably. Simulta-
neously, a fundamental shift in public policy towards universities took 
place. Governments expected universities to become more responsive to 
SVEIN KYVIK
388
societal needs and contribute more directly to the economic growth and 
improvement of public services through cooperation with industry and 
the public sector.
These changing demands on universities were more or less the same 
in most OECD countries (Goedegebuure et al. 1994). However, there 
were differences between countries in the extent to which the state ac-
tively governed universities and with regard to the means used to obtain 
these objectives. In this respect, funding and funding mechanisms are 
the most important measures for steering and influencing universities; 
consequently, funding principles and patterns changed substantially in 
most countries during the 1980s. A set of financial incentives was intro-
duced to affect university research indirectly (Geuna 1999). General 
government funds decreased relatively, forcing universities and staff 
into the market to seek supplementary research funding. Through the 
competition for funds, universities were expected to adjust their research 
practice to changing societal needs for practical knowledge. 
This article examines the effects of increasing external funding for 
problem choice and research output of academic staff at Norwegian uni-
versities. As in other countries, the government implemented policies to 
steer university research in more strategic and applied directions. Two 
main changes were the outcome of this process: an increase in ‘contract 
funding’ and an increase in ‘programme funding’. The article shows 
how the funding principles of Norwegian university research changed 
during the 1980s and 1990s, and how these changes affected funding 
patterns. Second, the effects of increased external funding on the content 
of research in terms of the extent of basic versus applied research as re-
ported by academic staff are examined. Third, the effects of contract 
funding on the content and outcome of research are discussed, and 
fourth, the paper examines the effects of programme funding on problem 
choice and publishing patterns in academic research. First, we briefly 
review relevant theoretical and empirical contributions in this field. 
2. Theoret ical  and empir ical  contr ibut ions
on the ef fects of  increased external  
 funding  research
During the last two decades we have witnessed a flow of statements and 
theoretical speculations from universities and scholars in the science 
studies community on the detrimental effects of increased external fund-
ing on university research. There has been a general concern that in-
volvement in contract research for industry and public agencies and par-
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ticipation in strategic programmes organised by research councils, the 
European Union etc., will lead to a decline in basic research and a radi-
cal change in the universities’ mission. The effects of this process have 
been described in various ways, and the influence of some of the con-
cepts coined has been pronounced, including “academic capitalism” 
(Slaughter and Leslie 1997) and “the drift of epistemic criteria” (Elzinga 
1985). The latter term means that increased pressure for external funding 
may constrain academic staff to become more concerned with the rele-
vance of research instead of pursuing basic problems. This process of 
the “the drift of epistemic criteria” means that traditional scientific inter-
nalist criteria might be eroded by the enhancement of applied research 
within a university context through the internalisation of external norms 
on problem choice.  
The most influential notion however, is the transformation of the 
paradigm of knowledge production from “mode 1” to “mode 2” (Gib-
bons et al. 1994). In contrast to “mode 1” research, which is more or less 
synonymous with disciplinary basic research, “mode 2” research is gen-
erated within a context of application; not only in the natural and social 
sciences, but also in the humanities. The creators of these concepts have 
argued that the process of knowledge production is being radically trans-
formed, and that “…the research that is variously described as ‘pure’, 
‘blue-skies’, fundamental, or disinterested, is now a minority preoccupa-
tion – even in universities” (Nowotny et al. 2003, p. 184). This conclu-
sion, which on the surface may sound convincing and in accordance 
with much of the critique voiced by university leaders and representa-
tives of academic staff is however, weakly founded in empirical studies. 
It builds on the assumption that universities have been previously en-
gaged mostly in basic research, and that applied research is an activity 
enhanced by new demands in society. There is ample historical evidence 
that research within the context of universities has always been shifting 
between the fundamental and the applied spheres. Godin (1998) main-
tains that no empirical data allows us to conclude that “mode 2” is really 
a new phenomenon. Martin (2003) similarly argues that in a long-term 
historical perspective, what we are witnessing appears to be not so much 
the appearance of a new phenomenon, but more a shift back towards re-
search practices prior to World War II. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the position of universities 
has changed over the last two decades. Governments have other expecta-
tions of universities today than they had in the 1970s, and the amount of 
externally funded research has increased quite considerably. Within such 
a short time-period, the conclusions drawn by Nowotny et al. (2003) 
might therefore be verified through empirical research. 
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A general problem in parts of the science studies literature and in in-
ternal university debates is the tendency to equate increased external 
funding and market-orientation with non-scientific influence on problem 
choice and research practice. A deconstruction of the notion of market 
orientation indicates however, that we should distinguish between at 
least four different financial markets with their own rules and regula-
tions for market transactions. First, we may speak of an academic finan-
cial market, where funds are distributed by research councils for basic 
research and private foundations, and where peer review of applications 
for research support is the dominant allocation mechanism. Research 
priorities are made by the academic community itself. Second, there is a 
public sector financial market where government ministries and other 
public agencies distribute funds for research, either through open com-
petition between applicants or direct contact with specific institutions or 
individual researchers. As we show, the academic community itself of-
ten has a large influence on problem choice in such projects. Third, there 
is an industrial financial market, which similarly to the public sector 
market, employs various transaction strategies. And fourth, in a Euro-
pean context we may speak of a European Union financial market, since 
this institution now has become an important actor in funding university 
research. In this market, academic peer-review also constitutes the 
dominant procedure in the selection of competing research projects, al-
though the major research topics have been negotiated in a political and 
administrative context. 
Empirical studies of the consequences of changing funding princi-
ples for the content and output of university research have been in rela-
tively short supply compared to theoretical analyses and speculations. 
Reasons for this discrepancy are that empirical research is time-
consuming and that a certain period of time has to pass after the change 
is initiated before meaningful observations can be made. Two relevant 
studies will be briefly addressed as a starting point for our analysis. One 
of the most important contributions is the study of academic identities in 
British universities (Henkel 2000). The British university system has 
been exposed to the largest changes in funding principles of research in 
Western Europe, and should be of particular interest in analysing the ef-
fects of changes in government expectations and funding schemes on the 
research practice of university staff. Henkel’s study documents how sci-
entists were increasingly under pressure to generate more external re-
sources, partly to sustain their own research agendas and partly to satisfy 
institutional needs and objectives. Based on interviews with academics 
in seven disciplines at 11 universities, Henkel describes how academic 
staff responded to new expectations and demands in a variety of ways. 
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She concludes that in spite of a much closer relationship with industry 
and other sectors of society, identities of staff in terms of academic val-
ues and integration with disciplinary communities seems to have re-
mained relatively stable, if not reinforced. Henkel’s conclusion does not 
fit very well with the hypotheses put forward by Gibbons et al. (1994), 
and may be rather surprising considering the strong changes that have 
taken place in the funding structure of British university research.
A similar interview study among university staff in Finland supports 
Henkel’s findings (Ylijoki 2003). It concludes that increasing market-
orientation and external funding does not displace traditional academic 
norms, values, and practices. Intellectual contributions to one’s field 
through publications in highly ranked journals are as important as be-
fore, if not more important. This does not mean that increasing external 
research funding is easy for academic staff; there are several kinds of 
tensions between market and academic orientation that require constant 
balancing and a lot of extra energy.
These two studies are convincing evidence that university staff 
maintain academic values and identities as their primary sources of mo-
tivation and guidelines for research. It is nevertheless hard to believe 
that the strong increase in external funding of university research would 
not have changed research practices in important ways. A pertinent 
question is whether these interview studies, basing their conclusions on 
attitudes and impressions on a selection of (primarily) senior professors, 
might have overlooked important trends not easily detectable through 
conversations with individuals.
This paper complements these two studies in four respects. First, it 
examines the effects of changing funding principles by using another 
university system – Norway – as a case. Second, it bases its analyses 
mainly on quantitative data. Third, it is more specific with regard to 
studying the effects of various funding sources where the increase in 
contract research and programme research are the most important. 
Fourth, rather than being primarily occupied with academic identities, 
this paper focuses on research practice and output.
3.  The data 
The data applied in this paper are mainly drawn from national R&D sta-
tistics and from three postal surveys among all academic staff of the 
rank of assistant professor and higher in 1982, 1992, and 2001. The staff 
come from five fields of learning; the natural and social sciences, the 
humanities, medicine, and technology. The latter field was only included 
SVEIN KYVIK
392
in the 1992 and 2001 surveys. This field classification follows the guide-
lines for research statistics suggested by UNESCO (1978). 
The response rate has declined over time, from 79 percent in 1982 to 
69 percent in 1992 and 60 percent in 2001. This tendency probably re-
flects the general increase in the number of surveys and forms of differ-
ent kinds to which staff are requested to respond. Nevertheless, a 60 per-
cent response rate in the last survey is acceptable, and higher than most 
comparable surveys undertaken in other countries. 
In addition, we refer to other Norwegian studies relevant for the 
enlightenment of changes in funding patterns and their effects on re-
search practices of university staff and the content of their research. 
4. Changes in funding principles and 
funding patterns
The shift in public policy in Norway towards universities took place in 
the late 1970s and 1980s. State authorities criticised the universities, ar-
guing that academic staff showed little understanding of the need for 
(new) knowledge by industry and the public sector. Criticism was lev-
elled at university researchers’ unwillingness to become engaged in im-
portant practical problems, and the universities’ lack of ability to tackle 
problems which required coordinated scientific efforts directed towards 
well-defined goals. The government subsequently implemented policies 
to steer university research in more strategic directions with a stronger 
emphasis on applied research. The following measures were undertaken: 
• An increasing proportion of the university budget was expected to be 
generated from sources other than general appropriations over the 
state budget;  
• The government initiated research priority areas and major research 
programmes; 
• The research councils were given a more prominent role in the allo-
cation of research funds. The councils were also encouraged to be-
come more strategic in their evaluation and shift focus from project 
funding to programme funding; 
• Universities were encouraged to seek research funding from indus-
try;
• The government expected that universities should actively apply for 
funding within the European framework programmes. 
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4.1 Relative decrease in general government funding 
Table 1 displays the relative size of various funding sources for univer-
sity research and changes in funding patterns over time. A major trend is 
the strong relative decline in general government funds from 80 percent 
in 1981 to 62 percent in 2001, with the largest decrease in the 1980s. 
This means that in the latter decade, close to 40 percent of the research 
funding came from external sources, having almost doubled over a 
twenty-year period.  
The decrease in general government grants has been particularly 
strong in the natural sciences and technology, while there has been no 
decrease in the humanities and only a small decrease in the social sci-
ences (Figure 1). Data from the 2001 survey show that in the preceding 
five-year period, 75 percent of academic staff received financial support 
for their research from sources outside the university. The funding pat-
tern differs notably between the various fields of science. Between 80 
and 90 percent of staff in the natural sciences, medicine, and technology 
reported external funding as the main source, in contrast to 75 percent in 
the social sciences and 55 percent in the humanities. 
Table 1: R&D expenditure in Norwegian universities 1981, 1991, and 
   2001, by source of funding (in %) 
 1981 1991 2001 
General government grants 79.5 66.7 61.6 
National research councils 10.3 18.3 18.9 
Public agencies 4.3 4.0 5.0 
Industry 2.8 5.5 6.0 
Private foundations/organisations 2.6 4.6 5.3 
Funds from abroad 0.5 0.9 3.2 
Total 100 100 100 
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Figure 1: Percentage of university R&D expenditure funded by general 
   government appropriations in 1981, 1991, and 2001, by field 
   of science
4.2 The introduction of government-initiated research  
  priority areas  
In the mid 1980s, in accordance with changes in science policy measures 
internationally, the government initiated research priority areas which 
were an innovation in the traditional funding structure of university re-
search. The priority areas were to concentrate and focus research efforts 
in subject areas where the extent and quality of research was not in ac-
cordance with the knowledge needs of society. The government became 
directly involved in establishing research priorities; something which 
was previously determined by the university, research councils, or the 
individual ministries. The primary objective was to support research 
which could stimulate technological development and economic growth, 
but social and cultural aspects were also included. In part this was done 
by channelling extra funds via the research councils to target areas, and 
in part by coordinating and restructuring already existing research initia-
tives. Eight priority areas were identified: information technology; bio-
technology; oil and gas production; management, organisation, and ad-
ministrative systems; dissemination of research on culture and tradition; 
health, environment, and living conditions; materials technology; and 
aquaculture. The government-initiated programmes soon became sig-
nificant to the funding of university research. In 1990, designated prior-
ity areas received some 15 percent of the government funding for re-
search and development. In practice, these funds were now allocated to 
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researchers through major research programmes organised and coordi-
nated by the research councils (Mathisen 1996). 
The introduction of research priority areas was seen by some actors 
as a way of reforming the universities. Research was to be increasingly 
focussed on more coordinated scientific efforts which would be to the 
direct benefit of society, and away from traditional academic individual-
ism and fragmented research practice. Inside the universities, the recep-
tion of this new funding policy differed. Many regarded the creation of 
programmes as important additional funding sources, and did not fear 
that external interests would create problems for the continuation of their 
research practice. An important reason for this attitude was that senior 
professors were influential members of councils and programme com-
mittees responsible for research priorities determined at government 
level. But many academic staff members also regarded the introduction 
of priority areas and research programmes as science policy instruments 
aiming at providing external control of academic research, placing pri-
orities in the hands of politicians and bureaucrats (Mathisen 1996).  
4.3 Governmental contract research – 
from Rothschild Principle to Langslet Doctrine 
In most countries various public agencies have the opportunity to fund 
research projects aimed at improving their work. Probably the best ex-
ample of policies for direct research funding by public agencies is the 
Rothschild principle in Great Britain, introduced in 1972: 
“… applied research and development (R&D), that is R&D with a practical 
application as its objective, must be done on a customer-contractor basis. The 
customer says what he wants; the contractor does it (if he can); and the cus-
tomer pays.” (Rothschild Report 1971) 
According to this policy, all applied research funded by government 
ministries should be organised on this principle (Kogan and Henkel 
1983).
In Norway, a large number of public agencies, not only governmen-
tal ministries, allocate funds for targeted research projects. Funds from 
government ministries have however, been particularly important. At the 
end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, earmarked resources for ‘research, 
development, experiment, etc.’ were introduced to cover the ministries’ 
own need for research-based knowledge. Soon, this government initia-
tive resulted in a considerable number of projects. But ministerial use of 
contract research gradually came to be criticised by the research com-
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munity as well as by politicians. Questions were raised about the quality 
of such research. Procedures for assessing the academic standards of re-
search projects were often absent. In addition, it was maintained that 
splitting up funds into many small and short-term projects was disadvan-
tageous, and that projects frequently did not have a critical enough dis-
tance from the policy of the ministries.
This criticism led to an emphasis on stronger quality control of con-
tract research. In 1983, the government decided that the research coun-
cils were to be more involved in the allocation of ministerial funds for 
research projects. This decree was later referred to as the ‘Langslet Doc-
trine’ after the minister who initiated the reform (Skoie 1985). In prac-
tice this meant that the ministries should transfer large parts of funds for 
research projects to applied research programmes under the auspices of 
the research councils. The ministries themselves should influence the 
profile of the programmes to maintain relevant criteria. In this way, the 
government attempted to unify principles of research quality (the scien-
tific standard of the research undertaken), and relevance (the applicabil-
ity of the research for ministerial policy purposes).  
With the shift from the ‘Rothschild Principle’ to the ‘Langslet Doc-
trine’ as a funding principle for ministerial research in the mid 1980s, a 
future decline in university research funding from public agencies could 
be expected. However, only a small decrease can be traced from 1981 to 
1991. From 1991 to 2001 direct funding of university research by public 
agencies in fact increased from 4 to 5 percent of the total R&D expendi-
ture in the universities. An evaluation of ministerial funding policy in 
the wake of the implementation of the ‘Langslet Doctrine’ showed that 
the ministries generally followed the policy concerning increased pro-
gramme involvement (Larsen et al. 1991). In 1989 the ministries allo-
cated funds to 85 research programmes under the auspices of the re-
search councils, compared to 15 programmes in 1983. However, this 
growth in programme funding was not followed by an equivalent de-
crease in the number of projects supported. On the contrary, the minis-
tries continued to fund R&D projects to the same extent as before. The 
reason for this policy seems to be a belief in targeted projects over 
which the ministries have greater control, and as a more instrumental 
means for their own work than the more general programmes. The gov-
ernmental policy to change funding strategy from projects to pro-
grammes thus led to a strong increase in R&D funding by the individual 
ministries.
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4.4 Research council funding –
from individual projects to large programmes
In most western countries, national research councils have been impor-
tant for funding university research since World War II. For most faculty 
members these councils have constituted a major source of additional 
funding for basic research. Broadly speaking, research councils may be 
divided into two groups: university or disciplinary councils strongly in-
fluenced by representatives of the scientific community at universities, 
and mission-oriented sectoral councils that essentially support applied 
R&D in close contact with user representatives and in accordance with 
government policies (Skoie 1996). University-oriented research councils 
have traditionally based most of their allocations on a peer review of in-
dividual research proposals. However, in the 1980s and 1990s these 
councils were increasingly encouraged by governments to become more 
strategic. They were expected to be proactive and not only respond to 
individual grant applications. The development of large strategic R&D 
programmes was given priority in order to strengthen the strategic and 
applied side of university research. Subsequently, research council fund-
ing not only aimed at strengthening the quality of research, but to an in-
creasing extent also enhancing its relevance.
Since 1993 there has been only one research council in Norway 
which covers the spectrum from basic research to technological devel-
opment. Of the external funding sources for research at Norwegian uni-
versities, national research council funding is the most important, and 
increased from 10 to nearly 20 percent over the two decades. In 2001, 55 
percent of academic staff received funding from the Research Council of 
Norway. About 70 percent of the staff in the natural sciences and tech-
nology received such funding in contrast to 50 percent in medicine and 
the social sciences and approximately 30 percent in the humanities.
The question of how large a role the research councils should play in 
funding university research has been discussed from time to time. In 
Norway, where resources for the research councils increased strongly 
during the 1980s while general university funds decreased relatively, the 
government clearly prioritised the research councils (Kyvik 1997). The 
argument was that the research councils would be in a better position 
than the universities to discriminate between good and mediocre re-
search, and that it would be easier for them to change priorities between 
fields. Moreover, the increase in research council funding was to a large 
extent attributed to the establishment of government-initiated research 
priority areas. The more important role of the research councils can also 
be explained by the fact that during the last half of the 1980s they re-
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ceived resources from several ministries in addition to the particular 
ministry under which they were placed. These funds were primarily 
earmarked for specific research programmes. In 1995, programme fund-
ing thus constituted a larger share of the total grants from the research 
councils to the universities than the funding of individual research pro-
jects.
4.5 Increased emphasis on industrial and private funding 
An increasing degree of industrial and private funding of university re-
search is an international trend (Geuna 1999). Belief in the importance 
of universities for innovation and economic growth appears to be widely 
accepted in most countries. This is expressed in government policies for 
universities and in the initiatives by industry and business to develop 
collaboration with universities. The expectations are above all connected 
to the development of a science-based industrial sector. 
In Norway, the role of industry as a funding source for university re-
search is relatively modest in relation to the expectations for this form of 
funding. The share of industrial funds of the total university R&D ex-
penditure amounted to 6 percent in 2001 – a doubling from 1981. But 
most of this increase took place in the 1980s, mainly due to generous 
grants from oil companies to support the development of research com-
petence related to the extraction of oil and gas in the North Sea. Indus-
trial funding of university research is first and foremost of importance in 
technology and accounted for 22 percent of R&D expenditure in 2001. 
In this field, two out of three researchers reported receiving finance from 
this source in 2001.
Funding of university research by private foundations and non-profit 
organisations also doubled over the two decades and constituted more 
than 5 percent of the research expenditure in 2001. Some in fact, func-
tion more or less in the same way as the traditional disciplinary research 
councils, using peer-review procedures as a basis for their allocation of 
research grants to individual projects. Private foundations and organisa-
tions are of particular importance in medical research where more than 
50 percent of the university staff in 2001 reported such funding in the 
preceding five-year period.
4.6 Increased emphasis on funding from European Union 
  research programmes 
As from the mid-1980s, the government has been an active agent for in-
creased international research co-operation. This direct approach is 
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manifest in several public documents in the latter part of the decade 
(Skoie 1997). The background for this policy change was the enhanced 
emphasis on technology and innovation as important driving forces for 
economic growth in the European Union. Even though Norway was only 
an associated member of the European Union in 1989, the government 
recommended that Norway should strengthen its involvement in the EU 
programmes. The government noted that the advantages Norway might 
gain would outweigh the membership costs, emphasising that the benefit 
would be easier access to new knowledge and technology. Since the be-
ginning of the 1990s, Norway has participated virtually as a full member 
in the EU framework programmes. Considering the large membership 
fee, the government expects that universities and their academic staff 
should actively apply for participation in and funding from the EU 
framework programmes. 
Funds from abroad have been of relatively little importance for fund-
ing university research in Norway, but there was a dramatic increase in 
the 1990s, from 0.5 to 3.2 percent of R&D expenditure – first and fore-
most due to funding over the European Union framework programmes. 
In 2001, EU funding constituted two thirds of the total funds from 
abroad; 31 percent of the academic staff had received such funding in 
the preceding five-year period. In contrast, only 17 percent of the re-
spondents in the 1992-survey reported such funding. Such sources are of 
particular importance in the natural sciences. In 2001, funding from 
abroad constituted 6.7 percent of the R&D expenditure in this field in 
contrast to only 0.8 percent in 1991. 
4.7 Changes in funding principles and funding patterns – 
  Summary 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the mode of funding university research 
changed substantially in Western Europe – and in Norway. The greater 
emphasis on a national research strategy led to the establishment of a 
large number of research programmes, and needs in industry and the 
public sector for innovation and practical knowledge resulted in the en-
hancement of contract research. As a result of these policy changes, ex-
ternal funding of university research increased and the universities 
gradually became more dependent on such funding. A strong growth in 
external research funding took place in the 1980s – from 20 percent in 
1981 to 33 percent in 1991 – and a slower increase in the 1990s to 38 
percent in 2001. If we look more closely at these figures, half of this 
growth is related to the large increase in research council funding of 
university research primarily through participation in programmes. In 
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addition, the growth in funding by private foundations and non-profit 
organisations is to a large extent a contribution to academic research. 
Thus, it is the academic financial market that has expanded the most, 
where research priorities are made by the academic community itself to 
a very large extent. The industrial financial market has been of relatively 
limited although increasing importance, being mainly restricted to the 
field of technology. 
5. Effects on the extent  of  basic versus 
appl ied research 
To what extent have changes in funding patterns of university research 
affected the content of research? One indicator is the relationship over 
time between basic research, applied research, and experimental devel-
opment. Universities have traditionally been regarded as the sites of ba-
sic scientific research, or research initiated by the evolution of problems 
internal to the scientific discipline itself. Other similar terms for this ac-
tivity are fundamental research, pure research, free research, non-
directed research, and curiosity-driven research (Skoie 1996). It is to be 
expected that the increase in external programme funding and contract 
research may have led to an increase in the share of applied research and 
experimental development. 
In the 1982- and 2001-surveys, academic staff were asked whether 
their R&D activities in the preceding year were mainly basic research, 
applied research, or experimental development. The definitions of these 
three categories were given in the questionnaire, and are identical to 
those formulated by the OECD in 1963 and published in “Proposed 
Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Development”, better 
known as the “Frascati Manual” (OECD 2002). The manual states that 
there are many conceptual and operational problems with these catego-
ries. They seem to imply a separation which rarely exists in reality, and 
the three types of R&D may sometimes be carried out in the same de-
partment by essentially the same staff. It is obvious that the distinctions 
between these three categories are often blurred, and in the questionnaire 
the staff were informed that if their research could be classified in dif-
ferent ways, they should indicate this by writing in 1, 2, or 3 in each of 
the three boxes instead of an ‘x’ in one of them, depending on which of 
the three categories they considered most applicable to their research; 1 
applied most, 3 applied least. 
In the 2001 survey, 57 percent of the academic staff classified their 
R&D-activities in the preceding year as mostly basic research, while 32 
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percent characterised it as predominantly applied, and 11 percent as ex-
perimental development. There are significant differences between fields 
of learning in this respect. The proportion of faculty who defined their 
work as primarily basic research varied between approximately 70 per-
cent in the humanities and natural sciences,  about 50 percent in the so-
cial sciences and medicine, and only 10 percent in technology. By and 
large, the variation in applied research between fields followed this pat-
tern, as there were relatively small differences in the percentage of ex-
perimental development between the various fields. 
A comparison with the 1982 survey is only possible in four of the 
fields because technology was not included. Figure 1 displays how aca-
demic staff classified their research at the two points in time. There has 
only been a small decline in the proportion of staff in the humanities, so-
cial sciences, and medicine who reported that their research was mostly 
basic; and a somewhat larger decline in the natural sciences. These re-
sults are consistent with changes in the percentages of university re-
search expenditure funded by general government appropriations over 
these two decades for the humanities, social sciences, and natural sci-
ences; but not for medicine, which experienced a significant drop in ba-
sic funding of research. 
The decline in basic research from 1981 to 2000 however, is much 
smaller than might have been expected considering the very large de-
cline in general government grants for research in the same period (Ta-
ble 1). These results may indicate that type of funding is of relatively lit-
tle importance for the character of the research undertaken. A test of this 
relationship was done by examining how academic staff in the 2001 sur-
vey classified their research when controlled for various funding 
sources. Of those who did not receive financial support from sources 
other than their university, 57 percent reported that they primarily under-
took basic research, 27 percent applied research, and 16 percent experi-
mental development. Of those who received grants from national re-
search councils, foundations, and European Union programmes; 60 per-
cent answered basic research as the most important activity, 30 percent 
applied research, and 10 percent experimental development. The equiva-
lent figures for those who undertook contract research were 55, 37, and 
8 percent. The relationship between type of funding and how academic 
staff characterised their research is thus very weak or insignificant. 
SVEIN KYVIK
402
Figure 2: Percentage of academic staff that characterised their  
   research in 1981 and 2000 as mostly basic research, applied 
   research, or experimental development; by field of science 
6.  Effects – of  contract  research 
We have shown that a substantial increase in contract research took 
place from 1980 to 2000, and that such research funding constituted an 
estimated 13-15 percent of the total R&D expenditure by the universities 
in 2001. One third of the academic staff in 2001 reported that they had 
obtained funding from industry or public agencies in the preceding five-
year period. We have also shown that the science policy debate in the 
1970s and 1980s was dominated by those critical to contract research. 
But what are the attitudes towards this type of research among ordinary 
academic staff members? 
Table 2 shows the percentages of academic staff in 1992 and 2001 
who agreed and disagreed with the statement that contract research often 
introduces new and interesting topics in research at their department. On 
both occasions between 20 and 25 percent of the staff agreed with this 
statement. In 2001, about 40 percent partly agreed, and 20 percent dis-
agreed. A substantially smaller percentage answered ‘don’t know’ or 
‘not relevant’ in 2001 than ten years earlier; indicating that the great ma-
jority at the latter point in time had some experience with contract re-
search, either through their own research or through observations of 
their colleagues with funding from industry or public agencies. Of those 
who actually had undertaken contract research, about 40 percent in both 
surveys agreed that this activity often introduces new and interesting 
topics in research at their department, in contrast to 15 percent of those 
who did not engage in this type of research. Academic staff members in 
the field of technology have substantially more positive attitudes to-
wards contract research than other staff members. On both occasions 60 
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percent of the staff in technology agreed with the statement, and 5 per-
cent disagreed.
Table 2: Percentage of academic staff in 1992 and 2001 that agreed and 
   disagreed with the statement that contract research often  
   introduces new and interesting topics in the research at their 
   department 
 Agree Partly 
agree
Disagree Don’t 
know 
Total 
1992 24 31 14 31 100 
2001 22 42 20 16 100 
Table 3 shows that only 15 percent of the staff in 1992 and 2001 respec-
tively agreed with the statement that ‘the extent and character of contract 
research is problematic in relation to the autonomy of research and the 
independence of their department’ while close to 40 percent disagreed. 
At both points in time there was no difference in the percentage who 
agreed with this statement among those who had undertaken contract re-
search, and those who had not. Of those who had undertaken contract re-
search close to 50 percent disagreed, in contrast to 30-35 percent of 
those who had not. This difference in opinion applies to both surveys. 
The field of technology again deviates from the other fields of learning. 
In 1992, 40 percent of those who had engaged in contract research in the 
preceding five-year period disagreed with the statement that this activity 
is problematic for the autonomy of research. In 2001, this proportion in-
creased to 60 percent. This indicates that attitudes towards contract re-
search are considerably more positive in the field where such funding is 
the most common, and also that during the last decade attitudes have be-
come substantially more positive among those staff members who actu-
ally undertake this type of research. 
Table 3: Percentage of academic staff in 1992 and 2001 that agreed and 
   disagreed with the statement that the extent and character of 
   contract research is problematic with regard to the autonomy 
   and independence of research at their department 
 Agree Partly 
agree
Disagree Don’t 
know 
Total 
1992 14 20 36 30 100 
2001 15 29 39 17 100 
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The reason why close to 50 percent of those who had undertaken con-
tract research did not agree with the statement that such funding endan-
gered autonomy of research is probably to be found in the character of 
this type of research. Industry and public agencies do not always an-
nounce project funds for R&D, but despite this lack of public an-
nouncement receive applications from researchers and research institu-
tions for support for R&D projects. An examination of research projects 
funded by governmental ministries revealed that more than half of the 
projects in 1989 were initiated by researchers, while ministries took the 
initiative in less than one third of the projects (Larsen et al. 1991). The 
objectives of each of the about 580 projects funded that year were exam-
ined in a survey addressed to the ministries. The questionnaire distin-
guished four categories, with the open-ended possibility to check more 
than one optional answer. The need to increase or update knowledge 
within a specific field was indicated as the motive behind 67 percent of 
the projects. The need for a general establishment of expertise was the 
basis for 47 percent of the projects. ‘Problem-solving’ was the aim of 24 
percent of the projects, and the need for ‘mission-oriented’ contributions 
in relation to specific legislative measures, evaluations etc. was the 
background for 20 percent of the projects. Generally-formulated objec-
tives thus dominated specific and mission-oriented demands in the min-
istries. Moreover, ministerial involvement in a project was often limited 
to being informed by the researchers about its progression and results. 
For only half of the projects, the ministries themselves reported that they 
had contributed to restricting thematic objectives. 
At a general level these results are supported by an analysis of publi-
cation data. No significant differences were found in publication practice 
between academic staff who had undertaken contract research and those 
who had not. Moreover, staff who had received industry funding pub-
lished more journal articles than staff without such funding. 
7.  Effects of  programme research  
The introduction of governmental research priority areas and the devel-
opment of research programmes in the research councils in the mid-
1980s were met with ambiguous attitudes by the universities. While 
some professors emphasised the extension of their funding base, other 
representatives argued that the programmes would lead to more applied 
research at the expense of basic research, and that governmental de-
mands would place excessive influence on research priorities. Others 
claimed that involvement in research programmes would result in re-
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search of a less scientific value than that of individual projects initiated 
by scientists.
There is no doubt that the research programmes have constituted im-
portant additional funding sources for university research. A total of 55 
percent of academic staff in 1992 agreed that the programmes had 
brought in funds to the department that otherwise would probably not 
have been provided (Table 4). As much as 36 percent of the staff ob-
tained funding through programmes organised by a national research 
council in the preceding five-year period, varying between 18 percent in 
the humanities and 58 percent in technology. A majority of the staff 
agreed with the statement that the programmes had contributed to vital-
ising research in their department. One of the reasons for this positive 
attitude may be that the programmes not only tempted researchers with 
financial support and material resources, but the opportunity to collabo-
rate with and get inspiration from researchers at other locations. 
But to what extent have these programmes actually affected research 
undertaken in the universities? Is it true that the scientific autonomy of 
university research has been eroded by the introduction of research pro-
grammes? Has involvement in these programmes resulted in research of 
questionable quality? Have the conditions for producing good research 
been undermined by these new mechanisms for financing and setting 
priorities in research?
The 1992 survey did not provide much evidence for a change in in-
ternalist scientific criteria (Table 4). Only 14 percent of the academic 
staff agreed with the statement that individuals other than researchers in 
their department had too much influence on scientific priorities and 
problem choices of their specific projects. Furthermore, only 9 percent 
of the staff agreed with the statement that the research programmes had 
resulted in research of less scientific value than usual in their depart-
ment.  
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Table 4: Percentage of academic staff in 1992 that agreed and dis-
   agreed with the following statements on the participation in 
   research programmes organised by the research councils 
 Agree Partly 
agree
Dis-
agree
Don’t
know 
Total 
Brought in funds to the 
department that other-
wise would probably 
not have been provided 
55 19 8 18 100 
Contributed to vitalis-
ing the research in the 
department 
29 31 16 24 100 
Contributed to making 
the research in the de-
partment more applied 
and user-oriented 
20 30 24 26 100 
People other than staff 
in the department have 
got too much influence 
on scientific priorities 
and problem choices 
14 17 40 29 100 
Resulted in research of 
less scientific value 
than usual in the de-
partment 
9 16 48 27 100 
Against the background of strong criticism of research programmes, 
these results may be surprising. It seems that the criticism does not re-
flect the experiences of the majority of the involved researchers. What 
could explain this discrepancy? Interviews undertaken among academic 
staff involved in research programmes revealed that to a large extent 
they used the research programmes to obtain access to extra resources 
without changing their priorities beyond the label of their research pro-
jects (Mathisen 1996). Traditional academic research was virtually unaf-
fected by the objectives of the programmes. Most informants said that 
their programme-financed research was very similar to what they had 
done earlier, or that it built upon their former research. The overwhelm-
ing tendency was that the involved researchers had undertaken only mi-
nor if any, changes in the research theme to obtain funding through the 
programmes.  
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These effects should be seen in connection with the decision-making 
processes preceding the establishment of the research programmes. Sen-
ior scientists from relevant disciplines were very active and influential in 
the formulation of research priorities and the academic community itself 
was given the main responsibility for the selection of research groups 
and distribution of funds to specific projects. Mathisen (1996) has ar-
gued that the priority areas and the research programmes developed by 
the government and the research councils was a form of ‘mild steering’ 
of problem choice in science through funding mechanisms. These initia-
tives, influenced by the concept ‘strategic research’, were effective in 
targeting areas for increased research efforts and should be regarded as 
strengthening rather than weakening university research.
In general, these results are supported by an analysis of publication 
data. There is no evidence that academic staff who took part in pro-
gramme research around 1990 performed worse scientifically than those 
who did not have such funding. There were no significant differences in 
publication practice between those who had programme funding or only 
university funding.  
Data pertaining to the participation of university staff in national re-
search programmes was not available in the 2001 survey, but there is no 
reason to believe that the extent of programme research was reduced. In 
addition, there has been an increase in the number of academic staff par-
ticipating in research programmes organised by the European Commis-
sion. In 2001, 16 percent of staff members reported that they had re-
ceived funding from EU-programmes in the preceding five-year period. 
These funds were particularly important in the natural sciences and 
technology, where 25-30 percent of staff members were involved in 
these programmes. In contrast to the national research programmes, uni-
versity staffs have had very little influence on EU research priorities. 
Nevertheless, they might have had considerable influence on problem 
choice in some of the projects in which they have participated. An 
analysis of publishing practices in the various fields of science indicates 
that researchers with EU funding were significantly more productive 
than other staff members, and published as many articles in international 
journals as their colleagues without such funding. 
8.  Conclusion 
The strong relative decline in general government grants for university 
research and the enhancement of research programmes and contract re-
search, has been strongly criticised by many university researchers. 
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These science policy measures were regarded as attempts by govern-
ment and bureaucrats to acquire stronger control over university re-
search, linking it more closely to societal interests and political priorities 
(Mathisen 1996). This critique has been largely supported by scholars in 
the science studies community, claiming that the social conditions of 
creative research as well as scientific progress itself are endangered. 
Traditional scientific internalist criteria might be eroded through the in-
ternalisation of external norms on problem choice among academic staff. 
These claims do not find much support in the data presented in this 
paper. The strong increase in contract and programme research in the 
1980s and 1990s led to only a relatively small decline in the percentage 
of academic staff who reported that their research was mostly basic. On 
a general level, these results are corroborated by publication data. In the 
course of the same period, the scientific article in an international (Eng-
lish-language) journal enhanced its position as the dominating type of 
publication, while reports declined in importance (Kyvik 2003). No sig-
nificant differences were found in publication practice between aca-
demic staff who had undertaken contract research or programme re-
search and those who had not been involved in such activities. 
These findings seem consistent with those reported by Henkel 
(2000) and Ylijoki (2003). A recent review of scientific research at 
American universities had similar conclusions. Bok (2003) states that 
research priorities have hardly shifted in any substantial way to favour 
applied research at the expense of more fundamental inquiry. He points 
out that the percentage of US university R&D devoted to basic research 
has remained fairly constant since the late 1970s. While industrial fund-
ing has increased, this accounts for less than 10 percent of all university 
research financing, and hence does not significantly affect the overall 
balance of priorities. An interview study among American and British 
scientists also supports these findings. The scientists consistently denied 
that the nature of their research was being changed substantially (Calvert 
2000).
There are probably two main reasons for the discrepancy between 
theoretical speculations of the consequences of increased market orienta-
tion and the measured effects of increased external funding on research 
practices; (a) an uncritical use of data on funding of university research, 
and (b) an incomplete understanding of the social mechanisms that come 
into play to sustain the position of academic research in universities.
First, there has been a tendency to equate increased market orienta-
tion with increased non-academic influence on problem choice in scien-
tific research. Even though the percentage of R&D expenditure in Nor-
wegian universities drawn from competition in the market increased 
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from 20 to 38 percent over the two decades, this does not mean that pri-
vate corporations and public agencies directed the use of these funds. It 
is the academic financial market that is by far the largest and expanded 
the most in this period, encompassing close to 25 percent of total R&D 
expenditure at the universities (Table 1). The public sector financial 
market transacts five percent of the total research funding, the industrial 
about six percent, and the EU-market between two and three percent. 
The mechanisms for selection of externally funded research projects are 
subsequently dominated by traditional academic peer-review proce-
dures.
Second, to the extent that university staffs seek funding in non-
academic markets, they do not necessarily restrict their research to ap-
plied problem-solving and experimental development. The large relative 
decrease in general government funds and the subsequent increase in 
programme and contract research so far seem to have had surprisingly 
small effects on problem choice and research output of academic staff. 
The reason is that university staffs are very reluctant to become involved 
in programmes or contract research if the results are not also expected to 
contribute to basic research. As there are strong norms in the scientific 
community against external influence on research, and because recogni-
tion and prestige are still linked to the quality of research, scientists 
normally have strong personal interest and motivation in combining ap-
plied and basic research. It is thus not necessarily a conflict between 
contributing to problem-solving in industry and public agencies and sci-
ence-internal knowledge production. 
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Private Higher Education in Poland:
A Case of Public-Private Dynamics 
WOJCIECH DUCZMAL AND BEN JONGBLOED
1.  Introduct ion 
Based on the dissertation of the first author (Duczmal 2006), this chapter 
seeks to increase our understanding of the rapid rise of private higher 
education in Poland and the effects on the dynamics of the Polish higher 
education system as a whole. After the collapse of communism in 1989, 
Polish higher education, like other sectors in the economy, went through 
a rapid period of reform that may be characterised as liberalisation, mar-
ketisation, and privatisation (Johnstone 2002). 
In higher education, the policy stance changed from a centralised, 
state-steered approach to a more decentralised, market-competitive one. 
A new law, the Higher Education Act of September 12, 1990, provided 
the basis for a number of far-reaching changes in the system. Major in-
novations included the devolution of authority from the government to 
institutions, allowing private providers of higher education to establish 
themselves alongside the incumbent public providers, and the introduc-
tion of tuition fees. 
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Figure 1: Number of public and private higher education institutions in 
   Poland; 1991-2004 
Source: own analysis based on Yearbook of Higher Education (1991-2004)  
One of the most visible results was the emergence of a large private 
higher education sector, the most extensive system of its kind in Europe. 
The number of private providers rose from 3 in 1990 to 280 in 2004, 
with more than half a million students (see figure 1). Almost 30% of all 
students attend institutions run by private providers. 
Public universities also adapted quickly to the new climate. In addi-
tion to providing places that were free of charge, they began to engage in 
the supply of fee-paying study places to students in part-time and week-
end programs. The result is that the number of fee-paying students in 
both private and public higher education institutions now exceeds the 
number of non-paying students (figure 2). 
Private higher education and the market-oriented behaviour of public 
higher education have been studied by many higher education research-
ers (Altbach 1999; Geiger 1986, 1988; Levy 1986a, b, 1992, 2002), but 
many of these are from the Anglo-Saxon world and studied the phe-
nomenon in their own higher education contexts, that is, outside Central 
or Eastern Europe. The privatisation movement has hardly been studied 
in Poland (Kwiek 2003; Reisz 2003). We seek here to partly fill this gap.
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Figure 2: Number of higher education students in Poland in fee-paying 
   and non-paying forms of studies, 1991-2004 (students in thou-
   sands)
Source: own analysis based on Yearbook of Higher Education (1991-2004)  
While a much larger study conducted by the first author looked at more 
details, this chapter addresses aspects of the strategic behaviour of indi-
vidual private providers. In particular, we look at their location, the type 
of programs offered, and the fees charged. In short: we study their dif-
ferentiation strategies. 
Section 2 sketches the analytical framework for our study, touching 
on the underlying theories. Section 3 identifies a number of hypotheses 
to be confronted with the empirical situation in Poland from 1990 on-
wards. Section 4 presents the sample of private higher education institu-
tions we cover in this study and covers aspects of the dependent vari-
able, the strategic responses. The outcomes of our empirical analyses are 
presented in sections 5 and 6, treating, respectively ‘products’ (pro-
grams) and ‘prices’ (tuition fees). Finally, section 7 presents conclusions 
connected to the hypotheses. 
2.  Theoret ical  f ramework 
To study the performance of higher education providers in Poland from 
1989 to 2004, we employ a theoretical approach that sees the strategic 
responses of providers as the outcome of a combination of institutional 
forces (in terms of the government’s higher education policy, i.e., laws, 
regulations, and funding arrangements) and external (demand and sup-
ply) conditions on the higher education market. This theoretical frame-
work is based on two main theories: neo-institutional theory (North 
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1996) and industry analysis (Scherer and Ross 1990; Dill 1997, 2003), 
also including some ingredients from business science (Porter 1980). 
Many studies from a wide range of countries conclude that the role 
and functions that private higher education plays are primarily deter-
mined by public policies addressing private higher education. In recent 
years, another important factor fuelling the growth of private higher 
education is massification – a phenomenon that places enormous de-
mands on higher education systems and government as the main funder 
of the system. In terms of the relationships between state policy and pri-
vate providers, three possible policy stances, or postures towards private 
education may be identified (Zumeta 1992, 1996). The first is laissez-
faire, where the state leaves private higher education to its own devices. 
In the second posture, central-planning, private and public institutions 
are treated much the same by the state and have planned roles in the 
higher education system. The third stance is the market-competitive ap-
proach, where the state injects market elements into the higher education 
system. Increased policy attention to the private sector is advocated by 
those that find that the mission, priorities and goals of private higher 
education are close to the public higher education sector’s mission, 
goals, and priorities. However, observers that regard the private sector as 
different from the public sector often advocate less policy attention for 
the private sector. We argue that state policies addressing the private 
sector, together with the so-called external forces, determine the actual 
behaviour (strategies) of the private providers. Private providers are ex-
pected to evolve in directions rewarded by institutional arrangements. 
How they behave is also shaped by external forces, understood as ‘de-
mand and supply’ factors such as demographic trends, the macro-
economic situation, the degree of rivalry in the market, etc. To explain 
how higher education providers will respond to institutional and external 
conditions we would like to go beyond merely descriptive analyses (e.g. 
Bowen et al. 1997; Cerych 1995; Geiger 1986, 1988) or observations 
that stress the copying behaviour of higher education providers (e.g. 
DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Levy 1999). Therefore, we have con-
structed the analytical framework, our ‘interdependency model’, shown 
in Figure 3. 
We focus on the interactions between higher education arrangements 
(public policies affecting higher education), the basic external conditions 
(the “Five Forces” identified in Porter (1980)), and the responses of 
higher education providers. While we are aware that higher education 
providers can influence the institutional framework and that basic condi-
tions also shape the institutional arrangements (and the other way 
around), we will not take into account other such interactions. Our de-
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pendent variable is understood here as the strategies of higher education 
providers and the way these work out at the level of the higher education 
system as a whole. 
The institutional framework includes national regulations, policies, 
norms, and traditions that impact academics’ and students’ behaviour. 
As we are primarily interested in understanding the effects of the injec-
tion of market forces into higher education policies, we analyse the 
higher education institutional framework through the concept of mar-
ketisation policy (Jongbloed 2003). We understand the concept of mar-
ketisation as a process that takes place in several related higher educa-
tion policy dimensions such as barriers to the entry of new providers to 
the higher education market, regulations affecting various aspects of the 
providers’ autonomy, conditions for providers to receive state funding, 
the availability of information on prices and quality, students’ freedom 
to choose the preferred educational provider, and students’ freedom to 
have a say in the content of their curriculum as well as their ability to 
qualify for government scholarships. 
Figure 3: Research framework 
The responses by higher education providers in terms of products, 
prices, and clients are co-determined by external factors, the demand 
and supply conditions. These basic conditions are operationalised 
through indicators derived largely from the “five forces” diagram devel-
oped by Michael Porter for analysing competitive strategies in an indus-
try (Porter 1980). When translated to higher education, we identify the 
following forces:
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Demand conditions: 
• overall economic conditions 
• demographic trends/students’ power 
Supply conditions:
• threat of substitutes 
• academics’ power 
• degree of rivalry between providers 
Although we do not analyse all five forces in detail here, we make a few 
remarks about the role they play. First, demographic developments 
heavily determine the available pool of clients to which higher education 
providers can cater. Periods of demographic decline will affect the insti-
tutions’ ‘hunting ground’, so to speak. Second, the general economic 
situation and sectoral structure of the economy also affect the demand 
for highly trained personnel, that is: higher education. 
Looking at supply conditions, the threat of substitutes refers in par-
ticular to the availability of vocationally oriented courses that are poten-
tial substitutes for higher education programs. In addition, the option for 
secondary school graduates to take a job in the labour market may also 
be regarded as a substitute for embarking on a higher education pro-
gram. Therefore, the employment opportunities for secondary school 
graduates form an indicator of the supply conditions. An indicator of the 
power of suppliers is the number of academic staff working in higher 
education institutions. If the number of teaching posts held by academics 
is larger, and there are more habilitated doctors and professors among 
them, the power of suppliers is considered larger. 
Of the five forces, rivalry between suppliers is an important variable 
in our model. Rivalry is partly a result of government policies and partly 
a result of economic competition between higher education providers. 
Rivalry is operationalised by looking at the concentration of higher edu-
cation providers on the market, the size of the higher education market, 
and the variety of degree programs on offer. Here, attention should be 
paid to the specific character of the higher education market. Higher 
education providers face a situation of monopolistic competition, which 
means they act on the market with many small and medium-sized pro-
viders; not all of a provider’s customers would choose other products if 
the provider raised its prices. Each provider is presumed to be able to 
differentiate its product from that of its rivals. Higher education provid-
ers may base their differentiation on low costs and proximity to clients 
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(i.e., students), or program diversity and high quality. Differentiation 
strategies are a crucial element in higher education markets and act as 
the dependent variable in our analytical model.  
3.  Hypotheses 
Our interdependency model is used to guide our exploratory analysis of 
the effects of marketisation in the Polish higher education market. We 
have formulated six hypotheses about the strategic responses by higher 
education providers (see table 1). Here we focus only on the private pro-
viders. The first set of hypotheses addresses the period immediately after 
the fall of the communist regime, 1989-1997, when the higher education 
market expanded rapidly. The second set of hypotheses is used to guide 
our analysis of 1997-2004, when the higher education system may be 
characterised as a saturated and more mature market.  
Hypothesis 1 argues that when the government allows private pro-
viders to enter the higher education market and eliminates barriers to en-
try, the fundamental free market rule will come to life: if a demand for 
higher education exists, supply will rise to fill the void. Due to the 
state’s policy posture towards the private sector, private providers will 
be mostly demand-absorbing institutions. 
Hypotheses 2-6 all relate to the strategies of private providers in 
terms of variety of programs, modes of delivery, pricing policy, location, 
composition of student market, and admission policy. Following Porter 
we identify two main groups of strategies:
• narrow/market segment strategies 
• broad market strategies.  
Within these two groups, organisations can choose a product differentia-
tion strategy or a cost leadership strategy. This leads to the four ‘generic 
strategies’ shown in table 2. 
WOJCIECH DUCZMAL AND BEN JONGBLOED
422
Table 1: Hypotheses 
Period 1:    1990-1997 Period 2 :  1997-2004 
In an expanding higher education 
market with increasing student 
demand, a low degree of rivalry 
between providers, low barriers 
to entry, and an absence of state 
financial support for private 
higher education institutions … 
In a mature higher education 
market, with stable student de-
mand, a high degree of rivalry 
between providers, and an ab-
sence of state financial support 
for private higher education … 
1. the number of private provid-
ers will expand significantly. 
The main function of private 
higher education will be to 
provide more higher education 
and absorb unmet student de-
mand. 
4. most private higher education 
institutions will choose a 
steady sales growth strategy, 
focusing on the entire market 
rather than selected student 
segments. They will offer di-
versified academic-oriented 
study programs and target 
students previously served by 
public institutions. 
2. most of the new private pro-
viders will choose an aggres-
sive growth strategy through 
market expansion. They will 
aim at selected segments such 
as mature and part-time stu-
dents, offering a limited range 
of study fields and focusing 
on high-demand low-cost vo-
cational study programs at 
medium or low tuition fee 
levels.
5. private higher education insti-
tutions that earlier offered 
high quality study programs at 
high prices will not change 
their strategies. 
3. only a limited number of pri-
vate institutions will choose a 
high quality-high price strat-
egy. They will provide a broad 
study offer, master degree 
level courses, and have a more 
balanced structure of enrol-
ment between part-time and 
full-time students.
6. new private providers will 
choose either a focused, low-
cost strategy by offering low-
cost study courses that are vo-
cationally oriented and charge 
low prices. Other new provid-
ers will adopt a focus-
differentiation strategy by of-
fering unique study courses 
for selected student segments.
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Table 2: Porter’s generic strategies 
Advantage 
Target/scope
Low cost Product uniqueness 
Narrow
(Market segment) 
Focus strategy: low 
cost
Focus strategy: differen-
tiation/high quality 
Broad 
(Industry wide) 
Cost leadership strat-
egy
Differentiation/high 
quality strategy 
Sharp and Dawes (1996) examined organisations in terms of their strate-
gies in a given environment. In their view, strategies depend on the 
characteristics of the market:
• Emerging and growing markets, with high fluidity of competitive 
structure, low competition from other firms within the industry, low 
buyer power and relatively rapid changes in customer needs; 
• Mature, saturated and stable markets, with lower fluidity of competi-
tors but higher rivalry, higher buyer power, and lower speed of 
changes in customer needs. 
The two distinct sets of conditions may be related to two distinct periods 
in post-communist Polish higher education: 1990-1997 and 1997-2004. 
This is because the institutional arrangements and external conditions 
are very different in the two periods. New providers starting after 1997 
are governed by the new Vocational Higher Education Act that specifies 
a very different opportunity set. Moreover, our interdependency model 
also takes into consideration the impact of basic demand and supply 
conditions. These conditions were very different at the beginning of the 
1990s compared to the second part of the decade and the early years of 
the 21st century. In particular, the second period is characterised by a de-
crease in the size of the school-age population (2-24 years of age).  
Hypothesis 2 suggests that new private providers will choose a broad 
market and ‘low cost strategy’, attracting students unable to enrol in 
public institutions. They will therefore be established mostly in metro-
politan areas and focus on mature students, many of them from poorer 
socio-economic backgrounds. These students prefer to study on part-
time study courses to be able to combine work and education. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that given the external and institutional envi-
ronment, only a few private higher education institutions will choose a 
high-quality strategy offering high quality study programs mostly at 
master level and charging high tuition fees. These institutions will focus 
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on national rather than regional markets. Private and reliant on tuition 
fees, they will mainly develop programs in high-demand areas.
Hypotheses 4 focuses on the strategic responses of private providers 
in a situation that may be characterised as a mature, stable, saturated 
market, where there is a high degree of rivalry. The private providers 
will offer a more academic type of program, rather than vocationally 
oriented courses. Most private providers will charge similar fees to the 
public providers. In other words, we expect a convergence between the 
public and the private sectors. 
Hypothesis 5 states that a small number of highly selective private 
and public institutions will not change their ‘premium positioning’ strat-
egy and will continue to defend their competitive advantage on the basis 
of the high quality of their services.
Hypothesis 6 argues that private institutions that appear on a rela-
tively mature and saturated market will choose between two strategies: 
(1) they will offer low-cost study programs that have a vocational orien-
tation, charge low tuition fees and locate themselves in small non-
academic cities to attract new groups of students; or (2) to differentiate 
themselves from other providers, they will offer unique programs not 
previously supplied by older institutions. We expect that in saturated 
markets with a high degree of rivalry between providers it is hard for 
newly established institutions to compete directly with older, more pres-
tigious institutions solely on the basis of low costs. They will have to 
seek out forms of differentiation and look for new potential student 
groups.
4.  Preparing the empir ical  analysis 
To establish whether there is support for the hypotheses, a large amount 
of data was gathered. While much is of a qualitative nature, we also 
managed to obtain quantitative information for a sample of individual 
higher education (HE) providers. While we have information for the sys-
tem of higher education as a whole, for the purpose of this article we 
from now on mostly concentrate on a sample of private institutions. Our 
dependent variable refers to different aspects of strategic responses by 
private HE providers. We look at the location of the provider, its student 
enrolment, program offerings, program levels, and tuition fees (see the 
right hand box in figure 3).  
To prepare the empirical investigation of the hypotheses, we con-
structed a sample by dividing Polish higher education providers into a 
number of distinct strata by looking at the area of location of providers 
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and their year of establishment. We distinguish whether the institution is 
situated:
• in the capital (Warsaw);
• in a large city or metropolitan area (> 300,000 inhabitants);  
• in a medium-sized city (100,000-300,000 inhabitants); or  
• in a small town (< 100,000 inhabitants).  
The changes in the population of public and private providers are shown 
in table 3. 
Table 3: Changes in the population of HE providers in Poland 
 in War-
saw 
in large 
cities
in medium-
sized cities 
in small 
cities
total
Institutions
established before 
1991
public 5 22 17 0 44 
Institutions estab-
lished between 
1991 and 1997 
public 0 2 0 0 2 
private 34 34 32 28 128 
Institutions estab-
lished during 
1997-2004
public 0 0 7 17 24 
private 24 41 25 42 133 
Excluding the already existing private, church-funded institutions (11 in 
1991), the first private provider emerged in 1991. Thereafter, a rapid ex-
pansion of private higher education took place (see also Figure 1). Stu-
dent enrolment in the private sector increased from 13,700 in 1990/1991 
to 582,100 in 2004/2005 (see also figure 2). Private higher education in-
stitutions are located throughout Poland, although (in keeping with typi-
cal patterns cross-nationally) the most prestigious are concentrated in 
and around large cities such as Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan, Wroclaw, and 
Lodz. On the other hand, the number of public providers hardly changed 
during the period 1991-1997. After the implementation of the new Vo-
cational Higher Education Act, twenty-four new public providers were 
established.
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For our empirical analyses we mainly focus on a representative sam-
ple of 35 private providers, 19 established before 1997 and 16 after (ta-
ble 4). The names of the institutions are given in sections 5 and 6 below. 
Table 4: Sample of private HE providers   
 in  
Warsaw 
in large 
cities
in medium-
sized cities 
in small 
cities
total
Private
institutions…
established during 
1990-1997
5 5 5 4 19 
established during 
1998-2004
4 4 4 4 16 
To give some background information and to place our sample into per-
spective, tables 5 and 6 provide some basic facts for the two sub-periods 
covered in our analysis. 
In 2004, there were 427 institutions, 126 public. A total of 71 of the 
public institutions operate in the same field as the private institutions, 
whereas the others are relatively unique, single-discipline institutions 
focusing mainly on medicine, arts, architecture, sports, and navy or po-
lice and military instruction (regulated by different laws and their ‘own’ 
ministries).
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Contrasting the rate of increase of student numbers with the increase in 
the number of providers, it becomes clear that during 1991-1997, despite 
the large growth in the number of (private) institutions, the degree of ri-
valry decreased. During 1997-2004 the number of public higher educa-
tion providers grew considerably. This was the result of the 1997 Act 
that led to the establishment of public vocational higher education insti-
tutions, many of which emerged in smaller towns outside the metropoli-
tan areas. By 2004 there were 28 such state institutions. Due to the in-
crease in the number of private and public providers and the demo-
graphic decline that took place, the degree of rivalry on the higher edu-
cation market increased substantially compared to 1990-1997. 
5.  Results of  empir ical  analysis,  Part  1:  
 program supply 
In terms of the institutional arrangements during the first period of 
analysis (1990-1997), we argue that despite having a substantial private 
higher education sector, Poland was still removed in many ways from a 
truly competitive higher education system. Of the five dimensions of 
marketisation policy, two (institutional autonomy and barriers to entry) 
were met to some extent, while this was hardly the case for the other 
(three) dimensions. Recognised private higher education institutions 
were not eligible for state subsidies, students in private higher education 
institutions were excluded from state scholarships, and laws and regula-
tions affecting the transparency of the system and ensuring quality and 
dissemination of information, were largely absent. In the beginning of 
the 1990s, the priority of policymakers was to allow more autonomy to 
the providers and increase the number of higher education providers to 
meet the rapid increase in demand for higher education without increas-
ing state spending on higher education.
During 1990-1997 there was a low degree of rivalry between pro-
viders. Most private providers adopted an aggressive growth strategy, 
concentrating on part-time programs. Almost eight of every ten students 
in the mid-1990s were enrolled on a part-time basis. This imbalance be-
tween full-time and part-time numbers increased during 1990-1997. The 
great majority of new private higher education institutions based their 
product differentiation mostly on location and low-price programs. 
These are the ‘demand absorbing’ institutions, catering primarily to stu-
dents from lower socio-economic classes and offering low-cost study 
programs in popular subjects, especially economics and management. 
Only a few private providers adopted a high-quality strategy. 
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The distribution of student numbers across disciplines is shown be-
low (figures 4 and 5). The first private higher education institutions that 
entered the market in 1991 and 1992 offered study courses in economics 
(mostly marketing and management). Over the years, one observes a 
gradual diversification in their programme supply. 
We now turn to our sample of private HE providers (table 4) to ana-
lyse the program supply.  
The study offer in the five selected private higher education provid-
ers located in Warsaw1 was relatively rich compared to other private 
providers established outside the capital. All ‘Academies’ began to offer 
master programs well before 1997.2 These private providers developed 
‘elite’ programs to set high academic standards and based their differen-
tiation strategy on high quality services and a variety of program offer-
ings. Mostly due to their proximity to high ranked academics working in 
public institutions, these private providers were able to expand their 
course offerings. Postgraduate master level courses were developed to 
build up prestige, reputation, and a ‘brand name’. This also provided 
good contacts with the business community and, what is more, the mas-
ter level courses provided higher profit margins since fees for such pro-
grams were higher than undergraduate studies. During 1997-2004, these 
providers continued to set high academic standards in the private higher 
education sector. In 1998, the Ko mi ski Academy became the first pri-
vate institution in Poland to gain PhD granting rights in economics; in 
2003 it received rights to confer the title of habilitated doctor. 
Figure 4: Distribution of students across disciplines, 1991-1997 
                                             
1 Private Academy of Business and Administration; Academy of Manage-
ment; azarski Academy of Commerce and Law; Ko mi ski Academy of 
Entrepreneurship and Management; Polish-Japanese Academy of Com-
puter Sciences. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of students across disciplines, 1998-2004 
In our sample, the five private providers situated in large metropolitan 
areas outside Warsaw only offered courses in the fields of business and 
management. In contrast to the providers established in Warsaw, none of 
these had the right to confer master degrees. They offered only three-
year courses leading to bachelor degrees. We note that these providers 
were established later than the private providers from Warsaw and there-
fore had less time to enhance their study offer or provide postgraduate 
courses. During 1997-2004 these institutions developed at a different 
pace and in different directions. The Academy of Management and Fi-
nance in Wroc aw, the Academy of Banking in Pozna , and the Acad-
emy of Entrepreneurship and Management in ód  tried to attract stu-
dents previously served by public institutions and developed a relatively 
wide study offer including master degree programs in finance and bank-
ing. The other two institutions (the Academy of Marketing and Business 
in ód  and the Academy of Banking and Finances in Katowice) chose a 
defensive strategy and did not expand their study offer.
From the third stratum that covers the private providers established 
in medium-sized cities, the study offer varied considerably in terms of 
program supply and degrees awarded. In the first period of analysis 
these providers typically concentrated on inexpensive fields such as 
economics and management, acting as specialised providers offering 
undergraduate courses. During 1997-2004 these private providers di-
vided into two groups. Three institutions broadened their study offer and 
obtained the right to confer master degrees (Academy of Finance and 
Management in Bia ystok, Private Academy of Environment in Radom, 
and Academy of Management and Administration in Opole). The second 
group comprises two providers that continued to be small teaching-
oriented vocational institutions (Polonia Academy in Cz stochowa and 
the Academy of Computer Sciences in Bielsko-Bia a).
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The fourth sub-sample is private providers in small cities; the most 
homogeneous group. All offer undergraduate programs in management 
and marketing at bachelor level. The majority represent the lower tier of 
private education, being less affluent and single-discipline institutions 
(Academy of Entrepreneurship and Marketing in Chrzanów; Academy 
of Management in Leszno; Academy of Management in S upsk). After 
1997, their study offer did not change much. However, the oldest private 
provider in this group (the Academy of Business in Nowy S cz) devel-
oped into one of the most prestigious private higher education institu-
tions in Poland and nowadays occupies a leading position in various 
rankings of non-state higher education institutions conducted by maga-
zines like Wprost, Newsweek, Home & Market, and Polityka.
For the private providers established after 1997 the differences be-
tween the four strata are no larger than the variation within the strata, in 
particular in terms of study offer. Most of the institutions analysed were 
established in 1999 and 2000. The new, vocational higher education in-
stitutions established in Warsaw displayed a diversified study offer; 
however, of all them were single-discipline institutions (Academy of 
Personnel Management, Academy of Advertisement, Academy of Ad-
ministration and Social Sciences, and Academy for Beauticians and 
Health Care). The private providers from the second stratum, established 
in large metropolitan areas, are also a relatively heterogeneous group, 
displaying various specialisations (Pedagogical Academy in ód ,
Academy of Business and Foreign Languages in Pozna , Academy of 
Economics and Computer Sciences in Kraków, Academy of Manage-
ment and Computer Sciences in Wroc aw). The institutions in the third 
stratum (established in medium-sized cities) offer management, peda-
gogy, tourism, sociology, and information technology (TWP Academy 
of Humanities in Szczecin, Academy of Tourism in Cz stochowa, 
Academy of Informatics in Gorzów Wielkopolski, and Academy of 
Management in Szczecin). Finally, the group of four vocational institu-
tions in small non-academic cities outside the large urban areas mostly 
consists of single-discipline institutions offering business-related pro-
grams (Academy of Management and Administration in Zamo , Acad-
emy of Local Development in yrardów, Academy in Humanities and 
Economics in Brzeg, and Academy of Business and Administration in 
uków).
Overlooking the program supply of the post-1997 privates, we con-
clude that since they operate in a saturated market with a high degree of 
rivalry, they had to develop a unique course supply not previously of-
fered by the older private institutions. This is why we see vocational 
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courses for beauticians, physiotherapy, monument renovation, sociol-
ogy, and tourism & recreation.  
6. Results of  empir ical  analysis,  Part  2:  
fee-sett ing by private providers 
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland guarantees free higher edu-
cation. There are exceptions to this rule however, as charging fees is 
permitted in part-time courses at public institutions and in the private 
sector in both full-time and part-time courses. In the 1990s, because the 
state budget subsidies did not increase proportionally with the growing 
number of students, fee-paying forms of study were created in the pri-
vate as well as the public sector. The share of fee-paying students 
amounted to more than 50 % in 2004.  
We now examine in detail the pricing policies adopted by the private 
providers in our sample. Since private higher education institutions 
completely depend on tuition fees, the level of their fees has a strong 
impact on their budgets. One would expect that public providers would 
pose a limit – a pricing umbrella – on the fees charged in the private sec-
tor. However, once competition on the higher education market in-
creases, one may predict a fall in the level of tuition fees, for both pri-
vate and public providers.
During 1990-1997, the (five) private higher education providers 
from Warsaw charged the highest tuition fees on the market due to the 
fact that they offered master’s degree courses, sometimes of a unique 
character (e.g., in computer sciences). Another reason was that the tui-
tion fee levels in the public higher education institutions in Warsaw 
were also among the highest on the country. This allowed the private in-
stitutions to charge high tuition fees without fear of losing clients to 
public institutions. Furthermore, Warsaw is the most developed region 
in Poland and offered promising career prospects for higher education 
graduates. The five providers chose a high quality/high price strategy. 
The fees were about 140% of the average for the whole sector, often 
paid in American dollars rather than Polish zlotys (The Private Academy 
of Business and Administration charged $2,390 in 1991/92; the Polish-
Japanese Academy charged $2,200 in 1997; the azarski Academy of 
Commerce and Law set its fees in 1993 at $1,200). During 1997-2004 
the pricing policy of these ‘elite’ private providers remained unchanged. 
Tuition fees were very high and increased over the years in contrast to 
other private providers in the country. 
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During the 1990s, private providers in other large metropolitan areas 
charged lower fees than those in Warsaw. As this group was very homo-
geneous in terms of study offer, fee levels were also quite homogeneous 
(Academy of Banking in Pozna : $1,300; Academy of Marketing and 
Banking in ód : $900; Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management 
in ód : $1,000; Academy of Finances and Banking in Katowice: $800). 
These institutions charged slightly higher fees than average for the pri-
vate sector despite the fact that their offer was not regarded as particular 
high quality. During 1997-2004 fees did not increase much as these in-
stitutions tried to attract new student groups previously served by public 
providers. Tuition fee levels for full-time courses even decreased. In 
2004, the highest fees were charged by the Academy of Banking in 
Pozna : $1,250; The Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management in 
ód  charged $1,050 in 2000/01. Fees charged by the other three pro-
viders were similar. 
The third stratum in our sample (private providers in medium-sized 
cities) was a very heterogeneous group during the first period of the 
transformation process. We distinguish two categories in this group. The 
first consists of two institutions: the Polonia Academy in Cz stochowa 
and the Academy of Finance and Management in Bia ystok. Due to their 
rich study offer and right to confer master’s degrees they set higher fees 
than other providers in the cluster. The institutions from the second 
group kept tuition fees low in order to be affordable for lower- to middle 
class students and working students. The Polonia Academy in Cz sto-
chowa charged about $1,200. The Academy of Finance and Manage-
ment in Bia ystok charged $800 in 1993, increasing to $900 in 1997. 
The fees charged by the other three providers were lower and close to 
the average on the market. During 1994-1997 the Private Academy of 
Environment in Radom charged $950. The Academy of Management 
and Administration in Opole, established in 1996, set the fees in its first 
year at average levels: $850. The Academy of Computer Sciences in 
Bielsko-Biala, adopted a similar policy on fee levels. During 1997-2004 
the fees charged by these five private providers converged, as all provid-
ers except the Academy of Computer Sciences and Management in Biel-
sko-Bia a offered master degree courses and thus aspired to ascend to a 
higher tier in the private higher education sector. The level of tuition 
fees stabilised from the year 2000 onwards at around $1,050. 
The fees in the second and third sub-sample were very similar, espe-
cially after 2000, as a result of similar strategies adopted by these insti-
tutions. Private institutions developed a wider spectrum of programs, ob-
tained rights to confer master’s degrees in a few disciplines, and became 
more interested in attracting full-time students. To some extent they 
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emulated the behaviour of ‘elite’ private providers and traditional public 
higher education institutions.
The fourth sub-sample includes four private providers established in 
small towns. We find two institutions that followed the high price policy 
and two that kept fees at low levels. The most distinguished was the 
Academy of Business in Nowy S cz. It focused on full-time rather than 
part-time programs. This was reflected in its pricing policy; contrary to 
other private providers, its fees for part-time programs were higher than 
for full-time: $1,600 for full-time and $2,000 for part-time programs. 
The Academy of Management in S upsk also charged relatively high 
fees: $1,250 (full-time courses). The other two providers followed a low 
cost strategy and in fee level terms were situated below the average for 
the private sector. For instance, the Academy of Entrepreneurship and 
Marketing in Chrzanow, established in 1994, charged $650 for full-time 
courses in its first year. During 1997-2004, tuition fees for the Academy 
in Nowy S cz remained high, although compared to other ‘elite’ private 
higher education institutions these were modest ($1,600 USD for full-
time and $1,200 for part-time courses in 2004). The Academy of Man-
agement in S upsk reduced its fees to $1,000 in 2004, while fees for 
part-time courses increased by 15% to $900. The Academy of Entrepre-
neurship and Marketing in Chrzanów increased its fees (in 2004: $1,050 
USD).
For our sample of post-1997 institutions subjected to the 1997 Voca-
tional Higher Education Act, we find two pricing strategies unrelated to 
the location of the provider. The first is the low price strategy adopted 
by vocational providers that offer undergraduate courses in inexpensive 
study fields, such as economics, humanities, and pedagogy. These are 
courses which are also offered by the great majority of older private 
providers and the traditional state universities. The average fees 
amounted to $800 for full-time and $750 for part-time programs. The 
other group of vocational HE institutions consisted of providers that de-
veloped relatively unique study programs addressing specific student 
niches and charging higher tuition. The average level of tuition fees 
charged by these institutions was $1,200 for full-time courses and 
$1,050 for part-time programs.    
In the period after the privatisation wave, there was a relationship 
between the study offer and the level of tuition fees; location also had an 
impact on prices. In general, we may distinguish two groups: first, the 
so-called ‘elite’ private providers situated mostly in Warsaw but also in 
some other regions; and second, a group much less affluent and more 
heterogeneous. According to our hypotheses, the ‘elite’ providers chose 
the high quality/high price strategy. The second group had lower fees, 
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reflecting the average fees charged in the private sector. These institu-
tions were usually undergraduate single-discipline institutions and their 
enrolment structure was dominated by part-time students. Therefore, 
these providers charged much lower fees for part-time than for full-time 
programs. In terms of location, the average level of fees was slightly 
higher in bigger cities. 
During 1997-2004 we identify three pricing strategies. The ‘elite’ 
private providers, positioning themselves as high-quality institutions 
charge very high tuition fees. The second group that also sets its fees 
above the average are those institutions that introduced new study lines 
over time, obtained rights to provide master’s degrees, and shifted their 
focus from part-time to full-time students. These private providers, in di-
rect competition with state higher education institutions, usually mir-
rored the level of fees set by their public counterparts situated in the 
same region. In addition, we may include in this group a few new voca-
tional higher education institutions that offer unique study courses and 
also charge relatively high fees. Finally, the last group of private provid-
ers comprises mostly single-discipline undergraduate institutions that 
concentrate on low cost disciplines; mostly economics and humanities. 
These institutions adapt their pricing policy to students from lower in-
come groups and kept their fees at affordably low levels. 
7.  Addressing the hypotheses;  conclusions 
We now return to our hypotheses relating to the strategies adopted by 
private higher education institutions. During a period of expansion and a 
low degree of rivalry between providers coupled with an absence of 
state financial support for privates, we observed a rapid expansion of the 
private higher education sector. This began in 1991 with the new state 
regulations that allowed private institutions to enter the market. Private 
institutions started to play an important role in meeting the demand for 
higher education. This is in line with hypothesis 1. In the academic year 
1992/93, the share of students enrolled in the private sector accounted 
only for 0.9% of all students, while in 1998 it had increased to almost 
19%.
Regarding hypothesis 2, the growth in private student enrolment was 
mostly concentrated in part-time programs, with almost 80% of students 
enrolled on a part-time basis. Interestingly, private higher education in-
stitutions that adopted a strategy of high academic quality standards 
showed an enrolment structure more balanced towards full-time stu-
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dents; they did not expand their enrolments at such a rapid pace as other 
private institutions. 
Continuing our hypothesis 2 exploration, we saw the majority of the 
new private providers founded particularly in metropolitan areas and 
larger cities. Private institutions did not often take root in the poorer re-
gions with a lower population density. The new private higher education 
institutions based their product differentiation on either location or low-
price programs, with a few adopting a high-quality strategy (hypothesis 
3). The great majority of new providers are ‘demand absorbing’ institu-
tions catering primarily to students from lower socio-economic classes 
and offering low-cost programs in popular subjects, especially econom-
ics and management. In 1997, the share of students enrolled in disci-
plines within these fields was between 60 and 70%. The overwhelming 
majority of these private institutions were single-discipline, vocation-
ally-oriented institutions, offering only bachelor degree programs.
In contrast, and as stated in hypothesis 3, only a few private provid-
ers (often located in ‘academic’ cities) adopted a high-quality/high-price 
strategy, developed a wider array of programs, and awarded master de-
grees. Yet, as expected, they were strictly limited in number, with only a 
few private providers, mostly the oldest, established in the early 1990s. 
To further address hypotheses 2 and 3, we also analysed the tuition 
charged by the private higher education providers. The bottom value 
was usually set on the basis of costs incurred, while the top level was set 
in accordance to fees charged by comparable (public and private) higher 
education providers in the region. Only a few private providers set tui-
tion fees regardless of the level of tuition fees charged by other provid-
ers. They mostly offered master level courses and were perceived as 
high-quality institutions. Their fees were much higher than the average 
private fee. During 1990-1997 the level of tuition fees in all private 
higher education institutions increased annually, mostly at a rate in line 
with or exceeding the rate of inflation. This was possible due to the rapid 
rise in student demand and the increase of fees in the public sector, 
which provided a ‘pricing umbrella’ for the private sector.  
The second period (1997-2004) for which we analysed hypotheses 4-
6, may be characterised as a period when state regulations caught up 
with the rapid expansion of private higher education. Student enrolment 
further increased – from 1,091,000 in the academic year 1997/98 to 
1,926,100 students in the academic year 2004/05. In 2004, students in 
private institutions accounted for 30% of all students, compared to 21% 
in 1997. In this second stage of the transformation period, the contribu-
tion of the private sector was acknowledged in government policies; 
from 2001 on, full-time students in private institutions became eligible 
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for state support in the form of means-tested and merit-based scholar-
ships. In 2004, part-time students in private higher education institutions 
became eligible for student support. However the effects of this policy 
fall outside our period of analysis. From 2001, the share of full-time stu-
dents in the private sector has increased, reaching its peak in 2004 at 
25% of total enrolment.
However, one of the furthest reaching elements of marketisation pol-
icy, making state subsidies available to recognised and accredited pri-
vate higher education institutions, was still absent. Therefore, public in-
stitutions still had an advantage over private institutions in terms of of-
fering tuition-exempt full-time study courses. In 1997 the government 
passed the Vocational Higher Education Schools Act to increase the 
number of public and private higher education institutions, aiming espe-
cially at smaller cities. Under the new regulations it became easier to 
open a higher education institution and standards for offering bachelor 
level programs and student places were less demanding than for provid-
ers operating under the previous 1990 Higher Education Act.
In terms of the external conditions for higher education, we focus 
first on demographic developments. The size of the school-age popula-
tion (2-24 years of age) began to decline from the beginning of the 
1990s and decreased by 13% from 1989 to 2004. This demographic low 
reached higher education in the year 2000. Secondly, the degree of ri-
valry between providers on the higher education market changed. Con-
trary to the beginning of the 1990s, the number of public higher educa-
tion institutions grew from 98 in 1997 to 128 in 2004 due to the passage 
of the 1997 Vocational Higher Education Schools Act. Combined with 
the growth in the number of private providers, there were 427 higher 
education institutions in 2004 compared to 245 in 1997. This meant that 
the degree of rivalry on the higher education market increased substan-
tially after 1997.
The new institutional arrangements and the changing external condi-
tions obviously had an impact on the development of higher education 
system. Both private and the public providers now tried to attract stu-
dents from segments they previously did not target and started offering 
more diversified study programs in terms of study fields, quality, type, 
mode of delivery, and price. Private institutions started offering study 
programs in fields such as engineering, health, information technology, 
and sciences. The distribution of students across disciplines changed 
considerably during 1997-2004 (figure 5). While in 1997 the students in 
economics-related programs exceeded 55%, their share decreased to 
36% in 2004. In 2004, more than 100 private providers had received the 
right to confer master’s degrees and a few were allowed to confer doc-
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toral degrees. As a result, the private higher education sector managed to 
attract more full-time students. The full-time share increased from about 
17% in 1998 to about 25% in 2004. In line with hypothesis 6, we there-
fore conclude that the private providers in many ways (but not in terms 
of receiving public funding) began to become more like public provid-
ers.
Among other things, hypothesis 6 stated that in a monopolistic com-
petition situation new private institutions that emerge on a mature and 
saturated market will often locate themselves in small, non-academic lo-
cations in order to attract new groups of students. This proved to be the 
case, and private higher education institutions proliferated more evenly 
across the regions in the studied period. Compared to 1997, private 
higher education providers in 2004 now were established in places with-
out academic traditions, and in economically less developed areas.
Interestingly, in accordance to our hypotheses, the level of tuition 
fees during 1997-2004 was stable, and fees even decreased towards the 
end of this period. Despite inflation and the rising salaries of academic 
staff, private higher education institutions were forced to lower tuition 
fees, copying the behaviour of public institutions. Public institutions for 
their part also decreased tuition fees in order to enrol a critical mass of 
students in their part-time programs to combat diminishing state subsi-
dies and student demand. 
Hypothesis 5 addresses the strategic responses of elite private higher 
education institutions on a mature and saturated market and was largely 
confirmed. The institutions that adopted a high-quality strategy during 
times of rapid market expansion did not change their ‘premium position-
ing strategy’ over time and continued to base their competitive advan-
tage on the high quality of their products. All ‘elite’ institutions charged 
high tuition fees to reinforce their superior quality. 
Our empirical analysis confirmed that most private higher education 
institutions in Poland, as in other countries, are vocationally and com-
mercially oriented colleges. They primarily strive to survive in the mar-
ketplace rather than to boost the broader public good. Therefore, as ex-
pected, their study offer is oriented towards low-cost study programs in 
high-demand disciplines. However, over recent years some changes can 
be observed, such as an increased variety in programs. 
Our empirical research also proved that our analytical framework 
(figure 3) was very useful in understanding developments in Polish 
higher education. To a large extent the reactions of private higher educa-
tion providers in terms of their location, their pricing strategies, and their 
decisions on the subjects taught and modes of delivery may be well-
understood in the light of our interpretation framework. Michael Porter’s 
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“Five Forces” model developed to analyse the main competitive strate-
gies of higher education providers proved to be a useful analytical tool. 
Our empirical analyses generally found support for our hypotheses 
about the dynamics in the Polish higher education system and the coex-
istence of private and public providers.  
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Market Competition, Demographic Change, 
and Educational Reform: The Problems 
Confronting Japan’s Private Universities in 
a Period of Contraction 
ROGER GOODMAN AND AKIYOSHI YONEZAWA
1.  Introduct ion 
East Asia is one of the regions where public-private dynamics in higher 
education is changing most rapidly. As Altbach (2004) points out, pri-
vate higher education in East Asia is unusual in the extent of the power 
it has in the higher education system as a whole in terms of both student 
numbers and prestige. Some private universities in Japan, South Korea, 
and the Philippines for example, have longer histories than major public 
universities and can compete in terms of quality even with top public 
universities. In this sense the relationship between public and private 
sectors in higher education is not a new topic for many countries in East 
Asia; focus on the relationship has recently become heightened because 
of a number of important structural changes that appear to be developing 
across East Asian higher education in general. 
First, private higher education is still growing. In addition to coun-
tries which already have higher education systems dominated by private 
sectors (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Philippines), the private sector 
is currently developing very quickly in Thailand and Indonesia. In the 
mid-1990s, Malaysia officially authorised private higher education, and 
transitional economies such as China and Vietnam have also begun to 
follow this trend. 
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Secondly, several countries have begun to introduce what might be 
termed ‘corporate-style management’ into their public higher education 
sectors. From the beginning of the 1990s, public universities in China 
gained corporate status. Some Indonesian, Malaysian, and Thai public 
institutions were also ‘incorporated’ and given greater flexibility in their 
governance and control over their finance around 2000; Japanese na-
tional universities were incorporated from 2004. Definitions of ‘incorpo-
ration’ are slightly different in different systems, but they all share the 
common ideas that public higher education should take more control 
over its governance, be independent from government, and that public 
financial support to institutions should be on a more contractual basis.1
These incorporated public institutions are increasingly becoming reliant 
on income from the private sector; through providing educational ser-
vices for tuition payments, or setting up their own income-generating 
business operations for example. 
Thirdly, foreign higher education providers are increasingly operat-
ing offshore programmes in East Asian countries, sometime setting up 
branch campuses and working through partner institutions. Laos for ex-
ample, has only three national universities but two foreign higher educa-
tion colleges. In Malaysia and Singapore, some foreign branches and 
joint programmes have been set up through the invitation of the respec-
tive governments which want to establish themselves at the centre of re-
gional higher education ‘hubs’. China has allowed the operation of for-
eign higher education programmes if they are set up as joint ventures 
with local partners. In 2004, the Japanese government also started to 
recognise foreign universities established in Japan although in reality 
such institutions have already existed for 25 years. 
Fourthly, for-profit higher education programmes are expanding. 
The Philippines has a long history of allowing for-profit private higher 
education, and Malaysia does not make a distinction between for-profit 
and non-profit in the legal treatment of its higher education institutions. 
Japan had previously not permitted for-profit universities and colleges, 
but from 2004 began to allow them in special districts under the gov-
ernment’s deregulation programme. 
Finally, the increasing importance of the market and market compe-
tition in higher education in the region can be seen in almost every as-
pect of the system. Most countries continue to experience increasing 
demand for higher education and the weakening barrier both between 
                                             
1 Singapore Management University, established as a ‘publicly funded pri-
vate university’, can also be seen as an example of the introduction of a 
corporate management system into a public higher education system.   
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public and private domestic institutions, and between domestic and for-
eign higher education institutions, have led to their higher education sec-
tors becoming increasingly competitive. The level of competition is par-
ticularly high in Japan and South Korea both of which face a serious 
over-supply of higher education provision, due to a combination of de-
regulation policies which has allowed the establishment of more institu-
tions at the same time the number of graduates has shrunk dramatically 
due to falling birth-rates over the past three decades. 
In short, the relationship between the public and the private sectors 
in higher education across East Asia is in a particularly volatile state due 
to the increase in the size of the private sector, the introduction of corpo-
rate style management into the public sector, and the recognition of for-
profit higher education. In Japan and South Korea, this volatility has 
been exacerbated by the fact that they have been experiencing deregula-
tion of their higher education systems while their main potential market 
for students has been shrinking. In the case of all these countries, these 
conditions beg the interesting question of how, under market principles, 
can a higher education system protect and improve the optimum public 
and private interest. This paper will begin to explore this question and 
concentrates on Japan – the oldest and most developed privately-
dominated higher education system in East Asia. It will suggest that the 
changing dynamic between the public and private sectors of higher edu-
cation in Japan may well have ramifications for other countries in East 
Asia, if not globally.
2.  How does Japan’s pr ivate higher educat ion 
 system f i t  into global  typologies of  pr ivate 
 higher educat ion? 
Perhaps the two best known typologies of private higher education are 
those of Levy (1986) and Geiger (1986). Based mainly on a study of 
Latin American systems, Levy developed a typology of private higher 
education institutions that included religious institutions, secular elite in-
stitutions, and demand absorbing institutions. Geiger based his compara-
tive study of the public-private relationship of higher education in North 
America, Europe, and East Asia; and developed a typology of higher 
education institutions specifically for understanding the complex Ameri-
can system. Geiger’s categories included private research universities, 
liberal arts colleges, and urban service universities. Levy’s ‘demand ab-
sorbing’ institutions and Geiger’s ‘urban service’ universities appear to 
have a great deal in common with Japan’s private universities in terms 
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of development based on the social demand for mass higher education, 
and their tendency to be located in large city areas where high demand is 
most pronounced. 
Levy also developed a typology according to the relationship be-
tween public and private institutions in different societies, describing 
these for example, as ‘homogeneous’ (Chile), ‘dichotomously distinc-
tive’ (Mexico), and ‘qualified distinctive’ (Brazil).  Within this typol-
ogy, Japan would be categorised as a type of ‘qualified distinctive’ 
higher education.  In Japan, only a relatively small public subsidy (cur-
rently around 10% of its running costs) is given to the private sector, 
which by this dimension clearly distinguishes it from the public sector 
(which currently receives around 80% of its costs from the state). Geiger 
in turn, categorised countries into ‘mass private’ (Philippines), ‘parallel 
public and private’ (Belgium, Netherlands), and ‘peripheral private’ 
(France, Sweden, UK). Japan’s system – where 75% of university insti-
tutions are private, attended by almost 80% of the total student body – is 
clearly one of ‘mass private’ higher education. 
Typologies are helpful but by their nature static; to fully understand 
the current system of Japanese private higher education and how it 
might change in the future, it is necessary to have some knowledge of its 
diverse origins and development over the past 130 years. As Kaneko 
(1997) describes, in the 1880s there were many political leaders outside 
the new Meiji restoration government as well as entrepreneurs who sup-
ported the establishment of non-governmental higher education institu-
tions. Some universities were started by intellectuals who had direct ex-
perience of the western world; others by expert groups such as medical 
doctors or engineers; others relied on networks of retired and current 
academics in the public higher education sectors. None of these institu-
tions were however, immediately recognised by the Japanese govern-
ment. Indeed, it was only when the demand for higher education gradu-
ates in the private industrial sector expanded in the 1920s – combined 
with the emergence of parliament-based cabinets and a wider electorate 
(Itoh 1999) – that the government finally officially recognised the exis-
tence of a private sector of higher education. 
The 1960s saw the Japanese private sector taking on the clear char-
acteristics of the ‘demand-absorbing’ mass higher education system. 
With only limited resources at its disposal to rebuild the country from 
the wreckage of World War II, the Japanese government could not es-
tablish a public mass higher education as the US did in the 1950s and 
1960s. Instead, public resources were intensively invested in a limited 
number of students in the public sector, so that by the 1970s almost all 
Japanese students began to stay on in the education system until the age 
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of eighteen and the private sector absorbed the surplus demand for ac-
cess to higher education. 
Umakoshi (2004) has pointed out a positive correlation between the 
general expansion of higher education systems and an increasing share 
of students admitted to the private sector in East Asia. Most East Asian 
countries which developed mass private higher education sectors such as 
Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, developed a system where demand-
absorbing private institutions came to dominate the number of university 
places and where only a small minority of students attended public 
higher education. In developing his argument, Umakakoshi refers to 
Cummings’ (1997) ‘J-model’ in which East Asian countries are de-
scribed as following the Japanese model, just like ‘flying geese’ in their 
transition from private-peripheral type to private-dominant types of 
higher education systems. In reality however, the current public-private 
dynamics in East Asian countries as outlined in the introductory part of 
this article, are much more complex than Umakoshi’s model suggests.   
Umakoshi’s model is based on two basic assumptions: (1) public and 
private higher education are clearly distinct from each other; and (2) the 
higher education systems of these countries go through the same pattern 
of ‘private higher education as a peripheral system’, ‘private higher edu-
cation as a compensatory system’ and then, ‘private higher education as 
a dominant system’ as the overall system develops into one of mass 
higher education. It is quite clear however, that many Asian countries 
are experiencing the disappearance of a clear distinction between public 
and private higher education.  Currently, as we have seen, most of the 
public higher education institutions in the region are introducing corpo-
rate-style management under titles such as ‘incorporation’, ‘corporatisa-
tion’ or ‘autonomisation’, and increasing the ‘privatised’ elements of 
their operations. Especially in China, public institutions own affiliated 
‘independent’ colleges, which charge full cost tuition fees and some-
times earn profits. It is far from clear that East Asian countries are all 
following the rather simple kind of transitional model that Umakoshi 
suggests. Indeed in the case of Japan and Korea we can expect to see the 
contraction of the private sectors of their higher education systems due 
to the shrinking number of secondary school graduates and the fact that 
already more than 70% of high school graduates continue on to higher or 
post-secondary education. Significant numbers of less prestigious pri-
vate higher education institutions in both countries are facing the pros-
pect of closing over the next few years.
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Figure 1: Transitional model of private-sector types. The shaded areas 
   represent private sectors; the cores represent public sectors 
   (Umakoshi 2004) 
Both of Umakoshi’s assumptions therefore, need closer examination in 
the light of recent developments in Japan. As shown in Table 1, Japa-
nese higher education has three sectors; national institutions are funded 
by national government and from 2004 have had public corporation 
status as ‘national university corporations’ or ‘independent administra-
tive corporations’; local-public universities institutions are funded and 
operated by local governments (prefectures or cities) and are currently in 
the transitional process from direct operation by local government to 
‘local-public university corporations’;2  and private institutions are oper-
ated by non-profit organisations called ‘School Corporations’. These 
private institutions receive around 10% of their running costs from the 
government through the Promotion and Mutual Aid Corporation for Pri-
vate Schools of Japan but otherwise are financially independent.3 Let us 
look first at the relationship between the public and private higher edu-
cation sectors and then at the effects of the contraction of the private 
sector as supply begins to exceed demand. 
2 For the purposes of this article, at points both national and local-public in-
stitutions are included in the term ‘public’.
3 Since 2004, a tiny number of private universities have operated as for-
profit stock companies within so-called Special Districts for Administra-
tive Reform as pilot cases of deregulation.   
PHE as 
periphery:
China, Vietnam,
Malaysia
PHE as compensation:
Indonesia, Thai
PHE as dominance:
Japan, Korea, Philippinesiland 
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Table 1: Institutions and Students in Higher Education in Japan (2006) 
Total National Local 
Public
Private
Institutions
Universities 744 87 89 568 
Junior colleges 468 8 40 420 
Colleges of 
technology 
64 55 6 3 
Specialised training 
colleges (tertiary pro-
grams) 
2.996 11 194 2.791 
Students 
Universities 2.859.212 628.947 127.872 2.102.393 
Junior colleges 202.254 597 11.909 189.748 
Colleges of 
technology 
59.380 52.587 4.493 2.300 
Specialised training 
colleges (tertiary pro-
grams) 
667.188 668 27.425 639.095 
Source: MEXT 2006 
3.  The increasingly complex relat ionship 
 between the publ ic  and pr ivate sectors in 
 Japanese higher educat ion 
Ichikawa (2000) is amongst those who have identified a move towards 
an increasingly unclear division between national, regional, and private 
sectors in the rapidly-changing picture that we have described in some 
detail above, and sees this as evidence of the recent emergence of ‘bor-
derless’ structures in the higher education system. As we show in this 
section, the relationship between the sectors actually has been becoming 
increasingly complex over the past four decades.
The basic aims of Japanese higher education policies until the mid-
1970s were to ensure higher education graduates and equality of access 
to higher education with the lowest commitment of public funds possi-
ble. The policies for this very difficult task were largely based around a 
clear distinction of the function of the private and public sectors. The fo-
cus of the public sector was on training the human resources required for 
national development and implementing university-based research ac-
tivities. Both of these aims were regarded as essential for the economic 
ROGER GOODMAN AND AKIYOSHI YONEZAWA
450
development of the country (Amano 1986).  At the same time, the exis-
tence of the private higher education sector ensured equality of access 
by absorbing the demand for higher education as a by-product of the re-
alisation of universal attendance in secondary education. Umakoshi’s 
(2004) argument suggests that this policy was a typical model in Asian 
countries. In general, private institutions in Japan have large educational 
programmes in the social sciences such as law, economics, and business. 
The tuition fees of these courses have been set relatively low in order to 
compete with public sector institutions, and teaching classes are large in 
order to keep fees reasonably inexpensive (Yonezawa and Baba 1998).4
However, in the context of broader welfare state policies that devel-
oped more generally in the country in the 1970s, Japanese private higher 
education institutions began to receive public money for the first time. 
At the same time however, the numbers of students in such institutions 
became strictly controlled under a national higher education plan. This 
in effect brought the public and private sectors closer together and is a 
trend which continued for example, when local government also started 
to become more actively involved in the higher education sector. Espe-
cially in rural regions, local governments from the 1970s began to de-
mand the establishment of more higher education institutions within 
their areas, both to provide access for local high school graduates but 
also to retain members of the younger generation within their local 
communities which were becoming rapidly depopulated as young people 
migrated to the cities. The number of local public institutions increased 
considerably during the 1980s and 1990s. The problem for these institu-
tions however, has been that local governments in general are under 
higher pressure from taxpayers than national ones, and local public uni-
versities and other higher education institutions were not protected by 
bureaucrats from the Ministry of Education. As a result, the idea of new 
public management in public universities began to become increasingly 
                                             
4 Urata (1998), using data from 1996, identifies an overlapping hierarchy of 
public and private universities in his analysis of how private universities 
set their tuition fees. One of the interesting features of the fee structure of 
private universities in Japan has been that the lower the level, the higher 
the fees and the worse the student: staff ratio. This otherwise counterintui-
tive feature is due to what economists call the ‘law of inelastic demand’, 
i.e., the less options left to the individual as he goes down the system, the 
higher the cost. These fee levels can also be directly correlated with the 
salaries of professors; those in lower level universities are today generally 
paid more than those in higher level ones. Yano and Maruyama (1988) 
suggest that the salary of teaching staff in private universities rose rapidly 
from the 1960s as the system expanded, and already exceeded that in na-
tional universities by around 1980. 
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popular and many outsourced their services to private companies from 
the 1990s. 
As Osumi (1999) points out,  the Japanese style of ‘new public man-
agement’ follows British and New Zealand models, having the charac-
teristics of being ‘top down’, ‘comprehensive’ and ‘radical’, in compari-
son with the more ‘bottom-up’, ‘ad-hoc’ and ‘modest’ Northern Euro-
pean (Finland, Denmark, and Sweden)’ and American models.  As a re-
sult, ‘new public management’ in Japan focuses on the active encour-
agement of market mechanisms and the maximum privatisation of pub-
lic services. 
On the other hand, private higher education institutions in Japan 
have been operated by School Corporations (Gakk  H jin), special non-
profit legal entities set up for public purposes.  In general, public support 
for local private institutions has been regarded as an effective policy for 
increasing the opportunity for access within the local community.  At the 
same time, local governments can participate in or even control the gov-
erning boards of those publicly-supported private higher education insti-
tutions.
It is important to understand that Japanese higher education already 
faced a period of contraction at the beginning of 1970s, when the first 
baby boomer generation finished their higher education. Many of the 
new private institutions that had been established in rural areas started at 
that time to rely on financial support from local communities because 
they could not get enough students to support themselves through fees. 
In many cases, senior members of local communities became members 
of the governing boards of those private institutions. As a further exam-
ple of this trend, in the 1980s many newly-founded private higher educa-
tion institutions received facilities and property from local public gov-
ernments. Some local governments these days indeed provide all facili-
ties of local private universities, send administrative staff to operate the 
institutions with their salaries covered by public funds, and appoint 
members to their governing boards. This type of public involvement in 
setting up new institutions was initially categorised as a ‘public-private 
cooperation model’. In the 1990s, a ‘publicly founded-privately operated 
model’ was developed in cases where the local government provided the 
initial facilities as well as almost all of the administration. 
The domination of a neo-liberal ideology and its replacement of wel-
fare state policy became clear in the 1980s, and the national government 
set strict budgetary ceilings aiming at developing what became known as 
‘small government’. These neo-liberal trends further weakened the 
boundary between the public and private sectors although opposite of 
what had happened under the welfare state policies. Those who believed 
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in the importance of market forces advocated equal competition among 
national, local-public, and private sectors.
Discussion about ‘equality’ between the public and private higher 
education sectors in Japan first appeared in the 1970s and has been one 
of the most important themes in debates about higher education reform 
ever since. In 1975, the cost of tuition at national and local institutions 
was negligible while average tuitions fees in the private sector were 4.3 
times higher than those in the public sector (the gap in medical studies 
was much larger). The fact that the majority of higher education students 
were ‘forced’ to study in private institutions – because of the limitation 
on places provided by the public sector – led to the rise of tuition fees in 
public institutions as a means of ‘equalising’ educational expenditure 
between the public and private sectors. Since the 1970s, the tuition fees 
of public institutions have continuously gone up faster than private ones, 
in part because of moves towards equalisation but also because of in-
creasing government budgetary stringency. According to MEXT data, 
the tuition fee gap between public and private institutions in 2004 was 
reduced to 1:1.6.5
The strict control of student numbers which had been brought in un-
der the higher education plan was deregulated in 1986 when the second 
baby boomer generation started to enter tertiary education. Even after 
passing this generation through the system, the government continued to 
loosen the regulation of student numbers. Amano (1997) has described 
this policy change as a move from a ‘planning’ to a ‘market’ model.
In place of central planning, the Japanese government gradually 
started to strengthen the higher education quality assurance system. In 
1991, the Ministry required universities to ‘make efforts’ at self-
monitoring and self-evaluation to improve the quality of their education 
and research activities. In 2000 an evaluation organisation funded by the 
government, the National Institution for Academic Degrees and Univer-
sity Evaluation (NIAD-UE), started a pilot project for the evaluation of 
national universities. From 2004, accreditation which needed to be 
granted every seven years became compulsory for all national, local-
                                             
5 Kaneko (1989) argued that social science majors in national universities 
were already paying full cost in national universities by the end of the 
1980s. Yonezawa and Yoshida (2001) analysed time series data of expen-
diture per student and the student: staff ratio in economics and engineering 
for example, over twenty years (1975-95), and indicated that the gap of 
unit cost drastically diminished during that period and the unit cost in so-
cial science majors became almost equal between national and private 
universities. They also suggested that the rise in expenditure per student 
was not necessarily accompanied by the staff/student ratio in the private 
sector.
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public and private universities, junior colleges, and colleges of technol-
ogy. MEXT was granted powers to ensure the improvement of condi-
tions in individual higher education institutions, adding to the powers it 
already had to close illegally operated institutions. Interestingly, these 
new quality assurance mechanisms have not slowed down the increase 
of higher education programmes in either the private and local-public 
sector so far.6
While there remains a nominal distinction between national, public, 
and private universities in Japan, the above account suggests this distinc-
tion has become increasingly blurred over the past forty years. So much 
so indeed, that the national and public universities are far from immune 
to the threats we describe in the next sections that currently face the pri-
vate institutions in Japan. 
4. The Current  Threat  Faced by 
Private Universi t ies in Japan 
As long ago as 1986, Geiger, using data from 1980, demonstrated that in 
terms of their entry requirements there was an overlapping hierarchy in 
which some private universities were better than some public universi-
ties. The fact remains however, that in this ‘overlapping hierarchy’, 
some private universities can compete with the best national ones, while 
all of the least-regarded institutions are private and it is these which face 
the biggest challenge over the next few years as the market for tradi-
tional entry-age students contracts. A whole spate of books have ap-
peared in recent years which reflect this situation with titles such as Fu-
rusawa’s 2001 Daigaku Survival (University Survival); Sat ’s 2001 
Daigaku no Ikinokori Senryaku (Universities’ Strategies for Survival); 
Yomiuri Shinbun Osaka Honsha’s 2002 Tsubureru Daigaku; Tsubu-
renai Daigaku (Universities which will go Bankrupt and those which 
will not). Put simply, these books agree that a large number of the cur-
rent private universities will disappear in the next few years. They differ 
only in their predictions of exactly how many universities will disappear 
(from a low of 15% to a high of 40%) and which institutions.
To a large extent, the problems that private universities now face are 
directly related to the reasons for their expansion in numbers from the 
end of the 1980s. Two factors particularly influenced the growth of pri-
                                             
6 The number of undergraduate students in national universities has de-
creased since 1993, but this is due to changes in national planning and the 
recent mergers of a number of institutions and cannot be directly related to 
the new quality assurance systems. 
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vate higher education during that decade.  First, government legislation 
for equal legal treatment between male and female workers in 1986 
stimulated the entry of female students into four-year higher education. 
This led to the growth in the female undergraduate market and the 
shrinking of the female junior college market. Many junior colleges 
could no longer fill the quota of places allocated by the national gov-
ernment: by 2000, almost 60% of junior colleges were under quota. A 
significant number of junior colleges tried to upgrade themselves into 
four-year universities and colleges, and the national government had to 
allow them to do this to prevent them from going bankrupt.7
Secondly, the neo-liberal ideology itself had a huge influence on 
governmental policy. Almost all forms of ‘regulation’ became targets for 
reform, and higher education was no exception. The regulation of stu-
dent numbers was dramatically weakened. This largely explains why 
during 1992-2004, the number of four-year universities increased by an 
even faster rate than the decrease in the eighteen-year-old population. In 
1992 there were 98 national, 41 public, and 384 private four-year uni-
versities in Japan; in April 2004, there were 88 national, 77 public, and 
545 private four-year institutions- an overall increase of 31.9%. The be-
ginning of this period coincided almost exactly with the peak in the 
number of eighteen-year-olds (the group who provide well over 90% of 
all university entrants) in the Japanese population. This generation, the 
second post-war baby boom, peaked at 2,050,000 in 1991 and then be-
gan a steady decline (31.2%) to around 1,410,000 in 2004. Due to the 
rapidly decreasing birth-rate in Japan since the late 1980s, there is no 
third baby boom on the horizon and the number of eighteen-year-olds 
will continue to decline to 1,183,000 in 2012 (an overall decrease of 
42.3% over twenty years). By the end of the 1990s the Japanese higher 
education market had experienced a dramatic shift from market condi-
tions of over-demand to over-supply. The total supply of the student 
places in four-year universities became nearly equal to the total demand 
in 2007.
Many private universities which enjoyed a huge number of appli-
cants in the early 1990s have seen that number dwindle by as much as 
7 In 1992, with 541 institutions (88% of them private) Junior Colleges 
(tanki daigaku) constituted over 44% of all of Japan's tertiary-level institu-
tions and catered to nearly 23% of all tertiary-level students (around 92% 
of their in-take being female); by 2004 they catered to only 9.6% of all 
university students, as more and more women entered higher status four-
year institutions. To survive financially, close to fifty junior colleges con-
verted to four-year universities (and many others were absorbed into their 
attached four-year institutions) during the decade after 1992. 
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90% so that now they no longer attract even enough to fill the available 
places. As many as 30% of all universities now find themselves with 
some faculties in that situation and many of these (especially in private 
universities where fees account for over 80% of total income) are facing 
the possibility of financial collapse.8
5. Attempts by Private Universi t ies to 
Find New Markets and Income Streams 
Japan faced a contraction of its higher education system in the 1970s as 
the first post-war baby boom generation left the system. This potential 
contraction was much more than made up for by the huge increase in 
those staying on to the end of secondary education and demanding 
places in the tertiary system. A better comparison for the present situa-
tion in Japan therefore might be with the US system at the end of the 
1970s when, as Kelly (1999) points out, there were many dire warnings 
of university collapse remarkably similar to some of the current warn-
ings about Japanese private higher education today. During the 1970s, 
US colleges had 16% fewer eighteen-year-olds to draw upon and be-
tween 1979 and 1992 it was calculated it would face a further 25% re-
duction – a total reduction of around 40% over two decades which, as 
Kelly (1999, p. 41) states, almost exactly mirrors the current Japanese 
case. Instead of the higher education system contracting in the 1970s and 
the 1980s in the US however, it went up by around 36%; two year col-
leges, which had been expected to disappear, did even better.  
One of the main reasons for this was the development of a number of 
new markets that dramatically expanded their student base. Private uni-
versities in particular in Japan have also recognised their need to diver-
sify away from what has been their traditional entrant: the eighteen- or 
nineteen-year-old Japanese student who has entered either directly from 
high school or a year later after a period at a full-time cram school (yo-
bik ). For various reasons however, the outcomes of these new initia-
tives do not look as promising in Japan as they were in the US.
One recognised area for growth is the development of graduate edu-
cation. Only about 8% of Japanese students currently go on to graduate 
education, as opposed to 13% in the UK and 16% in the US. One report 
from the early 1990s put Japan as second among industrialised nations 
                                             
8 For recent detailed analyses of the financial situation and viability of pri-
vate universities in Japan, see Maruyama (2002); Nakamura (2002); Shi-
mano (2004). 
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in the percentage of its college-age youth going to university and last in 
the proportion going on to graduate school (Daily Yomiuri Newspaper,
19 Feb. 1991). In part this has been thought to be due to the reluctance 
of Japanese employers to hire those they feel already so qualified that 
they will be difficult to train in their own company way of doing things 
(Urata 1996, p. 189-90). Ogawa (1999) explains that graduate education 
in Japan has generally been seen only as a training ground for those who 
want to go on to be academics and that there has been little use of it for 
gaining professional and other non-academic skills. The UK Dearing 
Committee (Dearing Report 1997, p. 55) was told that the Japanese Min-
istry of Education planned to increase the number of graduate students 
by 33% between 1995-2000, mainly in science and technology. In part 
this reflected the fact that, as Teichler (1997, pp. 286-287, 293) points 
out, major Japanese production companies changed their recruitment 
policies in the early 1990s in favour of increasing science and engineer-
ing graduates from Master’s programmes. This largely explains the dou-
bling in the number of graduate students from the mid-1980s to the mid-
1990s. While the number of undergraduate students in engineering and 
the natural sciences going on to graduate courses rose to almost one-
quarter and one-third respectively by the mid-1990s, in the social sci-
ences it remained around 3% where graduate study was still not seen as 
having employment value other than for those who wanted to be aca-
demics. Unfortunately for the lower level private universities, they have 
invested very heavily in the social sciences which were cheap to run and 
could accommodate large classes, and so the increased demand (from 
students and employers) for graduate education in science and engineer-
ing has had minimal effect for them. 
There has however, been the initial development in the last few 
years of non-science-based professional schools. Over 70 universities 
opened Law Schools on April 1 2004, as part of the process of radically 
reforming the training of – and increasing the number of – lawyers in 
Japan. At the same time, there has been the development of MBA (Mas-
ter of Business Administration) courses (Yamada, 2002). These pro-
grammes are having the effect of bringing a small number of shakaijin 
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gakusei (mature students)9 into universities. Most of these students how-
ever, are taking courses in the evening and weekends so that they can 
combine them with their jobs; there is as yet almost no evidence of stu-
dents taking career development breaks and even less of housewives 
coming back to university once their children are old enough to go to 
school. Significantly, these were both huge new markets for universities 
and community colleges in the US in the 1970s when they were facing 
the same drop in 18-year-olds as currently faced in Japan (Kelly 1998). 
In the 1990s however, employees were very reluctant to return to full-
time university education because of fears about getting new jobs as the 
economy slipped into recession. For housewives there were not only 
well-established systems for very cheap adult education at local Cultural 
Halls but also no evidence that employers would recognise their new 
qualifications if they went back to university after child-care breaks. On 
the university side, establishing graduate courses is an expensive propo-
sition; there are strict minimum requirements for staff: student ratios 
much tougher than for undergraduate programmes. The number of non-
science graduate students will need to increase much more therefore, be-
fore they become a significant means for universities to increase their 
income.
Another source of possible students has been those from foreign 
(known as ry gakusei in Japanese). This again has constituted a huge 
source of university income in Anglophone countries such as the UK, 
US, and Australia over the past decade. In 2003, Japan reached the tar-
get of 100,000 foreign students enrolled (26% at graduate schools; 53% 
on undergraduate programmes; 19% at vocational schools) that had been 
set by then-Prime Minister Nakasone in 1984. Much of this rise came 
about in the previous five years when the numbers doubled from 51,000 
to almost 110,000 as a result of the easing of immigration requirements 
for foreign students in 1997 and the rapidly growing demand for higher 
education in China and South Korea. Within 117,927 foreign students in 
2005, nearly 63.0% come from China and 13.5% from South Korea. If 
one excludes the further 3.6% who come from Taiwan, the rest of the 
world contributes a mere 23,450 foreign students to the second largest 
higher education system in the world. Foreign students are very concen-
                                             
9 There does not seem to yet be an official definition of who falls into the 
category of a mature student in Japan. Universities which operate special 
entrance categories for ‘shakaijin gakusei’ seem to have their own defini-
tions, though most of these seem to include the idea that the candidate ei-
ther has a paid job, or has had a paid job previously, while not receiving 
full-time education. The fact that definitions are so custom-made is a good 
indication of how undeveloped this market remains. 
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trated in the metropolises with more than 30% in Tokyo. This means 
that rural universities, which are most under financial threat, have found 
it difficult to recruit them as a mean of easing their financial situation.10
Even in urban areas, though, it is generally agreed that programmes for 
foreign students are more closely related to the image and public rela-
tions of universities than their finances. Many such programmes indeed 
run at a loss, and their financial situation was considerably worsened in 
the academic year starting in April 2004, which saw a severe reduction 
in the number of visas granted to students from China by the immigra-
tion authorities, in light of a number of very serious crimes committed 
by a very small number of such students in the previous year. As far as 
foreign students are concerned, there is not yet sufficient evidence to 
suggest that Japan is as good an investment of family income as the An-
glophone countries and while numbers are creeping up the overall effect 
of this new market on the system as a whole, and the lower-level private 
university sector in particular, is likely to remain minimal for some time. 
Japanese private universities have relied almost entirely on student 
fees (around 80% of their total income; in the form of entrance exam, 
entrance, tuition, and other fees) and (central or local) government sub-
sidies (around 10% of their current income on average). If neither ma-
ture nor foreign students offer an immediate means of bringing more in-
come into most universities, then what other means are available? There 
are three revenue-generating offices which one has found on most US 
and UK university campuses since the 1980s and which are only just 
beginning to appear in Japan: research offices, conference offices, and 
continuing education offices. As is well known, a far higher proportion 
of Japanese R&D is carried out in companies than in university laborato-
ries, and Japanese companies have generally favoured foreign universi-
ties to do research for them. Spin-off companies however, have recently 
been set up in a number of universities. This is expected, at least in the 
short-term, only to be a source of significant income for a few major 
universities with strong medical, engineering, and natural science de-
partments. Again, because of their investment in the social sciences and 
humanities, it is unlikely that many lower-level private universities will 
be able to earn substantial income through research contracts. 
                                             
10 One university in Tohoku set up classrooms in Tokyo and taught some of 
its foreign students there via video-links so that they could combine their 
studies with part-time jobs in the capital where jobs are much easier to 
come by than in the countryside. This well-reported case was presented as 
an example of the widely-held belief that many foreign students in Japan 
had come not to study but only to look for work and earn money to send 
back to their families abroad. 
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Another possible source of income for universities is to make better 
use of their facilities or to provide services for their local communities. 
Many of the older universities have campuses in prime situations in the 
middle of urban areas and many newer ones have superbly developed, 
designed, and equipped facilities. Most universities however, are still 
only utilised during the day and in term time. Recently however, some 
university administrators have been waking up to the revenue-generating 
possibility of utilising their campuses during the evenings, Sundays, and 
during vacations; of course, in the current recession, they are trying to 
sell space in a very competitive market. Similarly – and sometime in 
conjunction with the above – some institutions are beginning to develop 
programmes of lectures and classes for members of the public, though 
here, as mentioned above in the context of luring housewives back to 
university as full-time students, they face strong competition from 
courses which have been available for many areas at local cultural cen-
tres throughout Japan.  
All of the above ideas have been recognised as possibilities for in-
troducing new revenue streams into private universities. None have 
managed to do so to any substantial degree. A very small number of pri-
vate universities have come to rely on foreign students but this has 
proved to be a very unstable market – due to the sensitivity of Japan’s 
relations with its Asian neighbours and a global demand for teaching in 
English which is not readily available in Japan. Across the sector as a 
whole it has had minimal effect; virtually no universities have been able 
to use their facilities to raise substantial income through ‘sweating their 
resources’;11 links with industry have been hard to develop because most 
private universities had developed programmes at the time of their estab-
lishment that could be taught with high student: staff ratios and with lit-
tle investment in infrastructure such as laboratories but which now can 
deliver little of research interest to commercial enterprises. Instead of 
trying to attract new markets therefore, many universities have turned 
their attention to securing a greater share of the traditional market of 
eighteen-year-olds and trying to deal with the issue of retention as drop-
out rates have soared. In doing so, they have been to some extent ‘rein-
venting’ the idea of the University in Japan.
                                             
11 Naoi and Akabayashi (2004) argue that the inequalities in government 
subsidies mean that private universities can never compete in selling their 
facilities with public universities which can always undercut them in this 
market.  
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6.  Attempts at  ‘Reinvent ing’  the Universi ty 
The ability of the national government to directly affect the policies of 
individual institutions became much more limited with the introduction 
of the neo-liberal ideology of the 1980s. The strong recommendation to 
institutions that they set up systems of self-monitoring and self-
evaluation during 1990s was a governmental attempt to foster the man-
agement capacity of higher education institutions, most of which (espe-
cially national, public, and prestigious private universities) did not have 
strong leadership provided by Presidents and Deans, as we shall see in 
the next section. The University Council report in 1998 included de-
tailed proposals for quality improvement of university education, such as 
guidelines of weekly study hours of students, grading and GPA systems, 
better use of syllabi, faculty development and so on (University Council 
1998). The introduction and reinforcement of quality assurance mecha-
nisms and the incorporation of national universities in 2004 should also 
be understood as a governmental initiative to drive university reform.
Partly as a result of these government initiatives but also largely be-
cause of the threat caused to institutions’ existence by the lack of stu-
dents, a much greater emphasis on reforming what exactly universities 
offer to their students has developed over the past decade (Lee-Cunin 
2004). Students are beginning to be seen as consumers or, as Kitamura 
puts it, Japanese tertiary education is seeing the development of a 
buyer’s market where “students will be ‘courted customers’ rather than 
‘supplicants’ for admission” (1997, p. 148). During the 1990s, virtually 
all universities undertook some form of curriculum reform. Previously, 
under the label of academic freedom and a belief in the specialist nature 
of academic work, the teaching of academics had been left almost com-
pletely up to individuals. They designed their own syllabi, taught their 
own courses, set exams for their own students, and marked their stu-
dents’ papers; all without external evaluation or reference to colleagues. 
The result was that while some teaching was excellent, much of it was 
described as routine and unimaginative and just as seriously, there was 
no co-ordination between courses within and across departments. A vi-
cious circle developed as students became disillusioned and stopped at-
tending classes and professors decried the lack of student commitment, 
yet still continued to graduate them on the basis that this was the univer-
sity’s duty after it had accepted them (Usami 2000, for a good descrip-
tion of this process). As the job market for graduates came increasingly 
tighter during the 1990s, students became more selective of what and not 
just where they studied (Yano 1997) and more demanding about what 
they got for their money. Institutions of higher education were under in-
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creasing pressure to respond to these new demands (Arimoto 1997, p. 
205). Many students indeed dropped out of university altogether or at-
tended vocational schools (senmongakk ) alongside or after university to 
make themselves more attractive to employers. In response to these 
trends, universities instituted FD (Faculty Development) programmes to 
try and get their academic staff to think about their teaching (Inoshita 
2003).
Many commentators however, feel that FD programmes have not 
been very successful, in part because of Japanese professors’ self-image. 
According to Ehara (1998a) Japanese professors think of themselves as 
researchers in the German mould, rather than teachers in the Latin 
American mould, or as both researchers and teachers in the Anglo-
American mould. While it has always been difficult to get a full-time 
post in a Japanese university, once obtained it has offered both a very 
high level of security and by global standards for academics, a very 
good salary. There has historically been little incentive therefore, to re-
forming teaching practices, which have been unchanged for many dec-
ades. Even now that people recognise the imperative, they find it very 
hard to make the cultural change (Lee-Cunin 2004; McVeigh 2002). In 
order to bypass such resistance, some universities have introduced new 
courses, often taught by new teachers, though generally on the same 
campus, which have a more practical element to them than those taught 
by their established professors. For example, students studying English 
may be able to take courses designed for passing TOEFL taught by 
teachers from a local language school or for those majoring in econom-
ics, courses to prepare them for accountancy exams taught by teachers 
from a local vocational school (senmongakk ). Such universities see the 
need to offer practical training which will improve their students’ 
chances of employment, as employment rates (sh shoku ritsu) begin to 
replace entrance scores (hensachi) as the means of ranking universities 
(Asahi Daigaku Ranking 2004; Yonezawa et al. 2002). Drop-out rates 
continue to climb however, in most lower-level private universities and 
overall, attempts at reinventing themselves have proved hardly any more 
successful for most universities than has the search for new markets. The 
reason lies mainly in problems of university management. 
7. Universi ty Management and 
the Problem of  Reform 
From the governmental point of view, the reform of management, espe-
cially at national universities, has been a core part of its higher education 
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reform policy. There has long been criticism of the inefficiency of de-
centralised decision-making power in national universities. The Ministry 
and its advisory councils have continuously tried to strengthen the lead-
ership of university presidents and their capacity to effect management 
change (Study Team Concerning the Transformation of National Uni-
versities into Independent Administrative Corporations 2002). Through 
the incorporation of national universities, the long tradition of electing 
the Presidents of national universities from their own faculty was 
changed to appointment by a committee, although most national univer-
sities still operate an election system which is then implemented by the 
committee. National universities now have a Board of Directors with 
decision-making powers and Administrative Councils with external 
members who can advise on management issues. They need to produce 
medium-term goals and demonstrate their plans for dealing with person-
nel management issues such as introducing more contract-based re-
cruitment of academic staff and performance-related payment systems.
The reason the Government has invested so much effort in introduc-
ing these management reforms into the national universities is because it 
has long felt that it was the management structure which was most re-
sponsible for universities inability to reform themselves in the facing of 
changing internal and external threats and challenges. Very much the 
same can be said for the private universities for whom the immediate 
need for reform may be even greater.
Put simply, there are two basic management styles in Japanese uni-
versities (Nihon Shiritsu Daigaku Renmei 1986, 1999, Oe 2003). One, 
generally known as the ky jukai shihai (control by the professors’ coun-
cil) model has pertained in all national, public, and many private univer-
sities; the other, known as either the gakuch -shihai (control by the 
president) or the rijikai-shihai (control by the school board) model, can 
only be found in private institutions (Ehara 1998b). As Ushiogi (2002) 
points out, both styles have problems for the reform of higher education 
institutions.
While financial decisions are made by the school board, all academic 
decisions rest with the professors’ councils of each faculty in the ky ju-
kai shihai model. As a result, the ky jukai (professors’ meetings) have 
tended to have huge powers of veto over decisions with financial impli-
cations for the institution as a whole, without however being responsible 
for the financial effects of those decisions. Indeed, since the ky jukai has 
generally operated on the basis that it will only make a decision when a 
consensus has been formed, according to many informants it has fre-
quently been a negative and reactive rather than a positive and proactive 
force in the institutional decision-making process.
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The gakuch -shihai or the rijikai-shihai models are most commonly 
found in the newer private universities, many of which are family-run 
concerns passed on from parent to child (or adopted child) over two or 
three generations. Here, power over both academic and financial matters 
rests in the hands of an individual or a board made up of close associates 
of that individual. In some cases this individual is a respected academic 
in their own right who is fully involved in the day-to-day running of the 
university and who can balance the academic and financial aspects of 
their decisions. In many cases however, decisions are made by individu-
als and boards far removed from the issues they are discussing. As a re-
sult, staff often feel not only disempowered but also that decisions are 
arbitrary, something which those who work in such institutions say can 
lead to the development of a culture of fear and mistrust. There is no 
doubt however that with this model, decisions can be implemented much 
more quickly and hence Monbush  has strengthened the power of the 
heads of national universities to help them speed up the reform process.
As Hatakenaka (2004) points out in her comparative study of UK, 
US, and Japanese university management; from an Anglo-American 
perspective what is conspicuous about the Japanese model is the almost 
complete lack of academics with management and financial experience. 
These ‘hybrids’ as she calls them, are responsible for most management 
decisions in UK and US research universities and have allowed the 
nearly ubiquitous development of decentralised management where in-
dividual departments (or even smaller units) take responsibility for both 
the academic and the financial management of their own affairs.
8.  Conclusion 
In Japan, the strong influence of neo-liberalism has led to the ideas of 
New Public Management, privatisation, and ‘marketisation’ beginning 
to dominate the policy debate in higher education. These changes in 
higher education policy without doubt demand a new framework for un-
derstanding the relationship between the state and higher education insti-
tutions. Figure 3 shows the traditional relationship between the state and 
higher education institutions in which state governments regulate and 
guide higher education institutions while the institutions report to the 
state government. In the typical state evaluation model, external evalua-
tion organisations intervene or act as a ‘buffer’ between the two actors.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between state government and 
higher education institutions through the market. The higher education 
market tends to be highly segmented as indeed is typically observed 
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with Japan’s private higher education sector. In most cases, the state 
government maintains a direct means to guide and regulate those institu-
tions in the market and the institutions are required to report to ensure 
that they comply with legal and fiduciary regulations. The main relation-
ship between the government and institutions however, is not through 
these direct channels but through the market. While the state govern-
ment sets higher education policies, these policies are not aimed at con-
trolling higher education institutions directly. Rather, the state govern-
ment tries to influence the market and by utilising market mechanisms, 
indirectly impact the behaviour of higher education institutions. Both 
state government and higher education institutions accumulate informa-
tion on the market mechanisms and both can assess the likely outcomes 
of a particular policy. 
Figure 3: Relation between state government and higher education  
   institutions without market 
Figure 4: Relation between state government and higher education  
   institutions through market 
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The role of market mechanisms in Japan has become intensified in a 
way that probably has not been seen in any other system for a number of 
overlapping reasons. With over 70% of graduates going on to tertiary 
education, Japan already has a ‘universal system’ and room for further 
expansion within this age group appears to be somewhat limited. Al-
though there is an ‘overlapping hierarchy’, with some exceptions private 
universities cater to the bottom 75% of students on the academic scale 
and still rely almost entirely on fees from students for their survival, The 
governmental subsidy introduced in the 1970s in the era of welfare-state 
reforms was expected to increase to 50% of running costs but after peak-
ing at just under 30% in the early 1980s has since steadily fallen under 
the pressure of neo-liberalism to around a mere 10%. Despite protesta-
tions from the private university sector that the state has a moral if not a 
legal obligation to help them financially (in return for having helped 
with the excess demand for higher education in the post-war period)12,
there is little possibility in the current climate of the overall state subsidy 
being increased; state support may be increasingly provided to the top 
research-oriented private universities through various research pro-
grammes established with state money. Lower-level private universities 
see a bleak future. Many have seen application rates fall to between half 
and one-tenth (10%) of those of only ten years ago. Many are seeing 
only around half of their graduates secure employment within six 
months of graduation and up to 20% of students drop out while on 
course. Many go to vocational schools (senmongakk ) which are enjoy-
ing something of a boom, to earn practical qualifications which will im-
prove their job prospects. Others are seeing their campuses increasingly 
turned into what Refsing (1992) has memorably called ‘depositories’ as 
students string out their courses in the hope that the job market will pick 
up; in many private universities, only about 60% of universities are 
completing their courses within the expected 4 years. 
To survive, it is widely accepted that many private universities will 
need to reform very quickly (Kitamura 2002; Kusaka et al. 2003). As we 
have seen above, their internal management structures often make re-
forms, even minor reforms, extremely difficult to implement. It is diffi-
cult for them to enter the new markets that the US universities developed 
in the 1970s when they faced the same pressure. The reforms they are 
                                             
12 Some private university leaders even argue that the state’s moral 
obligation should be tied to the fact that the only higher education from 
the 9th to the end of the 19th century was provided by the private sector. 
Possibly the best account in English of the historical relationship between 
the state and the private education sector in Japan is provided by James 
and Benjamin (1988).  
ROGER GOODMAN AND AKIYOSHI YONEZAWA
466
trying to implement give interesting insights into what they see as their 
inherent weaknesses. They have concentrated on establishing courses 
which will be seen as more socially relevant to the need of students in 
the employment field (such as business and law schools, or in the wel-
fare field which is the major expected growth area in the Japanese econ-
omy as the population continues to age) and improving the quality of 
support and services that they provide to those students. Due to how 
universities are administered and because of the perception that profes-
sors have of themselves, reform is proving very hard to implement in 
many institutions. The next few years will be very painful for private 
universities in Japan. On the positive side however, it is likely that those 
universities able to successfully reform themselves in the face of the fi-
nancial pressures will come to play a more important role in socialising 
and training young people to be part of the professional and social fabric 
of the society rather than simply, as many have hitherto described them, 
as liminal sites for young people to ‘play’ in before they are trained to be 
corporate workers by companies. In this respect, it can be argued that the 
market may be playing a positive role in the public interest. The blur-
ring, if not yet disappearance, of the distinction between the public and 
private university sectors in Japan might also be argued to be in the pri-
vate interest as individuals have a clearer concept of the return of their 
investment in higher education and also greater opportunity of invest-
ment regardless of their social class backgrounds.
The emphasis on allowing the market to determine policy outcomes 
is not new of course, in a highly developed large private higher educa-
tion system such as exists in Japan. What is new is that Japan is about to 
see a ‘hollowing out’ of its huge private higher education system of a 
sort that has never been seen before. It is still hard to anticipate how that 
process will actually take place. The other interesting feature of the 
Japanese case is that the relationship which has long existed between the 
state and private universities is now becoming extended to the national 
and public institutions. In Japan we can see a critical transformation and 
integration of public and private higher education policies. It is possible 
that the emergence of this new relationship between the state, institu-
tions, and the market across the public and private higher education sec-
tors may go further; namely to the integration of the higher education 
policies with the industrial policies needed for Japan’s knowledge econ-
omy (Yonezawa 2007).  What is also clear is that we need to watch very 
closely what happens in Japan over the next decade since it will have 
important implications for our understanding of the relationship between 
public and private higher education not only across East Asia but glob-
ally as well. 
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Mapping Private Sector Expansion in 
Mexican Higher Education 
ROLLIN KENT
1. Introduct ion 
It is not an exaggeration to say that extensive development of the private 
sector is one of the most the most remarkable phenomena in the recent 
evolution of higher education in Mexico, if not its most notable 
characteristic. This flood, particularly that of local and international 
online ‘diploma mills’, has provoked another kind of torrent: a surge of 
alarming media statements by rectors and presidents of public and 
private universities warning against the deluge of mediocrity and fraud 
that threaten to overcome higher education and perhaps undo the fruits 
on fifteen of quality improvement policy. Policymakers have also taken 
part in this debate; responding with tighter licensing procedures and 
invocations to deepen and extend accreditation, which is still in its 
infancy. There is an emerging academic literature on the subject (Silas 
Casillas 2005; Rodríguez 2003; Villa Lever 2003) to which this research 
intends to contribute. 
This chapter1 explores the recent growth of private higher education 
in Mexico, specifically underscoring the new patterns in institutional and 
regional diversification and presenting a tentative institutional typology 
1 The research reported here was done through the Alliance for International 
Higher Education Policy Studies project, a collaborative effort focused on 
understanding the relationships between policy and performance in the 
higher education systems of Canada, the United States, and Mexico, with 
support from the Ford Foundation. 
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for discussion. It will briefly examine higher education as an industry,
drawing attention to the economic dimensions of the emergence of dif-
ferentiated regional markets for higher education. Subsequently it will 
explore the dialectic between the rapidly changing private sector and 
emerging policy initiatives at the federal and state levels. Such is the 
tempo of private sector expansion and differentiation that policy finds 
itself in a reactive, indeed defensive, position as privatisation gains pace. 
This mapping exercise takes up on Daniel Levy’s suggestion that “pri-
vate higher education’s roles emerge mostly unanticipated, not follow-
ing a broad preconception or systemic design. For the most part, central 
policy does not create, design, or even anticipate emerging private sector 
roles” (Levy 2002). This analysis however, will attempt to move beyond 
Levy’s assumption about the role of policy. Following Elinor Ostrom’s 
(1999) outlook on institutional analysis and public policy, we assert that 
the expansion of markets (in education as in other social domains) does 
not follow abstract or unpredictable pathways but rather conforms to the 
‘institutional rules of the game’. These rules are made up of a set of op-
portunities and constraints resulting from the social space created by the 
connections between markets and the state. The rules may be explicit or 
implicit and are the result of historical interactions among organisations 
attempting to make the best of opportunities and constraints in their spe-
cific settings. They constitute the institutional environment (Meyer 
1983; Scott 1995) in which private higher education in Mexico has de-
veloped.
2. Pr ivate  sector  expansion:     
 socia l  demand  outstr ips publ ic  supply 
Over the past fifteen years higher education enrolments in Mexico have 
grown by 80%, at an average annual rate of 4.3% (see Table 1 in the ap-
pendix). One the one hand demographics have favoured this trend, as the 
relevant age group continues to grow into the second decade of this cen-
tury, although at a slower rate than previously. On the other hand, and 
more importantly, the increased demand for higher education is a result 
of efforts by policy makers to improve primary and secondary schooling 
over the past fifteen years. The growing efficiency and completion rates 
at these levels have raised the number of preparatory school graduates, 
and more of them are spurred to continue into higher education. None-
theless, the percentage of young people between the ages of 19 and 24 
enrolled in higher education continues to be very low (in OECD terms) 
at around 22% (with large internal regional differences). Although sig-
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nificant equity challenges have yet to be overcome, social participations 
rates and flows have exerted ever increasing pressure on the higher edu-
cation system.  
How has this mounting demand been managed and absorbed by the 
higher education system? Table 1 shows that the public sector grew by 
47% over the past decade, whereas the private sector grew by 226%. In 
2004 for every hundred students enrolling in higher education, 47 went 
to public institutions and 53 opted for private establishments. This repre-
sents a greater private intake than at any other time in history, although 
in fact the trend seemed to level off in the middle of this first decade of 
the new century.  
Significantly, the greater proportion of students bound for the public 
sector enrols today in non-university establishments such as two- and 
four-year technical institutes, changing a historic trend in which public 
universities represented the centre of attraction for students. This is due 
to the explicit decision by policy makers in the early 1990s to limit the 
growth of public universities and favour the quite significant extension 
of technical post-secondary education following recommendations by 
OECD examiners in the 1990s (OECD 1997). At the same time, public 
universities were made the object of extensive programs basically de-
signed to increase quality, while limiting enrolment growth in this sec-
tor. The rationale for this policy has been that addressing matters of 
quality and equity requires a differentiated system of higher education, 
reversing the traditional role of massive and politicised public universi-
ties that had unsuccessfully attempted in the 1970s and 1980s to meet 
both needs within one institutional format. In terms of equity, it is ar-
gued that by locating all newly created technical two- and four-year in-
stitutes in under-served regions, out of the reach of public universities 
and beyond the sphere of the mostly urban private institutions, educa-
tional opportunities will be opened up to poor students in small cities 
and rural areas. In sum, systemic differentiation has been a mainstay of 
public policy in Mexican higher education since the latter part of the 
1990s.
An important although latent aspect of this policy has been to allow 
the private sector to attract a growing number of students who do not 
pass the entrance exams to public institutions. Though this has not been 
an explicitly stated policy, all parties understand that by limiting the in-
take of large public universities, expanding public enrolments through 
small technical institutes, and simultaneously exerting a lax licensing 
policy toward the creation of new private establishments, policy makers 
in the early 1990s gave a green light to the expansion of the private sec-
tor.
ROLLIN KENT
474
This policy stance toward the private sector was an implicit but very 
real ‘rule of the policy game’ that sent clear signals to educational entre-
preneurs who swiftly moved to take advantage of new opportunities in 
the market for higher education. Not only has the number of students 
flowing toward the private sector grown, but the growth rate of private 
establishments themselves has in fact outstripped expectations. In 1990, 
there were 776 establishments of higher education in Mexico; this num-
ber grew to 1,250 nine years later. Over that decade the number of pri-
vate establishments went from 358 to 735, surpassing the number of 
public institutions (ANUIES 2000, pp. 39-40). As seen in Table 1, en-
rolment in private universities grew by 175% in the 1990s, whereas in 
private non-university establishments (mostly small academies with lim-
ited academic facilities and poorly trained faculty) enrolment expanded 
by 460%. Half of all the incoming students to the private sector were 
taken up by the latter institutions. 
To use Daniel Levy’s terminology from his seminal work on private 
higher education in Latin America (1986), the previous wave of private 
sector expansion in the 1980s was characterised by élite flight from poli-
ticisation in public universities, thus spurring the growth of academi-
cally reputable private universities that are attended by the offspring of 
the middle and upper social strata and are well financed by firms as well 
as families. However, in recent years the growth industry in higher edu-
cation has been constituted by the non-élite sector, the academies, and 
diploma mills, which Levy terms demand-absorbing institutions. It is 
this rapidly growing sector that has become the focus of concern for 
both policymakers and institutional leaders in the public and private uni-
versities.
3. Expansion and dif ferentiat ion in     
 the private  sector  
We know from Burton Clark’s work (1983) that growth in higher educa-
tion always goes together with system differentiation. Academic organi-
sations do not merely inflate or extend themselves, but as a rule they 
also tend to change their institutional structures and diversify their 
means of providing educational services. A principal contention of this 
presentation is that private sector differentiation is a decisive but misun-
derstood phenomenon that deserves greater attention by researchers and 
policy makers. The changing market structure of private higher educa-
tion brought about by the entry of new competitors is an important ele-
ment of systemic change whose characteristics and implications are not 
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fully understood by researchers and policy makers (Dill 2003). The fol-
lowing analysis attempts to impose some kind of order in a situation of 
growing heterogeneity. 
3.1 Regional differentiation  
In terms of national averages, private sector expansion is quite signifi-
cant. But when analysed at the regional level, interesting differences 
emerge. Our research has selected several states where private growth 
has been especially prominent: Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nuevo Leon, Pue-
bla, and the Federal District (the national capital). 
Four of these states represent the most industrialised and highly ur-
banised regions in the country; except for Guanajuato they have the 
largest public universities (including UNAM, one of the largest in the 
world); they show high rates of enrolment growth and the most notewor-
thy expansion rates of the private sector. These five states represent 46% 
of national public enrolments and 60% of national private enrolments in 
higher education. All the principal private universities are either estab-
lished in these states or have important branch campuses there. They are 
also prime territory for the expansion of the rapidly grown non-univer-
sity sector in private higher education. 
Consequently, it can be said that regional markets of private higher 
education are emerging in certain areas. The reasons vary from one state 
to another, both as a result of policy and market forces. In the northern 
state of Nuevo Leon on the United States border, the Technical Institute 
of Monterrey has for many years led the way in opening up the market 
for élite demand, making it a traditional bastion of private higher educa-
tion in the elite sector. Monterrey Technical Institute has expanded all 
over the country and now operates a system of campuses in at least 
twenty other states. It also offers online degrees nationally and interna-
tionally in Spanish speaking countries. State education officials play a 
minor role in managing and coordinating higher education in Nuevo 
Leon, openly admitting in interviews that the large (and mostly federally 
funded) state university and the strong privately funded Monterrey 
Technical Institute do quite well on their own without government regu-
lation.
As the capital city, the Federal District is the pre-eminent focus of 
economic and political power as well as an enormous population centre 
of 20 million people, making it a natural habitat for both public and pri-
vate institutions of all types. The size and autonomy of the three large 
federally funded establishments (the National University, UNAM, the 
National Polytechnic Institute, and the Autonomous Metropolitan Uni-
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versity) limit the role of government in this state. The same is true of the 
effect of the numerous well regarded private universities, all of which 
are either based in the Federal District or have large campuses there. 
Two factors must be pointed out when examining higher education pol-
icy in the Federal District. As the seat of the federal government which 
directly funds very large public universities, the local authorities face a 
hybrid situation and are left with relatively little margin for operation. 
By the same token, for the past decade the capital city has been gov-
erned by a centre-left party that has shown little interest in educational 
policy (except for the establishment of a new municipal university). 
Guanajuato is a small state with high levels of poverty and social in-
equity but has been experiencing serious industrialisation and regional 
development. For the past fifteen years, state governments in Guana-
juato have stressed the importance of educational reform and expansion 
at all levels. Enrolments in higher education grew 300% since 1990, al-
though the enrolment rate of the relevant age group remains low. The 
push for educational reform and the resulting growing demand for post-
secondary education have stimulated both the public and private sectors, 
resulting in significant diversification. Guanajuato exemplifies the proto-
typical developmental strategy, where the push for urbanisation and in-
dustrialisation is accompanied by a policy of educational expansion. The 
latter in turn acts as a stimulus for an emerging private sector in higher 
education.
The states of Puebla and Jalisco present slightly different cases, 
though they show enough similarities to be typified together. Economi-
cally, demographically, and politically they are of secondary importance 
only in comparison to the Federal District and Nuevo León, and they are 
important regional centres of economic activity. It is in Puebla and Jal-
isco where the greatest numbers of new private institutions of higher 
education have been established over the past decade. Traditionally their 
higher education systems have been dominated by the public-sector with 
a dominant role for the state university: Jalisco has the second largest 
public university in Mexico and Puebla has the fourth largest. Both 
states, but especially Puebla, are developing a growing network of tech-
nical institutes. In contrast to the traditional dominance of public sector 
institutions, these states today appear as the fastest growing regional 
markets for private higher education. Seventy three new private estab-
lishments set up operations in Puebla between 1990 and 2003, pushing 
private enrolments from 18,400 to 69,000 students. In Jalisco forty five 
new private institutions were created in the same period, with enrol-
ments growing from 21,000 to 70,000 students. Only the Federal District 
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surpassed the states of Puebla and Jalisco in terms of new private institu-
tions created over this period. 
Officials in various state governments have expressed concern about 
the quality of these institutions and have moved to establish a set of 
conditions for operating private establishments such as program accredi-
tation, ISO certification of administrative processes, and entrance ex-
aminations. This is a new phenomenon in higher education policy in 
Mexico, where decisions are traditionally made at the federal level. 
Regulation of the private sector at the state level appears to be an in-
creasingly important component of emerging state systems of higher 
education.
Another hypothesis for explaining the specific attributes of private 
expansion in different regions arises when one examines new trends 
within the private sector itself. The term ‘private sector’ actually em-
braces a growing variety of institutional types, which are invisible when 
one merely contemplates enrolment statistics or counts the number of es-
tablishments. Two forms of institutional differentiation were observed in 
Burton Clark’s vocabulary (1983): horizontal differentiation among dif-
ferent organisational types; and vertical differentiation in establishments 
that move from undergraduate to graduate offerings. 
3.2 Horizontal differentiation  
In the public sector, institutional types are explicit and straightforward, 
defined as they are by policy. Over the past decade the public sector has 
diversified from a binary situation – with universities and 4 year techni-
cal institutes – to an array of postsecondary institutions: 
• universities
• four year federal technical institutes 
• four year state technical institutes 
• two year technical institutes (state level) 
• four year polytechnics (state level) 
Only two state universities were created in this period. But over eighty 
state technical institutes were established and more than fifty state run 
two-year technical institutes were set up. Polytechnics are a recent addi-
tion and are few in number. It should be noted that all new public insti-
tutions of postsecondary and higher education were originally funded 
jointly by federal and state governments and are currently managed at 
the state level. Consequently, the policy of institutional differentiation 
has also been a policy of decentralisation, moving ever greater responsi-
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bility for funding and managing public higher education from the federal 
to the state governments. 
But how do we distinguish institutional types in the private sector, 
where no accepted classification exists and establishments spring up 
with astonishing speed? Up to this point we have operated with part of 
Levy’s 1986 classification of private institutions: universities (or elite) 
institutions and non-university (or demand-absorbing) establishments. 
This classification is useful as an initial guide into the data, when one 
desires a snapshot of structure at a single point in time. A more flexible 
typology becomes necessary as one makes closer observations of institu-
tions and especially as one observes changes over time. Emergence and 
change are crucial elements here, and as Levy observes in a recent pa-
per, one may “discern waves of growth evolving into different types (or 
sub sectors) of private higher education” (2002). For example, small in-
stitutions that were clearly demand-absorbing at one point in time may 
develop in the future into something resembling a university. Other 
small institutions may erroneously be classified as ‘diploma mills’ when 
in fact they are specialised institutions designed to train professionals in 
a specific area of expertise. The following institutional types have been 
identified from research on the strategies and changes in the private sec-
tor, (Peña 2004): 
• Universities: Academically reputable institutions with long standing 
in Mexico, some going back forty or fifty years; they offer under-
graduate and graduate programs in a multiplicity of disciplines, and 
hire well-trained faculty some of whom are full-time (although few 
private universities actually carry out research). Internal quality con-
trol and external accreditation are standard procedures. This category 
is actually quite diverse in itself, comprising multi-campus systems 
and virtual educational delivery as well as more traditional universi-
ties.
• Non-university establishments (demand-absorbing): Usually (but not 
explicitly) for-profit, with undergraduate offerings in business, ac-
counting, education, or other ‘soft’ social professions; part-time fac-
ulty with minimum credentials; usually not accredited. They are 
proprietary and often family owned businesses. 
• Specialised Institutes: Focused on training professionals in one or 
two associated disciplines with reasonable academic infrastructure. 
Faculty are usually part-time but reputed practitioners; programs are 
often officially accredited. Some of these institutes operate as part-
nerships with corporations in certain sectors such as law firms, ho-
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tels, or restaurants with an interest in training specialised workers for 
their industry. 
• Non-university establishments in the process of academic consolida-
tion: Formerly non-university establishments that have strengthened 
their faculty and academic facilities; they aim to become respectable 
universities and express an interest in accreditation. In his analysis of 
higher education development in the United States, Burton Clark 
terms this a process of dignification of small establishments on the 
way to becoming reputable colleges or universities (1986).  In-depth 
research might yield a more precise classification based on strategic 
behaviour of these institutions; for example a Rand study (Brewer et 
al. 2002) reviewed by David Dill (2003, pp. 10-11) classifies institu-
tional strategies in a competitive environment into prestige-seekers 
and reputation-seekers.2 The number of establishments in this 
emerging category is very small compared to the total of non-
university establishments.  
• Expanding Non-university Businesses: Non-university establish-
ments that have prospered as educational businesses, growing in 
numbers but not in quality. Facilities remain elementary and faculty 
remain part-time and under-qualified. Offerings are low cost, popu-
lar, and high volume teaching programs, rarely venturing beyond 
business and the social professions; quality assurance procedures are 
followed only under duress. They obviously remain proprietary in-
stitutions and usually retain their family-owned nature if such was 
their original structure, growing either by expanding their original 
facilities and/or by creating new outlets in other cities. 
• International corporations: Large publicly quoted chains, such as 
Sylvan or Apollo, setting up operations in Mexico usually through 
merger with existing local institutions. Sylvan Learning Systems re-
cently established campuses in Chile and Mexico through such 
mergers.  
This tentative classification attempts to break down the private sector 
into distinctive sub sectors. It shows how the original demand-absorbing
or non-university sector is evolving in various directions. We observe 
four different categories in the non-university sector. Some of these ex-
pand as businesses; others move in the direction of consolidated univer-
2 Prestige seekers are imitators of prestigious universities whose quality no-
body contests, strengthening their perceived prestige through greater ad-
missions selectivity; reputation-seekers attempt to succeed by “satisfying 
customer needs” by improving student services, course scheduling, and 
programs (Brewer et al. 2002). 
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sities, others specialise in certain areas. An important but only partially 
resolved issue in using this kind of classification is whether this institu-
tional diversification actually involves increasing academic diversity 
and educational quality in the programs being offered. It is clear that 
most demand-absorbing establishments have no interest in moving be-
yond low cost, high volume programs, and of course this is the sector 
that is undergoing the most growth.  
3.3 Vertical differentiation into the graduate level:  
  a new market for the private sector 
Horizontal diversification between public and private sectors is one di-
mension of systemic change. The other dimension is vertical differentia-
tion. Between 1990 and 2002, graduate enrolments grew from 46,000 to 
148,000 (Fox 2002), an overall expansion of 200% and an average an-
nual rate of 10%. Graduate studies in Mexico are a new growth industry.  
The private sector has moved heavily into graduate studies. This is 
undoubtedly a rational response to a diversified market where there is an 
increased demand for retraining and upgrading by young professionals. 
It is also a response to growing competition within the private sector it-
self.  
We mention vertical differentiation as one important aspect of the 
systemic changes that are emerging but have not examined the data 
closely enough to formulate a more specific hypothesis. It is an aspect 
that has not been dealt with by policy however, and everything points to 
a repetition of the unregulated expansion of undergraduate education in 
the 1970s (Kent 1993). Federal policy programs are in place to regulate 
graduate programs of reputable quality in public institutions, but no such 
policy is being visualised for the rapidly expanding graduate programs 
in the private sector whose ostensible function is not producing scien-
tists but retraining in-service practitioners.  
4. Higher  education (and the pr ivate  sector)  as 
 an industry 
To obtain a firmer grasp of the public policy implications of the expan-
sion of private higher education, it is useful to recall David Dill’s use of 
the term industry (Dill and Sporn 1995; Dill 2003) when referring to 
higher education in the current post-industrial environment characterised 
by high competition among institutions, scarcity of resources, and un-
predictable fluctuations in enrolments and revenues. Dill and Sporn 
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point out that higher education today can be characterised as an ‘indus-
try’ in countries where “governmental reforms have devolved responsi-
bility and procedural autonomy to universities” and “introduced ele-
ments of competition through deregulation, cuts in government support, 
and the introduction of competitive contracting for student places and 
research” (Dill and Sporn 1995, p. 7). Intense expansion of private 
higher education is also a notable characteristic of the contemporary in-
dustry of higher education because of the competitive pressures that this 
sector brings to bear on the system as a whole. 
According to Dill and Sporn, to understand higher education as an 
industry one must examine the underlying sources of competitive pres-
sure on institutions, using Michael Porter’s schema for the amount of 
competition in an industry (Porter 1980): 
• the threat of new entrants 
• the bargaining power of suppliers 
• the bargaining power of customers 
• the threat of substitute services 
• the degree of rivalry among competing institutions 
Dill and Sporn argue that  
“…the five competitive forces reflect the fact that competition in an industry 
can be influenced by factors other than government regulation, or established 
institutions… Government policy at all levels can also influence industry 
structure both directly and indirectly; however, Porter suggests that it is more 
illuminating to consider how government affects competition through the five 
competitive forces rather than as a separate force.” (1995, p. 7) 
And they suggest that  
“…to better comprehend the implications for university reform, we must 
therefore turn from an analysis of governmental policies at the system level, to 
an analysis of the overall competitive forces that will shape the future of indi-
vidual universities.” (1995, p. 7) 
This perspective is fruitful in understanding the specific role of the pri-
vate sector in Mexican higher education. There can be no doubt that the 
massive influx of private institutions has modified Porter’s five sources 
of competitive pressure within higher education. Some of these pres-
sures apply within the private sector or only within a certain sub sector 
of private establishments, as would be the case of new entrants in the 
demand-absorbing sector mainly posing a competitive threat not to es-
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tablished universities but to other small educational businesses. But even 
in this case it is notable that presidents of reputable private universities 
have gone public with their concern that the expansion of ‘fraudulent’ or 
low quality private schools has the effect of tarnishing the overall image 
of private higher education as such, demanding that government regula-
tion and accreditation be extended to those establishments. This demand 
for greater government regulation in the private sector is quite a remark-
able phenomenon, showing that private institutions that traditionally re-
jected government interference in their affairs are today calling for a 
greater role of public policy toward the private sector. This system-level 
dynamic is a new aspect of the policy environment. 
Rivalry among competing institutions is evident in the push for new 
modes of delivery such as online programs, and especially new master’s 
programs in business and related fields. New private entrants do not as 
yet pose much of a threat to public research institutions for funding, but 
it is the case that private universities moving into new technologies are 
luring highly trained scientists away from the public sector to head new 
technology centres in partnership with industry. Given the competitive 
funding policy in research, hiring reputable scientists is the first step to 
competing for research funds.  
Recognition of private higher education as a sector of the local 
economy is a topic that deserves greater attention. Simon Schwartzman 
has written one of the rare studies of the economic dimension of private 
higher education in his study of Brazil (Schwartzman and Schwartzman 
2002). Throughout the 1990s in Mexico relatively robust incentives 
were in place for entrepreneurial activity in higher education. Low barri-
ers to entry into the market such as the following have been widespread 
for non-university (or demand-absorbing) establishments: 
• Uncomplicated legal requirements for licensing; 
• Legal indifference to the distinction between for-profit and not-for-
profit establishments; 
• Minimal ongoing supervision by government (in most states); 
• Low capital investment in facilities: usually large residences are re-
converted to classrooms and offices; 
• Relatively low investment in technology (when libraries and com-
puters are not extensively installed, although this requirement is be-
coming a crucial one for any educational establishment). 
Other conditions have created a situation where profits are to be made, 
such as: 
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• A qualified workforce in a buyer's market and consequently a low 
wage level; readily available human resources willing to work part-
time;
• A rising social demand for tertiary level diplomas; 
• Relatively limited competition. 
There is evidence that some of these conditions are changing. Local 
government is becoming more exigent in licensing requirements and su-
pervision. The academic labour market is increasingly demanding higher 
degrees for entry. Greater investments in technology may not be ignored 
for much longer by diploma mills. Competition among private institu-
tions is intensifying and its effects on institutional development remain 
to be seen. Higher education markets feed on themselves, in the sense 
that they are self-reinforcing mechanisms. Existing institutions provide 
the graduates who will become academics of the new institutions. Aca-
demic formats and curricula are borrowed from one institution to an-
other. When minimum academic qualifications for entering the aca-
demic labour market are raised as they have been in Mexico, vertical 
differentiation into graduate studies opens up new opportunities for in-
stitutions.  
5. Emerging pol icy responses to  
 chal lenges f rom the pr ivate  sector  
Over a period of fifteen years the policy environment has shifted appre-
ciably from a centralised (federal) form of governance, a predominantly 
public and binary system (with universities and technical institutes), and 
a marginal private sector; to a hybrid form of federal-state governance, a 
rapidly changing balance between the public and the private, and the 
emergence of multiple sub sectors in each. The role of policy itself is 
undergoing changes. Governments must now not only fund and regulate 
public institutions but also learn to deal with slippery market forces in 
the private sector. A systemic perspective is needed to understand pri-
vate and public sector changes, which do not occur in isolation from one 
another but interact. This interaction produces system-wide changes in 
the ways higher education relates to students, families, firms, and gov-
ernments. This evolution occurs in the context of an increasingly diver-
sified governmental system that is decentralising, devolving funds and 
power to the state and municipal levels. 
Quality improvement, control, and assurance have been central 
themes in Mexican higher education policy for the past decade and a 
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half. In the first stage of modernisation policy, as it is termed in Mexico, 
the focus of programs for improving and controlling quality was the 
public sector, especially the universities and technical institutes. The 
widespread assumption was that the public sector was failing in most re-
spects and needed deep reforms. At that point, in the late 1980s, the ini-
tial wave of expansion of private universities was perceived as a logical 
social response to public sector failure. There was of course, an ideo-
logical dimension to this argument, set as it was in the context of the 
wave of neo-liberal reforms of that period. In fact, public universities 
were perceived as one more component of wide spread public sector 
failure in Mexico; thus the growth of private universities was accepted 
implicitly, not only as an understandable response to the critical situa-
tion of the public sector but as a way of easing the burden on public fi-
nances for higher education (Fuentes Molinar 1989; Gago Huguet 1989; 
Prawda and González 2001). This perspective was widespread in Latin 
American higher education (Schwartzman 1993; Brunner 1991; Courard 
1993; Brunner et al. 1994). Private sector expansion, if not actually 
promoted (as in Chile), was accepted by policymakers as a welcome ad-
dition to the higher education landscape, no longer as  an unfortunate 
phenomenon to be controlled or marginalised by a dominant public sec-
tor. Implicitly, public policy ascribed a demand-absorbing role for pri-
vate higher education. 
Without a doubt, considerable although fluctuating financial invest-
ments were made in the public sector. Total public spending on higher 
education increased about 30% between 1990 and 2004, although na-
tional expenditures for higher education have not substantially gone be-
yond 0.6% of GDP as the current government promised (Fox 2001). A 
significant portion of this investment was used to create more than 80 
four-year technical institutes and more than 50 two-year institutes in 
small cities and regions accessed predominantly by lower income stu-
dents; not only diversifying the technical sector but making a notable ef-
fort to reduce regional and social inequities in access. In existing public 
universities average expenditure per student went from US$3,400 to 
US$4,100 between 1994 and 2001 in accordance with the focus on qual-
ity improvement (SEP-IESALC-UNESCO 2003, pp. 114-127). All the 
same, these expenditures were insufficient to cover growing social de-
mand for higher education, thus opening opportunities for the private 
sector to expand. 
Throughout the 1990s federal policymakers maintained their focus 
on the public sector, with policy toward the private sector basically con-
sisting of minimum licensing requirements for new institutions. It is im-
portant to note some basic aspects of constitutional law and funding for 
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private higher education. The law allows for the existence of private es-
tablishments of higher education as long as they obtain a license to oper-
ate from either the federal educational authorities, those at the state 
level, or a public university. It is assumed that private institutions will 
operate for the public good, but crucially no specific distinction is made 
between for-profit and not-for-profit organisations. Thus in practice for-
profit establishments operate without being obligated to divulge their 
corporate nature. Finally, private higher education receives no public 
funding in Mexico, making it “really private” (Levy 1986); the only ex-
ception, and it is very minor one, is the allocation of public research 
funding to private universities through a peer-review process. In this le-
gal and financial context of virtual deregulation, the private sector has 
found positive opportunities for escalation.  
It is noteworthy that the chief strategy document released by the Na-
tional Rectors’ Association in 2000 (ANUIES 2000) had virtually noth-
ing substantial to say about this phenomenon, except for acknowledging 
its growing rate of expansion in almost all states and underlining the fact 
that the great majority of private institutions were mainly teaching estab-
lishments (thus implicitly downgrading their academic importance). This 
important document makes only passing mention of the need for ac-
creditation and regulation of the private sector, and does not visualise 
the systemic impact that it was already having. The tacit message was 
that the pivotal portion of higher education is the public sector, whereas 
private institutions seemed destined to play a secondary role as accom-
paniment.  
In the latter part of the 1990s however, the undeniable reality of pri-
vate expansion brought policy makers to the realisation that a more 
elaborate policy was necessary for the private sector. In the past four 
years, the press has reported the growing concern of rectors and presi-
dents of established public and private universities over the rush by pri-
vate entrepreneurs to create new offerings for students not admitted to 
universities. Accusations of ‘educational fraud’ are persistent. Educa-
tional authorities are accused of corruption in licensing new private in-
stitutions and outcries are increasingly heard for the need to protect un-
wary consumers. 
In this context, federal policymakers in coalition with the national 
rectors’ association (ANUIES) and the independent federation of private 
universities (FIMPES) developed a proposal for a national accreditation 
system for all higher education institutions. This became formal policy, 
and the current federal administration (2000-2006) has made the Na-
tional Council for Higher Education Accreditation (COPAES) a central 
part of its policy (Aréchiga and Llarena 2003). The federal government 
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has tightened criteria for licensing institutions and has published the 
names of private establishments that have lost their licenses. Federal and 
state educational authorities initiated a nationally coordinated policy for 
licensing new programs and closing private establishments operating be-
low official standards. The federal agency for consumer protection pub-
lished a national report stating that only 74 private establishments (out 
of more than 1000) are actually university institutions, the rest being 
‘educational business out to defraud the incautious customer’. The inde-
pendent federation of private universities asserted in 2003 that 75% of 
all private establishments in Mexico are not accredited. Readers’ Digest 
in Mexico is publishing an annual ranking of universities and major 
newspapers are carrying out opinion surveys of public and private uni-
versities.
It is instructive to outline the initial reactions by higher education in-
stitutions to this growing government involvement. The following table 
provides a summary of responses by different types of private estab-
lishments to recent government decisions in the state of Puebla as of 
2004. From interviews at various types of private establishments, it was 
observed that each institutional type responds to emerging government 
regulation and accreditation in different ways, as presented in Figure 1 
(based on Peña 2004). 
Figure 1: Responses to Policy in the Private Sector by Institutional Type 
Institutional 
Type 
Response to Government Regulation, Accredi-
tation and Competition 
Universities Endogenous interest in quality control and assur-
ance: many universities have been externally ac-
credited for years, without urging by the govern-
ment. They are wary of government regulation, 
which is seen as directed to other private institu-
tions which ‘must be forced’ to increase quality. 
They are however very sensitive to government 
promotion of greater competition among elite uni-
versities, as when new such institutions are author-
ised.
Recently cre-
ated non-
universities 
Government regulations are perceived as trouble-
some meddling by external authorities in business 
as usual. 
Specialised in-
stitutes
Endogenous interest in program certification, ei-
ther nationally or abroad. 
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Institutional 
Type 
Response to Government Regulation, Accredi-
tation and Competition
Non-
universities un-
der consolida-
tion
Increasing acceptance of quality control and assur-
ance as necessary to gain acceptance as academi-
cally reputable institutions. 
Expanding 
Non-
universities 
Quality control and assurance are accepted only as 
external requirements, which are followed mini-
mally. Unfettered growth is their guiding belief. 
International 
corporations 
Responses are similar to universities, sharing an 
endogenous awareness of quality control and as-
surance.
Source: Peña 2004 
The policy measures and institutional responses reported here are in 
flux, as government officials embark on various policy experiments to 
regulate the private sector. At the same time, institutional behaviour by 
the various private sector establishments is changing both in response to 
market circumstances and to emerging policy programs. 
6. Conclusions 
It is obvious that markets and competitive forces are growing rapidly in 
Mexican higher education. It is more useful to point out that markets do 
not develop in the abstract because the courses they follow are the result 
of organisational responses both to demographic and economic forces 
and to decisions (or non-decisions) made by policy makers. This prem-
ise underlies our attempt in mapping the recent expansion of private 
higher education in Mexico, moving from the abstract category of mar-
ket forces in general to the actual emerging institutional trajectories. 
Several conclusions may be drawn. 
The first implication is that Ostrom’s institutional perspective offers 
fruitful avenues for the analysis of private higher education when mar-
kets and competition are taken into account as part of the institutional 
landscape. It follows from this assumption that the behaviour of private 
higher education organisations responds broader opportunities and con-
straints than those observed from the limited perspective of government 
policy.  
Nonetheless, the basic fact remains that the implicit rules set out by 
policy makers have had a significant effect on the development of the 
private sector. When the decision was made in the early 1990s to stress 
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quality improvement in public institutions without expanding enrol-
ments, it was implicitly assumed that enrolment expansion would be ab-
sorbed by the private sector. One important aspect of this decision was 
to distribute the social cost of enrolment expansion to families and stu-
dents. Although not an explicit policy of privatisation, this decision in 
effect set the stage for rapid private sector expansion. Today policy 
makers face unforeseen consequences of that decision. One is that rapid 
enrolment growth in private ‘demand absorbing’ establishments has 
provoked concern over their poor educational quality. The resulting 
paradox is that the actual effects of quality improvement and enrolment 
constraints in the public sector provoked diminished quality in the fast-
est growing part of the private sector. Another consequence has to do 
with the equity effects of assigning the role of enrolment expansion to 
the private sector: it is clear today that in spite of significant growth in 
higher education, Mexico lags significantly behind other OECD coun-
tries and even other developing countries in Latin America in matters of 
access and equity.  
A further conclusion has to do with understanding institutional het-
erogeneity in the private sector. It would seem logical that private estab-
lishments would consistently attempt to imitate prestigious institutional 
formats in the public sector (academic drift), and also simultaneously try 
to diversify their offerings or at the very least their public image from 
other similar establishments. This dialectic of imitation and diversifica-
tion often results in a muddle. Identifying real differences becomes dif-
ficult because heterogeneity may not always be equivalent to effective 
diversification. Institutions may look the same but may turn out to be of 
quite different quality. Establishments that are similar today may de-
velop along different pathways because of different entrepreneurial 
strategies or competences or as a result of varying responses to public 
policy. The ability to distinguish among different types of institutions is 
important for at least two reasons. One concerns the need of the con-
sumer – the student and his or her family – to understand these differ-
ences in order to make qualified investment choices. The other reason 
refers to the challenge facing policy makers in regulating quality, pro-
gram authorisation or licensing, and disseminating information about the 
private sector. 
This chapter identified various forms of institutional differentiation. 
Horizontal differentiation occurs when institutions actually become aca-
demically diverse in their offerings, their mode of delivery, and the qual-
ity of their services. Some institutions may diversify when they merge 
with others in different provinces or other countries. However, in a set-
ting of rapid and unregulated private sector expansion such as Mexico, 
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the search for institutional quality and educational diversity is just as of-
ten superseded by niche-making in already saturated markets. There is 
certainly a role here for policy in assisting students to understand these 
differences. 
Vertical differentiation arises when institutions move from offering 
exclusively undergraduate programs to masters and doctorates. The lat-
ter is certainly rare in the Mexican case because of the weak research 
capacity of private universities, but the master’s degree is rapidly be-
coming the new frontier in private higher education. An open question 
here is whether in the future the push for graduate education will provide 
an academically distinctive set of institutions in the private sector. 
This research is a confirmation of Dill and Sporn’s insight about tak-
ing the notion of a higher education industry seriously when attempting 
to understand the private sector. Depending on the policy framework, 
profit seeking, entrepreneurialism, and competition are forces that effec-
tively play a role. If the demographics are right and the constraints on 
social participation in public institutions are favourable, higher educa-
tion can be a big business. If the legal environment does not explicitly 
distinguish between for-profit and non-profit private establishments, 
profit making may become paramount. This may or may not be scandal-
ous to the ear of the educator, but it is real. Therefore taking the eco-
nomic perspective on private higher education may be useful for policy 
makers, especially considering three basic factors: the use of information 
(Dill and Soo 2004), the enforcement of contracts, and the creation of 
balanced incentives (Ray 1998). 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Expansion and Differentiation of the Public and Private 
Sectors in Mexican Higher Education 
Public Sector 
Year Universities Normal 
Schools
4 Year 
Technical 
Institutes   
2 year 
Technical 
Institutes 
Total Pub-
lic 
State Federal     
1990 529,026 173,643 77,550 171,089 0 976,463 
1995 550,414 176,775 118,452 232,162 4,919 1,115,100 
2000 609,922 175,740 120,573 313,361 36,359 1,313,532 
2003 677,686 183,171 91,047 379,194 56,796 1,461,160 
Private Sector 
Universities Normal 
Schools
Non-
University 
Institutions 
2 Year 
Technical 
Total
Private
National
Total: 
Public + 
Private
        
139,946 31,437 58,254 0 229,637  1,206,100 
198,272 41,584 98,452 1,592 339,900  1,455,000 
291,603 80,358 230,904 2,551 605,416  1,918,948 
366,710 58,863 300,678 2,831 729,082   2,190,242 
Source: Subsecretaría de Educación Superior e Investigación Científica, SEP
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The ‘Public’ Nature of Higher Education in 
Italy: What Place for Autonomy and Variety? 
GAETANO LUBERTO
1. Introduct ion 
The attribution of ‘publicness’ to higher education outputs is derived 
from mainstream economics. According to this perspective, the public 
nature of higher education depends on the characteristics of the outputs 
provided by the universities: research, teaching, scholarship, learning, 
service, transmission of values and culture, the disinterested search for 
truth, professional competence, promotion of social and economic de-
velopment, social mobility and equity, character building, and the devel-
opment of critical reason are among the main (but not exhaustive) re-
sponsibilities that different stakeholders assign to the universities in 
various degrees and with emphasis depending on their preferences and 
interests.
The analytical problem of evaluating the nature of each of these out-
puts is still more complex since the assumption is that many if not most 
higher education ‘goods’ may be related to each other.  
It is therefore understandable that we find great variety, diversity, 
and differentiation in higher education systems and institutions. We may 
ask whether such variety should be considered a ‘good’, even a ‘public 
good’, and whether it is connected with one of the fundamental peculiar-
ity of the university: autonomy (Felt 2002). 
After putting forth some theoretical considerations supporting the 
idea that there are strong correlations among variety, autonomy, and the 
public nature of higher education, I will examine the issue in the context 
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of the Italian university system reform process. The aim is to show how 
the weak university autonomy and the absence of any institutional vari-
ety in Italian higher education is the result of an historical pattern that 
fostered centralisation and uniformity. Centralisation and uniformity 
have been the ideological cement that have made the ‘public’ nature of 
the higher education ‘good’ coincide with the values and interests of na-
tional politicians and ministerial bureaucrats, academic oligarchies, and 
professional bodies. As long as this pattern is still active in the reform 
process and even able to restore old practices, it decreases the publicness 
of higher education dependent on a high level of institutional autonomy 
and system variety. 
2. A f i rmer foundat ion for  the publ ic  nature of  
 sc ience:  variety 
According to Callon (1994), science is not public because of excludabil-
ity and non-rivalry, but for the more fundamental reason that it is a 
source of variety. The variety of science is based on the continuous re-
configuration of local and heterogeneous networks which may or may 
not have reciprocal connections and links. It is the never-ending prolif-
eration of such networks that makes science resistant to the rigidities and 
irreversibility of private science (and of the economic forces that support 
it). It is also true that public science (based on variety and exploration) 
and private science (based on replication and exploitation) are not oppo-
site but complementary forces, each drawing on the other. Callon’s 
analysis is supported by anecdotal evidence showing how the usual net-
work size of peer reference groups, within which most scientists’ work 
is carried out, amounts to 150-200 people. These are usually deeply spe-
cialised clusters of disciplines and sub-disciplines competing against 
each other on the basis of often incompatible analyses and prescriptions 
but that can also be nested in wider fields of studies that allow for ex-
changes of models, methodologies, and theories. Additionally, the pos-
sibility of creating new fields or networks is a check on the natural ten-
dency of disciplines to ossify because of their unavoidable ‘blind spots’ 
(Lohmann, 2004). From the same socio-cognitive point of view, it can 
be shown that a relatively small network structure is more apt than other 
kinds of social structures to make effective scientists’ most scarce re-
source: attention (Klamer and Van Dalen 2002).  
It is legitimate to ask whether the proliferation of network and scien-
tific variety runs against some kind of prescriptive limit. Callon does not 
think so and in the last part of his work suggests that interventions 
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should always aim at assuring free association and participation to local 
networks, fostering an equal opportunity for all networks to expand, and 
fighting against irreversibility and convergence of predominant net-
works by “lending support to emergent collectives and encouraging their 
proliferation” (Callon 1994). Only in this way can one assure the ‘pub-
lic’ sufficient variety in knowledge production, otherwise threatened by 
the dynamics of real markets. Among the few supporting such a strong 
interventionist program is Fuller, who suggests that reversibility and 
fungibility should be priorities for funding science (Fuller 2000), point-
ing at Big Science as an example of social and epistemological rigidity.  
The extension of interdisciplinary and intra-disciplinary variety and 
differentiation is hotly debated in the scientific enterprise. Traditional 
academic science tends to grow on relatively stable disciplines, while 
post academic science (Ziman 2000) and “mode 2” science (Nowotny et 
al. 2003) would see disciplines as modules for more relevant trans-
disciplinary and problem-oriented intellectual adventures. Internal vari-
ety and differentiation depend of course, on the type of discipline. ‘Ur-
ban’ and ‘rural’, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ are social and intellectual dimensions 
that can impinge on the degree of proliferation of theories and method-
ologies (Becher and Trowler 2001). Analysing differences amongst sci-
entific fields, Whitley (2000) identifies seven ‘stable’ types of so-
cial/reputation structures: conceptually and technologically integrated 
bureaucracies, polycentric professions, partitioned bureaucracies, poly-
centric oligarchies, and professional and fragmented adhocracies. In the 
introduction to the second edition of his book, Whitley states that the 
greater relevance of Mode 2 science as well as the growth of “explana-
tory instrumental sciences,” as he suggests redefining disciplines in-
cluded the Pasteur’s quadrant (Stokes, 1997), based on both theoretical 
understanding and practical use, did not seem to cause “a convergence 
in prevalent patterns of intellectual and social organisation across the 
science, ….as variation in the structure of scientific fields remains sig-
nificant” (Whitley 2000, pp. xxi-xxii). 
Whitley’s remark is congruent with the emerging compound of 
knowledge regimes coupled in various forms to actors’ interests and al-
liances which bring about “different effects within different disciplines, 
with different fields of knowledge and within different states” (Bleiklie 
and Byrkjeflot 2002, p. 530).  
Rip reinforces Callon’s argument since, in his words  
“emphasising heterogeneity, rather than reducing can be seen as a hedging 
strategy… (since) …the links between science and society…..counteract a too 
rapid lock-in into a protected regime of strategic science….(besides)…under 
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conditions of uncertainty, it is only prudent to maintain variety… Heterogene-
ity is valuable in its own right.” (2000, p. 34) 
Heterogeneity is valuable because it counterbalances the natural ten-
dency of normal and laboratory science to simplify the world to make it 
conform to strict methodological concerns or short-term control aims.  
3.  Taking ser iously the complexity of  
 knowledge development  process in   
 h igher  educat ion 
In higher education we find different types of scholarship (Boyer 1990; 
Braxton et al. 2002; Huber 2001): the scholarship of discovery, the 
scholarship of integration, the scholarship of teaching (and learning), 
and the scholarship of application (or engagement).  
The scholarship of discovery is the activity leading to new and 
original propositions, models, theories, and visions about the natural and 
the social world. Its main product is the excellent research that puts the 
academic on the frontline of his or her discipline. Creation of original 
knowledge, priorities rules, and high-citations statistics are very impor-
tant issues in this context. The scholarship of integration arises from the 
attempt to counterbalance the fact that the excellent research is usually 
pursued within strict disciplinary specialisations and paradigms. The 
former is therefore based on an interdisciplinary or thematic agenda 
aimed at fostering the awareness of both common grounds and real dif-
ferences among diverging research theories or traditions. The elabora-
tion of existing knowledge is the main purpose of the scholarship of in-
tegration: its products can range from the enlightening critical review of 
one or more related subjects to the basic textbook for undergraduate 
studies. The scholarship of application and engagement is developed 
through service and consulting activities, and reflection on the results of 
both. It is obvious that application and diffusion of knowledge is ac-
complished especially by those academics pursuing this kind of scholar-
ship. The scholarship of teaching focuses on the study of the specific 
transmission of knowledge in academic settings having as its own objec-
tive the effectiveness of students’ learning. The scholarship of teaching 
and learning must be distinguished by the activity of teaching: a distinct 
and formal role of faculty work consisting of the transmission of knowl-
edge to well-defined subjects.  
There is of course, overlap among and between the four different 
types of scholarships and the formal activity of teaching. For instance, 
THE ‘PUBLIC’ NATURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN ITALY
499
students can learn from both transmission and application (internships, 
field and service work, etc.) at the same time. Effective teaching materi-
als can be prepared in most cases, only if supported by complementary 
competences in the scholarship of integration and scholarship of teach-
ing and learning. Action and clinical research cannot be understood 
without positing a vast overlap between the scholarship of application 
and that of discovery and/or integration. In Mode 2 science, the context 
of application is of utmost relevance for new discoveries. Each of these 
scholarships has some relevant connections with the teaching activity. 
In light of this complexity, the positive and reciprocal externalities 
between teaching and research cannot be easily specified (Hughes 
2004). Indeed, it is not surprising that statistical studies generally have 
found a null correlation between them (Marsh and Hattie 2002). As a 
deduction of the more fine grained approach I am proposing here, it 
should probably be recognised that the variety and diversification of 
academic competences and skills is one of the most neglected conditions 
for viability and growth of higher education. 
A task environment characterised by high horizontal (disciplinary) 
and vertical complexity (across the different phases of knowledge crea-
tion, integration, transmission, application, and diffusion) requires spe-
cialised professional roles. For instance it is well known that, from an 
organisational point of view “research…requires specialisation and 
flexibility to follow new developments,  (teaching) requires synthesis 
and more stable structures” (Enders 2001, p. 16).  
How to manage interdependencies among the phases of the knowl-
edge process development without falling back in the simplistic and un-
realistic pretension that all the different aspects of scholarship, research, 
and teaching be included with the same weight and proportion in each 
and every academic role? As a matter of fact, a high number of impor-
tant universities in Europe as well as the United States employ only-
teaching and only-research personnel.  So, it might be more effective 
and practical to envisage that the integration of the different components 
of the knowledge process be the fundamental mission of university bod-
ies and institutions. In this way, university status, interpreted as mainly 
derivative of homogeneous academic roles, can become a collective 
propriety of the academic institution. It is the institutions that should 
carry the main responsibility to find the most appropriate balance among 
different kinds of scholarship and different levels/segments of teaching. 
According to this perspective, the presence within the universities of 
academic roles differently combining teaching and scholarship tasks is 
fully intelligible and does not require ad hoc justifications, becoming, on 
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the contrary, one of the fundamental sources of institutional variety and 
distinction. 
The empirical scanning of higher education systems shows that be-
hind the rhetorical stance this situation is almost the norm (Felt 2002; 
Nybom 2003; Schimank and Winnes 2000). In England, only research 
position amount to more 30% while only teaching positions are almost 
10% of all positions (Hesa figures for 2000-01). In some U.S research 
universities (e.g., the University of California campuses) tenure track for 
only-teaching positions are included in the academic personnel structure 
(University of California 2002).  To these positions can also be shifted, 
with their consensus, people from professorial roles. In most Scandina-
vian countries only teaching tenured lecture positions are quite common. 
In Germany, professors of Universities of Applied Sciences are required 
to spend most of their working time in teaching and professional activi-
ties. Even in more centralised higher education systems such as France 
and Italy the apparently rigid structure of academic roles covers a more 
differentiated situation. In France, research shows how differentiated in 
practice the academic role can be on the bases of the discipline, the insti-
tution, and the personal life project (Becquet and Musselin 2004); be-
sides, it is useful to remind how in French universities many courses at 
the first level are taught by permanently detached secondary teachers; 
the need to face a complex reality has also brought the government to 
inquire about possible solutions usefully exploiting such variety (Espéret 
2001). In Italy, along with permanent academic staff, universities are al-
lowed to utilise temporary contract personnel with only teaching duties. 
In the academic year 2002-2003, the number of such personnel, respon-
sible for at least one curricular teaching module but not including lan-
guage instructors, was 22.195 against the 55.470 population of the per-
manent academic staff.  
The activity of teaching distinguishes universities from research in-
stitutes and organisations. In this way they remain faithful to their his-
torical Middle Age origins, though in order to draw a boundary with re-
gard to other teaching institutions, university teaching must be fertilised 
with some kind of scholarship, not necessarily at the individual level but 
at a collective level (Fuller 2003; Lay 2004; Verger 1992). 
The specificity of the universities and higher education institutions 
as social vehicles of the knowledge development process does not come 
from the fact that they are repositories only of the explorative phase in 
basic, pure, or curiosity driven research; but from the fact that their le-
gitimate mission is also related to the exploitation and retention of 
knowledge (through transmission, diffusion, and application).  Each and 
every university cannot avoid managing in its own singular way this 
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trade-off by arranging appropriate intra-ecological evolution processes 
and dynamically situating itself within the co-evolutionary process that 
connects science, technology, and society (Rip 2002). The constantly ac-
tive dynamics of apparently contradictory phenomena such as ‘academic 
drift’ or ‘vocational drift’ in higher education institutions reveals the dif-
ficulty to find a stable equilibrium point in managing the trade-off be-
tween different types of scholarships and teaching. On the other hand, 
the plurality of equilibria chosen by different institutions in pursuing 
their peculiar knowledge configurations might turn out to be the best ad-
aptation to the changing social contract between the higher education 
system and society (Martin 2003). 
4. Some f igures on the inst itut ional  and system 
 performance of  I tal ian higher  education 
Statistical comparison with OECD countries and the 15 European 
Community countries before the enlargement are revealing at this point 
(OECD 2002). While the Italian GNP per capita is a little higher than 
that of OECD countries and the 15  European community countries be-
fore enlargement, higher education expenses are only 0,9% of GNP 
against the 1,3% of OECD countries and 1,2% of the15 European coun-
tries. Much of the gap comes from the lack of investment of the private 
sector but public funds for HE not only compensate but are even lower 
than both averages. Consequently, the yearly expense per tertiary stu-
dent is also quite lower (7.550 equal purchasing power dollars against, 
9.210 and 9.700 dollars respectively). Funds for scholarship are by far 
less than in most of these countries; likewise, the percentage of beds in 
university residence in 2001 was only 1.7% of the overall number of 
students (one third concentrated in three universities!), while in the 
comparable European nations (expect for Spain and Portugal), the same 
percentage ranges from 7% to 20%. 
Structural reasons and lack of funding have taken a toll on the per-
formance of the higher education system. In 2001, the percentage of 24-
64 year old Italians holding a tertiary degree was 10% (mostly four year 
degrees) against the 23% of OECD countries. The traditional neglect of 
the short-cycle degree explains only in part such a situation since the 
percentage of long-cycle undergraduate degrees in OECD is still higher 
(15% of the same population).  
The fundamental problem however, is not a lack of participation in 
higher education (the enrolling rate of 19 years old in fact has jumped 
from 7% in 1960 to 62% in 2003, thanks also to the new 3+2 degree im-
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plemented since the year 2000-2001): the problem lies in the inability of 
the university system to adapt to the passage from an élite to a mass sys-
tem. Guido Martinotti, the main consultant of the last government com-
mission that planned the implementation of the Bologna declaration in 
Italy, has calculated that between 1960 and 2000 of the 9.187.154 
youngsters that to access university studies in Italy, only 2.933.307 
(31,93%) obtained a degree, often with a long delay over the planned 
four-five years nominal length (the success rate has increased only in re-
cent years when it topped 42%, but the average length of the course 
study is still around 7 years for most types of degrees).  Lack of differ-
entiation is one of the reasons for this low performance: for instance, 
more than half of the students are not full time, but the introduction of 
part-time has not brought about significant changes in teaching methods 
and arrangements (apart from the possibility to officially extend the 
length of study and be more or less unofficially, exempted from course 
attendance).
One of the main consequences of the incapacity to effectively man-
age the passage to mass higher education is on equity. Although fees and 
tuitions have been quite low in the past, and although most universities 
have followed open access policies, the percentage of students from 
lower economic conditions participating in higher education is stably 
low. Economic and sociology studies consistently highlight that formal 
equality in provision of higher education services does not foster social 
class mobility (Checchi et al. 1999; Schizzerotto 2002), but confirms 
traditional patterns that make higher education a welfare benefit for 
middle and high classes. 
The lacking performance of Italian universities as a learning site for 
the would-be students also has a negative impact on its external attrac-
tiveness. International students are just 1% of the student population 
while the same average in the other European countries is above 6%; 
similarly in Erasmus student mobility, Italy has shown a significant 
prevalence of outgoing over incoming students (in 2002-2003 the fig-
ures were 15.225 and 10.982 respectively). Foreign doctoral students in 
Italy are only 2% of the relative population, while the percentage in 
other comparable European countries goes from 6% in Portugal to 35% 
in the United Kingdom. 
The percentage of researchers by each 1000 workers in Italy is 2,8% 
(one of the lowest in Europe where the average percentage is 5,4%), 
while investment in research amounts to 1.07% of GNP vs. the 1.9% 
European average (European Commission, Key Figures, 2003). While 
most of the difference is due to poor private investments in R&D, public 
investments do not compensate and are still lower than the OECD aver-
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age. The last comparative inquiry (King 2004) indicates that the ‘quanti-
tative’ productivity of the system is satisfactory in areas such physics, 
mathematics, and engineering; while it lags in biological, health, and 
environment sciences where the traditional organisation of academic 
work has the most negative impact (Whitley 2003). However, it is at the 
institutional level that Italian universities show lagging research per-
formance. In all the international comparative benchmark exercises 
(Center for Science and Technology Studies 2004; Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University-Institute of Higher Education 2004; The Times Higher Edu-
cation Supplement 2004), Italian universities are situated in backward 
positions.
What seems to be lost is the potential for doing much better: as a 
matter of fact, intellectual brain drain is one of the highest in Europe. 
The percentage of graduates living outside Italy in 1999 (2.3%) was 
seven times higher the percentages of foreign graduates living in Italy 
(0,3), while in France, Germany, and England the latter figure is always 
higher than the former and in Spain the difference between the two is 
quite small (Becker et al. 2003). 
In coherence with this scenario, the Italian research system also lags 
behind on the side of commercialising knowledge. In fact, the number of 
patents presented at the European Patent Office, per million population 
is less than half that of the before enlargement 15 European Community 
countries (67 vs. 154) (European Community Commission, Science, 
Technology, and Innovation, Key Figures 2002). 
5. Governance and management  of  I ta l ian 
 h igher  educat ion:  the weight of  academic 
 work organisat ion 
In the European context, the Italian higher education system is marked 
by some peculiar characteristics derived from its distant and recent past 
(Clark 1977; Giglioli 1979; Moscati 1997; Rugiu 1991).  Clark’s thesis, 
substantially confirmed by the later studies, is that until the 1970s higher 
education in Italy may be seen as a system “strewn with barriers to com-
petition: a monopoly controlled by an oligarchy through a bureauc-
racy”(Clark 1977). The absolute discretion of the chair holder in the 
monocratic institute remained opaque and devoid of any responsibility 
check for a long time. In this scenario, the formally legitimated centrali-
sation of curricula, disciplines, administration, resource allocation, and 
recruitment procedures  
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“means that neither market mechanism nor administered standards….are 
strongly operative … (because of)..the oligarchic particularism..(that).. has tri-
umphed over both bureaucratic universalism…. and market competitive 
forces.” (Clark 1977) 
The absence of any countervailing power in or outside the universities 
made it easy for chair holders to control higher university posts. This 
control was not targeted to strengthen the university as an institution 
since the interaction between single institutes, ministerial bureaucrats, 
and politicians was often managed individually by the chair holder. In 
this vein, Giglioli (1979) defines the Italian academic work organisation 
as a bureaucratic (for its utmost reliance on state rules and regulations) 
and patrimonial (for the quasi-private use of public resources by chair 
holders) system. Additionally, in the Italian case professional standards 
were also judged by Clark to be very weak; self-policing against patron-
age, favouritism, and opportunism as well as full support for academic 
quality work were hindered by the absence of universal professional as-
sociation, independent journals, and other institutions of modern profes-
sions in dynamic capitalistic societies. Italian academic guilds were dif-
ferent from modern and contemporary professions where competition 
for income, assets, status, and reputations is very high since patronage 
depends on trust 
“elicited collectively by requiring all practitioners systematically to submit to 
the critical appraisal of their peers. The result is an occupational subculture 
that tends to be acutely status conscious, but which also tolerates greater can-
dor and higher levels of criticism and conflict than would be thought accept-
able in most human communities.” (Haskell 1997, p. 5) 
 Applying Whitley’s (2000) typology, the social and organisational 
structure of the Italian academic system emerges as an oligarchic/bu-
reaucratic hybrid. Substantial lack of open competition through debate, 
controversy, and open theoretical conflict lead us to categorise it as par-
titioned bureaucracy. The informality of coordination and control 
mechanisms within the insulated and separated national and local aca-
demic schools puts the system in the oligarchic sphere. The combined 
result is an arena of status integrated partitioned oligarchies, whose main 
objective is to preserve acquired status and asymmetrical relationships in 
and outside universities: in this arena the knowledge development proc-
ess too often becomes a zero-sum game for positional goods, unless ex-
ogenous forces break the self supporting equilibria. 
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Organisation of academic research by single institutes has been criti-
cised for a long time (Ben-David 1991; Consolatio 1961; Herbst 2004), 
but only in Italy has  
“the fusion of academic oligarchy and state bureaucracy... (been)…an ideal 
system for suppressing competition….for individual talent, institutional status 
based on talent, (and)...among operating units.” (Clark 1977, p. 125) 
The diffusion of the departmental structure promoted by the 1980 reform 
law has not significantly changed the situation. Departments have substi-
tuted the old institutes in most universities, but this has meant no rupture 
at all.  Departments have taken administrative roles while research is co-
ordinated in sectional subgroups, and the most important decisions are 
still made in restricted Faculty Councils (Pitzalis 2002) although some 
universities have used the statutory autonomy to extend full decision and 
active elective rights to all tenured researchers. 
Both Clark and Krause notice moreover, that the typical Italian chair 
holder was not only strictly intertwined with central bureaucracy, but 
also had strong relations with the professional, social, and political 
world. Many academics are parliamentary representatives; others play 
important roles in cultural and media institutions, in political parties, and 
in government. But the high presence of top academics in Italian society 
and institutions has never helped legitimise the requests of sufficient re-
sources for higher education or contributed to consolidate the status of 
universities as collective instruments to pursue research and learning be-
yond their more routine and symbolic function of credential providers. 
The present Italian higher education regime is the result of choices 
made after the unification of Italy accomplished by the Piedmontese 
reign in 1861 (Capano 1998, 1999; De Vivo and Genovesi 1986; Rugiu 
1991) towards a very strong centralisation of decision-making power on 
academic, statutory, and administrative matters. Autonomy was further 
reduced by the choice to follow the French model in the recruitment of 
professors, reserving it to a central commission of the faculty corpora-
tion appointed by the ministry (who could also directly nominate some 
professor as in the German case). Institutional autonomy was therefore 
extremely low and limited to operational and ceremonial aspects. 
Consequently, each university was given the same status (Capano 
1998). It is on this base that il valore legale del titolo di studio (the legal 
value of the university degree) has begun to be used as an argument to 
justify this situation and neglect any other possible alternative. Central-
ised disciplines and subject formal uniformity was justified as the only 
way to assure that the same degree or title conferred by any university 
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had the same value. Indeed, the delay in introducing doctoral degrees 
(established only in the 1980s), vocational sub-honour degrees and post- 
graduate specialisation degrees (allowed by the 1990s reforms), is well 
explained by the difficulty to reinterpret the concept of the ‘legal value’ 
of the study title for the new qualifications. Since the only legally de-
fined ‘doctor’ was the holder of the four or five year bachelor degree, it 
was particularly difficult to legally rearrange content and uses of the 
new degrees. As a natural consequence, while the vocational ‘university’ 
diplomas introduced by law n° 341 in 1990 substantially failed because 
they were not seen as valuable university degrees, the doctoral degree 
has taken the almost exclusive role to channel graduates towards a re-
search career in academic and similar settings.  
The centralisation of academic personnel recruitment was and still is 
justified by the need to maintain the legal value of university degrees, 
although the argument does not stand up on a comparative evaluation 
since such centralisation is also conspicuously absent in those continen-
tal European higher education systems where we find a structure of na-
tional university degrees.  
The fascist regime stressed this side of centralisation even more, im-
posing on the professors an oath of allegiance that was refused by only 
12 of 1225 chair holders. In the following years, relations between the 
fascist regime and the university became tighter and collaborative in 
many cases, while the surface of serious opposition had to wait for dis-
asters brought about by World War II (Maiocchi, 2004). In the postwar 
period, centralisation of appointment remained, even though it was at 
times coupled by legislative initiatives turned to stabilise in the role, 
through non competitive qualification procedures, the categories of con-
tractual teachers and researchers entered in the new emerging mass uni-
versity system, but difficult to manage according to the rigid and slow 
recruitment system of the elitist university. By this time, however, cen-
tralised practices was responding more to the needs and interests of an 
academic corporation balkanised along, particularistic, ideological and 
political lines, than to an unitary vision of the state mission (Brierley 
1999; Clark 1977; Clark 1983; Krause 1996; Rugiu 1991).  
6. A few steps towards autonomy and variety…  
A big change was implemented with the 1993 financial law which intro-
duced a lump-sum model of funding to universities. In partial exchange 
for financial cuts, a substantial administrative and spending autonomy 
was granted to universities. Funding was concentrated on a lump-sum 
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budget (the Fund for Ordinary Functioning of the university – FFO – in-
cluding everything but central competitive research and infrastructure 
building money). As a consequence, a professor transferring to another 
university could no longer bring his salary and research money to the 
new place, so the patrimonial system, previously prospering inside the 
state bureaucracy, received an almost fatal blow. Additionally, since the 
funds going to each university were based for the largest quota on past 
expenses, while a small but growing quota (9% in 2004) was linked to 
redistributive algorithms (to compensate under-funded universities) and 
incentive formulae (to improve teaching efficiency), room for pork-and-
barrel manoeuvring was strongly reduced. 
In 1998, a new law was approved which allowed a partial decentrali-
sation of recruiting procedures, giving more voice to each university. 
The law was a compromise between those who aspired to give the uni-
versity the right to choose their own academic staff and those who were 
faithful to centralisation. The evaluation commission is made up of four 
professors elected by the disciplinary national community and one cho-
sen by the university; the university has the right to ‘call’ or not the one 
of the two candidates qualified by the commissions (in 2006 the possi-
bility to qualify two candidates for each place was cancelled). 
As a consequence of the new law, the number of full professor in-
creased by almost 40% (from about 13.000 in 1999 to more than 18.000 
in 2004) while the number of the other academic categories remained 
stable (about 18.000 associate professors and 21.000 researchers). 
Meanwhile, even though many researchers have been promoted to asso-
ciate professors, the overall number of tenured academics has also in-
creased from the about 50.000 in 1999 to little more than 57.000 in 
2004.
The pressure of the Bologna Declaration has been the other funda-
mental exogenous variable on the change process. As if they had sud-
denly discovered the gaps in comparison with the more articulated sys-
tems of the other European countries, policy makers entered a frenzied 
period of reforms. In particular, the 3+2 course structure (three-year lau-
rea + two-year specialist laurea) along with the credit system was rap-
idly approved much sooner than in most other countries. In coherence 
with the tradition of centralised policies, the curricular structure was im-
posed on all universities, beginning in the academic year 2000-2001 
(with the known exceptions in medicine, architecture, and engineering). 
Two thirds of the subjects were bounded to the national table, while dis-
cretion was allowed for the remaining one third. A recent Ministerial 
Decree (270/2004) increased the discretion for universities up to 50% of 
the overall first-level degree 180 credit and up to the 60% of the second-
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level 120 credit degree, though not for professional degrees such as Law 
for which university discretion has been strongly curtailed. 
The process of implementation has produced strong resistance from 
traditional academicians and intellectuals (on both sides of the political 
spectrum), especially in some areas (humanities, law). The fear is of 
quality deterioration and fragmentation because of the new modular 
structure (Vaira 2003; Woolf 2003). But a much more powerful opposi-
tion has come from professional bodies which are afraid of the ‘inva-
sion’ of the shorter degree graduates. The Minister, sensible to the po-
tential vote of these large influential categories, issued a new decree ‘re-
forming the reform’ at the end of 2004. In place of the 3 year (180 cred-
its) + 2 year (120 credits) structure the Ministerial Decree from the 
2005-2006 academic year activated, a ‘Y’ structure i.e., 1+2+2 model. 
According to this model, after a first common year (60 credits) in the 
various disciplinary areas, students will have to choose either the ‘pro-
fessional’ pattern (other two years) leading to the first level degree or the 
‘theoretical/methodological’ degree which allows the student to enter, 
after attaining the first degree, the second level (whose final title has 
been renamed laurea magistralis).  
Under this provision, Italian universities will continue to enjoy a 
monopolistic position in tertiary education, since the option to create a 
tertiary non-university sector through complex public-private consortia 
co-financed by the European Community has a very limited scope 
(about 5000 students in almost 400 courses, according to the last minis-
terial inquiry).  
The choice of the Minister partially contradicts the initial program-
matic intention of the centre-right government to cancel the rapid im-
plementation of the Bologna reform accomplished by the centre-left 
government ousted in 2001. An important, if not the most important rea-
son for the detour, was that the reform has undeniably begun to give its 
first positive results. In the three years after the introduction of new 
shorter degrees (2001-2003),  student enrolment has  increased 19,6%, 
while the percentage of nineteen years old youngsters over the total 
number of  the same age youngsters went from 46.7% to 59,7%; it has 
also  increased the percentages from 16% to 21% for over 22 year old 
students (CNVSU – National Committee of Evaluation on the Univer-
sity System 2004). An even more remarkable improvement is the num-
ber of graduates which increased 57% from 1999 to 2003. Consequently, 
the percentage of fuori corso (students graduating after the regular num-
ber of study years) is finally decreasing.  
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7. …and many steps backwards ( through 
 recentra l isat ion of  accountabi l i ty pract ices 
 and faculty recruitment)  
During the 1990s, Italian Universities received substantial forms of 
autonomy in statutory and financial matters as well as in teaching and 
recruiting policies. This autonomy was however, limited by policy-
makers’ unwillingness to face and solve fundamental structural nodes 
such as the valore legale del titolo di studio, preserving total uniformity 
in a world of increasing pressures towards variety and autonomy. 
While there are those who (even from their minority position) 
strongly criticise the totemic nature taken by the valore legale of univer-
sity degree titles and its deleterious effect on the performance of the 
higher education system (Perotti 2002), many still defend it as preven-
tive assurance against the loss of reputation that a single course or uni-
versity could face in a more competitive environment. 
The 2001 government change has allowed the political, bureaucratic, 
and academic forces opposed to autonomy and variety (but perfectly 
aligned to the Italian higher education tradition based on high uniformity 
and centralisation) to return and try to reverse the evolution of the past 
decade. Such an alliance (in part transversal to the political spectre) 
could not do much in opposing the Bologna reform since the perform-
ance of Italian higher education as a ‘mass system’ was too low and the 
external pressure of the Bologna reforms was clearly the only way to 
improve the situation of a static self-referential system devoid of any 
real incentive change. 
But on other issues, the attempt to return to the past has begun and is 
still under way.  
Apparently, the introduction in 2004 of formula-based performance 
budgeting is a step toward autonomy and output coordination allowing 
for autonomy on input and means choices (after 10 years of funding 
based on historical figures adjusted to correct the greater disparities 
among public outlays of similarly sized universities). More output re-
sponsibility for universities would mean more autonomy for the univer-
sities, but also more constraints for government to build a stable frame-
work within which universities could develop their strategies more ef-
fectively. 
 An ambitious and costly RAE type initiative was also launched in 
2004 to evaluate the excellence of research in all university research ar-
eas. This evaluation however, finished by the end of 2005 and repeated 
on a three-year cycle, has no planned relation with the performance 
budgeting initiative so one wonders whether it is intended to increase 
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accountability of higher education institutions or discretionary choices 
of the political principal. 
The creation of two different central advisory organisms, one for the 
evaluation of the overall university system – CNVSU and another to 
evaluate research (CIVR) is probably not only the legacy of a passion 
for redundant administrative structures, but it may be another sign of the 
will to have the possibility to choose the experts’ opinion most conven-
ient for political interests from time to time. This suspicion is strength-
ened by the dependent nature of the CIVR. Contrary to the English case, 
the CIVR is a dependent advisory structure of the Ministry directed by a 
Committee appointed at the discretion of the Minister. Furthermore the 
National Evaluation Committees on the University system (CNVSU) is 
under the strict political control of the Ministry and devoid of any au-
thority over resource distribution. Such political dependence has been 
significantly revealed in the granting of legal university status to a small 
private Southern institution with no accreditation, no experience, no sta-
ble teacher bodies or operational funds; but entitled to a well connected 
centre-right local politician. Not even the strong denouncement of the 
Rectors Conference convinced the Minister and ‘her’ committee to re-
cede.
The inclination of political masters (government and parliament) to 
centralise the decision-making power of the higher education govern-
ance structure and intervene in an opportunistic way has been confirmed 
in many other occasions.  
Resources outside the formally predefined and transparent criteria of 
fund allocation have been attributed to faculties and universities with po-
litical and administrative clouts (indeed, by April of 2005 there was no 
official notice of the total funds assigned to each university for the 2004 
fiscal year!).  
At the beginning of 2005, universities were asked through a Ministe-
rial Decree to elaborate within the following two months a three-year 
plan concerning the recruitment of teaching and non- teaching staff. Be-
fore authorising the recruitment process, the Ministerial bureaucracy 
will evaluate each plan on criteria that have not so far been communi-
cated in the ordinance or in any other document. There was no indica-
tion about the likely financial resources available to the universities for 
the planning exercise. 
New initiatives (from the new, and costly, Italian Institute of Tech-
nology of Genoa to the proposed change of academic personnel recruit-
ment and juridical status) have been launched without any preliminary 
comparative research or serious consultation with the main stakeholders. 
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Additionally, the Italian Minister was the only one (along with the 
Greek colleague) to initially oppose the establishment of a European Re-
search Council which would subtract decision making powers from na-
tional bureaucracy and academic corporations. 
It is particularly the law project to change the juridical status and re-
cruitment process of the university teaching and research staff that 
clearly shows how the new alliance between parts of the political, bu-
reaucratic, and academic worlds is trying to push back the forces of 
autonomy and variety that were beginning to prevail in the past decade. 
In fact, the primary purpose of the law project is to recentralise the most 
important choice a university can make to differentiate itself from other 
institutions: the definition of professional competences required to those 
who will be responsible for carrying out university institutional missions 
and the possibility to choose the personnel most suited to the specific 
combination of such missions that in practice, notwithstanding any un-
realistic rhetoric, singles out each higher education institution.  
The centralisation of recruitment procedure accomplished by closed 
number qualifications granted by national faculty commissions (whose 
appointment criteria are left to the discretion of the ministry) should 
guarantee the selection of candidates based on criteria of ‘cosmopolitan’ 
research excellence, but it is not clear at all how national commissions 
will be able to avoid the political negotiation and compromises of the 
past. Certainly, they will be responsible for the most important person-
nel choices, but they will not be responsible for the consequences of 
their choices on the universities. National commissions will be isolated 
from the contextual and specific needs of the universities; universities 
will lose the possibility to use academic personnel as leverage for their 
distinctive competence and missions. For instance, an Economics Fac-
ulty will be much less able to pick a Law teacher interested in the inter-
disciplinary discourse between law and economics, while for a Law 
Faculty it will be more difficult to avoid mathematically oriented 
economists disdaining the less formal institutional approaches. Centrali-
sation occurs because universities are not trusted in their capacity to 
choose their own academic personnel inputs, but there are few signs that 
national commissions can be trusted to make the best choices for the 
system and for the involved university either.  
It is interesting to note that centralised recruitment is almost absent 
in higher education systems of Western industrialised countries in full 
accordance with one of the distinctive aspect of medieval universities. 
The only exceptions are France and Spain. But even in French universi-
ties, competitions for tenured academic roles are local among candidates 
inserted yearly in open-ended national qualification lists (except for pro-
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fessors belonging to disciplines such as Law, Economics, and Manage-
ment, particularly sensitive in a state-oriented culture). In Spain, the 
former centre-right introduced a centralist law which was strongly con-
tested by universities and is now under revision by the new socialist 
government (CRUE – Spanish Conference of University Rectors 2004). 
The 2002 Spanish law and the new Italian law project aim to obtain 
a homogenous professorial class through centralistic cooptation operated 
by national faculty guilds. In both cases universities are allowed to in-
crease (up to 50% of the total) the percentage of fixed-term contractual 
teachers and researchers easily replaceable since they have no formal 
‘internal labour market’ rights, not even a ‘tenure track’ perspective. 
This evolution appears in sharp contrast to the introduction of the ‘Jun-
ior Professor’ in German universities, mainly motivated by the need to 
assure full autonomy of teaching and research to young beginning aca-
demicians (Federal Ministry of Education and Research 2005).  
If the Italian law project is approved a very large casualised teaching 
and research work force probably will be used for vocational courses 
and as a reservoir for academic careers under the strict control of full 
professors. Teaching will therefore continue to be considered a subsidi-
ary, demeaning endeavour unable to find the stability and status needed 
to accumulate relevant knowledge and develop effective practices. 
 In absence of any formal or informal mobility rules for Ph.D. stu-
dents and researchers, the risk is high that young non-tenured research-
ers will be maintained in a status of substantial ‘fief’ dependency, foster-
ing a level of conformity not particularly congruent with contemporary 
hypercompetitive international research. The likely result will be ‘the 
worst of all possible worlds’ for autonomy and variety in academic work 
at the beginning of a career: top-down pressures to homogeneity from 
national guilds and analogous bottom pressures from local oligarchies.  
In addition, there are evident signs of a return to a bureaucratic and 
patrimonial vision of the university personnel structure. The same law 
project removes any impediments for professors to engage in profes-
sional and commercial activities external to universities (the only duty 
being to annually spend 350 hours for university work at the university 
of which 120 should be delivered as official classes compared to the pre-
sent 60 hours). The bureaucratic-patrimonial trend is further confirmed 
by the new code of patent rights that the Government is trying to ap-
prove in a separate bill. If this bill is approved, Italy will be one of the 
very few industrialised countries to exclude universities from the patent-
ing rights of inventions and innovations carried out by its academic per-
sonnel (Dragotti 2004)! 
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8. Conclusions 
Reforms enacted in Italian higher education during the past 15 years 
gave some autonomy to universities in governance, financial, curricular, 
and personnel matters in order to improve a very low institutional and 
system performance. However, the unsolved tension and contradictions 
inside the reform process as well as the reactions of those opposed for 
different reasons (Luzzatto and Moscati 2005), have caused new politi-
cal interventions in the direction of even lesser formally differentiated 
scenarios and towards recentralisation.  
State and disciplinary centralisation, reinforced through alliances 
with professional bodies and faculty recruitment at the national level, 
thwart teaching and research innovations; evaluation systems are going 
to be based on performance-based indicators but at the same time, a reli-
ance on discretionary bureaucratic means of control is increasing. Also, 
governance reforms for universities are being studied which reduce the 
previously awarded governance and statutory discretionary power (we 
did not deal with this issue here, since public debate has just begun). A 
particular aspect of the Italian situation is the rhetorical use of the valore
legale del titolo di studio (legal value of the degree) to justify full-range 
standardisation of university inputs and outputs. 
Under this perspective, no contradiction should be expected between 
some features of ‘academic capitalism’ (casualisation of lower teaching 
and research roles, polarisation of academic workforce, elimination of 
boundaries between professional interests and university missions) and 
the traditional Italian bureaucratic/oligarchic academic governance (state 
interference, bureaucratic controls, weakened institutional autonomy). 
On the contrary, the appeal to the public nature of higher education is 
useful to conceal the patrimonial private-like running of higher educa-
tion institutions both at micro and macro level.  
If universities are downgraded to mere means of political, bureau-
cratic, and academic groups coalesced at the national levels with hierar-
chical connections to the local level, many of the essential conditions al-
lowing universities to function as vital knowledge vehicles (autonomy 
and variety) tend to be lost.  In addition, the identification of the ‘public’ 
dimension with the national state overlooks the fact that international ar-
rangements, non-profit institutions, and community governance may 
produce more and better public or ‘associative’ goods than a centralised 
national system (Marginson 2004). This is particularly evident in the 
case of the Italian higher education system where alliances among po-
litical, academic, bureaucratic, and professional groups are trying to 
counteract the forces of variety, diversity, and autonomy that would up-
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set lots of status positions and socio-economic rents enjoyed in virtue of 
a monopolistic power reinforced by its ‘public’ nature. In a more signifi-
cant way, the ‘conservative’ groups are well aware that more autonomy 
and variety would endanger their standardised view of academic work as 
well their uniform and limited ideology of what a university should be. 
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